FIRST DIVISION
BELEN REAL, G.R. No. 152065
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-
versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent.
X
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X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review
under Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 45 thereof,
is the August 3, 2000 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which affirmed the June 23, 1992
Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 4116
finding petitioner guilty of swindling (estafa) under Article 315, paragraph
1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts appearing from the record
are as follows:
Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of
private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy entrusted to
petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter to
remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold
within a specific period of time.
On
Petitioner
selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items
selected by petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote
the name Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her signature at
the lower portion including her address. The receipt reads:
K A T I B A Y A N
PINATUNAYAN KO na aking tinanggap kay Benjamin
Uy, ang mga sumusunod na alahas:
No.
1449
Bilang Kalakal Halaga
1 Collar
Emerald Cut Diamond P155,000.00
1 Pendant
Solo Diamante 4 kts 55,000.00
1 Set
Solo Marquez Lequids 50,000.00
1 Set
3 Stones Diamante Lequids 47,000.00
1 Domino
12 Stones Men’s ring 35,000.00
1 Set
Blue
1 Set Corrales with broach 4,500.00
KABUUANG HALAGA P371,500.00
nasa mabuting kalagayan upang ipagbili ng KALIWAAN lamang sa loob ng 10
araw mula ng aking paglagda; kung hindi ko maipagbili ay isasauli ko ang lahat
ng alahas loob ng taning na panahong nakatala sa itaas; kung maipagbili ko
naman ay dagli kung [isusuli] at ibibigay ang buong pinagbilhan sa [may-ari] ng
mga alahas. Ang aking gantimpala ay ang mapapahigit na halaga sa nakatakdang
halaga sa itaas ng bawat alahas; HINDI AKO pinahihintulutang [ipautang] o
ibigay na hulugan ang alin mang alahas; ilalagak, ipagkakatiwala, ipahihiram,
isasangla o ipananagot kahit sa anong paraan ang alin mang alahas sa ibang tao.
NILAGDAAN ko ang kasunduang ito ngayon ika-10 ng January,
1989 sa
(Sgd) Belen Real Aplaya,
Bauan, Bats.
LAGDA NG TAO NA TUMANGGAP TINITIRAHAN[3]
NG NASABING ALAHAS SA ITAAS NITO
Ten days thereafter, Uy went to
petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and asked about their
transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that
the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the payment was in the form of
check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated
Constrained, Uy brought the matter to
his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who thereafter sent a demand letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to
make good her obligation. Consequently,
Uy lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner before the City Prosecutor of
Batangas.
On
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded
“Not Guilty.”
While admitting to have had several
dealings with private complainant Uy, petitioner claimed that her last
transaction with him was on
On
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Belen Real guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of
reclusion temporal, to indemnify Benjamin Uy in the amount of P371,500.00,
to pay the costs, and to suffer all the accessories of the law.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
The trial court ratiocinated:
From
the evidence adduced during the trial of this case, it has been clearly
established that all the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence are present in the commission of the offense and that the guilt of
the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Undoubtedly,
accused had received the seven (7) pieces of jewelry from Benjamin Uy on
January 10, 1989 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning at Nueva Villa
Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City in trust or on commission[,] with the
obligation on her part to return the said pieces of jewelry if unsold, or to
deliver the proceeds of the sale, if sold within ten (10) days from receipt.
This agreement is clearly embodied in the receipt dated January 10, [1989]
signed by the accused.
That
there was misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
accused is very evident in this case. The fact that the accused had failed to
deliver the proceeds of the sale of said jewelry items nor had she returned the
same jewelry items when demanded to do so by the private complainant shows that
accused had misappropriated or converted to her personal use the amount of P371,500.00.
In fact, she even required the private complainant to return to her house for
several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him. However,
accused did not comply with her obligation.
In
a litany of cases, the Supreme Court held that the failure to account upon
demand, for funds or property held in trust is a circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it [is] the agent’s
duty to return the jewelry upon demand by the owner and the failure to do so is
evidence of that conversion of the property by the agent.
It
was also established that there was a demand made by the private complainant
from the accused, verbal and written[,] as shown by the letter of demand which
was received by the accused.
Notably
in the instant case[,] accused enjoyed the full trust and confidence of
Benjamin Uy when the latter entrusted the pieces of jewelry to the accused, it
being a fact that the latter is a “kumadre” of Benjamin Uy, the latter having
been a sponsor in marriage of a daughter of the accused, aside from the fact
that previous to January 10, 1989 there had been transaction between Benjamin
Uy and accused involving a great amount of money.
