SECOND DIVISION
|
WILFRED*
A. NICOLAS,
Petitioner,
-versus- HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Third Division and
the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
Respondents. x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x JOSE FRANCISCO ARRIOLA, Petitioner, - versus - THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
G.R. Nos. 175930-31 G.R. Nos. 176010-11 Present: QUISUMBING,
Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 11, 2008 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In the present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, petitioners, Wilfred A. Nicolas (Nicolas) and Jose Francisco
Arriola (Arriola), attribute to public
respondent, Sandiganbayan, grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolutions of August 31, 2006[1]
and December 7, 2006[2]
denying their Demurrer to Evidence and their motions for reconsideration,
respectively.
Nicolas and Arriola, former
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, respectively, of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), stand charged before public respondent
in Criminal Case Nos. 26267 and 26268,[3] for violation of Section 3604[4] of
the Tariff and Customs Code in the first case, and Section 3(e)[5] of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in the
second.
Culled
from the records are the following material facts:
On
On
For purportedly allowing the release
of the goods, Nicolas and Arriola were indicted for conspiring with one John
Doe who took possession of the goods without proper documentation and payment
of customs duties and taxes in the alleged amount of P656,950, thereby
depriving the government of revenue.
Both Nicolas and Arriola pleaded not
guilty to the charges.
The prosecution presented four
witnesses: (1) Commodore George T. Uy (Uy), former commander of the LOGCOM
whose signature appeared in the Authority for the withdrawal of the van; (2) Romeo Allan Rosales, chief of
the Informal Entry Division-Manila International Container Port (IED-MICP); (3)
Ruel Pantaleon (Pantaleon), chief of the Supply Section of the General Services
Division (GSD) of the Bureau of Customs; and (4) Alejo Acorda (Acorda) of the
LOGCOM who signed as a witness in the Certification of Withdrawal of the van.
Through its testimonial and
documentary evidence, the prosecution attempted to show that the withdrawal of
the van from the LOGCOM compound was based on a Notice of Withdrawal signed by
Nicolas, and on the Authority for the withdrawal of the van which, though it
appeared to have been issued by Uy, was not actually signed by him.
The prosecution likewise attempted to
establish that the documents, including Official Receipts allegedly presented
to show payment of customs duties and taxes, were all spurious.
After concluding the presentation of
its evidence, the prosecution filed on
By Resolution of
(1) Exhibit “A” -
Turn-Over
Receipt dated
(2) Exhibit “E” - Certification of Withdrawal
dated
(3) Exhibit “F” - A portion of the passport of then Capt. Uy[11]
(4) Exhibit “G” -
Affidavit
of Capt. Uy dated
(5) Exhibit
“H” -
Letter
dated
(6) Exhibit
“I” -
Letter
dated
(7) Exhibits “J” to J-2” - Certification
dated
(8) Exhibit
“K” -
Certification
dated
The rest of the Exhibits for the
prosecution, being mere photocopies, were not admitted by public
respondent. The excluded evidence
consisted of
Petitioners separately filed motions
for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Attached
Demurrer to Evidence.[17]
Respecting the first Information, petitioners’ respective Demurrer maintained that the
evidence admitted by public respondent failed to identify and prove that they
were the perpetrators of the crimes charged, for there was no showing that they
caused, approved or acted in any manner relative to the release of the goods.
Petitioners went on to contend that
none of the documentary evidence bore their names or signatures. And neither
was there any testimonial evidence that they acted towards the release of the
shipment.
Additionally, petitioners contended
that the shipment was not shown to be imported, or for export, or otherwise
subject of coastwise trade as to be subject to customs duties; and that even assuming that customs
duties were due, there was no evidence that the same were not paid.
Regarding Import Entry Declaration
Nos. 5000-99, 5001-99 and 5002-99 which, the prosecution maintained, were used
for the release of the goods but were not processed through the IED-MICP, petitioners contended
that the same were not shown to have a bearing on the shipment or to their
indictment. These import entry
declarations were not even presented as documentary evidence, they added.
