SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126258. July 8, 1999]
TALSAN ENTERPRISES, INC., FRANCISCO P. SAN DIEGO, VICTOR RAMOGA and BONIFACIO TALPLACIDO, petitioners. vs. BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. and ANGELES RAMOS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated March 29, 1996 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 42036 and its resolution[2] dated September 4, 1996, denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
The factual antecedent of this
case may be stated as follows:
On March 4, 1992, at around 11:30
P.M., at the Maharlika Highway, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus owned
by respondent Baliwag Transit, Inc. and driven by respondent Angeles Ramos, hit
and bumped a Kia Ceres Van bearing plate no. TAH-743 owned by petitioner
Francisco P. San Diego and driven by Alfredo Santiago. As a result of the mishap, petitioners, on
June 10,1992, instituted a civil complaint[3] for damages against herein private respondents before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 92-1591.
On June 29, 1992, summons and copy
of the complaint were served upon private respondents’ cashier, Miss Baby
Cansino at respondents’ bus station at No. 199 Rizal Ave. Extension, Caloocan
City, who received the court process but refused to sign the original summons.[4]
On September 11, 1992, the trial
court, upon motion of petitioners, declared private respondents in default.[5] Pursuant to the order of default petitioners
presented their evidence ex-parte.
Respondents received a copy of the
default order on September 23, 1992 and on October 8, 1992, it moved for a
reconsideration alleging that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person by reason of improper
service of summons. Respondents argued
that the person who received the summons is only a cash receiving clerk
"who, unschooled with the law, and whose position is not so integrated
with the management circle of defendant corporation, did not fully appreciate
the legal significance and consequences of said document that she failed to
turn over the same to her superior officers."[6]
Without ruling on the respondents’
motion, the trial court, on October 13, 1992, rendered a decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay:
1. Plaintiff Francisco San Diego, the sum of P158,272.00 representing the repair cost of the Kia Ceres Van and the sum of P60,833.65 representing the amount paid for the medical and hospitalization of plaintiffs Victor Romago and Bonifacio Talplacido;
2. The sum of P60,000.00 representing the unearned income of plaintiffs Victor Romago and Bonifacio Talplacido;
3. Plaintiff corporation, the sum of P130,000.00 representing its unearned income due to the non-use of the damaged Kia Ceres Van;
4. Plaintiffs Victor Romago and Bonifacio Talplacido, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. The sum of P25,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees; and
Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED."[7]
A copy of the decision was
received by the respondents on October 13, 1992, and without waiting for the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration, respondents appealed the decision
to the respondent Court of Appeals, asseverating in essence that they could not
be held in default because the receipt of summons by Ms. Baby Cansino, a mere
“cash receiving clerk” in one of the respondents’ station does not bind the
petitioner.
On March 29, 1996, the respondent
court annulled and set aside the order of default and the judgment by default
and remanded the case to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. In granting respondents’ appeal, the respondent
court ratiocinated that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent. It opined,
thus:
“The service of summons on Baby Cansino, who is not an agent of
appellant corporation but a mere rank and file employee whose position is not
so integrated with the management of the corporation, was insufficient. Contrary to appellees’ position, substantial
compliance was not observed in this case.
Appellant corporation was not notified of the action filed against it;
first because summons was served at a place other than respondent's principal
place of business; and second, because service of summons was made upon a
person not contemplated in the rule on service of summons. Baby Cansino is obviously devoid of
knowledge of the importance of court summons and process as she simply left the
same unattended on the window ledge where the sheriff left the same. Being a mere ‘cash receiving clerk’, Ms.
Cansino cannot be considered as an agent or representative of the appellant
corporation”[8]
The motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was denied on September 4, 1996.
Hence, this present petition where
petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not there was a valid service of summons upon respondents
2. Whether or not the appeal taken by the private respondents instead of a motion for new trial is the proper remedy.
The petition is partly
meritorious.
First, the service of summons upon
Angeles Ramos, the bus driver, was improper.
In actions in personam,
such as the case at bench, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him.[9] If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt
service impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.[10]
In the case at bench, the sheriff
hastily effected the service of summons upon respondent Ramos by substituted
service without first attempting to personally serve the same upon him. This is in violation of the rule which
provides that service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal
service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person
will substituted service be availed of.[11]
Consequently, the lower court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Ramos and for that
reason it has no right or power to render judgment against him.[12] Perforce, the judgment rendered against respondent
Ramos is nugatory and without effect.
With regard to the service of
summons upon respondent Baliwag Transit through its cashier, Ms. Baby Cansino,
we find such service of summons proper.
Under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court, if the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines, such as private respondent Baliwag, service of summons
may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors.
The affidavit of Ms. Cansino
stating that she is not the cashier of respondent Baliwag, but merely a cash
receiving clerk deserves scant consideration for being self-serving. The Sheriff’s Return certifying that summons
were served upon “the defendant Baliwag Transit, Inc. and Angelo Ramos, thru
Ms. Baby Cansino, cashier of Baliwag Transit, who received the said court
processes but refused to sign the original summons at no. 199 Rizal Ave. Ext.,
Caloocan City,” is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person on
whom the summons was served was in fact the cashier of the company.[13] The affidavit of Ms. Cansino cannot overcome the
presumption that official duty had been regularly performed,[14] which presumption may be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence.[15] Respondent Baliwag failed to overcome such
presumption.
But even assuming that Ms. Cansino
is not the cashier, as respondent Baliwag claims, still, service upon her was
proper. Ms. Cansino is considered an
agent of the company authorized to receive court processes.
Generally, service on persons
other than those mentioned in Section 13, Rule 14 has been held as improper.[16] However, this has been liberalized to give life to
the rationale behind the rule.
