THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No.
131405. July 20, 1999]
LEILANI MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ASIAN LAND STRATEGIES CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unsubstantiated
accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal
justifications to dismiss an employee. The
employer must prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which
loss of confidence or breach of trust is based. Mere allegations, even if supported by pro forma and generalized
affidavits, are not sufficient evidence to justify the dismissal of an
employee.
The Case
The
Petition for Certiorari before us seeks to set aside the Decision dated
February 19, 1997, promulgated by the National Labor Relations Commission in
NLRC CA No. 011082-96, which reversed that of the labor arbiter granting
petitioner’s Complaint for illegal dismissal.
In his Decision dated May 17, 1996, Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludares
disposed as follows:[1]
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the complainant and against the respondent, ordering the latter, as follows:
1. To
pay the sum of P8,000.00 as one (1) month separation pay of the
complainant in lieu of reinstatement;
2. To
pay the sum of P92,000.00 as back wages of complainant from June 16,
1995 up to this writing;
3. To
pay complainant moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00; and
4. To
pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P15,000.00.”
Reversing
the above disposition, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)[2] ruled:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the instant case is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.”[3]
Reconsideration
was denied in the Resolution dated September 19, 1997.[4]
The Facts
Respondent
Commission narrates the facts in this wise: [5]
“[Petitioner] started working with the [private] respondent during the latter part of April 1994. Shortly thereafter, she was appointed as [f]inance [m]anager of the [private] respondent and her tasks [included], among others, xxx custody of and disbursement of company funds.
“On June 9, 1995, [petitioner] claims that she was summoned by Ms. Ma. Angela Celeridad, the company’s [v]ice-[p]resident, who informed her that management had decided to terminate her employment. Hence, she was told either to resign or face dismissal. Later that day at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, [petitioner] alleged that the [p]resident of the company, Johnny P. Lee, announced that her employment was already terminated. On June 23, 1995, [petitioner] lodged her complaint against the company for illegal dismissal.
“[Private] [r]espondent, however, paints a different scenario of the circumstances surrounding [petitioner]’s cessation from her employment. [Private] [r]espondent denies having dismissed the [petitioner] as no memorandum or letter of dismissal was issued to the [petitioner]. [Private] [r]espondent asserts that on May 20, 1995, it received a complaint from several of its marketing and sales agents accusing [petitioner] of committing deliberate delays in the payment of their commission in violation of company policy. They alleged that she refused to release their commissions despite payment of the price of the properties they ha[d] brokered unless she [was] given a certain amount [as her cut]. These individual complainants include[d] Amado Roa, [a]cting [v]ice-[p]resident for marketing and all [d]ivision [h]eads of the Sales Department of the company, namely: Leonora Punongbayan, Elma Mendoza, Nestor Pamintuan and Melly Rubid. The company, through its [p]resident, furnished [petitioner] with a copy of the complaint and gave her time to answer the same. Despite having been given an extension to file a reply to the charges against her, [petitioner] failed to submit the same. Instead, on June 10, 1995, she stopped reporting for work.
“In addition, [private] respondent claims that on June 15, 1995, another employee of the company, a certain Rufino Pahati, lodged a separate complaint against [petitioner] regarding his application for cash advance. Mr. Pahati claim[ed] that [petitioner] made him apply for cash advance but it was she who took the money. She promised to pay him back but failed. Allegedly, the company sent a letter to Mendoza dated June 24, 1995 demanding her to explain all [the] irregularities imputed [to] her. Hearing no response from her, the company was constrained to conduct an investigation in her absence. [Petitioner] was found to have committed the above-mentioned anomalies imputed [to] her. On June 28, 1995, the [private] respondent notified [petitioner] that as of June 15, 1995, she was considered resigned from her job.
“On June 23, 1995 the instant complaint was filed seeking xxx reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.”
Ruling of Respondent Commission
As
finance manager, petitioner held a sensitive position which depended largely on
her employer’s continued trust and confidence in her. Respondent Commission found that she had committed acts that were
of such nature as to be sufficient to cause the loss of such trust and
confidence.
The
dismissal of the criminal charges against petitioner did not prove the absence
of a valid ground for her dismissal.
Conviction in a criminal case is not indispensable to the dismissal of
an employee, and the findings of a public prosecutor are not binding upon a
labor tribunal.