On the prosecution’s submission
that customs duties were not paid, petitioners’ contended that the same
is visited by a similar failure to link the allegedly fraudulent Official
Receipt[18]
Nos. 75071606, 7501609, and 75071603 to the cargo.
Respecting the second Information, petitioners’ Demurrer maintained that the prosecution
failed to establish each and every material element thereof.
In the main, petitioners thus argued
that the prosecution was not only unable to show that they were the
perpetrators of the crimes charged or that they committed any prohibited
act; it was also not able to prove
that undue injury was caused the government.
Finally, as to both Informations,
petitioners submitted that the existence of conspiracy between them and/or John
Doe was not established.
To petitioners’ motions to File
Demurrer to Evidence[19]
and their Demurrer to Evidence,[20]
the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition.
By the first questioned Resolution of
Public respondent concluded that
petitioners should not have allowed the withdrawal of the goods from the LOGCOM
compound by persons other than the real consignee and without obtaining proof that
the customs duties were fully and correctly paid. In doing so, public respondent ruled,
petitioners “can be deemed to have conspired or colluded with one
another or others to defraud the customs revenue or otherwise violated the
law.”[21]
Petitioners filed their respective
motions for reconsideration.[22] The prosecution filed an Opposition[23]
which merited petitioners’ Reply.[24]
By the second questioned Resolution
of
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
As stated early on, petitioners
jointly ascribe grave abuse of discretion to public respondent for denying
their Demurrer given what they submit is the absence or lack of evidence to
sustain the cases against them.
Nicolas additionally submits that
public respondent grievously abused its discretion when it disregarded this
Court’s December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R. No. 154668[26]
“Wilfred A. Nicolas v. Aniano A.
Desierto,” in which he was absolved of administrative liability
for gross neglect of duty and
dishonesty arising from the same incident subject of the criminal charges
against him.
Invoking the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, Nicolas contends that public respondent particularly
failed to abide by this Court’s ruling in the said administrative case
that he had acted in good faith in relying upon the apparently valid and
genuine documents submitted to him when he requested for the release of the van
from the LOGCOM compound.
It appears that Nicolas had, by way
of a Manifestation,[27]
informed public respondent of this Court’s Decision in the administrative
case. Public respondent merely
noted it, however, together with the pleadings that were subsequently filed
after the Manifestation.[28] On the basis of the same Decision in the
administrative case, Nicolas filed a Motion to Dismiss[29]
the criminal cases against him but public respondent denied it.[30]
Before delving on the substantive
issues, this Court must first address the propriety of the availment of a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in assailing a denial of a demurrer to
evidence. Then, too, it must determine if the present petitions have been
rendered moot and academic by the continuation of the trial – for
reception of evidence for the defense.
As to the latter issue, the Court notes that public respondent had
cancelled the initial presentation of defense evidence upon the filing of the
present petitions to afford the Court time to act on petitioners’
applications for TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
By Order given in open court on
The Court did not issue a TRO or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop public respondent from continuing the
proceedings in the cases. There is
no information if the defense has started or concluded the presentation of its
evidence.
Be that as it may, the continuation
of the trial should not stand in the way of this Court’s ruling on the
present petitions. Suffice it to
stress that should the denial of petitioners’ Demurrer be found to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, whatever proceedings were conducted
before public respondent during the pendency of the present petitions are void.
Moreover, it bears stressing that the
evidence for the prosecution is the yardstick for determining the sufficiency
of proof necessary to convict; and
that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence rather than
on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[32]
On whether certiorari is the proper
remedy in the consolidated petitions, the general rule
prevailing is that it does not lie to review an order denying a demurrer to
evidence, which is equivalent to a
motion to dismiss, filed after the prosecution has presented its
evidence and rested its case.[33]
Such order, being merely interlocutory, is not appealable; neither
can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.[34]
The rule admits of exceptions, however. Action on a demurrer or on a motion to dismiss rests on the
sound exercise of judicial discretion.[35] In Tadeo v. People,[36]
this Court declared that certiorari
may be availed of when the denial of a demurrer to evidence is tainted with “grave abuse of discretion or
excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.” And so it did declare
in Choa v. Choa[37]
where the denial is patently erroneous.
