EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130507. July 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
GONZALES y MENDOZA alias “BOBBIT”, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the
Decision[1] dated April 8, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. DNO-1385 finding accused-appellant Roberto Gonzales y
Mendoza alias “Bobbit” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
On January 17, 1995, accused
Roberto Gonzales y Mendoza alias “Bobbit” was charged with the crime of
Multiple Murder in an Information which reads, to wit:
“That on November 20, 1994 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at sitio Mahawak, Barangay Damolog, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously slash the necks of Yolen Hortezano, 16 years old, Josel Hortezano, 9 years old and Aileen Hortezano, 5 years old, with the use of an 8” kitchen knife, while asleep, causing their instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Upon arraignment, accused,
assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged.[2]
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following
witnesses: (1) Dr. Ariel C. Roque, the Municipal Health Officer who conducted
the autopsy of the victims’ corpses; (2) Mary Iris Hortezano, the eight-year
old eyewitness and sister of the victims; (3) PO3 Elvis M. Arche, the police
officer who facilitated the arrest of the accused-appellant; and (4) Yolanda Hortezano, the mother of the
victims who was presented to prove the civil aspect of the case.
Only the accused was presented as
witness for the defense.
Dr. Ariel C. Roque is the
Municipal Health Officer of Sogod, Cebu whose duties include, among others,
conducting autopsy examination and other medico legal cases. He testified that he examined the three (3) dead bodies of the children of Mr.
Hortezano in their house at 10:30 p.m. on November 20, 1994. He first examined Yolen, 16 years old; then
Jocelle, 9 years old; and finally, Aileen, 5 years old.[3]
He submitted the following Post
Mortem Reports:
“I have the honor to inform you that Hortezano, Yolin Damolog, Sogod, Cebu; a medico-legal case has been attended in this office on 11-21-94 at 8:30 am for the following findings: DOI = 11-20-94
TOI = 10:30 pm
POI = Victims House
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
1. Deep incised wound (9-10 cm deep) 21 cm in length from left to right transverse in direction severing the trachea, neck muscles, major vessels of neck both (R) and (L) (carotid artery & jugular vein) anterior aspect
2. Superficial incised wound 5 cm in length 3 cm below no. 1
3. Superficial incised wound 1 cm in length lateral aspect distal 3rd (R) forearm
4. Superficial incised wound 2 cm in length middle 3rd posterior aspect (R) forearm
5. Cadaveric position showing resistance
6. Blood stain found all over the body
7. Pelvic exam - panty intact with napkin
- no bruises on thigh & legs
- hymen intact”[4]
x x x x x x x x x
“I have the honor to inform you that HORTEZANO, JOCELLE 9 y.o., Male, Mahawak, Damolog, Sogod, Cebu; a medico-legal case has been attended in this office on 12-21-94 at 8:30 AM for the following findings:
DOI = 11-20-94
TOI = 10:30 PM
POI = Victims House
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
1) Deep incised wound (6 cm
deepness) 14 cm in length anterior neck directed left to right transverse in
direction severing the trachea, major vessels of (R) side of neck, Neck muscles
(R) w/ chip cervical bond fracture (R) lateral aspect.”[5]
x x x x x x x x x
“I have the honor to inform you that HORTEZANO, AILEEN 5 y.o., Female, Mahawak, Damolog, Sogod, Cebu; a medico-legal case has been attended in this office on 11-21-94 at 8:30 am for the following findings:
DOI = 11-20-94
TOI = 10:30 PM
POI = Victims House
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
1) Deep incised wound (4 cm
deep) 12 cm in length left lateral aspect anterior neck severing the deep
muscles of the neck, major blood vessels of left side of the neck.”[6]
Dr. Roque further testified that
the wounds suffered by the three (3) children were all caused by slashing of
the necks with a knife cutting the carotid arteries and veins which caused the
instantaneous death of the children.
