THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133913. October 12, 1999]
JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS, petitioner, vs. THE CITY OF LEGASPI, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The annulment of a final judgment
on the ground of extrinsic fraud prescribes within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. On the other
hand, a petition for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction may be barred by
laches. In any event, once a
controlling legal principle is established by final judgment, the same parties
may no longer litigate the same matter again.
The
Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) dated January 21, 1998
and its Resolution[3] dated May 18, 1998 in CA-GR
SP No. 34326, dismissing Jose Manuel Stilianopulos’ action to annul the final
Order dated September 16, 1964 in Cad. Case No. RT-763, which directed the Register
of Deeds to reconstitute the Original Certificates of Title (OCT) over certain
properties in favor of the City of Legaspi.
The
Antecedent Facts
On September 26, 1962, the City of
Legaspi filed a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of its titles[4] to twenty parcels of land, including Lot 1 (Psd 3261), the certificates
of which had allegedly been lost or destroyed during World War II.[5] On September 16, 1964, the
trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the Original
Certificates of Title over these lots including OCT No. 665[6] in favor of the applicant.
On August 4, 1970, the City filed
a Complaint for quieting of title over Lot 1, Psd-3261 (covered by OCT No. 665)
against Carlos V. Stilianopulos alias Chas V. Stilianopulos, Ana Estela
Stilianopulos, and the American Oxygen and Acetylene Company.[7] While this case was
pending, Carlos V. Stilianopulos died.
As a consequence, TCT No. T-1427 which was registered under his name was
cancelled, and TCT No. 13448 was issued in the name of his son, petitioner
herein, on July 12, 1974.[8] On February 29, 1984, the
trial court rendered its Decision, which upheld the validity of TCT No. 13448
and its superiority to OCT No. 665.
Thus, petitioner was declared the lawful owner of the disputed property,
Lot 1, Psd-3261.[9]
On appeal by both parties,[10] the Court of Appeals[11] in its Decision of October
16, 1987, reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the City of
Legaspi. Petitioner’s recourse to this
Court was dismissed in a Minute Resolution promulgated on August 17, 1988,[12] on the ground that the
issue raised was factual in nature.
Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution of October 26, 1988.
Undaunted, petitioner filed an
action for the cancellation of OCT No. 665,[13] which the trial court subsequently dismissed
on August 15, 1989 on the ground of res judicata.[14] On appeal,[15] the CA affirmed the trial court, reasoning
that petitioner’s action was “an action for annulment of the order” of the
reconstitution of OCT No. 665 and was therefore not cognizable by the trial
court.[16]
Refusing to accept defeat, on June
13, 1994, petitioner again filed before the Court of Appeals a new action[17] for
annulment of the September 16, 1964 Order based on three grounds: “(1) that the Respondent City of Legaspi procured
OCT No. 665 fraudulently; (2) that the original certificate of title which was
judicially reconstituted was non-existent:
and (3) that the court which ordered the reconstitution lack[ed]
jurisdiction.”[18]
Before the CA, herein petitioner
alleged (1) that the City of Legaspi had omitted in its Petition for
Reconstitution of Title the name and address of his predecessor-in-interest,
Chas V. Stilianopulos, who at the time, was the occupant and possessor of the
disputed property; and (2) that as early as January 26, 1953 and February 10,
1953, the respondent had actual knowledge that the petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest was the registered owner and possessor of said Lot
1. He added that on January 26, 1953, the
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest and the herein respondent had jointly
petitioned the trial court in Cad. Case No. MM-302 for the approval of the
consolidation subdivision plan and the technical description of said Lot 1, as
well as for the issuance by the Register of Deeds of the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title to the subject property in the name of the petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest.[19]
He further alleged that Lot 1, the
disputed property, had never been issued an original certificate of title
before World War II, as it was “not an original/mother lot but a
derived/resulting subdivision which came into existence only on February 10,
1953.” His father and predecessor-in-interest was allegedly the registered
owner of (1) Lot No. 9703-A, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3227, taken by transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3224, which had
been entered at the Register of Deeds of Legaspi, Albay, on August 12, 1936,
and administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate as TCT No. 93
(3227) 20625 on June 20, 1949; and (2) Lot No. 1023, evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1912 entered at the Register of Deeds of Legaspi,
Albay, on October 10, 1931, which was administratively reconstituted from the
owner’s duplicate as TCT No. 98 (1912) 20626 on June 21, 1949.