Indeed, resort to
certiorari is expressly recognized and allowed under Rules 41 and 65 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Rule 41:
SEC.
1. Subject of appeal. – x x x
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x
x
(c) An interlocutory order;
x x x
x
In all the above instances where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Rule
65:
SEC. 1. Petition
for certiorari -- When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
(Emphasis supplied)
Did public respondent commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ Demurrer? The Court finds that it did.
Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. –
After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence:
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to
be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of court.
If the court
denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files
such motion without the express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of
the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or sustain the
issue.[38]
The party filing the demurrer in effect challenges the sufficiency
of the prosecution’s evidence.[39] The Court is thus tasked to ascertain if
there is competent or sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt.[40]
Alleged Violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code
With respect to petitioners’
indictment for violation of Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the
prosecution needed to prove that: (1) at the time material to the case,
petitioners were officials or employees of the Bureau of Customs or of any
other agency of the government charged with the provisions of the Code; and (2)
they either conspired or colluded with another or others to defraud the customs
revenue or otherwise violate the law (paragraph d), or willfully made an
opportunity for any person to defraud the customs revenue or failed to do any act
with intent to enable any person to defraud the customs revenue (paragraph e).
Fraud contemplated by law must be
intentional – that which is actual and not constructive, and consists of
deception willfully and deliberately dared or resorted to in order to give up
some right.[41]
Conspiracy, on the other hand, must
be established by the same quantum of evidence as the elements of the offense
charged. It must be shown by overt
acts indicating not only unity of purpose but also unity in execution of the
unlawful objective by the alleged conspirators.[42]
From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the
prosecution admitted by public respondent, the Court gathers that apart from
establishing that petitioners were government officials, the prosecution was only
able to establish that: (1) the van was turned over to the LOGCOM on April 19,
1999; (2) the same van was withdrawn from the LOGCOM compound on May 6, 1999;
(3) the signature appearing above the name of prosecution witness, then LOGCOM
commander Uy, in the Authority for the withdrawal of the van was not his; (4)
Import Entry Nos. 5000-99 to 5002-99 were not filed with the IED-MICP; and (5)
Bureau of Customs O.R. Nos. 75071606, 7501609, and 75071603 are spurious.
There is no competent or sufficient
evidence of particular overt acts that would tend to show that petitioners
colluded with each other or with another person or others to defraud the
customs revenue or to otherwise violate the law, or that they willfully made it
possible for John Doe to defraud the customs revenue.
Not one of the prosecution witnesses
identified, mentioned or even alluded to either of petitioners as having
personally interceded or been present during the release of the cargo from the
LOGCOM compound, or testified as to any act or omission that may be construed
to be in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the customs
revenue.
The Notice of Withdrawal (Exhibit
“D”), the only document bearing the name and signature of
petitioner Nicolas, was not even admitted by respondent court.
It may not be amiss to mention
further that while Uy testified that he did not sign the Authority to release
the van, he admitted during cross-examination that the signature above his
printed name appeared to be that of his deputy commander, Col. Romero, who was
authorized to sign “for” him in his absence.[43]
Respecting
the purported failure of petitioners to note the fraudulent nature of O.R. Nos.
75071606, 7501609 and 75071603, the Court notes the testimony of Pantaleon,
then chief of the Supply Section of the GSD of the Bureau of Customs, which is
quoted in the Petition[44]
of Nicolas, and which merited no refutation from the prosecution in its Consolidated
Comment.
Thus, during cross-examination,
Pantaleon stated that only the Printing Office, his Division chief and he were
privy to the formula used in the printing of BC Forms No. 38, and that other
government offices including the EIIB have not been informed of this formula.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness you made mention of [the] formula used in determining the series number of official receipts. Now, could you tell us: Does this formula change every year or is it constant?
A: Constant, sir.