Obviously,
accused abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy when
she refused and failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to defraud
Benjamin Uy of P371,500.00 is[,] therefore, definitely clear.
The defense of the accused that she had not transacted with Benjamin Uy on January 10, 1989 and that her last transaction with the [latter] was on December 22, 1988 deserves not even a scant consideration in the face of the positive declaration made by Benjamin Uy and his witness and supported by the receipt, [Exhibit “A”], embodying their agreement.
On
the allegation of the accused that she was required by Benjamin Uy to sign
blank receipts [the same] is also unbelievable considering the fact that
accused had reached third year in college and had been a sales agent of private
complainant for quite a time before
Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which, on
Petitioner now raises the following points:
1. That one element of estafa under
Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC does not exist, hence, acquittal from the
crime charged is proper; and
2. That the courts below erred in
imposing a penalty that contravenes the imperative mandate of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.[9]
Petitioner argues that a reading of
the trial court’s decision reveals its total silence on the presence of damage
or prejudice caused to private complainant Uy; ergo, she could not be
held guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Moreover, petitioner advances that instead of
imposing a straight penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the trial court should have imposed
a penalty with minimum and maximum periods in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The petition is in part meritorious.
The elements of estafa under
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC[10]
are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.[11]
Although the trial court only
mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private complainant Uy, it
cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that petitioner’s
refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights
and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to
damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.[12] In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not
only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize
profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in
as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the
same pieces of jewelry. To assert his
legal recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in
litigating the case.
While sustaining the conviction of petitioner
of the crime charged, this Court rules, however, that the penalty imposed by
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[13] in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the RPC for the offense. The penalty
next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of
the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[14]
Specifically, the penalty provided in
the RPC for estafa is as follows:
ART.
315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st.
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Art. 315
above-quoted is composed of two periods; hence, to get the maximum period of
the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the two
periods should be divided into three. Article
65 of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the prescribed
penalty into three equal periods of time included in the penalty imposed,
forming one period for each of the three portions. Thus, the maximum, medium and minimum periods
of the penalty prescribed for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC are:
Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5
months, and 10 days
Medium – 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days
Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years[15]
In the present case, as the amount involved
is P371,500, which obviously exceeds P22,000, the penalty
imposable should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 further states that a period
of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000
defrauded in excess of P22,000 but in no case shall the total penalty
which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The
amount swindled from Uy exceeds the amount of P22,000 which, when
translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000 defrauded,
goes beyond 20 years (close to additional 35 years to be exact). Hence, under the law, the maximum penalty to
be imposed to petitioner should be 20 years of reclusion temporal.
On the other hand, the minimum period
of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. In this case, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision
correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision
correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Therefore, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months.[16]
Considering the attendant factual
milieu as well as the position of the Office of the Solicitor General in the
present case, this Court is convinced that the appropriate penalty to be
imposed upon petitioner, which is in accordance with law to best serve the ends
of justice, should range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal,
as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the
August 3, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which
affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Batangas City, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed. Petitioner is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal
as maximum.
Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
of the Court of Appeals is hereby required to explain why he concurred in the
decision aforementioned applying the wrong penalty, the explanation to be
submitted in thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, which
copy is hereby directed to be furnished upon him forthwith upon finality of
this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, with Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring.
[2] Penned by Judge Ireneo V. Mendoza.
[3] Records, p. 74.
[4] Records, pp. 203-209.
[5]
[6] Records, pp. 207-208.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 90-96.
[8]
[9] See Rollo, p. 13.
[10] Art.
315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
xxx
1. With
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property;
xxx
[11] Ceniza-Manantan v. People,
G.R. No. 156248,
[12] Batulanon v. People, G.R. No.
139857, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 35, 57-58; Ilagan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110617, December 29, 1994, 239
SCRA 575, 587-588; and Sy v. People, G.R. No. 85785,
[13] Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225.
[14] See Perez
v. People, G.R. No. 150443, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 222; Sim,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159280, May 18, 2004, 428 SCRA 459, 470; and
People v. Menil, Jr., 394 Phil. 433, 459-460 (2000).
[15] Ceniza-Manantan v. People, supra at 17; Bonifacio v. People,
G.R. No. 153198,
[16] Ceniza-Manantan v. People, id. at 18; Bonifacio v. People, id. at 534; Perez v. People, id. at 222; Sim, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, supra at 471; and
People v. Menil, Jr., supra at
460.