FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115039.  September 22, 1998]

BARTOLO SERAPION, AGUSTINA ESPIRITU, ROSA HERMOGENES, BASILISA TRAZONA, DANIEL SANGALANG, GERARDO PRINCIPE, PRIMITIVA MONTARAY, and FELICIDAD TRAZONA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGDALENA BATIMANA ALBERTO assisted by her husband BUENAVENTURA ALBERTO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioners  assail the decision of the  Court  of Appeals dated 12 January 1994 as well as its resolution of 12 April 1994 in CA-G.R. No. SP-31997 contending that the appellate court erred in ruling that RA No. 7279[1] otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 is not applicable in the instant case for unlawful detainer.

On 10 December 1981, private respondent Magdalena Batimana Alberto, assisted by her husband, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners Bartolo Serapion, Agustina Espiritu,  Rosa  Hermogenes, Basilisa  Trazona,  Daniel Sangalang,  Gerardo Principe, Primitiva  Montaray, and Felicidad Trazona with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,[2] alleging that petitioners  refused  to  vacate  her  land  in   Brgy. Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, despite termination of their individual lease contracts on 30 August 1981.  In their defense petitioners invoked prior  unexpired lease contracts with Felino Batimana, Magdalena's father   and predecessor-in-interest, which were allegedly renewable for another five (5) years at their option.  Petitioners impugned the  validity  of  their individual lease contracts with Magdalena on the ground that they were executed by means of fraud, intimidation and duress.

The case was tried under the regular rules of procedure in its entirety by Judge Antonio M. Serapio.[3] However,  after admission  of  the evidence for the defendants nothing happened to the case until it was re-assigned to  Judge  Jose R. Sebastian who thereafter rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff spouses thus -

1. The lease contracts between plaintiff Magdalena Alberto and the eight defendants are valid and binding between the parties, the same having been duly constituted, signed and acknowledged  before the notary  public.  The allegations of fraud, intimidation and duress remained just that, allegations, as  defendants failed to substantiate the same with competent proofs.  It  is indeed very hard to believe defendant's (sic)  defense  vis-a-vis their failure to repudiate the contract during the 18 months it was in effect before its expiry date on August 31, 1981  and  that when sued thereafter they did not even deny under oath in their answer the due execution and authenticity of the document sued upon.

2. The defendant's (sic) earlier contracts of lease with the former owner of the property have no material bearing on the  case at bar as plaintiffs were not even privies thereto.   Moreover, the lease contracts superseded and in effect cancelled the agreements with the former owner, Felino Batimana, considering that all the  defendants recognized the new owner of the land, Magdalena B. Alberto, not only in their very contract of lease itself, but also by  paying  increased rents of P40.00 monthly to said plaintiff.

3. There can be no quibbling on the fact that defendants violated their lease contract when they refused to vacate the lot  on which their respective houses stood by not removing their dwelling when the lease expired.[4]

Petitioners were thus ordered to vacate and peacefully remove   their respective houses from the subject premises; and, individually, to pay private respondents P5.00 a day from 1 September 1980 until they fully vacated the subject premises, P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, P300.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of suit.[5]

The foregoing decision was served on the parties on 8   September  1992.[6] Two  days later private respondents moved for the immediate execution of the decision without however serving   notice to petitioners.   The motion was granted in the Order of 14 September 1992.[7] The following day or on 15 September 1992  petitioners  filed a  "Motion for Reconsideration of Decision and Recall of Writ of  Execution"  calling the  attention of the court to the guidelines  for  the eviction of urban and rural poor dwellers set forth  in the Constitution and RA No. 7279.   In the order of 28 September 1992,[8] which was received by the parties on the same day,[9] the motion was denied for lack of merit.   Petitioners did not appeal therefrom.    Instead, on 1  October  1992  they  filed  a  petition  for certiorari with the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, contending that Judge  Sebastian committed  grave abuse of discretion in prematurely issuing the writ of execution and in not  applying  RA No. 7279  to  the  case.[10]

On 6 October 1992 private respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition after petitioners refused to  peacefully vacate the subject premises which motion was granted in the order of 13 October 1992.[11]

On 19 October 1992 petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order on the ground that the motion for a writ of demolition was  set  for hearing without due notice to them, as well as the pendency of the petition for certiorari with the RTC, Valenzuela,  Metro  Manila, docketed as Civil  Case  No. 3957-V-92. 

When Judge Sebastian was later relieved by this Court the case was taken over by Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan.[12]

On 19 January 1993 Judge Corpus-Cabochan recalled and set aside the writs of execution and of demolition issued by Judge  Sebastian on the ground that petitioners were not properly notified of the motions therefor.   But the main decision itself dated 7 September  1992 was allowed to stand after finding   "no cogent  and legal reason to reconsider the same."[13] However, Judge Corpus-Cabochan declared that petitioners still had eight (8) more days to appeal on the ground that they consumed only seven (7) days of  the 15-day appeal period when they filed their "Motion for  Reconsideration of Decision and Recall of Writ  of Execution" on 15 September 1992.

