THIRD DIVISION
|
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner, - versus - REGINA
M. ASTORGA, Respondent. x---------------------------------------------------x SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner, - versus - REGINA
M. ASTORGA, Respondent. x---------------------------------------------------x REGINA
M. ASTORGA, Petitioner, - versus - SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
and ANN MARGARET V. SANTIAGO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 148132
G.R. No. 151079
G.R. No. 151372
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated:
____________________ |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For the resolution of the Court are
three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 148132 assails the
Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was
employed by respondent Smart Communications, Incorporated (SMART) on P33,650.00. As District
Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely, annual performance
incentive equivalent to 30% of her annual gross salary, a group life and
hospitalization insurance coverage, and a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00.[5]
In February 1998, SMART launched an
organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. This was made known to the employees on
To soften the blow of the
realignment, SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended
by SMART. SMART then conducted a
performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest
ratings were favorably recommended to SNMI.
Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she was not
recommended by SMART. SMART,
nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care
Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried lower salary
rank and rate.
Despite the abolition of the
CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. But on
The termination of her employment
prompted Astorga to file a Complaint[8]
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer
for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann Margaret V. Santiago (
SMART responded that there was valid
termination. It argued that Astorga was
dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an authorized cause for termination
of employment, and the dismissal was effected in accordance with the
requirements of the Labor Code. The
redundancy of Astorga’s position was the result of the abolition of CSMG and the
creation of a specialized and more technically equipped SNMI, which is a valid
and legitimate exercise of management prerogative.[10]
In the meantime, on
Astorga moved to dismiss the
complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction; (ii) failure to state a cause
of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and
(iv) forum-shopping. Astorga posited
that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the
subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment contract;
hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in
regular courts.[13]
Pending resolution of Astorga’s
motion to dismiss the replevin case,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[14]
dated
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter
ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the dismissal of [Astorga] to be illegal and unjust. [SMART and
1. Reinstate [Astorga] to [her] former
position or to a substantially equivalent position, without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits from the time of [her] dismissal to the date of reinstatement,
which computed as of this date, are as follows:
(a) Astorga
BACKWAGES; (P33,650.00 x 4 months) = P134,600.00
UNPAID SALARIES (
P 16,823.00
March 1-31, [1998] = P 33,650.00
P 3,882.69
CAR MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCE
(P2,000.00
x 4) =
P 8,000.00
FUEL ALLOWANCE (300 liters/mo. x
4 mos. at P12.04/liter) = P 14,457.83
TOTAL = P211,415.52
x x x x
3. Jointly and severally pay moral damages in
the amount of P500,000.00 x x x and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00.
x x x
4. Jointly and severally pay 10% of the
amount due as attorney’s fees.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
Subsequently, on
Assessing the [submission] of the parties,
the Court finds no merit in the motion to dismiss.
As correctly pointed out, this case is to
enforce a right of possession over a company car assigned to the defendant
under a car plan privilege arrangement.
The car is registered in the name of the plaintiff. Recovery thereof via replevin suit is allowed
by Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is undoubtedly within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
In the Complaint, plaintiff claims to be the
owner of the company car and despite demand, defendant refused to return said
car. This is clearly sufficient
statement of plaintiff’s cause of action.
Neither is there forum shopping. The element of litis penden[t]ia does not
appear to exist because the judgment in the labor dispute will not constitute
res judicata to bar the filing of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Astorga
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on
Astorga elevated the denial of her
motion via certiorari to the CA, which, in its February 28, 2000 Decision,[19]
reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the
petition and, consequently, dismissing the replevin
case, the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorga’s complaint for
illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful
jurisdiction over the complaint. SMART’s
motion for reconsideration having been denied,[20]
it elevated the case to this Court, now docketed as G.R. No. 148132.
Meanwhile, SMART also appealed the
unfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter in the illegal dismissal case to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In its
The NLRC disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
is hereby reversed and set aside.