These two lots were consolidated
and subdivided into Lot 1 with an area of 5,808 square meters for Chas V.
Stilianopulos; and Lot 2 with an area of 1,003 square meters for the City of
Legaspi to which it had been donated by petitioner on September 13, 1952, as a
city street to be named Stilianopulos Boulevard; and Lot 3, containing an area
of 3,205 square meters for Chas V. Stilianopulos, per Consolidation Subdivision
Plan Pcs-3261 surveyed on July 6, 1952.
In the Deed of Donation executed on September 13, 1952, the respondent
acknowledged that the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest was the absolute
owner of the derived or resulting Lot 2 donated to it.[20]
As earlier mentioned, the Petition
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals through the assailed Decision and denied
reconsideration through the assailed Resolution.
Ruling
of Respondent Court
The Court of Appeals ruled that
“the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has lapsed [and] the petitioner is
likewise guilty of laches in the filing of this case for annulment.”
Res judicata had also set in against petitioner, as there was an
identity of parties and causes of action -- ownership and possession of the lot
covered by OCT No. 665 -- between the earlier case for quieting of title and
his Petition for Annulment. Further,
petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the earlier case;
thus, he was guilty of laches.
Hence, this Petition.[21]
Assignment
of Errors
In his Memorandum, petitioner
failed to submit “a clear and concise statement of the issues” as required in
our Resolution dated November 16, 1998.
However, from the “Arguments”[22] found in the Memorandum, we
gather petitioner’s assignment of errors as follows: (1) "the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has [not]
lapsed" and (2) the reconstitution court had no jurisdiction and
“petitioner is [not] guilty of laches.” In addition, the Court will pass upon
the CA holding that this case is also barred by res judicata.
This
Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First
Issue:
Prescriptive Period for Annulment Based on Extrinsic Fraud
Presence of Extrinsic Fraud
Petitioner contends that
respondent committed extrinsic fraud when it alleged in its Petition for
Reconstitution of Title that it was the owner of Lot 1, Pcs-3261, and that the
Original Certificate of Title to said lot issued in its name had either been
lost or destroyed during the last war.
Respondent was allegedly aware all
along that (1) Lot 1 was never covered by an original certificate of title
because it was derived merely from the consolidation and subdivision of Lot
Nos. 9703-A and 1023 on February 10, 1953;[23] (2) as a derived lot, it
was for the first time issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1427 only on
March 5, 1953;[24] (3) the Report of the
Commissioner of Land Registration stated that Decree No. 85234 pertained to Lot
No. 9703, not to the lost or destroyed OCT No. 665 as it was made to appear in
the reconstituted title;[25] (4) petitioner’s father and
respondent jointly petitioned for the approval of the consolidation-subdivision
plan of Lot Nos. 9703 and 1023, resulting in the creation of Lots 1, 2 and 3 in
Cad. Case No. MM-302;[26] and (5) petitioner’s father
donated Lot 2 to respondent.[27]
Further, petitioner and his
predecessor-in-interest were not named in the Petition for Reconstitution as
occupants or “persons in possession” of the disputed land or notified of said
proceedings, in violation of Section 12(e) of Republic Act No. 26.[28] Instead of disputing it,
both the CA and the respondent allegedly elected to remain silent on these
contentions.