Respondent
Commission also faulted petitioner for the failure of private respondent to
conduct a hearing regarding the complaints against her. Allegedly, she refused to report for work to
avoid and prevent an investigation by the company. Thus, the accusations against her stood unrebutted, and private
respondent had no recourse but to consider her services ended.
Hence,
this Petition.[6]
The Issues
Petitioner
does not pinpoint the issues, but Respondent Commission poses the following
question:[7]
“Whether or not Respondent NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter and in
declaring that petitioner was not illegally dismissed.”[8]
To fully
ventilate the foregoing question, the Court resolved to subdivide the discussion
into three issues: (1) Should this
Court review the factual findings of the labor tribunals below? (2)
Did petitioner abandon her post?
(3) May petitioner be validly dismissed on the ground of breach of trust
and loss of confidence?
The Court’s Ruling
The
Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Review of Factual Findings
The
factual findings of the labor arbiter, when sufficiently supported by the
evidence on record, should as a rule be given great respect by appellate
tribunals.[9] Pursuant to this doctrine, petitioner insists that
private respondent adduced no “scintilla of evidence” to establish that she
abandoned her job or committed serious irregularities constituting a breach of
trust and loss of confidence. Hence,
the NLRC abused its discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s factual
findings.
On the
other hand, Respondent Commission ruled that “there [was] sufficient cause for
respondent to terminate complainant after she failed to report back to work
without justifiable cause.” The NLRC and private respondent argue that the
labor arbiter failed to take into account important pieces of relevant evidence
showing that petitioner was guilty of a serious breach of trust. Thus, Respondent Commission invokes the
similarly entrenched rule that its findings should be respected because they
are grounded on substantial evidence.[10]
Since the
factual findings of the NLRC are inconsistent with those of the labor arbiter,
this Court -- as an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be raised
in certiorari proceedings -- resolved to conduct a full review of the
records before us in order to determine the facts of this case.[11]
In St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission,[12] we held that petitions for certiorari challenging
NLRC decisions should be remanded to or filed directly with the Court of
Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction over such cases. However, since the Memoranda of the parties
have already been filed in this Court prior to the finality of St. Martin, we
shall dispose of this case once and for all, rather than remand it to the
appellate court.
Second Issue:
Abandonment Must Be Proven
Petitioner
prays that we should reinstate the labor arbiter’s Decision, which ruled out
abandonment in this wise:
“Anent the defense of alleged abandonment,
[the labor arbiter] also find[s] the same to be incredible if not highly
unthinkable because [petitioner] is a mother and at the same time the head of
the family having been separated from her husband. She is the only breadwinner of the family and her job is her only
means of livelihood. Abandonment of
position is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less
legally presumed from certain equivocal acts.
For abandonment to arise, there must be concurrence of the intention to
abandon and some overt acts from which it can be inferred that the employee
concerned has no more interest to work.
On the contrary, she immediately filed her complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement.”[13]
Respondent
Commission found the foregoing reasoning weak.
It held that petitioner abandoned her work to avoid the investigation of
the complaints filed against her, viz.:
“xxx Admittedly, there was a xxx [falling]
out between [petitioner] and [private] respondent which was triggered by the
complaint filed by several company agents against complainant. This, however, [did] not justify
complainant’s absence for an indefinite period. There was no reason for her to abandon her work beginning June
10, 1995. In fact, she was supposed to
confront her accusers on that day. The
absence of any memorandum or order directing her dismissal, which complainant
herself kept xxx harping [on] to prove illegal dismissal, all the more
strengthens the theory that she was expected by the company to report for work
on June 10, 1995 and on the following days.
With her actuation, the company was left with no choice but to consider
her as resigned.”[14]
We cannot
concur with the NLRC. The unflinching
rule in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof.[15] To establish a case of abandonment, the employer must
prove the employee’s deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment
without any intention of returning.
Specifically, the employer has to show the concurrence of the
following: (1) the employee’s intention
to abandon employment and (2) overt acts from which such intention may be
inferred -- as when the employee shows no desire to resume work.[16] The private
respondent failed to establish any of these.
The
employer herein argues that the lack of a notice of termination is proof that
petitioner abandoned her job. We
disagree. Mere absence from work,
especially where the employee has been verbally told not to report, cannot by
itself constitute abandonment. To
repeat, the employer has the burden of proving overt acts on the employee’s
part which demonstrate a desire or an intention to abandon her work. It failed to discharge this burden.
