EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129289. July 29, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
CARULLO y SARMIENTA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Jose Carullo was
charged with two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 3532 and 3533 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 13,[1] of Ligao, Albay under separate informations which
read as follows:
I. In Criminal Case No. 3532 – Rape
“That on or about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of October 20, 1996, at Barangay Kinale, Municipality of Polangui, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with lewd design, and with grave abuse of his parental authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with his daughter, Emily A. Carullo, a 17 year old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.”[2]
II. In Criminal Case No. 3533 – Rape
“That on or about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of October 21, 1996, at Barangay Kinale, Municipality of Polangui, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon, with lewd design, and with grave abuse of his parental authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with his daughter, Emily A. Carullo, a 17 year old girl against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.”[3]
When arraigned, appellant entered
a plea of not guilty to both charges.
Thereafter, by order of the court dated January 29, 1997, upon joint
manifestation of the prosecution and the defense, the two criminal cases were
consolidated and tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution
which led to appellant’s conviction are as follows:
Jon-jon Carullo, the son of
appellant and brother of private complainant Emily Carullo, testified that on
or about eight o’clock in the evening of October 20, 1996, he was watching
television at his cousin’s house which is approximately 20 meters away from
their house in Barangay Kinale. At
around 8:30 p.m., Jon-jon headed for home to rest but before he could knock at
the door, he heard his sister crying and his father angrily shouting at her to
stop crying so that she will not be hurt and to submit herself to him. He also heard the sound of a bolo being
unsheathed from its scabbard while his father was threatening Emily. Upon hearing such menacing remarks, he left
and met his cousin Rodolfo Carullo on the road . Both of them proceeded to the house of former barangay captain
Santiago Creolo to report what Jon-jon overheard. Creolo, however advised them to talk to Kagawad Domingo Remolacio
who, unfortunately, was drunk at the time.
Forthwith, Jon-jon and Rodolfo proceeded to Centro Kinale and had the
incident recorded in the blotter. With
nowhere else to go, Jon-jon spent the night at his Aunt Miling’s house.
The next day, at around 7:00
o’clock in the morning, Jon-jon waited for his sister Emily to pass by her way
to school. Upon meeting her, he asked
what their father did to her the night before but Emily did not answer and
simply cried. Together they went to the
house of Santiago Creolo and the latter accompanied them to the Polangui police
station where the complaints against the appellant were filed.
Iluminada Arbo Carullo, the mother
of private complainant and the common law wife of the appellant, testified that
she started cohabiting with the appellant in 1975 and they begot two children,
Emily and Jon-jon. At the inception of
their purported marital relations, they resided in Manila and went home to
Kinale, Albay only in April 1996.
Private complainant Emily Carullo,
17 years old at the time of the alleged rape, narrated that appellant ravished
her on two occasions, the first at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of
October 20, 1996 and later, at about 2:00 o’clock in he morning of October 21,
1996. Emily testified that on October
20, 1996, there was a get-together at heir house to commemorate the death
anniversary of her paternal grandmother.
After prayers were offered, snacks were served. According to Emily, the gathering lasted
until 5:00 o’clock p.m. but a few of the guests stayed a little longer as her
father engaged them in a drinking spree.
By 7:00 o’clock p.m., all the visitors had already left, so Emily went
to her room to sleep. As she was dozing
off, she was startled when someone beamed a flashlight to her face. She asked who that person was and she
recognized her father’s voice when he replied, “I”. Her father then held her
hand saying, “Intindihin mo ako.” When she asked why he was asking for
her understanding, her father simply said, “Kailangan mo akong intindihin.”
Thereafter, appellant embraced her and started kissing her on the lips and neck
while groping for her breasts. At this
point Emily started crying and, to cow her into silence, appellant unsheathed a
bolo from its scabbard and poked the same at her neck threatening her that if
she did not stop crying she would get hurt.