[Astorga] is further ordered to immediately return the company vehicle
assigned to her. [Smart and
SO ORDERED.[22]
Astorga filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it on
Astorga then went to the CA via certiorari. On
Astorga filed a motion
for reconsideration, while SMART sought partial reconsideration, of the
Decision. On
WHEREFORE,
[Astorga’s] motion for reconsideration is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. [Smart] is hereby ordered to pay [Astorga]
her backwages from
SO ORDERED.[25]
Astorga and SMART came to us with
their respective petitions for review assailing the CA ruling, docketed as G.R
Nos. 151079 and 151372. On
In her Memorandum, Astorga argues:
I
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF ASTORGA’S DISMISSAL DESPITE
THE FACT THAT HER DISMISSAL WAS EFFECTED IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE, CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO
GENUINE GROUND FOR HER DISMISSAL.
II
SMART’S
REFUSAL TO REINSTATE ASTORGA DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AS REQUIRED BY
ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE, ENTITLES ASTORGA TO HER SALARIES DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL.
III
THE
COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF A CAR WHICH ASTORGA ACQUIRED AS
PART OF HER EMPLOYEE (sic) BENEFIT.[27]
On the other hand, Smart in its
Memoranda raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND HAS SO FAR DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION WHEN IT RULED THAT SMART DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO TERMINATING ASTORGA ON THE GROUND OF
REDUNDANCY.
II
WHETHER THE NOTICES GIVEN BY SMART TO ASTORGA
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS BEFORE TERMINATION.
III
WHETHER THE RULE ENUNCIATED IN SERRANO VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FINDS APPLICATION IN THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING
THAT IN THE SERRANO CASE THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO NOTICE AT ALL.[28]
IV
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
WITH APPLICABLE DECISION[S] OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND HAS SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL
FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN FILED BY
SMART TO RECOVER ITS OWN COMPANY VEHICLE FROM A FORMER EMPLOYEE WHO WAS LEGALLY
DISMISSED.
V
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE REPLEVIN CASE IS NOT THE
ENFORCEMENT OF A CAR PLAN PRIVILEGE BUT SIMPLY THE RECOVERY OF A COMPANY CAR.
VI
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT ASTORGA CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
SMART UNDER THE LABOR CODE.[29]
The Court shall first deal with the
propriety of dismissing the replevin
case filed with the RTC of Makati City allegedly for lack of jurisdiction,
which is the issue raised in G.R. No. 148132.
Replevin is an
action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully
distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to
possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or
detained the property.[30] The term may refer either to the action
itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.[31]
That the action commenced by SMART
against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City was one for replevin hardly admits of doubt.
In reversing the RTC ruling and
consequently dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the CA made the
following disquisition, viz.:
[I]t is plain to see that the vehicle was
issued to [Astorga] by [Smart] as part of the employment package. We doubt that [SMART] would extend [to
Astorga] the same car plan privilege were it not for her employment as district
sales manager of the company.
Furthermore, there is no civil contract for a loan between [Astorga] and
[Smart]. Consequently, We find that the
car plan privilege is a benefit arising out of employer-employee
relationship. Thus, the claim for such
falls squarely within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiters and the NLRC.[32]
We do not agree. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully
assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in
denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss.
SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the
alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil,
dispute. It involves the relationship of
debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.[33]
As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,[34]
this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of
which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought
therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another
person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the
title or possession of personal property.
The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over
the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has
wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to
plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the
field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
x x x x
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined
with the issue in the Replevin Case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the
other. In fact in
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning
split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by
pertinent laws.
The CA, therefore, committed
reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the dismissal of
the replevin case for lack of
jurisdiction.
Having resolved that issue, we
proceed to rule on the validity of Astorga’s dismissal.
Astorga was terminated due to
redundancy, which is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of an
employee. The nature of redundancy as an
authorized cause for dismissal is explained in the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[35] viz:
x x x redundancy in an employer’s personnel
force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same
position that private respondent held prior to termination of his services does
not show that his position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any well organized business
enterprise, it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or
more people doing the work of one person.