Furthermore,
the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal within a reasonable period
negates abandonment.[17] In the present case, the Complaint was filed about
two weeks after petitioner had been dismissed or had been deemed resigned.
Third Issue:
Loss of Trust and Breach of
Confidence
Petitioner
insists that the complaints against her were “afterthoughts” concocted by the
private respondent to gain leverage in the Complaint for illegal dismissal that
she had filed. As proof, she cites the
city fiscal’s dismissal of the criminal Complaints for estafa brought against
her by her employer.
Respondent
Commission correctly held that the dismissal of the said Complaints by the city
prosecutor did not bar the private respondent from considering them in
evaluating petitioner’s trustworthiness.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employee’s misconduct is not
required to establish loss of trust and confidence.[18] It is enough for the employer to present substantial
evidence – such amount of evidence as to induce a belief that the employee is
responsible for a misconduct, and participation therein renders that employee
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by the job.[19]
Complaints and Notices
Petitioner
questions the NLRC’s admission in evidence of the letter-complaint of Roa and
the other division heads of the Sales Department of the company.[20] She alleges that these complaints were concocted by
the private respondent, as she never received any copy of these; and that they
were made known to her only after she had filed the Complaint for illegal
dismissal.
We
disagree. The notices served on her
sufficiently apprised her of the existence and the nature of the accusations
against her. The company president’s
letter of June 2, 1995[21] informed her that there was a complaint from Amado
Roa and the other division heads of the Sales Department for her “alleged
deliberate withholding or delaying of the release and payment of the
commissions xxx, unless and until given a certain amount in consideration [of]
the expeditious release of the said commissions.” Celeridad’s letter of June
24, 1995[22] reiterated the same gripe. That she did not receive a copy of these Complaints does not show
that they were mere fabrications of the private respondent. Procedural due process only requires
employers to furnish their errant employees written notices stating the
particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for their dismissal and
to hear their side of the story.[23] Obviously, the employer complied with these. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner
to exercise her right by asking the management for copies of the letters.
She also
alleges that the notices were fabricated since the private respondent presented
them only during the appeal before the NLRC.
Again, we disagree. Under its
rules, the NLRC is allowed to receive evidence and to weigh its probative
value.[24] Furthermore, contrary to petitioner’s claims, the
private respondent did not have to send these notices via registered mail,
because the recipient could have been served such documents in the very office
where she was working.[25]
Accusations Must Be Substantiated
All in
all, we believe the petitioner was sufficiently notified of the charges against
her. Nonetheless, such belief does not
necessarily ripen into a holding that her dismissal was justified, because the
employer failed to substantiate the accusations, which are as follows:
1. The division heads, led by acting Vice President Amado Roa, complained that (a) on several occasions petitioner intentionally delayed the release of commissions, unless the sales agents agreed to give her grease money; and (b) she solicited “contributions” for various “causes” in exchange for the release of said commissions.
2. Elma
Mendoza grumbled that, to encash her disbursement voucher, she had to give the
petitioner P1,000.
3. Carolyn
“Bam” Gonzales, one of the firm’s accredited brokers, protested that although
the company’s book of accounts showed a disbursement of P6,712.32
representing her commissions for closing a sale, she did not receive such
amount.
4. Rufino Pahati complained that petitioner made him sign a cash advance voucher for money given to another employee.
After
hearing the testimonies of Roa, Mendoza and Pahati, the labor arbiter
disbelieved these accusations, because “the alleged serious irregularities
surfaced for the first time only after this complaint [for illegal dismissal]
was filed.” The labor arbiter rationalized that, if there was any truth to
petitioner’s involvement in any serious irregularities, “she should have been
informed and furnished xxx a written notice stating the particular acts or
omissions constituting the grounds for her dismissal,” but that private
respondent failed to show evidence that it had complied with the notice and
hearing requirements.
To
rectify the oversight, private respondent submitted before the NLRC two notices
requiring petitioner to respond to the accusations leveled against her.[26] On this basis, Respondent Commission reversed the
labor arbiter, holding that there was sufficient basis for private respondent
to lose trust and confidence in petitioner.
