ARSENIO VERGARA
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. Promulgated:
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
The
sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not
only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[1]
Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.[2]
On appeal is the Decision[3] of
the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding
petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165)[5]
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to
pay a fine of P350,000.00.[6]
I.
On
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
On
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued with the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely,
Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño),
who arrested petitioner.
Bautista
testified that at around
Aratas
and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material points. On
cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the
contents of petitioner’s bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado.[10] Nonetheless,
he claimed that at Mercado’s house, it was petitioner himself who brought out
the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoño
testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioner’s bag
and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.[11]
The
prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the
forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him
for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a
plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination,
however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner
nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could
not identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the
marijuana leaves.[12]
The charges were denied by petitioner.
As the defense’s sole witness, he testified that at around
Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s
house, his bag was opened by the tanod
and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later
turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He
claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did
not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend
such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and
charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he
who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friend’s house, he
averred that it was one of the tanod
who did so at Mercado’s house and that it was only there that they saw the
marijuana for the first time.[14]
Finding that the prosecution had
proven petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordered him to
pay a fine of P350,000.00.[15]
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. On
That
the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the
existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In this case,
accused-appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper
was taken from his bag. The corpus
delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the
existence of the marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by
accused-appellant
In this appeal, petitioner prays for
his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal,
that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search
of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he
maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in
evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear
showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance which could
have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied.[17]
After meticulous examination of the
records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so holds that a
reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere
in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in
the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person.[18] Petitioner’s
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the
admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were
incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating
the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as
well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell,
that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents
of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of
the barangay captain. On their
way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the
contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first
time at the barangay captain’s
house.
Even casting aside petitioner’s
version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just
the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person may be
arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
x x
x
It is obvious that based on the
testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod,
not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was
arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at
the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense.[20] The tanod
did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a),
Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.[21] Here,
petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as
he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run
away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod
with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging
in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner
testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the prosecution’s version
generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the start, the
conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that
petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then
later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.[22] Of
persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz[23] that
“[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt
without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous.”
Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to
an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v.
Tudtud,[24]
“[t]he phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part
of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his
liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows
exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its
application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.”[25]
Indeed, the supposed acts of
petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as
sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest.[26]
If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under
the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion
they have been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a
stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,[27] must precede
a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.[28]
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of
his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves
allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as
they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.[29]
As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
—
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest. The
following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1)
search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4)
waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected
in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.[30]
When petitioner was arrested without
a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit.
Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the
Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search being incidental
to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not
convinced. As we explained in Caballes v.
Court of Appeals[31] —
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[32]
In the case at bar, following the theory
of the prosecution— albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when
petitioner’s bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was
already under the coercive control of the public officials who had custody of
him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed
to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged
"consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag
when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within
the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.[33] As
a result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.[34]
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in
evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful
search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the
identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioner’s bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof that the
transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.[35] The
existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine
qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime.[36]
In a line of cases, we have ruled as
fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the
accused.[37] There
can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and
established to be the prohibited drug.[38]
As we discussed in People v. Orteza[39],
where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements
necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu –
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers
complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified
in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said
drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation,
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of
the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was
submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually
recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the
buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People
v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the
seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People,
the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where
the markings on the shabu were made
and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to
the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution’s failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest
of petitioner by the barangay tanod,
the records only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to
the police station. The Joint Affidavit[40]
executed by the tanod merely states
that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police
station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt[41] issued
by the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected
drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod
contradict each other on the matter of when petitioner’s bag was opened, they
also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The
prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies.
Even more damning to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist,
that he did not know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached
the police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the
marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police
officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if
such was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to
establish the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought
for examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as
irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody
over the seized marijuana as such “[f]inds prominence only when the existence
of the seized prohibited drug is denied.”[42]
We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the
appellate court narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana was taken
from his bag, without taking the statement in full context.[43] Contrary
to the Court of Appeals’ findings, although petitioner testified that the
marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof.[44] Furthermore,
it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the
principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in
criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers
and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of
custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper
exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time
the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who
takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for,
safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or
replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence
to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the
courts a quo cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[45] Among
the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence.
This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the
defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this “[c]annot be used to
advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.”[46]
Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences,
one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible
with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason
that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.[47]
Drug addiction has been invariably
denounced as “an especially vicious crime,”[48] and
“one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society,”[49] for
those who become addicted to it “not only slide into the ranks of the living
dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding
members of society,”[50]
whereas “peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction.”[51]
Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the
moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully
vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and
drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an accused’s
right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it
shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In this case, the totality of the
evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which
petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s
exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to
take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of
diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons
brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake.
Here, we note that the courts a quo
neglected to give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the
determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that
in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are
duty-bound to be “[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person
be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.”[52]
In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public
officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest
degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner,
unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court
of
the date of his release, or the
reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[3]Rollo, pp. 76-89. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
[17]People v. Bacla-an, 445 Phil. 729, 746 (2003), citing People v. Mendoza, 327 SCRA 695 (2000). See also People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125 (2000).
[18]See People v. Bacla-an, 445 Phil. 445 Phil.
729, 748 (2003) citing People v. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000)
and People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283
(1995). See also People v. Kimura,
G.R. No. 130805,
[21]People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775
(2003), citing People v. Chua, G.R.
Nos. 136066-67,
[36]People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637, 648 (2003), citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116 (1994). See also People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 61, citing People v. Mendiola, supra, People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762 (1989), People v. Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 (1990) and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136 (1990).
[37]See People v. Mapa, G.R. No. 91014, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 670 (1993), People v. Dismuke, G.R. No. 108453, 11 July 1994, 234 SCRA 51, People v. Casimiro, 383 SCRA 400 (2002), People v. Pedronan, 452 Phil. 226 (2003), People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, 21 June 2004, 432 SCRA 470.
[45]People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 158
(2000), citing People v. Pagaura, 267
SCRA 17 (1997), People v. De los
[46]People v. Santos, G.R. No. 175593,
[47]People v. Sapal, 385 Phil. 109, 126 (2000), citing People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 126998, 14 September 1999 and People v. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993).
[48]Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, 329 Phil. 432, 435 (1996), citing
People v. Nario, 224 SCRA 647 (1993).
[50]