On 2 February 1993 petitioners' filed their notice of appeal  from the MeTC judgment "dated 19 January 1993," which they  received on 26 January 1993.[14] On the same day, Judge Corpus-Cabochan ordered the elevation of the records to the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in view of the appeal but clarified that the decision  being appealed was that of 7 September 1992 and not her order of 19 January 1993.[15]

On 22 June 1993 the RTC-Br. 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,  rendered judgment on the appeal thus -

Accordingly therefore, the Court sets aside the judgment  or decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila dated September  7, 1992 and this case dismissed without  prejudice x x x[16]

The RTC ruled that petitioners could not yet be legally evicted from the leased premises despite the expiration of  their  individual lease contracts  in view of the effectivity of RA No. 7279 on 24 March 1992 which prescribed  a moratorium[17] of three (3) years from the date of  its effectivity[18] on the eviction of squatters or the urban poor dwellers.    Petitioners  were  ordered  to  continue  paying rent to private respondents in the meantime.

On 12 July 1993 private  respondents  moved to reconsider  the RTC decision on the ground that it  did not  touch on the merits of    the   MeTC   decision   but   dealt   only   with   the   issue    of   the applicability of RA No. 7279 which purportedly could not be entertained for the first time on appeal.   The motion was denied on 19 August 1993 on the ground that the applicability of RA  No. 7279  was exhaustively argued before the MeTC during the hearing of petitioners'  "Motion to  Recall  its  Demolition Order."[19]

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals  questioning the RTC Decision of 22 June 1993 as well as its Order  of  19 August 1993.[20]

On 12 January 1994 respondent appellate court ruled in favor of private respondents -

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of  Valenzuela,  Metro Manila, Branch  172,  is hereby  set  aside  and the  decision   of  the Municipal  Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila is hereby restored and  affirmed in toto.[21]

The Court of Appeals ruled that RA No. 7279 was not applicable to petitioners because, first, they failed to present proof that  they  were  beneficiaries or future beneficiaries registered under the Socialized Housing Program under the Act; and, second, the  issue was raised for the first time on  appeal in violation of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.   Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied  on 12 April 1994, hence this petition.

It must be stated at the outset that what concerns the Court is only the applicability of RA No. 7279 on the enforceability of the  final and executory decision dated 7 September 1992 of the MeTC.  Apparently,  the   decision   became   final   and   executory   because petitioners failed to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period to appeal.   Instead of  perfecting their appeal from the order of 28 September 1992 denying for lack of merit their motion for reconsideration of the decision  dated 7 September 1992,  petitioners filed on 1 October  1992  a petition  for certiorari with  the  RTC,  Valenzuela, Metro Manila, attributing  grave abuse of discretion on the part of MeTC  Judge  Sebastian in failing to apply RA No. 7279 to their case.[22] However, that petition docketed as Civil Case  No.  3957-V-92  was  eventually  dismissed  with finality  on 19 October 1992 for the reason  that  "the remedy of appeal should have been availed of instead of th[is] petition for certiorari."[23] Having attained finality, the  MeTC decision of 7 September 1992 ordering the ejectment of petitioners from the land  of private  respondents could no longer be reviewed by the courts.[24]

Thus,  as discussed by the parties themselves, only two issues  are involved, namely,  whether  petitioners timely invoked the applicability of RA No. 7279  to the instant case;  and, if so,   whether petitioners are covered by the moratorium on eviction provided for in Sec. 44, Art. XII of the law.

Petitioners contend that respondent appellate court gravely erred in resolving both questions in the negative.   They insist that they were not able to invoke  RA  No. 7279 during the trial as the law was passed only on 24 March 1992 or after the instant case  was already  submitted  for  decision  in   the   MeTC.  On   the   second question, petitioners contend that they are covered by the moratorium on eviction in Sec. 44, Art. XII,  because  they  are  living  "in urban and  urbanizable areas"  as required in Sec. 4, and are  "underprivileged and  homeless citizens"  as the term is defined in  Sec. 3, par. (t), thereof.

We sustain petitioners on the first issue.    They were not yet time-barred  from raising the issue of the applicability of RA No. 7279 in their joint motion for  reconsideration of the MeTC decision and the recall of its writs of  execution and  demolition.    It must be emphasized that the trial of this  case  ended on 7 May 1986 and was assigned for decision to  Judge Sebastian in March 1990,  while  RA  No. 7279 on the other hand did not become law until more than two (2) years after, or on  24 March 1992. 