It held:
“xxx Based on evidence submitted, the allegations in the complaint of Mr. Roa and several other employees stood unrebutted and the company had no recourse but to hold her responsible for the accusations leveled against her, or [at] least, to find her unfit to continue holding such sensitive and fiduciary position as finance manager.
x
x x x x x x x x
As finance manager, complainant’s
relationship with the company [was] one of trust and confidence. After complainant refused to answer the
charges of anomalies imputed [to] her by several sales agents despite being
afforded the opportunity to be heard and to defend herself, the respondent
cannot be faulted for losing its trust and confidence [i]n her as financ[e] manager. Under the circumstances, it would be most
unfair to compel the company to continue employing complainant.”[27]
We fail
to see how the NLRC could have arrived at such a conclusion. Reviewing the evidence on record, we find
that the relevant evidence for the private respondent consisted only of the
following: (a) Gonzales’ commission
voucher (Exh. 3);[28] (b) the letter-complaint signed by the division heads
of the Sales Department (Exh. 2);[29] (c) Pahati’s letter-complaint (Exh. 1);[30] (d) the affidavits of Celeridad, Gonzales and Mendoza
(Exhs. 4-A, 4-B & 5);[31] (e) Lee’s letter-notice dated June 2, 1995 (Annex 6);[32] (f) Celeridad’s letter-notice dated June 24, 1995
(Annex 8);[33] and (g) several cash disbursement vouchers including
those of Mendoza and Gonzales (Annexes 9-18).[34]
While the
cash disbursement voucher and Gonzales’ affidavit support the claim that her
commission was released to another person, they do not show that petitioner was
responsible for such irregularity. As
finance manager, she approved disbursement of the company’s funds, but the
actual payment of cash was usually the function of the company cashier. Petitioner insists that she had no
participation in the preparation of said documents.[35]
The
flimsiness of private respondent’s evidence is obvious. In its Memorandum on Appeal, it claims that
petitioner had “effective control not only over the processing of said
application [referring to Pahati’s cash advance] but also the subsequent salary
deduction.”[36] From such premise, private respondent concludes that
petitioner was guilty of the accusations of Roa and company, viz.:
“In the light of the actuations of
[petitioner] in the foregoing transaction, the accusations of the sale[s]
agents and managers regarding her motives behind the delay in the payment of
their commission income become credible.
xxx [This] betrays a tendency on her part to circumvent [c]ompany
procedures and to employ irregular means without qualms for her personal
benefit, especially in pecuniary matters.
She likewise exhibited a propensity to capitalize on her superior
position to exert undue influence over her peers and subordinates for purposes
inimical to the interest of the [c]ompany.
Such mental attitude and psychological make-up of [petitioner] renders
her unfit to assume a position as sensitive as that of the [f]inance
[m]anager.”[37]
Labor
tribunals should be cautioned against confusing conjecture with evidence. The absence of petitioner, who failed to
contest the charges against her in the investigation conducted by private
respondent, did not mean admission of the accusations.
Although
admissible in evidence, affidavits being self-serving must be received with
caution, even if presented only on appeal before the NLRC.[38] This is
because the adverse party is not afforded any opportunity to test their
veracity.[39] While Roa, Mendoza and Pahati testified for the
private respondent before the labor arbiter, stenographic notes of the
proceedings were not taken. Since their
testimonies were not retaken during the appeal before Respondent Commission,
the NLRC had no basis to reverse the labor arbiter’s assessment of their
credibility. Their affidavits, standing
alone, cannot be considered as substantial evidence. By themselves, generalized and pro forma affidavits cannot
constitute relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate.[40]
True,
employers cannot be compelled to retain in their service employees who are
guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the former. True also, management has the right to
dismiss erring employees as a measure of self-protection. In the case of managerial employees,
employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating their
employment because they perform functions which by their nature require the
full trust and confidence of the company.[41]
However,
loss of trust and confidence has never been intended to afford an occasion for
abuse.[42] It cannot be used arbitrarily, whimsically or
capriciously; it must be supported with substantial evidence.[43]
Unsubstantiated
suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers do not provide legal
justifications for dismissing employees.
In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor,
pursuant to the social justice policy of our labor laws and the Constitution.[44] The act of extorting money from sales agents in
exchange for releasing their commissions is a serious accusation, but
allegation is not proof. We reiterate
that the employer has the burden of proof.