For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual.[29] It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where
the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated.[30] It is extrinsic or
collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that
there is no fair submission of the controversy.[31]
Our examination of the facts shows
that, indeed, respondent failed (1) to state in its Petition for Reconstitution
that Lot 1 was occupied and possessed by petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest
and (2) to give him notice of such proceedings. Deliberately failing to notify a party entitled to notice
constitutes extrinsic fraud.[32]
Prescriptive Period
Although the CA and the respondent
impliedly admitted the presence of extrinsic fraud, both contend, however, that
the prescriptive period for filing an action based thereon had already run out
on the petitioner. The appellate court
said:[33]
“If the ground for the annulment is extrinsic fraud, the action has to be filed within four (4) years from the time the fraud is discovered pursuant to the provisions of Article 1891 of the Civil Code. xxx.
“We find in this case that the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has lapsed xxx,
“Cad. Case No. RT-763 was a petition for reconstitution of title dated September 26, 1962 filed by the City of Lega[s]pi thru the then incumbent Mayor Luis S. Los Baños with the Court of First Instance of Albay on September 28, 1962. It resulted in the issuance of the Order dated September 16, 1964 which ordered, among others, the Register of Deeds of Lega[s]pi to reconstitute the titles of Lega[s]pi City over a number of lots, including Lot 1 which is claimed by the petitioner as owned by his predecessor-in-interest. Pursuant thereto, Original Certificate of Title No. 665 was issued in the name of respondent Lega[s]pi City. There is no showing that the order was appealed by any party and has thus become final.
“Petitioner claims that the City of Lega[s]pi is guilty of fraud in not notifying his predecessor-in-interest, Chas. V. Stilianopulos, about the petition for reconstitution of title and that they were never informed of the proceedings or the decision therein rendered thus resulting in the issuance of O.C.T. No. 665 to the City of Lega[s]pi, while they hold T.C.T. No. T-1427 covering the said lot.
“Assuming that petitioner or his father Chas. V. Stilianopulos was intentionally not notified of the proceedings by the City of Lega[s]pi, the records do show that precisely to quiet its O.C.T. No. 665 over the property, the City of Lega[s]pi brought the matter to court.
“In Civil Case No. 4183 for Quieting of Title filed by the City of Lega[s]pi on August 4, 1970 against Stilianopulos over the same parcel of land, one of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff City of Lega[s]pi was to have the plaintiff declared as the lawful owner of Lot 1, Psd-3261 which is a portion of Lot 9703-A and covered by O.C.T. No. 665 in the name of the plaintiff. xxx.
“As early as 1970, therefore, the petitioner was made aware of the existence of O.C.T. No. 665 in favor of the City of Lega[s]pi which he now claims was issued through fraud. Yet, the petitioner failed to file proceedings to annul the Order of reconstitution of O.C.T. No. 665.”
Petitioner argues that the
four-year prescriptive period for filing the Petition for Annulment should
begin, not from August 4, 1970, when the action for quieting of title was
filed, but from the discovery of the fraud by the petitioner’s counsel “shortly
after March 24, 1988.” Petitioner filed the action for cancellation of title
based on extrinsic fraud on May 26, 1988, or sixty-one days after the
“discovery” of the fraud. Said action
allegedly interrupted the running of the prescriptive period until May 26,
1994, when petitioner received a copy of the CA Decision in the case for
cancellation of title. Hence,
petitioner submits that less than three months had lapsed after the filing of
the Petition for Annulment at the CA.
Petitioner’s arguments are
untenable. He could and should have
raised the issue of extrinsic fraud in the action for quieting of title. It was then that he became aware of the
reconstituted title in the name of respondent.
A simple check on the records of the reconstitution proceedings would
have revealed that it was conducted without notice to the petitioner’s father.
Thus, we find no sufficient
explanation why March 24, 1988 should be reckoned as the date when the
prescriptive period should begin.
Simply unacceptable is the contention that petitioner’s counsel
discovered the extrinsic fraud “shortly after March 24, 1988”[34] only. Granting arguendo that the
prescriptive period should begin when petitioner’s counsel read the Land
Registration Commission Report, the “discovery” should have been made earlier,
because the Report had been made available to the said counsel when it was
attached to the respondent’s Appeal Brief on April 5, 1986, or at the latest,
when the CA Decision was promulgated on October 16, 1987. There was absolutely no excuse why
petitioner had to wait until the finality of the Decision in the case for
quieting of title, before raising the issue of extrinsic fraud in order to
annul the Decision in the reconstitution proceedings. Clearly, the facts constituting the fraud should have been known
to petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, when the Petition to quiet the title
was filed in 1970.