While parties are not precluded from  invoking facts or events to prevent or defer execution or enforcement of a final and executory judgment where such facts or events constitute a supervening  cause rendering  such enforcement or execution impossible  or unjust,[25] RA No. 7279 is not the supervening cause that would prevent the inevitable eviction of petitioners from the subject premises.    As respondent appellate court correctly ruled, Sec. 44, Art. XII, of  RA  No. 7279  cannot be applied in petitioners' favor  for their failure to identify and prove themselves to be program beneficiaries under the  law.  The    fact    that    petitioners   claim   to   be   homeless   and underprivileged citizens living in an urban or urbanizable area as  the terms are defined under the law does not automatically entitle  them to invoke the  moratorium provision on eviction.  As worded, Sec. 44, Art. XII, categorically applies the moratorium to program  beneficiaries  or those who possess  the qualifications set forth in Sec. 16, Art. V, namely, (a) must be Filipino citizens; (b) must be underprivileged  and  homeless citizens, as defined in Sec. 3, Art. I,  of  the Act; (c) must not own any real property whether in the urban or rural areas; and, (d) must not be professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates.    

Persons who meet the foregoing eligibility criteria may then be included in the list of eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries upon their registration in accordance with the  procedure  set  forth  in   the Implementing  Rules  and  Regulations  Governing   the Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government  and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.    However, the  listing is without prejudice to certain validation procedures to determine full eligibility that may be adopted by the government shelter agency or the local  government unit responsible for the socialized housing program/project in the locality concerned.[26] Clearly then, to be considered a program beneficiary under RA No. 7279 requires  much more than one's own personal determination but compliance with the proper validation procedures.  Petitioners do not claim to have complied with these validation procedures.

Even assuming RA No. 7279 to be applicable, its moratorium  period has already lapsed as Sec. 44, Art. XII, of the law provides for a period of  only three (3) years from the date of its effectivity -

Sec. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. -  There shall be a moratorium on the  eviction of all  program  beneficiaries  and  on   the demolition of their houses or  dwelling units for a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act x x x  (underscoring supplied).

Since the law has been effective since 24 March 1992, there is  no longer any impediment to the proper eviction of petitioners from  the land of private respondents as decreed in the final and  executory decision of 7 September 1992 of the MeTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.[27]

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the Court of  Appeals  in CA-G.R. No. SP-31997 are  AFFIRMED.   The decision of the MeTC-Br. 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, dated 7 September 1992 in its Civil Case No. 3206 is considered final and executory; its implementation may proceed in due course.

SO ORDERED

Davide Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing JJ., concur .


[1]"An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program, Establish the Mechanism for its Implementation, and For Other Purposes."

[2] Docketed as Civil Case No. 3206.

[3] See Order dated 19 January 1993, p. 1; Records, p. 162.

[4] Penned by Judge Jose R. Sebastian, MeTC-Br. 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; Rollo, pp. 26-29.

[5] Id., p. 29.

[6] Records, p. 104.

[7] Id., p. 107.

[8] Id., p. 112.

[9] Id., pp. 116-117.

[10]Id., p. 189.

[11]Id., p. 122.

[12]Order dated 25 November 1992; Records, p. 130.

[13]Id., pp. 162-164.

[14] Id., p. 173.

[15] Id., p. 175.

[16] Penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 30-32.

[17] See Sec. 44, Art. XII.

[18] Sec. 49. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation  (approved, March 24, 1992).

[19] Rollo, pp. 33-34.

[20] Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 31997.

[21] Penned by Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera, concurred in by Justices Nathanael  P. De Pano, Jr., and Asaali S. Isnani;  id., pp. 35-39.

[22] See Note 10.

[23] Penned by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, RTC-Br, 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; Records, p. 160.

[24] Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G. R. No. 112337, 25 January 1996, 252 SCRA 387; Clorox Company v. Director of Patents, No. L-19531, 10 August 1967, 20 SCRA 965.

[25] Soco v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 116013, 21 October 1996, 263 SCRA 449, 456; Flores v. Court of Appeal,  G.R. No. 97556, 29 July 1996, 259 SCRA 618, 648-649; Rodriguez v.  Project 6  Market Service Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 79968,  23  August 1995, 247 SCRA 528, 531; Cruz v. Leabres, G.R. No. 99846, 22 May 1995, 244 SCRA 194, 200-201.

[26] Sec. 1, Implementing Rules Governing the Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries.

[27] House Bill No. 13001 entitled "An  Act  Extending  the Moratorium  on Eviction or Demolition Amending Art. XII, Sec.  44 of  RA No. 7279 otherwise known as the Urban Development and  Housing Act of 1992" was vetoed by President Fidel V. Ramos on 4  October 1995.