As already pointed out, it failed to present sufficient evidence that
petitioner was responsible for such abnormality.
An
employee who has been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and full
back wages.[45] However, as held by the labor arbiter, conflict and
antagonism have strained the relations between the parties; hence,
reinstatement is no longer viable or advisable. Instead, petitioner should be awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.[46]
Moral
damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee is attended by
bad faith, fraud, or an act oppressive to labor; or if it is done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.[47] The adverse result of an action does not per se
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.[48] Neither attorney’s fees nor litigation expenses
should be awarded,[49] absent a showing of any of the grounds provided under
the Civil Code.[50] Where the award of moral damages is eliminated, so
must the award for attorney’s fees.[51]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are
hereby SET ASIDE. The labor
arbiter’s Decision is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, as follows: (1) private respondent is hereby ORDERED
to pay petitioner (a) back wages from June 16, 1995 up to the finality of this
judgment without any deduction or qualification and (b) separation pay in the
sum of P8,000; and (2) the award for moral damages and attorney’s fees is DELETED. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Labor Arbiter’s Decision, p. 9; rollo,
p. 56.
[2] Third Division, composed of Comms. Joaquin A.
Tanodra, ponente; Lourdes C. Javier, presiding commissioner; and Ireneo
B. Bernardo, member.
[3] NLRC Decision, p. 24; rollo, p. 83.
[4] Resolution, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 85-86.
[5] NLRC Decision, pp. 2-7; rollo, pp.
62-67.
[6] This case was deemed submitted for resolution
upon the Court’s receipt of the Memorandum for the private respondent on
October 9, 1998.
[7] Memorandum for Public Respondent, p. 4; rollo,
p. 180.
[8] The private respondent posed a similarly
worded issue: “Whether or not the Public Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion when it ruled that petitioner was validly dismissed for cause.” See Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 5; rollo,
p. 231.
[9] CDCP Tollways Operation Employees and Workers
Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, 211 SCRA 58, 63, June 3,
1993; Maranaw Hotels & Resort Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 215
SCRA 501, 504-505, November 6, 1992; Philippine Telegraph & Telephone
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 451, 455,
March 21, 1990; and Mary Johnston Hospital v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 165 SCRA 110, 116, August 30, 1988.
[10] Palomado v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 257 SCRA 680, 690, June 28, 1996; Reyes & Lim Company, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 201 SCRA 772, 776, September 25, 1991; and
PNOC-Energy Development Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
201 SCRA 487, 494, September 11, 1991.
[11] Manila Mandarin Employees Union v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 264 SCRA 320, 335, November 19, 1996; and
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
239 SCRA 272, 282, December 16, 1994.
[12] GR No. 130866, September 16, 1998, p. 16, per
Regalado, J.
[13] Labor Arbiter’s Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo,
pp. 53-54.
[14] NLRC Decision, pp. 19-20; rollo, pp.
79-80.
[15] Gonpu Services Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 266 SCRA 657; Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 266 SCRA 713; De la Cruz v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 268 SCRA 458; Reahs Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 247; Pascua v. National Labor Relations
Commission & Tiongsan Super Bazaar, GR No. 123518, March 13, 1998; Paguio
Transport Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, GR No. 119500, August
28, 1998; Vinta Maritime Co., Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations
Commission et al., GR No. 113911, January 23, 1998; Anino et al. v. National
Labor Relations Commission et al., GR No. 123226, May 21, 1998.
[16] Sentinel Security Agency Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, GR Nos. 122468 & 122716, September 3, 1998, pp.
10-11; Escobin v. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 49,
April 15, 1998; Fernandez v. National Labor Relations Commission et
al., 285 SCRA 149, January 28, 1998.
[17] Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 272 SCRA 737, 747, May 29, 1997; Fernandez
et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission et al., supra.
[18] MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 259 SCRA 664, 677, July 29, 1996.
[19] Riker v. Ople, 155 SCRA 85, 92,
October 27, 1987; Cruz v. Medina, 177 SCRA 565, 571, September 15, 1989;
Vergara v. National Labor Relations Commission, GR No. 117196, December
5, 1997, p. 13; ComSavings Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission,
257 SCRA 307, 316, June 14, 1996; Cocoland Development Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 259 SCRA 51, 61, July 17, 1996.