We believe that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where
the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the
actual requirements of the enterprise.
Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and
superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of
factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or
dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
The characterization of an employee’s
services as superfluous or no longer necessary and, therefore, properly
terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom and soundness of such
characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review provided,
of course, that a violation of law or arbitrary or malicious action is not
shown.[36]
Astorga claims that the termination
of her employment was illegal and tainted with bad faith. She asserts that the reorganization was done
in order to get rid of her. But except
for her barefaced allegation, no convincing evidence was offered to prove
it. This Court finds it extremely
difficult to believe that SMART would enter into a joint venture agreement with
NTT, form SNMI and abolish CSMG/FSD simply for the sole purpose of easing out a
particular employee, such as Astorga.
Moreover, Astorga never denied that SMART offered her a supervisory
position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the offer because the
position carried a lower salary rank and rate. If indeed SMART simply wanted to
get rid of her, it would not have offered her a position in any department in
the enterprise.
Astorga also states that the
justification advanced by SMART is not true because there was no compelling
economic reason for redundancy. But
contrary to her claim, an employer is not precluded from adopting a new policy
conducive to a more economical and effective management even if it is not
experiencing economic reverses. Neither
does the law require that the employer should suffer financial losses before he
can terminate the services of the employee on the ground of redundancy. [37]
We agree with the CA that the
organizational realignment introduced by SMART, which culminated in the
abolition of CSMG/FSD and termination of Astorga’s employment was an honest
effort to make SMART’s sales and marketing departments more efficient and
competitive. As the CA had taken pains
to elucidate:
x x x a careful and assiduous review of the records
will yield no other conclusion than that the reorganization undertaken by SMART
is for no purpose other than its declared objective – as a labor and cost
savings device. Indeed, this Court finds
no fault in SMART’s decision to outsource the corporate sales market to SNMI in
order to attain greater productivity.
[Astorga] belonged to the Sales Marketing Group under the Fixed Services
Division (CSMG/FSD), a distinct sales force of SMART in charge of selling
SMART’s telecommunications services to the corporate market. SMART, to ensure it can respond quickly,
efficiently and flexibly to its customer’s requirement, abolished CSMG/FSD and
shortly thereafter assigned its functions to newly-created SNMI Multimedia
Incorporated, a joint venture company of SMART and NTT of Japan, for the reason
that CSMG/FSD does not have the necessary technical expertise required for the
value added services. By transferring
the duties of CSMG/FSD to SNMI, SMART has created a more competent and
specialized organization to perform the work required for corporate
accounts. It is also relieved SMART of
all administrative costs – management, time and money-needed in maintaining the
CSMG/FSD. The determination to outsource
the duties of the CSMG/FSD to SNMI was, to Our mind, a sound business judgment
based on relevant criteria and is therefore a legitimate exercise of management
prerogative.
Indeed, out of our concern for those
lesser circumstanced in life, this Court has inclined towards the worker and
upheld his cause in most of his conflicts with his employer. This favored treatment is consonant with the
social justice policy of the Constitution.
But while tilting the scales of justice in favor of workers, the
fundamental law also guarantees the right of the employer to reasonable returns
for his investment.[38] In this light, we must acknowledge the
prerogative of the employer to adopt such measures as will promote greater
efficiency, reduce overhead costs and enhance prospects of economic gains,
albeit always within the framework of existing laws. Accordingly, we sustain the reorganization
and redundancy program undertaken by SMART.
However, as aptly found by the CA,
SMART failed to comply with the mandated one (1) month notice prior to
termination. The record is clear that
Astorga received the notice of termination only on
Article 283 of the Labor Code clearly
provides:
Art. 283. Closure
of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof x x x.