Under Article 1391 of the Civil
Code, an action for annulment shall be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud;[35] that is, within four years
from the discovery of the fraudulent statements made in the application.[36] Clearly, the period for
raising this issue lapsed a long time ago.
Second
Issue: Annulment Based on Lack of
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the Reconstitution
Court
Petitioner also avers that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of OCT No. 665,
because respondent failed to state in its Petition that his
predecessor-in-interest was in possession of Lot 1, or to give him notice of
the said proceedings. The appellate
court debunked this contention by ruling that he was the one guilty of laches,
which thus cured the defect in the reconstitution court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner became aware of the
reconstitution proceedings when the action for quieting of title was instituted
in 1970, and the CA held that the lapse of more than twenty years before he
filed the present action to annul the judgment in those proceedings constituted
an unreasonable delay.
From the above allegation, it
appears that the trial court had no jurisdiction. First, under Section 13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to
the occupant of the land covered by the title sought to be reconstituted is
mandatory and jurisdictional.[37] If no notice of the date of
hearing of a reconstitution case is served on the possessor or anyone else
having interest in the property involved, the order of reconstitution is null
and void.[38]
Second, reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a
new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition.[39] Thus, it arises from the
loss or destruction of the owner’s copy of the certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot 1 was
not lost or destroyed. It remained in
the possession of the petitioner’s father and was eventually passed on to
him. If a certificate of title has not
been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the Decision had no
jurisdiction.[40]
Laches as a Defense
However, the CA ruled that the
delay of more than twenty years since petitioner learned of the reconstituted
title was unreasonable, giving rise to the presumption that he had abandoned
the idea of seeking annulment of the proceedings on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and that he had opted to take other actions instead.
Petitioner disputes this CA
ruling, arguing that (1) on May 26, 1988, he filed Cad. Case No. M-10108 for
the cancellation of OCT No. 665, thus negating the presumption that he had
abandoned the annulment of the reconstitution proceedings; (2) he could not
file the action for annulment while the Petition for Cancellation of Title was
still pending, because of the rule against forum-shopping; (3) there was no
unreasonable delay in the filing of his Petition for Annulment, which was filed
just eighteen days after his receipt of the CA Decision upholding the dismissal
of his Petition for Cancellation of Title; and (4) the application of the
equitable doctrine of laches in this case will perpetrate fraud and injustice
against him.
We remain unconvinced. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, warranting the presumption
that the right holder has abandoned that right or declined to assert it.[41] This inaction or neglect to
assert a right converts a valid claim into a stale demand.[42]
Laches prevents a litigant from
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction.[43] True, petitioner filed the
annulment Complaint right after the dismissal of the cancellation-of-title
case, but it is equally true that it was filed only after the quieting-of-title
case had been decided in favor of the respondent. By participating in the quieting-of-title case and arguing
therein his defenses against the legality of the title of the respondent in
order to establish his rights over the disputed property, petitioner is deemed
to have chosen this action over the annulment of the reconstitution
proceedings.
Annulment of the reconstitution
proceedings was belatedly resorted to only after the CA had reversed the trial
court and upheld the reconstituted title of respondent. Laches bars a party from invoking lack of
jurisdiction for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling
everything done, with his active participation, in the case below.[44]
It cannot be said either that the
application of laches would work an injustice against petitioner, because he
was given a fair chance in the quieting-of-title case to prove his ownership of
the disputed lot.
Furthermore,
by seeking the reexamination of the ownership of the disputed lot, petitioner
accepted the jurisdiction of the court which heard the action for quieting of
title. A litigant cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and, after failing to
obtain such relief, to repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[45] Clearly, laches has attached and barred the
petitioner’s right to file an action for annulment.