Thus, in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor Corporation,[17] we ruled:
"The rationale of all rules for service of process on corporation is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him."
Consequently,
service of summons on ordinary clerks,[18] private secretaries of corporate executives,[19] retained counsel,[20] officials who had charge or control of the operations
of the corporation, like Assistant General Manager,[21] and the corporation's Chief of Finance and
Administrative Officer,[22] were considered proper. These individuals were considered “agents” within the
contemplation of the rule.[23]
Ms. Baby Cansino is an officer of
respondent Baliwag Transit who is conferred with vital and sensitive functions
and responsibilities. Accordingly, she
may be relied upon to appreciate the importance of the papers served on
her. She is not one of the lesser
officers of the corporation who would not have been able to appreciate the
importance of the papers delivered to her.
She falls squarely under the term agent who is authorized by law to
receive the process of the Court for the corporation.[24]
Moreover, since, respondents do
not deny that they actually received the summons and the attachments thereto,
there is, therefore, substantial compliance with the rules on service of
summons. The actual receipt of the
summons by respondent's cash receiving clerk must be construed as receipt on
behalf of the officer of the corporation.[25]
In addition, service on
respondent's bus terminal at the address stated in the summons and not in its
main office in Baliwag do not render the service of summons invalid. In Artemio Baltazar vs. Court of
Appeals[26] we
held:
"The regular mode, in other words, of serving summons upon a
private Philippine Corporation is by personal service upon one of the officers
of such corporation identified in Section 13.
Ordinarily, such personal service may be expected to be made at the
principal office of the corporation. Section
13, does not, however, impose such requirement, and so personal service upon
the corporation may be effected through service upon, for instance, the
president of the corporation at his office or residential
address."(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, the service of summons
upon respondent Baliwag Transit is proper.
Consequently, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over
respondent Baliwag.
The trial court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over respondent Baliwag via proper service of summons
notwithstanding, its accountability for the complained negligence of its driver
cannot be determined as of the moment.
Since the driver has yet to come under the court's adjudicatory powers
for not having been properly summoned, then obviously there is no proof adduced
in a full-dress trial as to his purported negligence upon which respondent Baliwag's
primary but vicarious liability[27] under Article 2180[28] of the New Civil Code is perched. Therefore, as things stand, no presumption
of negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees can operate
against, much less be overcome by, respondent Baliwag as employer since the
factual basis for such adverse presumption simply does not exist.[29]
Going now to the second issue, the
appeal taken by the private respondents was proper. It is well-settled that, a defendant who has been declared in
default has the following remedies, to wit: (a) he may, at any time
after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath,
to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a
meritorious defense;[30] b) if judgment has already been rendered when he
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he
may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; c) If he
discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) he may
also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence
or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him.[31]
It must be recalled that after
private respondents received a copy of the resolution declaring them in
default, they seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on October 8,
1992. However, while the motion for
reconsideration was pending resolution, the court rendered its decision. Given this factual milieu, private
respondents can appeal the judgment pursuant to Section 2(3), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. A default judgment is an
adjudication on the merits and is thus appealable.[32]
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial
Court for further proceedings consistent with the above ruling.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno,
Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and
concurred in by Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Conchita Carpio Morales; Rollo,
pp. 14-20.
[2] Id., pp. 23-24.
[3] Pp. 1-4, Record.
[4] Sheriff’s Return, p. 13, Record.
[5] Order of default, p. 19, Id.
[6] Motion for Reconsideration, p. 102, Id.
[7] RTC Decision, pp. 96-100, Record.
[8] CA Decision, Rollo, pp.18-19.
[9] Section 7, Rule 14, Rules of Court.
[10] Section 8, Id..
[11] Litonjua vs. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 246
(1977) cited in 124 SCRA 441 (1983).
[12] Dultra vs. Court of First Instance of Agusan,
70 SCRA 466 [1976].
[13] R. Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 241 SCRA 77-78 [1995].
[14] Section 5(m), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
[15] Vargas and Co. vs. Chan Hang Chiu, 29 Phil.
446 [1915].
[16] ATM Trucking, Inc. v. Buencamino, 124 SCRA
434 [1983]; Delta Motors Sales Corporation v. Mangosing, 70 SCRA 598 [1976]
cited in R. Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[17] 81 SCRA 298 [1978].
[18] Golden Country Farms, Inc. vs. Sanvar
Development Corporation, 214 SCRA 295 [1992]; G & G Trading vs. Court of
Appeals, 158 SCRA 466 [1988]
[19] Summit Trading & Development Corp. vs.
Avedaña, 135 SCRA 397 [1985].
[20] Republic vs. Ker &Company, Ltd., 18 SCRA
207 [1966].
[21] Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Far East Motor
Corp, supra.
[22] Far Corp. vs. Francisco 146 SCRA 197 [186].
[23] Filoil
Marketing Corp. vs. Marine Development Corp. of the Phil., 177 SCRA 86 [1982].
[24] Far Corp. v. Judge Francisco, supra.
[25] Rebollido vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Golden
Country Farms, Inc. vs. Sanvar Development Corporation, 214 SCRA 295 [1992]
[26] 168 SCRA 354 [1988]
[27] Lanuzo vs. Ping, 100 SCRA 205 (1980).
[28] Article 2180 - The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also
for those persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x x x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x x x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
[29] Saludares vs. Martinez, 29 SCRA 745 (1969);
Poblete vs. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 (1979); Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Coronado, 176
SCRA 792 (1989).
[30] Section 3, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
[31] Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
[32] Jao &Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
251 SCRA 391 [1995]; Oriental Media, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 647
[1995].