FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and
G.R. No. 149118
CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO,
Petitioners,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairman,
-
versus -
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES, and
TINGA,
JJ.
SPOUSES
FORTUNATA BATUYONG,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari challenges the two rulings of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No. 50952. The
first decision dated
First,
the factual background of the case.
Flaviana
Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani P.
Candelaria (Candelaria) were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot, then covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-10870. On 1 February 1995, a partition agreement[3]
was entered into by petitioners and Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294,
containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less, was adjudicated to
Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square
meters, more or less, was given to petitioners.
TCT No. C-10870 was cancelled and TCT No. 288500 was issued in the name
of petitioners.
On
On
A
verification survey was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Florentina C.
Valencia. She submitted a report dated 12
November 1996 which yielded the findings that Lot 6-A (Candelaria’s) and Lot
6-B (petitioners’) were not correctly positioned geographically on the ground
with respect to TCT No. 294743. Thus, as
per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters serves as right of
way of Lot 6-B (petitioners’ lot) while sub-lot C with an area of 10.18 square
meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents’ lot) presently occupied by petitioners.[5]
Despite
the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the forestalled
construction, allegedly occupying at least 20.61 square meters of respondents’
lot, including the portion being used as right of way for petitioners’ tenants.
After
respondents secured a permit from the barangay and the Caloocan City Building
Official to fence their lot, they made demands to petitioners to vacate the
encroached portion but to no avail.
Respondents brought the matter to the barangay but no amicable
settlement was reached. A Certificate to File Action was issued to them
by the Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa. A
final demand was made through a letter dated
On
P500.00 per month
as fair rental value from May 1996 until the premises is finally vacated, plus P5,000.00
as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.[8]
On
appeal, the RTC[9] affirmed
the judgment of the MeTC.[10] In doing so, the RTC debunked the three (3)
arguments posed by petitioners. First, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the
RTC ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the instant complaint. The RTC noted that the issue of jurisdiction
was never raised in the court a quo
while on the other hand, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings
therein by filing their Answer and Position Paper. Evidently, petitioners raised the question of
jurisdiction as a mere afterthought as he did so only after he obtained an
adverse judgment. Second, the
allegations of the complaint sufficiently averred a case for ejectment which
the RTC found to be within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Third, the trial court ruled that petitioners
categorically recognized the validity of the verification survey done by
Engineer
Petitioners
filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied in an
Order[12]
dated
The
complaint in the instant case establishes jurisdictional facts necessary to
sustain the action for unlawful detainer and the remedy it seeks is merely to
obtain possession of the controverted lot from respondents. Specifically, it alleges that sometime on May
21, 1996, petitioners started construction works in the area which intruded
into a portion of respondents’ property; that the parties eventually agreed to
stop the construction subject to the result of a survey to be conducted
thereon; that a survey was conducted in the presence of the parties and a
report was submitted by Engr. Valencia on November 12, 1996, showing an
encroachment of about 20.61 square meters of respondents’ lot including that
portion being used as a right of way for petitioners’ tenants; that even after
the boundaries had been verified, petitioners resumed the construction on the
area; that despite verbal and written demands, the last of which was made on
March 20, 1999, petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the encroached
area. Surely, respondents’ resort to
unlawful detainer when petitioners failed to leave the controverted premises
upon demand is in order.[14]
The
appellate court also held that the fact that petitioners’ houses already stood on
the controverted lot long before the purchase of the land by respondents failed
to negate the case for ejectment.[15] The
appellate court emphasized that prior physical possession is not a condition sine qua non in unlawful detainer cases. The court likewise sustained the RTC findings
on the validity of the verification survey conducted by Engineer
On
Petitioners
now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the question of
jurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey results.[17]
Petitioners
anchor their petition on the court a quo’s
lack of jurisdiction over the instant suit.
The averments in the complaint do not make out a case for ejectment,
they claim, as their entry into the disputed lot was not made by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Neither was their possession of the disputed property by virtue of the
tolerance of respondents or the latter’s predecessor-in-interest.
Respondents
counter that the jurisdictional elements necessary to maintain an action for
unlawful detainer clearly obtain in the case at bar, namely: (a) after the
parties agreed to the conduct of a survey by a government surveyor and after
the survey, it was determined that the structures introduced by herein
petitioners have encroached a portion of herein respondents’ lot; (b) notices to vacate and surrender of
possession of the encroached portion were made to petitioners, the last being on
March 20, 1997; and (c) the suit was
instituted on April 11, 1997 or within one (1) year from date of last demand.[18]
Respondents also stress that
possession of the premises by petitioners took place more than one year before
the filing of the complaint and the absence of an allegation in the complaint
that such possession of the disputed portion was merely by virtue of respondents’
tolerance does not deprive the lower court of its original and exclusive
jurisdiction nor will it negate respondents’ action for unlawful detainer.[19]
It
is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[20]
The
Complaint[21] filed
by respondents (plaintiffs therein) alleged these material facts:
2. That defendants and Isagani P. Candelaria were the
former co-owners of a certain piece of land located in Maypajo,
3. That on February 1, 1995, said co-owners subdivided
this parcel of land by virtue of a Partition Agreement wherein Lot 6-A, Psd
00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters, more or less, was given to
Isagani P. Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square
meters, more or less, was given to defendants. A copy of said Partition
Agreement is hereto attached as Annex “A”;
xxx xxx xxx
5. That on P100,000.00,
under a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
7. That
sometime in May 21, 1996, defendants started construction works in the area and
intruded into the lot owned by the plaintiffs causing the latter to protest and
report the matter to the barangay authorities;
8. That on the same day, the parties were summoned to
appear before the Barangay Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the
construction works, and in a subsequent conference on June 7, 1996, they agreed
to defer the matter pending the result of a survey to be conducted by a
government surveyor;
xxx xxx xxx
11. That the following day,
12. That on
13. That
despite defendants’ knowledge of the property boundary, and despite repeated
serious objections from plaintiffs, defendants proceeded to construct a
seven-door bungalow-type semi-concrete building, occupying at least 10.18
square meters and another 10.43 square meters for the right of way, thus
encroaching upon at least 20.61 square meters of plaintiffs’ lot, and further
demolishing plaintiff’s wall.