Their eyes were closed and somewhat swelling; their bodies were already
in rigor mortis at the time of the examination. The body of Yolen, the eldest, was in a position “which could be
described as struggling with her hands in half raised frontal position like an
L.” Their bodies were all bathed with blood.
The instrument used in slashing the children was a sharp bladed
instrument.[7]
Mary Iris Hortezano, eight (8)
years old and sister of the victims, was presented as an eyewitness to the
incident which happened in their house on November 20, 1994 at about 10:00
o’clock in the evening. She testified
that she was asleep with her brothers and sisters Yolen, Jocelle, Aileen and
Junjun. On the date of the incident,
their parents were not at home because they were at the fiesta at Lapulapu
City. At around midnight of November
20, 1994, while sleeping with her brothers and sisters, she was awakened by the
entry of Noy Bobbit, their neighbor, who barged into their house through the
window.[8] Noy Bobbit immediately
placed (“patong”) his body over that of her sister Yolen, whose stomach was
being pressed by Noy Bobbit; when Yolen kept on resisting, Bobbit slashed her
sister’s neck with a knife.[9] Her brother Jocelle, who
was beside Yolen, was also awakened by the entry of the accused into their
house. Jocelle fainted but accused also
slashed his neck; then, accused slashed the neck of Aileen who was then
sleeping beside Mary Iris because she had fever at that time.[10]
Prosecution witness Mary Iris
further testified that she was not killed because her body was already stained
with blood and accused probably thought she was already dead.[11] After accused killed
Aileen, he stood up, placed his hands in akimbo and left passing the main door
of the victim’s house.[12] After accused left the
house, Mary Iris went downstairs to go to the house of Noy Eleazar.[13]
On cross-examination, prosecution
witness Mary Iris testified that when the incident happened, she was 7 years
old and in Grade I.[14] On the night of the
incident, she slept at 6:00 o’clock in the evening, ahead of her sister
Yolen. They slept in one room and in
one line. Aileen was at her right while
Junjun was beside Aileen. To her left
were Jocelle, then Yolen. At the time,
the house was lighted by a lamp. Accused
was wearing a white t-shirt.[15] She further testified that
when accused “attacked” her sister, Yolen pleaded “Please Noy Bobbit, it’s
enough, it is very hurt”; that her sister’s shouting was loud which awakened
her and Jocelle; and that when she saw accused slashed her sister Yolen’s neck,
she fainted.[16] When she regained
consciousness, she saw accused slashing the necks of Jocelle and Aileen.[17] Junjun, who was then
sleeping, was not harmed.[18]
Prosecution witness PO3 Elvis
Arche, who went to the victims’ house at midnight immediately after the report
of the incident, saw three (3) bodies lying down and already dead.[19] He testified that he saw a
pair of slippers and footsteps of blood leading to the house of the accused and
thereafter arrested the latter. He found
the slippers at a distance of around three (3) meters outside the house of the
victims[20] but there was no blood.[21] In the cemented pathway
from the entrance of the fence to the house of the accused were more than ten
(10) bloodied footprints. The bloodied
footprints ended at the entrance of the house of the accused.[22] Witness called out at the
accused at the latter’s house who responded “Don’t shoot me, I will go out.”[23] Accused went out and looked
for some slippers but he could not find any because it could not fit his feet.[24] Witness further found a
knife under three layers of hollow blocks located at the left corner inside the
house of the accused.[25] This knife was clean but
was still wet.[26] Witness further testified
that when he searched the body of the accused, he found some scratches on his
body, “as if he is coming from the bushes.”[27]
On cross-examination, PO3 Arche
testified that when he was searching for evidence at the crime scene, he saw a
pair of blue slippers with shoetack protruding, about 11 inches in size.[28] The house of the accused
was about 150 meters from the place of the incident.[29]
Yolanda Hortezano was presented to
testify on the matter of civil damages.