Emily tried to resist her father’s advances but was completely
overpowered as he was holding her tightly.
Appellant thus succeeded in removing her shorts and underwear. Then, while pinning his daughter to the bed,
appellant hurriedly removed his pants and underwear, at which point Emily freed
herself from his grip and got up from the bed, but just as quickly, appellant
grabbed her and pushed her down again where the former finally consummated the
carnal act.
As if Emily had not suffered
enough, the appellant allegedly sneaked into her room once again at around 2:00
o’clock a.m. and forced himself on her.
Emily pleaded that she be spared this time, but her pleas fell on deaf
ears.
The next morning, after she woke
up, Emily headed for the house of her aunt, Maria Coderes, and on the way, she
met her brother, Jon-jon, who accompanied her to Santiago Creolo. After reporting the incident to the barangay
authorities, Emily, together with Jon-jon and Creolo, proceeded to the Polangui
police station and filed the rape charges.
Municipal Health Officer of
Polangui, Albay, Dr. Arnel Borja, testified in court that on October 21, 1996,
he examined the private complainant and his findings revealed that, although
there were no signs of external physical injuries on her body, he noted two hymenal
lacerations in the complainant’s private organ which, he said, could have been
caused by the penetration of a male organ.
The defense, on the other hand,
presented three witnesses to refute the allegations of rape committed by the
accused-appellant:
Alfredo Calpe, 51 years old, a
farmer and resident of Balangibang, Polangui, Albay, asserted that, in the
afternoon of October 20, 1996, appellant Carullo invited him to the latter’s
house in Barangay Kinale to commemorate the death anniversary of Carullo’s mother. After the prayers and snacks, appellant
brought out four bottles of gin and engaged his guests, including Calpe, in a
drinking spree to cap the day’s affair.
At around 8:00 o’clock p.m. and after consuming three of the four
bottles of gin, Calpe left even as the appellant and the others set out to
finish the last bottle.
Norma Peña, b a niece of the
appellant, testified that she was at the appellant’s house on October 20, 1996
to commemorate her grandmother’s death anniversary. She averred that on said date, Emily arrived late for the family
affair, and appellant scolded his daughter for not helping in the
preparations. According to Peña, she
left the Carullos’ house past 9:00 o’clock in the evening, and by that time,
she said, appellant was visibly too drunk to have committed the crimes
charged. She likewise controverted
Emily’s claim that the first rape was committed at around 8:00 o’clock that
night as the drinking spree had just started then.
Appellant Jose Carullo, for his
part, acknowledged that private complainant and Jon-jon are his children by
common-law wife Iluminada Arbo. He
testified that before his detention, he lived with Iluminada and Jon-jon in
their house in Barangay Kinale while Emily stayed at her aunt’s place in
Magurang. On direct examination,
Carullo denied the accusations against him, saying that at the time the first
rape was allegedly committed, there were a few guests still present and the
drinking spree in his house was in full swing.
In fact, he claimed, he was not able to finish the sixth bottle of gin
with his guests because he passed out and fell asleep on a bench where he found
himself the following morning.
According to Carullo, he even
roused Emily from sleep at around 6:00 o’clock the next morning, urging the latter
to prepare breakfast as she had to go to school. After giving his daughter’s allowance, he left his house to tend
to his farm. Later that day, a
policeman and a barangay councilman of Kinale invited him to go with them to
the municipal building where he saw Emily conversing with the investigator who,
when asked what the problem was, ignored him and instead locked him in a
cell. When asked about the probable
motive behind his daughter’s accusations, appellant replied that Emily is the
type of person who wants to get things done regardless of who gets
involved. He likewise theorized that
probably, someone is courting his daughter and this person hatched this evil
scheme against him.
After due trial, the lower court
convicted the appellant in a decision dated March 25, 1997, the decretal
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration and finding the accused Jose Carullo y Sarmienta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against his then 17-year old daughter, the Court hereby:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3532 sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 3533 sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party the amount
of P100,000.00 and to pay the costs.”[4]
Hence, this appeal.