Q: So, the same formula in 1999 is the same formula for this year?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Okay, now Mr. Witness, who determined this formula?
A: I myself, Sir.
Q: You determined the formula?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Okay.
Now, Mr. Witness, who were the persons to whom you divulged this
formula?
A: Sa
akin po at saka sa Hepe ng Division na nagretiro. To me and to the Chief Division that
[sic] ha[s] retired.
Q: Aside from the two (2) of you, nobody knows the formula?
A: The printing office, Sir.
x x x x
Q: Now, in performing your duties with respect to the formula and the printing of the official receipts, do you inform other government offices of the formula?
A: No, Sir.
Q: So, you did not inform the EIIB in 1999 about this formula?
A: Hindi
po. No, Sir.
Q: So they wouldn’t know by just looking
at the official receipt whether the official receipt is fake or not because
they do not know the formula, would that be a fair statement?
A: They don’t know the series, Sir.
Q: Now my question is, you wouldn’t know whether the official receipts would be fake?
A: Hindi ko po alam kung paano nila i-determine. I don’t know how they will determine it.[45] (Italics and emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, petitioners were not in
a position to detect any fraud.
As
to the allegations in the Informations that petitioners failed to turn over the
goods to the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Memorandum No. 225 and the Joint
Guidelines, this Court reiterates its observations in the administrative case
against Nicolas subject of G.R. No. 154668:[46]
x x x. Under its standard operating procedure, [the EIIB] normally did the inventory in the presence of representatives of the AFP Logistics Command (which was the depository of apprehended container vans), the Bureau of Customs, the broker or importer, and the Commission on Audit. If there was any irregularity, only then would the EIIB turn over the cargo to the Bureau of Customs.
The aforementioned procedure was consistent with Memorandum Order No. 225, which required the turnover of seized articles to the Bureau of Customs. For practical considerations, the EIIB could not be expected to forward to the Bureau of Customs all cargoes immediately upon apprehension. The EIIB still needed to determine whether there was any irregularity in the importation. Memorandum Order No. 225 itself did not require the immediate forwarding of apprehended cargoes to the Bureau of Customs. Believing in good faith that the taxes and duties had already been paid, petitioner [Nicolas] cannot be faulted for not sending the cargo to the Bureau.[47]
Alleged Violation of R.A. No. 3019
To sustain the indictment or to
support a guilty verdict against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution must establish all the foregoing elements of the
offense:
1. The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
2. That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
3. The public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public functions;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.[48]
The prosecution attempted to build
its case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 upon the theory that Nicolas and
Arriola, as EIIB commissioner and deputy commissioner, respectively, and in
connection with their official duties as such, were responsible for the release
of the goods from the LOGCOM compound without the actual payment of customs
duties and taxes, thereby causing injury to the government.
The prosecution proffered that the
withdrawal of the van from the LOGCOM based on what turned out to be fictitious
documents and the subsequent loss of its cargo, which they attributed to
petitioners, were motivated by manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect.
The evidence for the prosecution
failed to sustain its case, however.
In addition to this Court’s earlier observations about the missing
links in the prosecution’s evidence, it failed to show by what particular
acts petitioners had discharged their functions with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.
Sistoza v. Desierto[49] stressed that for culpability to
attach under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, it is not enough to show mere bad
faith, partiality or negligence because the law requires the bad faith or
partiality to be evident or manifest, respectively, and the negligent deed to
be gross and inexcusable. And that
the acts indicating any of these modalities of committing the violation must be
determined with certainty.[50] Thus held the Court:
Simply
alleging each or all of these methods is not enough to establish probable
cause, for it is well settled that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can we deduce any or all of the
modes from mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of the
petitioner as with any other person is presumed. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith which
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will.
On the other hand, gross inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. Rather, it refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It entails the omission of care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property, and in cases involving public officials it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and devious.[51] (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case of Nicolas, he was
exonerated of administrative liability in G.R. No.