She testified that when she heard that her children were killed, she
“felt sad” and she prayed for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00 as she engaged the
services of counsel in prosecuting this case.[30]
The
defense presented accused himself as sole witness. Accused, a welder, denied the allegations in the complaint.[31] The version of the defense,
as narrated in the accused-appellant’s brief is as follows:
“The defense presented as its only witness, the accused-appellant himself, Roberto Gonzales, to refute the imputations marshalled by the prosecution. He swore that he did not know anything about the killing of the victims as he was sleeping alone in his house located at Damolog, Sogod, Cebu during the evening of November 20, 1994 since 9:30 p.m.
He stressed that he was all alone that fateful night as his wife and children were in Mindanao. He recalled being rudely awakened by the barking of the dog and the loud voices of two persons, who were later on identified as policeman Elvis Arche and a certain Ilao, who were calling out his name in the night and ordering him to step out of his house. He narrated that he initially peeped through the window to see who was summoning him and when he saw the effigies of the two persons outside pointing their firearms at him, he asked them politely what his fault was and why they wanted him to get out of his house. To this, they responded by asking him where his .38 revolver was to which he replied that he had no weapon on him. In fear that they might shoot him, he did as he was ordered and went out. As soon as he was about to unlock the padlock of the door of his fence though the two persons immediately grabbed him and dragged him outside of his fence and then frisked him.
He accentuated the fact that since the two persons were unable to find anything on him, they tied his hands with a rope and searched his house although they were not armed with a search warrant. He recounted that they were looking for a firearm and having been unable to find one, they accosted him and brought him to the police headquarters in Sogod, Cebu where he was incarcerated.
While in jail, the policemen, PO3 Elvis Arche and his companion approached him at around 11:00 o’clock that same night to force him to admit that he is the owner of a pair of red slippers. When he refused to admit the same, he was struck on the head by them with one of the slippers. The following morning at around 8:00 a.m. of November 21, 1994, his incarcerators brought him again to his house which they searched for a second time. Considering that they were still unable to find anything useful to pin him down, they got a knife from the spoon and fork tray. Following this incident, he was again detained at the police station.
Later on, the policemen presented him before the Provincial
Prosecutor. During that time, he was
surprised to learn that they offered the knife which they took from his tray
and a pair of blue slippers as evidence to establish his connection to the
crime. He informed the court a quo
that he was astonished when the pair of blue slippers was given as evidence to
the prosecutor instead of the pair of red slippers which he was earlier being
forced to admit ownership of. When
asked to explain the ten (10) bloody footprints found by policeman Arche on the
cemented pathway from the entrance of the house of the accused-appellant, he
replied that the same were nothing more but traces of floorwax which he (i.e.
the accused-appellant) applied while cleaning his house earlier. He further propounded that he did not have
any grudge with policeman Elvis Arche prior to the incident.”[32]
After trial, the court a quo
rendered judgment on April 8, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Roberto Gonzales GUILTY beyond reasonable of the heinous crime of Murder and hereby sentences accused Roberto Gonzales the supreme penalty of death.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainants
the sum of P150,000.00 as moral damages and to pay private complainants
the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.”
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant raises the
following assignment of errors:
“I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EYEWITNESS MARY IRIS HORTEZANO AND THE TESTIMONY OF PO3 ELVIS ARCHE DESPITE THEIR LACK OF CREDIBILITY.
“II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARRIVED AT THROUGH A LABORED CORRELATION.
“III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LATTER REFUTED THE SAME FOR HAVING BEEN EXECUTED INVOLUNTARILY.
“IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P150,000.00 AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P50,000.00 TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIMS.”
In the first assignment of error,
appellant contends that the direct examination of prosecution Mary Iris
Hortezano was replete with leading questions which would give the impression
that the answers given by her were all coached and not spontaneous. He argues that witness Mary Iris was only 7
years old at the time the incident happened and she could not have possibly
recalled with strikingly precise detail the gruesome events as they unfolded. Appellant further argues that the testimony
of Mary Iris that she saw appellant slash the throats of her siblings, despite
the insufficient illumination, leaves much to be scrutinized; that the line of
questioning of the prosecutor suggests a series of rehearsed responses to
compensate for the deficiencies in the testimony of the prosecution witness;
and that the witness should have been disqualified by reason of her immaturity
pursuant to Section 21(b) of Rule 130.