[20] Exh. 2, NLRC Records, p. 80.
[21] Annex 6, NLRC Records, pp. 82-86.
[22] Annex 8, ibid., p. 290.
[23] Secs. 2(d)(ii) & (iii), Rule I, and Sec.
2(1, a & c), Rule XXIII of Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code (1998 ed).
[24] Panlilio v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 281 SCRA 53, 57, October 17, 1997; Philippine Telegraph &
Telephone Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA
451, 457, March 21, 1990; and Bristol Laboratories Employees Association v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 187 SCRA 118, 121, July 2, 1990.
[25] NLRC, Records, p. 194.
[26] The first notice, dated June 2, 1995, was
from the company president, Johnny P. Lee; and the second, dated June 24, 1995,
was from Celeridad.
[27] NLRC Decision, pp. 22-23; rollo, p.
82. The certified true copy of the NLRC
Decision lacks p. 23.
[28] NLRC Records, p. 78.
[29] Ibid., p. 80.
[30] Id., p. 79.
[31] Id., pp. 82-86.
[32] Id., p. 288.
[33] Id., p. 290.
[34] Id., pp. 291-300.
[35] NLRC Records, p. 36.
[36] Id., p. 149. Pahati’s application for cash advance is not, however, found in
the records.
[37] Id., p. 150.
[38] Panlilio v. NLRC, supra;
PT&T v. NLRC, supra; and Bristol Laboratories Employees
Association v. NLRC, supra.
[39] Midas Touch Food Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 259 SCRA 652, 661, July 29, 1996; Molina v.
People, 259 SCRA 138, 159-160, July 24, 1996 Osias v. Court of Appeals,
256 SCRA 101, 118, April 10, 1996; People v. Matildo, 230 SCRA 635, 636,
March 2, 1994.
[40] Cf. Madlos v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 254 SCRA 248, 257, March 4, 1996.
[41] Manila Midtown v. NUWHRAIN, supra;
Cruz v. Medina, supra.
[42] Ranises v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 262 SCRA 371, 379, September 24, 1996.
[43] Madlos v. NLRC, supra.
[44] Samillano v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 265 SCRA 788, 797, December 23, 1996.
[45] Ibid., p. 798; Fernandez v.
National Labor Relations Commission, GR No. 105892, January 28, 1998; and
Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, 265 SCRA 61, 71,
November 28, 1996. The Court in
Bustamante held that in accordance with RA 6715, illegally dismissed employees
are entitled to their full back wages from the time their actual compensation
was withheld until the finality of the Decision (supra).
[46] Belaunzaran v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 265 SCRA 800, 808-809, December 23, 1996; Caliguia v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 264 SCRA 110, 123-124, November 13, 1996;
Tumbiga v. National Labor Relations Commission, 274 SCRA 338, 348, June
19, 1997; and Banana Growers Collective at Puyod Farms v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 276 SCRA 544, 557, July 31, 1997.
[47] Ford Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 267 SCRA 320, 329, February 3, 1997; Cosico Jr. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 272 SCRA 583, 595, May 23, 1997; Equitable Banking
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352, 379,
June 13, 1997; Cocoland Development Corp. v. NLRC, supra, p. 63;
Tumbiga v. NLRC, supra, p. 349.
[48] Barreto v. Arevalo, 99 Phil 771, 780,
August 27, 1956; and Castillo v. Castillo, 95 SCRA 40, 68, January 22,
1980.
[49] Tumbiga v. NLRC, supra; Special
Police Workmen Association (PLUM) Federation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 278 SCRA 828, 835, September 5, 1997; Ramos v. Ramos, 61
SCRA 284, 306, December 3, 1974; Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 86, March
16, 1976; and Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 20 SCRA 61, 66-67, May 16, 1967.
[50] ART.
2208. In the absence of stipulation,
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered except:
1. When exemplary damages are awarded
2. When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his or her interest
3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff
4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff
5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim
6. In actions for legal support
7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers
8. In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws
9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime
10. When at least double judicial costs are awarded
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered
In all cases, the attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
[51] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (Special
Sixth Division), 275 SCRA 413, 432, July 14, 1997; Philippine Air Lines v.
Miano, 242 SCRA 235, 240, March 8, 1995; and LBC v. Court of Appeals,
236 SCRA 602, September 21, 1994.