After a careful scrutiny of the
entire record of the case, and considering the abhorrent nature of the crime of
rape which, in this case, is punishable by the supreme penalty of death, we are
constrained to affirm the conviction of the trial court.
Appellant maintains that the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes charged negate the
veracity of the prosecution’s claim that his identification as the malefactor
was clear, positive and convincing. We
do not subscribe to this conclusion.
While it is true that the Carullo residence did not have any electricity
at the time of the alleged rapes, the fact, however, remains uncontroverted
that appellant entered the victim’s room with a flashlight in hand, thus
illuminating the room which has a floor area of only 4 x 3 meters. The identity of the appellant as the rapist
is bolstered by the finding of the trial court that, prior to the sexual
assault, the appellant engaged his daughter in a conversation, thus,
“Q- Did you recognize the person who focused that flashlight?
xxx.
A- Yes.
Q- Who?
A- My father.
Q- Why were you able to say that it was your father who was focusing the flashlight on your face?
A- I asked who he was.
Q- Was there ever an answer coming from the person who was focusing the flashlight?
A- Yes.
Q- What was the answer?
A- I.
Q- After that what happened next?
A- He held my hands and he said that I should understand him.
Q- Aside from those words, what else?
A- I said, why should I understand you?
Q-And what did your father answer if any?
A- He said, “There is a need for you to understand me.”
Q- Now, when your father uttered/said that, what did you do or say if any?
A- I said, why are you telling this to me?
Q- After that, what happened next?
A- He embraced me and kissed
me.”[5]
From the foregoing, it is clear
that the person who entered Emily’s room and molested her was her own
father. If, as the defense sought to
establish, Emily was unaware of the identity of the person who entered her
room, it would be highly incongruous for the victim to have engaged in such
kind of a conversation with an intruder whom she did not know. To be sure, the natural reaction of one
roused from sleep by the sudden intrusion of a stranger would be to shout for
help, or at least be alarmed. In the
case at bar, Emily, knowing that it was her father talking to her, allowed him
to hold her hand and even conversed with him.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the trial court, assuming that the
complainant at first failed to identify the person who beamed the flashlight to
her face, she, however, eventually recognized her father’s voice when he
spoke. As cited by the trial court, in People
vs. Calixtro,[6] this Court ruled that private complainant’s
identification of the accused through the latter’s voice may be accepted
considering that they are barriomates and, in fact, appellant admitted that
they were friends. In the present case,
the accused here is the father of the victim and admittedly, if one can
identify a friend or acquaintance just by the sound of the latter’s voice, with
more reason can she readily recognize, even in the dark, any member of her
family through his voice.
Well settled is the rule that when
an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says, in effect, all that
is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.[7] Moreover, as this Court held in another case, it
would be highly improbable for a young girl to fabricate a charge so
humiliating to herself and her family as well, had she not been truly subjected
to the pain and harrowing experience of sexual abuse.[8] Thus, since there is no evidence to show that the
private complainant was actuated by improper motives, her identification of her
own father as her rapist should be given full faith and credit. This Court has also had occasion to rule
that the unfounded claim of evil motives on the part of the victim would not
destroy the credibility reposed upon her by the trial court because a rape
victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close
relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.[9]
As perceptively observed by the
Solicitor General, Emily’s willingness to tell her story to the police
investigator and to submit herself to a physical examination by a physician, is
a mute but eloquent testimony of the truth of her accusation against accused-appellant. If she had indeed been fabricating the
serious charges of rape against her father, the idea of allowing her private
parts to be examined would have caused her to recoil, not only out of
humiliation but also at the possibility of being caught in her
prevarication. As it turned out, the
medical examination confirmed Emily’s claim that she was indeed violated.
