Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
LIGAYA, CHARITO, G.R. NO. 158998
PARALUMAN And
EFREN,
all surnamed BIGLANG-AWA
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and
REYES,
JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondent. March 28, 2008
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed
in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 30, 2003 which reversed and
set aside the Order dated August 14 , 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 93; and the CA Resolution of July
4, 2003, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of Ligaya,
Charito, Paraluman and Efren, all surnamed Biglang-Awa
(petitioners).
The
facts of the case are as follows:
On
In
the complaint, petitioners and Encarnacion alleged
that they are the legitimate owners of eight parcels of land, all located along
1)
Lot 884-B, Psd-00-043766, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-181964, in the name of Ligaya Biglang-Awa (Ligaya);
2) Lot 884-C, Psd-00-043766, covered by TCT No. N-181965, in
the name of Paraluman
Biglang-Awa (Paraluman);
3)
4) Lot 884-E, Psd-00-043766, covered by TCT No. N-181967,
in the name of Efren Biglang-Awa
(Efren), and
5) Lots 884-F, 884-G, 884-H and 884-I, all of
Psd-00-043766 and covered by TCT Nos. N-181968, N-181969, N-181970 and
N-181971, respectively, all of which are in the name of Encarnacion.
Petitioners averred that in 1977,
without the knowledge and consent of Encarnacion and
through fraudulent manipulations, misrepresentations and the use of falsified
documents, Tolentino succeeded in having four of the
eight subject parcels of land, which are in the name of Encarnacion,
encumbered by way of mortgage to secure a loan made by Tolentino
with respondent; that on separate occasions in 1998 and 2000, and using similar
fraudulent manipulations, misrepresentations
and use of falsified documents, Tolentino was
able to secure in his name new Torrens titles over all the eight subject
parcels of land.
Subsequently,
petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on all the titles registered in the name
of Tolentino.
On
On
January 4, 2001, Encarnacion filed a Notice of Dismissal[4]
claiming that the subject complaint was filed without her permission and/or
conformity; that the four parcels of land, titled under her name, and which
formed part of the subject matter of the said complaint, were solely her own; and
that she freely and satisfactorily sold them to Tolentino.
On
even date, respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim[5]
praying that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
against it, and for failure of Encarnacion to verify and certify the complaint against
it.
On
ACCORDINGLY, the court confirms plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas vda. de Biglang-Awa's notice of dismissal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended.
The action therefore, insofar as plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas vda. De Biglang-Awa only and all the defendants are concerned, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Let her name be deleted from the caption of the complaint.
With this dismissal, there is no further legal obstacle to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT Nos. N-198629; N-198630, N-198631; and N-198632, all in the name of defendant Roberth B. Tolentino.
SO
ORDERED.[6] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thereafter, Tolentino filed a Motion for Issuance of a Certificate of
Finality of the Court's Order of
On
Subsequently, petitioners filed a
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint.[8] The Amended Complaint seek to implead Encarnacion petitioner and
a sister Liwayway Biglang-Awa
(Liwayway) as party defendants. Petitioners contend
that they, together with Encarnacion and Liwayway are co-owners, pro-indiviso,
of the subject parcels of land; that through manipulations and misrepresentations,
Tolentino, Encarnacion and Liwayway were able to secure a partition of and titles over
the disputed properties.
On
The following incidents thus, have been submitted to the court for resolution:
1)
Motion For Issuance of a Certificate of Finality of the court's order of
2)
Motion for Reconsideration of the
3) Motion to Dismiss filed by Tolentino; and
4) Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint
On The Motion For Issuance of a
Certificate of Finality
The records show that plaintiffs, other than Encarnacion Cleofas, filed their motion for reconsideration on February 19, 2001, which is the 15th day counting from February 02, 2001, of the 15-day period within which a party aggrieved may either appeal or move to reconsider a final order. Thus, a motion for reconsideration having been filed seasonably, Tolentino's motion for a certificate of finality, perforce, must be denied as the court hereby denies the same.
On The Motion For Reconsideration
The court notes that the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was filed not by Encarnacion Cleofas but by her co-plaintiffs. To the court, the notice of dismissal filed by plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas Vda. de Biglang Awa is something that is personal to her. The same having been filed pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 17, the court's action on her initiative is limited to merely confirming said dismissal. From this confirmatory order of the court only she and she alone may move to reconsider or move for any other reliefs. Her co-plaintiffs do not have the standing to ask for any relief arising from the court's action on her notice to dismiss her complaint. This is especially true considering that the allegations on the complaint mainly concern her only and the defendants. Whatever rights her co-plaintiffs may have with respect to the complaint will not at all be prejudiced by the dismissal ordered upon her notice. The motion for reconsideration must likewise be denied as it is hereby denied.
On The Motion to Dismiss Filed by Tolentino
Insofar as the remaining plaintiffs are concerned, it would appear that whatever cause of action they may still have against the defendants has been seriously impaired, if not negated, by the notice of dismissal by plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas and the apparent lack of standing to sue by plaintiff Ligaya Biglang-Awa on her behalf as well as of her capacity to sue in behalf of her co-plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant PTC, it is clear that the allegations of the complaint, insofar as the plaintiffs are concerned, fail to state a cause of action. It is plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas Vda. de Biglang Awa who had a cause of action against PTC but this has been done away with by reason of her notice of dismissal.