The contentions are untenable.
The fact that prosecution witness
Mary Iris Hortezano was merely seven (7) years old at the time of the incident
and eight (8) years old at the time she testified does not disqualify her from
being a witness nor does this circumstance render her testimony incredible. It is well-settled that any child regardless
of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully
facts for which he is examined. The
requirements of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of
observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.[33] Even a mental retardate is
not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.[34] And, there is no minimum
age for witnesses, even a child can be a witness so long as he can perceive and
relate his perceptions. Besides, the
testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful
than that of older persons.[35]
As regards the claim that the
direct examination of prosecution witness Mary Iris was replete with leading
questions, there is no doubt that witness Mary Iris was a “child of tender
years” as she was only 8 years old at the time she testified. Section 10 of Rule 132 is clear on this
matter, thus:
SEC. 10. Leading and misleading questions. – A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) x x x
(b) x x x
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf mute;
(d) x x x
(e) x x x.” (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, minor lapses are to be
expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too
painful to recall.[36] A witness is not expected
to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minor and minute
details.[37] Furthermore, it has been
held that minor inconsistencies do not discredit but rather strengthen the
testimony of a witness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[38] Thus, the testimony of
witness Mary Iris that there was a lamp and the reference to a “parol”[39] and a kerosene lamp[40] by the prosecution, are
mere minor inconsistencies which do not destroy the fact that the place of the
incident was lighted; enough for witness Mary Iris to identify
accused-appellant whom she has known because they were neighbors.[41] And it has been held that
the illumination from a kerosene lamp is sufficient to permit the identification
of a malefactor.[42]
In the second assigned error,
appellant contends that the trial court convicted him on the basis of
circumstantial evidence culled exclusively from the testimony of prosecution
witness PO3 Arche. Appellant argues that
Arche’s testimony was concocted and not corroborated by testimonies of other
prosecution witnesses, and hence, self-serving. He further alleges that the traces of blood found on the cemented
pathway are nothing more but floor wax spilled by him while cleaning his house
and the prosecution was not diligent enough to have the same analyzed to verify
its exact nature.
PO3 Arche testified that there
were traces of bloody footprints found on the cemented pathway; that a pair of
blue slippers was found in between the houses of appellant and the victims;
that the bloodied footprints led to the house of appellant; that there were
scratches on appellant’s body; that a newly washed knife was found under three
(3) layers of hollow blocks in the sala of appellant’s house; and that
appellant looked restless when he put on a pair of small slippers as he could
not find one his size. These are
circumstances providing a strong corroboration of the statements made by
eyewitness Mary Iris pointing to appellant as the assailant. Moreover, there is no ill-motive whatsoever
that has been attributed to prosecution witness Arche as to why he would
testify against appellant and implicate him of such a heinous crime; hence
Arche’s testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[43]
The testimony of PO3 Arche would
merely be corroborative. There is an
eyewitness in the person of the victims’ sister Mary Iris. The doctrine of long standing is that the
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
support a conviction, even in a charge for murder.[44] Even an uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness, if credible, is enough to warrant conviction.[45]
Furthermore, the defense consists
of denial and alibi. Accused-appellant’s
bare denials cannot stand in view of the positive identification made by
eyewitness Mary Iris Hortezano. It has
been held that the positive identification by an eyewitness has greater weight
than the unsubstantiated denial of the accused. Denial, like alibi, is a weak defense, which becomes even weaker
in the face of positive identification of the assailant by an eyewitness.[46]
Settled likewise is the rule that
alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution
witness.[47] For alibi to prevail, it
must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else.[48] In this case, there was no
physical impossibility because accused-appellant’s house was only about 150
meters away from the victims’ residence.[49]
Anent the third assignment of
error, appellant contends that the trial court should not have admitted and
accorded consideration of his extrajudicial confession marked as Exhibit
“M”. He argues that he was forced to
sign the said document as he could no longer bear the pain being inflicted on
him. He further argues that Atty.