To show the cogency of the
foregoing disquisition, the interrelation of these rules has recently been
synthesized and codified in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed
within four years from its discovery or, if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches.[46]
Third
Issue:
Res Judicata and the Second Cycle of Review
To show that there is no res
judicata between the earlier case and this Petition for annulment of
judgment, petitioner uses the appellate court's pronouncement in the action for
quieting of title that “the matter of the regularity of the judicial
proceedings for the reconstitution of [OCT] No. 665 affecting its validity has
not been raised in the pleadings.”
Petitioner has jumped to the wrong
conclusion. What the CA said was that
he had not raised the defense of the nullity of the reconstitution
proceedings. It did not rule that res
judicata would not bar a subsequent action for annulment of judgment. Indisputably, he misinterpreted the CA.
We are convinced that indeed res
judicata has already set in. This
conclusion is the most persuasive argument raised by the appellate court. The principle applies when the following
elements are present (1) a judgment has became final; (2) such judgment was
rendered on the merits; (3) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there was identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action between the previous and the subsequent
action.[47] There is identity of cause
of action between a case for annulment of title and one for annulment of
judgment.[48] Causes of action are
identical when there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance
of the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions. If the same facts or evidence can sustain
either, the two actions are considered the same, so that the judgment in one is
a bar to the other.[49]
The underlying objectives or
reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases
are essentially the same -- adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot
and nullification of one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the
same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-title case
would also be used in this Petition.
The difference in form and nature
of the two actions is immaterial and is not a reason to exempt petitioner from
the effects of res judicata.[50] The philosophy behind this
rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. Verily, there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is
fully and fairly adjudicated.[51]
It is also readily apparent that
the action for annulment of judgment was in effect a second cycle of review
regarding a subject matter which has already been finally decided. Material facts or questions that had been in
issue in a former action and were then admitted or judicially determined are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein. Such facts or questions become res judicata and may not
again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action --
whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form of
proceeding, action, subject matter, claim or demand.[52]
Plainly, a second cycle of review
is prohibited. Whatever has once been
irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle in an earlier final
judgment continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in
another suit, as long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the dispute before the court.[53]
Despite the presence of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction in the reconstitution of OCT No. 665, the
annulment of the reconstitution order at this time is futile. At most, petitioner in this case can only
prove possession of the lot at the time of the reconstitution proceedings. However, even if the reconstitution proceedings
and the reconstituted title were annulled, the ownership of the disputed lot by
the respondent has already been settled in the quieting-of-title case. Therefore, the petitioner is legally bound
to abide by the Decision in the earlier case, as he has allowed the trial court
to determine the ownership of the disputed lot and the nullity of his
title. He has lost any legal right to
pose the same question for litigation again before a court of law.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
The Register of Deeds of Albay is ORDERED to CANCEL TCT
No. 13448. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug,
Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-43.
[2] Ninth Division, composed of Justice Salome A.
Montoya, chairman and ponente; Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
Rodrigo V. Cosico, members, both concurring.
[3] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[4] Docketed as Cadastral Case No. RT-763 before
the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II.
[5] CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 37.
[6] Ibid
[7] Docketed as Civil Case No. 4183 before the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch VIII.
[8] Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 2-3; rollo,
pp. 72-73.
[9] Ibid., p. 3; rollo, p. 73. See also Memorandum for Respondent, p. 2; rollo,
p. 112.
[10] Docketed as CA-GR CV No. 06900
[11] Twelfth Division composed of JJ. Pedro
A. Ramirez, ponente; Luis A. Javellana, chairman; and Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes, member, both concurring.
[12] GR No. 82430.
[13] Docketed as GRL Cad. Case No. M-10108 before
the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch V.
[14] Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 5; rollo,
p. 75.
[15] Docketed as CA-GR CV No. 24429.
[16] Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 5-6; rollo,
pp. 75-76. See also Memorandum for
Respondent, p. 6; rollo, p. 116.