xxx xxx xxx
20. That
despite repeated and continuous demands made by plaintiffs upon defendants,
both oral and written, the last being on March 20, 1997, defendants in manifest
bad faith, wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and oppressive manner and in
utter disregard of the property rights of plaintiffs, have failed and refused,
and still fail and refuse to vacate the same up to the present time x x x.[22]
From the above-quoted allegations
taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible
entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer. The
distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: first, in forcible
entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; second,
in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from
the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the
defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract
with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a
previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in
nature.[23]
Respondents had been in prior
physical possession of the property in the concept of owner prior to petitioners’
intrusion on
On the other hand, to establish a
case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in physical
possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by
another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[24] It is not essential, however, that the
complaint should expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up
showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.[25]
The words "by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and
exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of
"force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary
that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of
going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.[26] In the case at bar, petitioners’ encroachment
into respondents’ property in an oppressive and malevolent manner, coupled with
their refusal to vacate the premises
despite knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless of respondents’ serious
objections, indelibly connotes “force” within the meaning of the law.
Petitioners contend that while they
concede they might have intruded on respondents’ property, the action is barred
by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the occurrence
of the alleged intrusion. The contention
is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior
court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1) year,
respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession. In forcible entry, the
one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land.[27]
Records show that the ejectment suit
was instituted on
As a collateral issue, petitioners
claim that they are at least entitled to the rights of a builder in good faith on
the premise that they are not the owners of the property encroached upon.
This
contention is not tenable. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder
that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw
in his title.[28] In the
instant case, when the verification survey report came to petitioners’
knowledge their good faith ceased. The
survey report is a professional’s field confirmation of petitioners’
encroachment of respondents’ titled property. It is doctrinal in land
registration law that possession of titled property adverse to the registered
owner is necessarily tainted with bad faith.
Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot despite
knowledge of respondents’ ownership put petitioners in bad faith.
Now,
the second issue. Petitioners question
the evidentiary weight of the verification survey report. They point out that since the survey was a
unilateral act of respondents, done as it was without their consent, they
should not be bound by its findings.[29]
In
raising the issue, petitioners are in effect asking this Court to reassess the factual
findings of the courts below, a task which is beyond this Court’s domain. Factual matters cannot be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. This Court at this stage is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[30] We find no ample reason to depart from this rule,
more so in this case where the Court of Appeals has affirmed the factual
findings of the RTC and the MeTC.
Moreover, there is a presumption that
official duty is regularly performed,[31] i.e., government officials who perform
them are clothed with the presumption of regularity,[32]
as the courts below pointed out.[33] In this case, the verification survey was
conducted by a government functionary.
Even prescinding from the presumption
of regularity, what appears on record is that the verification survey was
conducted with the agreement of both parties and in their presence. That was the finding made by the courts below
and affirmed by the appellate court without any wrinkle.[34]
WHEREFORE,
based on the foregoing, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1]Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Mariano M. Umali.
[2]Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
[20]Ross Rica Sales Center v. Spouses Ong, G.R.
No. 132197, 16 August 2005, citing Caniza
v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) and Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10
September 2003, 410 SCRA 484; Ganila, et.
al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, 28 June 2005, citing Heirs of Demetrio Melchor v. Melchor,
G.R. No. 150633, 12 November 2003, 415 SCRA 726, 732; Tecson v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 152978, 4 March 2005.
[23]Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 216 citing
Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44
(1951); Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil.
44 (1921); Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil.
230 (1944); Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74
Phil. 666 (1944); Banayos v. Susana
Realty, Inc. L-30336, 30 June 1976, 71 SCRA 557; Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, et al., No. L-53788,
[26]David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28
July 2005, citing Mediran v. Villanueva,
37 Phil. 752 (1918); Joven v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, 2 August 1992, 212 SCRA 700.
[27]Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 577; Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, 19 October 2001, 367 SCRA 631, citing Sps. Pedro Ong and Veronica Ong v. Socorro Parel and Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, 28 March 2001; Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968).
[30]Filinvest Land v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138980, 20 September 2005, citing Alvarez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142843, 6 August 2003, 408 SCRA 419.
[32]Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108,
[33]Said the MeTC:
As rightly pointed out by the plaintiffs in their
position statement, there is no law that prohibits the conduct of a
verification survey. Indeed, a survey
enjoys the presumption of accuracy until it can be proven otherwise. (Rollo, p.
129)
On appeal, the RTC further elucidated, thus:
Anent the conclusion of the court a quo
that indeed the defendants-appellants have encroached upon a portion of the
plaintiffs-appellees’ lot, this Court finds no reason to disturb the same.
It must be pointed out that there was
already an admission at the barangay level that the defendants-appellants have
encroached on the lot of the plaintiffs-appellees as evidenced by Exhibit “R”
which was not controverted.
This fact stems from a verification survey conducted by no less than a representative from the DENR, a government entity. The rule is that: “Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption.” Moreover, it has been held that: “Absent a strong showing to the contrary, the Court must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.” (Rollo, p. 155, citations omitted).