The court also notes that the complaint fails to allege the value of the real property that is the subject of the action and for which docket fees ought to be assessed and paid for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. The non-payment of the appropriate docket fees is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
The court therefore finds the motion to dismiss by Tolentino as well as by PTC to be in order. Thus, these motions are granted.
On
The Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint
With the grant of the motion to dismiss, the consequent denial of the motion for leave to amend complaint ought to follow but there is need for some discussion on the matter.
During the hearing on the notice of dismissal and motion to dismiss, plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas Vda de Biglang Awa unequivocally told the court among others, that she never met plaintiff's counsel before and that she never authorized nor engaged counsel to file the present complaint. Thus, her notice to dismiss the action. This repudiation of a presumed client-attorney relationship is quite disturbing to the court. It indicates that some “short-cuts” or “cutting corners,” to put it mildly, may have been resorted to by counsel appearing for the plaintiffs.
In light of the foregoing, the motion for leave to amend complaint filed by the same counsel for the plaintiffs would not appear to be deserving of a favorable response from the court, Moreover, the amendment sought to be made appears to have drastically altered the causes of action of the parties plaintiffs and parties defendants between and among themselves.
It is true that an unwilling party plaintiff may be joined as a defendant but this must be set out at the inception of the complaint. Even if, for the sake of argument, that this joinder may be made via an amendment, the allegations of the complaint do not clearly indicate that the case involves a party who refuses to give her consent to be joined as a plaintiff. As revealed in open court during the hearing on the incidents, the plaintiff Encarnacion Cleaofas Vda. de Biglang Awa has not been made aware at all of the filing of the complaint and of the reasons therefore. It may not therefore be correctly said that she was an unwilling co-plaintiff.
Given the prevailing circumstances, the sound exercise of discretion would be to withhold the grant of the relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the court resolves to:
1) deny defendant Tolentino's motion for issuance of a certificate of finality;
2) deny [petitioners'] motion for reconsideration
3) grant the [respondent's] motion to dismiss; and
4) deny [petitioners'] motion for leave to amend complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the commencement of any appropriate action that may be initiated by the proper party plaintiffs against the proper defendant or defendants.
The
previously scheduled hearing on
SO
ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
On
On
On
xxxx
The
Resolution of
Anent the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens and the opposition thereto, the court finds that it may not be granted at this time in view of the clear pronouncement in the resolution of April 16, 2001 that “the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the commencement of any appropriate action that may be initiated by the proper party plaintiffs against the proper defendant or defendants.”
The motion for reconsideration and the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens are thus both resolved in the negative.
SO
ORDERED.[12]
On
September 19, 2001, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[13]
on the ground that RTC ---- dated Febuary 2, 2001
declaring that there is no further legal _______ to the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens
have already become final and executory.
On
On
Unsatisfied
by the August 14, 2001 and December 21, 2001 Orders of the RTC, respondent
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the RTC is guilty
of grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for cancellation of the
notices of lis pendens
annotated on TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632.[16] The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 69643.
On
Meanwhile,
on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed Order dated
SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA via its
Resolution of
Hence,
the present petition raising the following issues:
1)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in reversing and
setting aside the order of the RTC dated
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in disregarding the fact that it is [a] matter of right of the petitioners to amend their complaint prior to the submission of an answer or responsive pleading by the adverse parties
3)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in finding that
the petitioners have no more cause of action against the respondents since
petitioners have no more any “direct or indirect interest to protect.”[21]
Petitioners
contend that the February 2, 2001 Order of the RTC never attained finality
because petitioners were able to seasonably move for its reconsideration; that
in its Resolution of April 16, 2001, the
RTC amended and modified its February 2, 2001 Order by ruling that “(t)he
dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the commencement of any
appropriate action that may be initiated by the proper party plaintiffs against
the proper party defendant or defendants”; that the April 16, 2001 Resolution
of the RTC has become final and executory because
none of the defendants filed a motion for its reconsideration.
Petitioners
aver that under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, as well as in several
rulings of this Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right
at any time before a responsive pleading is served; that prior to the filing of
Tolentino's answer, petitioners filed an amended
complaint wherein they alleged that they are co-owners of the subject parcels
of land and that they have been deprived of their proper shares in the
partition of the said lands through the falsifications committed by the
defendants impleaded in the original and amended
complaints.
Petitioners
further claim that the CA erred in ruling that there is no longer any legal
obstacle to effect the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens annotated on the titles covering the
subject properties since petitioners do not have any interest to protect. On
the contrary, petitioners claim that they will be greatly prejudiced by the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on TCT Nos. N-198629, N-198630, N-198631, and
N-198632 because they are co-owners pro-indiviso
of the eight parcels of land subject of the instant case; that the dismissal of
Civil Case No. Q-00-42489 did not ipso facto operate as cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens
since such dismissal has not attained finality.