[17] Docketed as CA-GR SP No. 34326, the precursor
to the present case.
[18] CA
Decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 34.
[19] Ibid.,
p. 2; rollo, p. 35.
[20] CA Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp.
35-36.
[21] This
case was deemed submitted for resolution on January 25, 1999 upon this Court’s
receipt of the Memorandum for the Respondent.
Petitioner's Memorandum was received earlier.
[22] Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 25-37; rollo,
pp. 95-107.
[23] Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 14; rollo,
p. 84.
[24] Ibid.,
p. 15; rollo, p. 85.
[25] Ibid., p. 16; rollo, p. 86.
[26] Ibid., p. 13; rollo, p. 83.
[27] Ibid., p. 14; rollo, p. 84.
[28] Ibid.,
pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 83-84.
[29] Santos v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA
673, 681, July 21, 1993.
[30] Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas v. Court of
Appeals, 270 SCRA 309, 318-319, March 21, 1997.
[31] Ibid.; Strait Times, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 714, 721-722, August 28, 1998; and Cosmic Lumber
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168, 179-180, November 29,
1996.
[32] Salva v. Salvador, 18 Phil 193, 200,
January 3, 1911.
[33] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp.
37-38.
[34] Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 21; rollo,
p. 91.
[35] Cimafranca v. IAC, supra;
Dumanon v. Butuan City Rural Bank, 119 SCRA 193, 199, December 15, 1982;
Lopez v Court Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, 277, January 20, 1989; Bael v.
Court Appeals, 169 SCRA 617, 624, January 30, 1989; Asuncion v. Court
Appeals, 150 SCRA 353, 362, May 20, 1987.
[36] Tomas Roco v. Gimeda, 104 Phil 1011,
1014, December 27, 1958; and Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
147 SCRA 611, 619, January 31, 1987.
[37] Secs. 12 & 13, RA No. 26; Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 435, January 27, 1981; and
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 551, 556, August 23, 1995.
[38] Ibid.,
p. 439; Alabang Development Corp. v. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA 261, 271-272,
August 30, 1982.
[39] Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA
218, 223, May 22, 1995.
[40] Strait Times v. CA, supra, p.
724; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 158, 162, November 14,
1994; and New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 740,
747-748, February 20, 1996.
[41] Agra v. Philippine National Bank, GR
No. 133317, June 29, 1999, pp. 11-12; Madija v. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540,
551, October 23, 1984; Españo Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 511,
514, February 17, 1997.
[42] Cimafranca v. IAC, supra, p.
620.
[43] Romualdez
v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 414, September 14, 1993;
Cimafranca v. IAC, supra, p. 621. See also Roberto Abad, “Attack on Jurisdiction, When Barred by
Estoppel by Laches,” 46 SCRA 149-157.
[44] Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency
(Filipinas), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 646, 651, July 20, 1990.
[45] Garment and Textile Export Board v.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 258, 297, February 13, 1997.
[46] Section 3, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[47] Guevara v. Benito, 247 SCRA 570, 573,
August 23, 1995; Mangoma v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21, 25, February
1, 1995; and Carlet v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 97, 106, July 7, 1997
[48] Linzag v. CA, 291 SCRA 304, 313, June
26, 1998; Carlet v. CA, supra.
In Mangoma v. CA, there was identity of cause of action between
the specific performance case for execution of deeds of sale and the annulment
of titles cases based on the same contract to sell.
[49] Linzag v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Concepcion v. Agana, 268 SCRA 307, 318, February 17, 1997; Carlet v.
CA, supra, p. 107; Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 492,
502, July 5, 1996.
[50] Linzag v. CA, supra, p. 315;
Carlet v. CA, supra, p. 109.
[51] Linzag v. CA, supra, p. 315.
[52] Carlet v. CA, supra; and Veloso
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 196, 202, August 28, 1996.
[53] Veloso Jr. v. CA, supra;
Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 457, 462, April 18, 1997; and
Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 540, 550-551, February 9, 1996.