154668[52]
by this Court. In said case,
the Court noted that while he requested the release of the cargo, he did so in
good faith as he relied on the records before him and the recommendation of
Arriola. And it noted that there was nothing to indicate that he had
foreknowledge of any irregularity about the cargo.[53] Thus Nicolas was absolved of having
acted with gross neglect of duty, viz:
Arias v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 81563
& 82512,
x
x x x
Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence. While Arriola might have been negligent in accepting the spurious documents, such fact does not automatically imply that Nicolas was also. As a matter of course, the latter relied on the former’s recommendation. Petitioner [Nicolas] is not mandated or even expected to verify personally from the Bureau of Customs — or from wherever else it originated — each receipt or document that appears on its face to have been regularly issued or executed.[54]
This Court is not unmindful of its
rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of
a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the
administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not
inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa.[55] The applicability of these rulings,
however, must be distinguished in the present cases.
In Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman[56]
and the other cases[57]
cited by the prosecution in its Consolidated Comment,[58]
it was the dismissal of the criminal cases that was pleaded to abate the
administrative cases filed against the therein petitioners.
More importantly, the quantum of
proof required to sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than
that necessary for criminal actions. To this effect was the ruling in Ocampo:
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then, too, there is the “substantial evidence” rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusion in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.[59] (Emphasis supplied)
Where, as in this case, the
administrative complaint was dismissed for failing to satisfy the degree of
proof which is merely substantial evidence, a
fortiori the criminal case based on the same facts and evidence cannot but
falter and fall against the highest quantum of proof – proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
The present cases must be
distinguished likewise from those involving the prior dismissal of
administrative cases.[60]
Unlike in the cases cited by the prosecution, this Court’s Decision in
the administrative case against Nicolas ruled squarely that the he was not
guilty of bad faith and gross neglect of duty,
which constitute an essential element
of the crime under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Under the doctrine of stare
decisis, such ruling should be applied to the criminal case for violation
of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, the facts and evidence being substantially the
same.[61]
In
fine, absent the element of evident bad faith and gross neglect of duty, not to
mention want of proof of manifest partiality on the part of Nicolas, the graft
case against him cannot prosper.
Like in the case of Nicolas, no act
or conduct on the part of Arriola was established that would tend to show that
he had acted in evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable
negligence in the performance of his functions, as then deputy commissioner of
the EIIB and head of the Special Operations Group, relative to the release of
the van.
Turning once more to the evidence in the
present criminal cases, no documentary or testimonial evidence linking Arriola
to the withdrawal of the van, much more, the loss of the goods it contained, is
appreciated.
To stress, not one of the documents
admitted for the prosecution contained Arriola’s name, initials or
signature. Neither did any of the
prosecution witnesses, not even Acorda who was present during the deposit and
withdrawal of the van from the LOGCOM compound, mention or refer to Arriola in
any manner or testify on his probable complicity or involvement in the crimes
charged. For that matter, nothing
in the entire testimony of Acorda[62]
supports the submission that it was upon Arriola’s request that the van
was withdrawn from the LOGCOM.
ATTY. SABADO [On cross-examination]
Q : Do
you know the reason why Major
Rasay and Captain Uy
allowed the shipment or the van to be taken out of the
Logcom?
WITNESS
A : For
us, sir, when there is a request from the EIIB that the
property be released, and if it is
approved by our boss, it
will be released, sir.
ATTY. SABADO
Q
: So,
you only knew that there was a request and that Captain Uy and Major Rasay
allowed this request?
WITNESS
A
: Yes,
sir.[63]
Even granting arguendo Arriola made a recommendation for the withdrawal of the van as the prosecution suggested, this alone does not prove that he acted in bad faith. The presumption of law being in favor of good faith, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove bad faith.
Even on the purported spurious
receipts that prosecution witness Pantaleon testified on, there is no showing
that Arriola was instrumental or participated in their preparation or that he
knew of their fraudulent nature.
It bears emphasis that references to
petitioner Arriola in the Decision on the administrative case against Nicolas
were made only for the purpose of determining the culpability of the latter.
These statements, therefore, are in no way binding on Arriola.