The defense further posits that
the evidence presented in behalf of the accused-appellant were sufficient to
exculpate him from liability for the crimes charged. It should be noted, however, that the testimonies of the defense
witnesses, including that of the accused-appellant, merely established that the
first alleged rape could not have happened at the time claimed by the victim –
that is, about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of October 20, 1996 – because there
were still some guests present at the Carullo residence at that time. That no rape could have been committed
within the hour of 8:00 o’clock that fateful night, however, does not necessarily
mean that no rape was committed shortly thereafter when all the guests had
already left. Besides, even if the
victim indeed mistook the time of the rape to be around 8:00 o’clock in the
evening, such error on her part cannot be taken against her considering that
before the rape, she had just been roused from sleep by her father and could
have been disoriented. Thus, in another
case, we held that a witness, testifying about the same horrifying event, can
hardly be expected to be correct in every detail and consistent with other
witnesses in every aspect, considering the inevitability of differences in
perception, recollection, viewpoint or impressions as well as their physical,
mental, emotional and psychological states at the time of reception and recall
of such impressions. After all, no two
individuals are alike in powers of observation and of recall.[10]
More important is the fact that
the time of the sexual assault is not an element of the crime of rape. Generally speaking, the determination of the
precise time when the alleged rape was committed merely serves to test the
credibility of the complaining witness regarding the circumstances surrounding
the rape. In the present case, the
records clearly show Emily’s candor and spontaneity in relating her ordeal in
the hands of her own father. Several
times during her examination, the trial court duly noted that she was crying
while answering questions about the details of her rape. In People vs. Atop,[11] the Court held that the tears that spontaneously
flowed from the private complainant’s eyes and the sobs that punctuated her
testimony when asked about her experience with the accused eloquently conveyed
the hurt, the pain, and the anguish the private complainant has suffered and
lived with during all the years.
The trial court, having considered
Emily’s testimony as competent and credible, we see no reason to reverse such
finding. It is doctrinal that the
evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a witness is accorded the
highest respect because it is the trial court that has the direct opportunity
to observe the witness’
Demeanor on the stand and
determine if she is telling the truth or not.[12]
Under the circumstances,
accused-appellant’s denial that he did not rape his daughter must necessarily
fail. Elementary is the rule that
positive identification, where categorical and consistent, prevails over
unsubstantiated denials because the latter are negative and self-serving, and
thus, cannot be given any weight on the scales of justice.
All told, the case at bar properly
falls under one of the instances when the capital punishment of death may be
imposed. The informations in Criminal
Case Nos. 3532 and 3533 sufficiently describe the acts committed, the age of
the victim (17 years old) and the relationship between the accused-appellant
and the victim as father and daughter.
With this qualifying circumstance, Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 becomes applicable. It provides that the death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed where the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The imposition of the death penalty in such
case is mandatory.[13]
Worth emphasizing is the fact that
four members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; but they
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority of the Court that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial
court in Criminal Case Nos. 3532 and 3533 imposing the death penalty for each
count of rape on accused-appellant Jose Carullo y Sarmienta is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that, in line with current jurisprudence,[14] the civil indemnity to be awarded tot he victim
should be P75,000.00 for each count of rape or a total of P150,000.00. The amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages
for each count of rape or a total of P100,000.00 is likewise imposed.
In accordance with Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., on leave.
[1] Presided by Judge Jose S. Sañez.
[2] Records, p. 16.
[3] Records, p. 15.
[4] Rollo, p. 24.
[5] tsn, February 18, 1997, pp. 60-61.
[6] 193 SCRA 303, (1991).
[7] People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 (1997).
[8] People vs. Cabillan, 267 SCRA 258 (1997).
[9] People vs. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312 (1998).
[10] People vs. Mamalayan, 280 SCRA 748 (1997).
[11] 286 SCRA 157 (1998).
[12] People vs. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339 (1996)
[13] People vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997).
[14] People vs. de los Santos, G.R. No. 121906,
September 17, 1998 citing People vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998.