Teofilo Tumulak who assisted him was not his counsel of choice.
This is untenable.
In the appellant’s extrajudicial
confession,[50] he admitted the killing of
the minor children inside the latter’s house on November 20, 1994; that he used
a kitchen knife in stabbing the children; that he wore a pair of slippers at
that time; and that an “enchanted spirit” guided him to kill the children. The document was signed in the presence of
Atty. Teofilo Tumulak and subscribed by the Municipal Mayor Thaddeus Durano.[51]
In the case of People vs. Suarez,[52] the Court ruled that the
accused has the final choice of the lawyer as he may reject the counsel chosen
for him and ask for another one.
However, a lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where, as in this case, he never raised any objection against the
former’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer. In the case at bar, there is
no evidence adduced by accused-appellant to discredit the confession.
More important, it should be
stressed that the extrajudicial confession was not the basis of appellant’s
conviction. Where there is independent
evidence, apart from the accused’s alleged uncounseled confession, that the
accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a conviction.[53] The victims’ sister, Mary Iris, was an eyewitness to
the gruesome incident and, in a simple and straightforward manner, she
positively identified appellant as the one who slashed the necks of her three
siblings on that fateful night. As
stated above, even an uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to warrant a conviction, even for a charge
of murder.
After a thorough and meticulous
examination of the evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to disturb the
trial court’s reliance on the eyewitness account of Mary Iris Hortezano. We agree with the trial court that the
evidence points to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, as the one
responsible for the deaths of the three (3) Hortezano children. There is also sufficient evidence that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the killings, thus qualifying
the same to murder. Appellant’s act of
slashing the necks of the children aged 16, 9 and 7, while they were asleep
clearly constitutes treachery and qualifies the killing to murder. It has, time and again, been held that the
killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be
expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery[54] even if the manner of attack was not shown.[55]
While this Court agrees with the
trial court’s judgment of conviction, there is a compelling reason to reduce
the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua in view of the absence of
an aggravating circumstance. The
Information charged appellant of Multiple Murder. The three (3) killings resulted not from a single act but from several
individual and distinct acts of slashing.
We therefore, rule that appellant is guilty not of a complex crime of
multiple murder but of three (3) counts of murder for the death of the three
(3) victims in this case.[56] Pursuant to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua, there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.[57] As appellant is found
guilty of three (3) separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be
three (3) sentences of reclusion perpetua.
Finally, anent the award of civil
indemnity, in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence,[58] the amount of P50,000.00 each or a total of P150,000.00
as death indemnity is awarded to the heirs of the three (3) victims.
Moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00
awarded by the trial court is reasonable considering the grief and sorrow[59] suffered by the parents at the sudden loss of their three (3) children
at one harrowing instance. Moral
damages, which include mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings,
may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in the victim’s death.[60]
As regards the award of attorney’s
fees which is based on the trial court’s finding that because of this case, the
parents of the victims were compelled to secure the services of counsel,[61] the Court finds the same to be reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, and
accused-appellant Roberto Gonzales y Mendoza is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
three (3) sentences of reclusion perpetua.. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims in the amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity; P150,000.00
as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.
[1] Written
by Judge Esperidion C. Riveral.
[2] Order of September 22, 1995, p. 54, Record.
[3] TSN, October 13, 1995 at pp. 3-5.
[4] Exhibit “A”, p. 86, Record.
[5] Exhibit “B”, p. 87, ibid.
[6] Exhibit “C”, p. 88, ibid.
[7] TSN, October 13, 1995 at p. 8.
[8] TSN, February 19, 1996 at pp. 4-5, 13 &
16.
[9] Ibid. at pp. 5-7.
[10] Ibid. at p. 7.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid. at p. 8.