Given
that the evidence presented by the prosecution against petitioners does not prima facie prove petitioners’
culpability beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence did not shift to
the defense. The Court thus finds
that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in denying their Demurrer
to Evidence.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan’s assailed
Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* “Wilfredo” in some pleadings.
[1] Penned
by Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, chairperson of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan and concurred in by Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y.
Geraldez. Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31,
pp. 125- 132; rollo, G.R. Nos.
176010-11, pp. 39-46.
[2]
[3] Similarly
entitled “People of the
[4] Section
3604. Statutory Offenses of
Officials and Employees. - Every
official, agent or employee of the Bureau or of any other agency of the
government charged with the enforcement of the provisions of this Code, who is
guilty of any delinquency herein below indicated shall be punished with a fine
of not less than Five Thousand Pesos nor more than Fifty Thousand Pesos and
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years and perpetual
disqualification to hold public office, to vote and to participate in any
public election:
x x x x
(d) Those who conspire or collude with
another or others to defraud the customs revenue or otherwise violate the law;
(e) Those who willfully make opportunity
for any person to defraud the customs revenue or who do or fail to do any act with
intent to enable any person to defraud said revenue;
x x x x.
[5] Sec.
3. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
[6] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, pp. 101-112.
[7]
[8] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, p. 291; rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, p. 133.
[9] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, p. 113.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp.
292-348; rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, pp. 47-51. Dated
[18] BC Form No. 38.
[19] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, pp. 134-142. Dated
[20] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp.
349-396. Dated
[21] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, p. 131; rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, p. 45. Resolution of August 31, 2006.
[22]
[23] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp. 397-408.
[24]
[25] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp. 133-134; rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, pp. 66-67.
[26] 447 SCRA 154.
[27] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp. 168-173.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, p. 428.
[32] Madrid v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 366, 400 (2000), citing People v. Comesario, 366 Phil. 62, 68 (1999).
[33] David v. Rivera, 464 Phil. 1006, 1013-1014 (2004); Ong v. People, 396 Phil. 546, 554(2000); Cruz v. People, 363 Phil. 156, 161 (1999).
[34] David v. Rivera, supra; Tadeo v. People, 360 Phil. 914, 919
(1998). Vide Cruz
v. People, supra; Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 515, 535-536 (2003).
[35] Tan v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 320,
329 (1997); Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 335, 346 (1997).
[36] Tadeo v. People, supra note 34.
[37] 441
Phil. 175, 182-183 (2002), citing Cruz v.
People, supra note 33.
[38] Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
153526,
[39] Gutib v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[40] Supra; Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 34.
[41] Farolan, Jr. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 298, 304, cited in Remigio v. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 859, 869 (2002).
[42] People v. Larrañaga, 66 Phil.
324, 388-389(2004); People v. Manuel,
G.R. Nos. 93926-28, July 28, 1994, 234 SCRA 532, 542; Orodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57579,
.
[43] Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN),
[44] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp. 66-67.
[45]
[46] Supra note 26.
[47] Supra at 169-170.
[48] Peralta v. Desierto, G.R. No. 153152,
[49] Supra.
[50] Supra.
[51] Supra at 132.
[52] Supra note 25.
[53] Supra note 26 at 166.
[54] Supra at 167.
[55] Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 121404, May 3, 2006; De La Cruz v.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 464 Phil. 1033, 1049 (2004); Añonuevo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
458 Phil. 532, 541(2003); Ocampo v.
Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21, 27 (2000).
[56] Supra at 27-28.
[57] Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas,
317 Phil. 9 (1995); Tan v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 112093,
[58] Rollo, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, pp. 452-477; rollo, G.R. Nos. 176010-11, pp. 397-427.
[59] Supra at 27-28.
[60] Paredes, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709, 730 (1996); Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 (1999). No administrative case was involved in Ong v. People (supra note 33); hence, the citation of the case was inappropriate.
[61] Tala Realty
Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino, 389 Phil. 455, 461-462 (2000); Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 551, 563 (1997); Paredes,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 55 at 730-731.
[62] TSN,