SMART’s assertion that Astorga cannot
complain of lack of notice because the organizational realignment was made
known to all the employees as early as February 1998 fails to persuade. Astorga’s actual knowledge of the reorganization
cannot replace the formal and written notice required by the law. In the
written notice, the employees are informed of the specific date of the termination,
at least a month prior to the effectivity of such termination, to give them
sufficient time to find other suitable employment or to make whatever arrangements
are needed to cushion the impact of termination. In this case, notwithstanding Astorga’s
knowledge of the reorganization, she remained uncertain about the status of her
employment until SMART gave her formal notice of termination. But such notice was received by Astorga
barely two (2) weeks before the effective date of termination, a period very
much shorter than that required by law.
Be that as it may, this procedural
infirmity would not render the termination of Astorga’s employment illegal. The
validity of termination can exist independently of the procedural infirmity of the
dismissal.[41] In DAP Corporation v. CA,[42]
we found the dismissal of the employees therein valid and for authorized cause
even if the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement under Article
283 of the Labor Code. This Court upheld
the dismissal, but held the employer liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements.
The CA, therefore, committed no
reversible error in sustaining Astorga’s dismissal and at the same time,
awarding indemnity for violation of Astorga's statutory rights.
However, we find the need to modify,
by increasing, the indemnity awarded by the CA to Astorga, as a sanction on
SMART for non-compliance with the one-month mandatory notice requirement, in
light of our ruling in Jaka Food
Processing Corporation v. Pacot,[43] viz.:
[I]f the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by
an act imputable to the employee, and (2) if the dismissal is based on an
authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the
notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his
management prerogative.
We deem it proper to increase the
amount of the penalty on SMART to P50,000.00.
As provided in Article 283 of the
Labor Code, Astorga is, likewise, entitled to separation pay equivalent to at
least one (1) month salary or to at least one (1) month’s pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. The records show that Astorga’s length of service
is less than a year. She is, therefore,
also entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay.
Finally, we note that Astorga claimed
non-payment of wages from
However, the award of backwages to
Astorga by the CA should be deleted for lack of basis. Backwages is a relief given to an illegally
dismissed employee. Thus, before
backwages may be granted, there must be a finding of unjust or illegal
dismissal from work.[45] The Labor Arbiter ruled that Astorga was
illegally dismissed. But on appeal, the
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling and categorically declared Astorga’s
dismissal valid. This ruling was
affirmed by the CA in its assailed Decision.
Since Astorga’s dismissal is for an authorized cause, she is not
entitled to backwages. The CA’s award of
backwages is totally inconsistent with its finding of valid dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition of SMART docketed as G.R. No. 148132 is GRANTED. The February 28, 2000 Decision and the May 7,
2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 53831 are SET ASIDE. The
On the other hand, the petitions of
SMART and Astorga docketed as G.R. Nos. 151079 and 151372 are DENIED.
The June 11, 2001 Decision and the December 18, 2001 Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 57065, are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Astorga is
declared validly dismissed. However,
SMART is ordered to pay Astorga P50,000.00 as indemnity for its
non-compliance with procedural due process, her separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month pay, and her salary from
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
*
In lieu of Associate Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 484 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed), with Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera (retired) and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 148132), pp. 146-152.
[2] Rollo, pp. 164-165.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo Brawner (retired), with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 151079), pp. 24-36.
[4]
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 151372), pp. 58-59.
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 151079), p. 46.
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 151372), p. 62.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 148132), p. 47.
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 151372), pp. 79-92.
[15]
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 148132), pp. 79-80.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 151079), pp. 102-120.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 151372), p. 175.
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 151079), p. 250.
[28]
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 148132), p. 266.
[30] Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1168.
[31] Tillson
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89870,
[32]
[33] See Nestle Philippines Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 85197, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 340, 343.
[34] G.R. L-75837,
[35] G.R. No. 82249,
[36] Dole Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 417 Phil. 428, 440 (2001).
[37]
[38] Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 364 Phil. 912, 924-925 (1999).
[39] Rollo (G.R. No. 151372), p. 62.
[40]
[41] DAP
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165811,
[42]
[43] G.R. No. 151378,
[44] G & M (Phil.), Inc. v. Batomalaque,
G.R. No. 151849, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 111, 118.
[45] Filflex Industrial & Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 115395, February 12, 1998, 286 SCRA 245, 253.