[13] Ibid. at pp. 9-10, 16-18.
[14] Ibid. at p. 10.
[15] Ibid. at pp. 11-13.
[16] Ibid. at p. 14.
[17] Ibid.
at pp. 16-18.
[18] Ibid. at p. 16.
[19] Ibid. at p. 19.
[20] Ibid. at pp. 19 & 22.
[21] TSN, May 7, 1996 at p. 8.
[22] TSN,
February 19, 1996 at pp. 24-25.
[23] Ibid. at p. 25; TSN, May 7, 1996, pp.
6 & 8.
[24] TSN, February 19, 1996 at p. 26.
[25] Ibid. at pp. 27-28.
[26] Ibid. at p. 28.
[27] TSN, February 19, 1996 at p. 29; TSN, May 7,
1996 at p. 6.
[28] TSN, May 7, 1996 at pp. 3-4.
[29] Ibid. at p. 4.
[30] TSN, May 21, 1996, pp. 5 & 10.
[31] TSN, October 28, 1996 at pp. 2-3.
[32] pp.
7-9, Appellant’s Brief, pp. 69-71, Rollo.
[33] People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16; People vs.
Rodico, 249 SCRA 309; People vs. Amaro, 235 SCRA 58.
[34] People vs. Español, 271 SCRA 689.
[35] People
vs. Carullo, 289 SCRA 481.
[36] People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188.
[37] People vs. Tidula, 292 SCRA 596.
[38] People vs. Renario Manlapaz y Ocampo,
G.R. No. 129033, June 25, 1999; People vs. Carreon, 282 SCRA 544; People vs.
Zumil, 275 SCRA 182; People vs. Patawaran, 274
SCRA 130.
[39] TSN, February 19, 1996 at pp. 12-13.
[40] Ibid. at p. 16.
[41] TSN, February 19, 1996 at p. 16.
[42] People vs. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151.
[43] People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31; People
vs. Danao, 253 SCRA 146.
[44] People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94; People vs. Bajar,
281 SCRA 262; People vs. Adora, 275 SCRA 441; People vs. Ballabare, 264 SCRA
350; People vs. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA 1; People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA
523; People vs. Camat, 256 SCRA 52; People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA
19.
[45] People vs. Borce, 289 SCRA 445.
[46] People vs. Macuha, G.R. No. 110085, July 6,
1999; People vs. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713.
[47] People vs. Cabebe, 290 SCRA 543; People vs.
Pili, 289 SCRA 118; People vs. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1.
[48] People vs. Bitoon, G.R. No. 112451,
June 28, 1999; People vs. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27; People vs. vs. Sumampong, 290
SCRA 471; People vs. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213.
[49] TSN, February 19, 1996 at p. 23.
[50] Exhibit “M”, pp. 17-18; Translation on pp.
19-20, Record.
[51] Exhibits “M-3” & “M-4”, respectively, ibid.
[52] 267
SCRA 119.
[53] People vs. Diamsoy, 178 SCRA 321.
[54] People vs. Abuyen, 213 SCRA 569;
People vs. Ganohon, 196 SCRA 431; People vs. Lora, 113 SCRA 366;
People vs. Mabilangan, 111 SCRA 398.
[55] People vs. Valerio, Jr., 112 SCRA 208
[56] People vs. Rolando Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, March
11, 1999 (En Banc).
[57] People vs. Sabalones, & Beronga, G.R. No.
123485, August 31, 1998; People vs. Cawaling, et al., G.R. No. 117970, July 28,
1998; People vs. Laceste, et al., G.R. No. 127127, July 30, 1998; People vs.
Quitlong, et al., G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998
[58] People vs. Robles, G.R. No. 124300, March 25,
1999; People vs. Piamonte, G.R. No. 91999, February 25, 1999; Felipe E. Pepito,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999.
[59] TSN, May 21, 1996 at p.10.
[60] People vs. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473.
[61] p. 11, thereof, p.128, Record; TSN, May 21,
1996 at p. 10.61