Respondent
further counters that under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice
of lis pendens
may be canceled after showing that the purpose of the annotation is for
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights
of the party who caused it to be annotated; that in the present case, the CA
did not commit any error of law in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the
subject titles as these annotations are clearly not necessary to protect the
rights of petitioners.
Respondent
further contends that the notice of lis pendens being
ordered canceled by the CA refers to those annotated over the title to the
properties which were formerly owned exclusively by Encarnacion;
the order does not include the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the titles of the properties formerly owned by petitioners; that Encarnacion's exclusive ownership of four out of the eight
parcels of land subject of the complaint is confirmed by the petitioners themselves in their
complaint; that it is deceptive for petitioners to continuously refer to the
allegations in their amended complaint because such amended complaint was not
admitted by the RTC in its Resolution dated April 16, 2001.
Respondent
further argues that the complaint filed by petitioners was already dismissed by
the RTC per its Orders dated February 2, 2001 and April 16, 2001; that the
Order of February 2, 2001 was a “dismissal with prejudice” insofar as it
affects the four properties formerly owned by Encarnacion
and insofar as respondent is concerned considering that the latter was merely impleaded as a mortgagee of these properties; that the
Order of the RTC dated April 16, 2001 did not amend its February 2, 2001 Order
as the “dismissal without prejudice” being contemplated by the April 16, 2001
Order refers to the remaining four properties allegedly owned by petitioners
excluding those parcels of land formerly owned by Encarnacion;
that the February 2, 2001 and April 16, 2001 Orders of the RTC had already
become final and executory.
Lastly,
respondent contends that the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 69842)
filed by petitioners with the CA questioning the propriety of the
Premised
on the factual circumstances established in the present case, the basic issues
to be resolved are: (1) whether the RTC should have allowed petitioners to
amend their complaint against herein respondent, and (2) whether it is proper
to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of the
The
petition is not meritorious.
With
respect to the first issue, it is true that petitioners were able to file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the
The
Court likewise agrees that the April 16, 2001 Resolution of the RTC did not
amend its
With
respect to petitioners' right to amend their Complaint, after respondent had
filed its answer, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC.
2. Amendments as a matter of right. –
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
SEC. 3. Amendments
by leave of court –
Except
as provided in the next preceding Section, substantial amendments may be made
only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay. Orders of the Court upon the
matters provided in this Section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and
after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. (3a)
In
Republic v. Africa[23],
this Court held that where some but not all of the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their
complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely
against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the
other defendants.
In the
present case, prior to petitioners' filing of their Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint, respondent already filed its
Answer with Counterclaim. Hence, since respondent had already filed its answer, it follows that
petitioners may no longer amend their complaint against the former as a matter
of right. They may do so only upon leave of court, as provided under Section 3,
Rule 10[24]
of the same Rules, which they did by filing their Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint.
In the recent
case of Philippine Ports Authority v.William Gothong & Aboitiz (WG&A),
Inc.[25], this
Court, in discussing the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, held that:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, however when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”
On the basis
of the foregoing ruling, the denial of petitioners' Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint on the ground that the amendment “drastically altered the causes of
action of the parties plaintiffs and parties defendants between and among
themselves” is erroneous.
Nonetheless,
the Court finds that the RTC correctly denied petitioners' Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint, although for a different reason.
In their
original complaint, petitioners claim that the properties covered by TCT Nos.
N-198629 to N-198632 were owned exclusively by Encarnacion.
There was no mention whatsoever that Encarnacion's
titles over these parcels of land were obtained through fraud or any other
illegal means. However, in their Amended Complaint, where petitioners sought to
make Encarnacion and Liwayway
as defendants, they subsequently seek
the nullification of Encarnacion's titles over the
abovementioned parcels of land by alleging that petitioners together with Encarncacion and Liwayway are
co-owners of all the subject that and the titles thereto were obtained on the
basis of falsified subdivision agreements and subdivision plans.
It should be
noted, however, that the basis of the February 2, 2001 Order and April 16, 2001 Resolution of the trial court,
both of which had already become final and executory,
is its finding that the four parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to
N-198632 were exclusively owned by Encarnacion. Since
the
Moreover, the
RTC already dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioners for lack of
jurisdiction over the action because petitioners failed to pay the appropriate
docket fees. Petitioners did not appeal this ruling of the RTC. In any case,
such order of dismissal had already become final and executory
pending resolution of the present petition. On this basis, the Motion for Leave
to Amend Complaint is rendered moot.
As to the
second issue, petitioners had categorically declared in their original
Complaint that the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632
were previously owned exclusively by Encarnacion. On
this basis, the RTC correctly ruled that petitioners have no cause of action
against respondent. In its Order of
The
Court agrees with the CA. The Court's disquisition in Romero v. Court of
Appeals[29]
is instructive, to wit:
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
While the trial court has inherent
power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power, meanwhile, is exercised under
express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled on two grounds: (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.[30]
In
the instant case, it is established that petitioners have no interest over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to 198632. Hence, the annotation
of notices of lis
pendens on the abovementioned titles is not
necessary to protect petitioners’ individual titles over the other properties
involved in their complaint.
Furthermore,
as the complaint of petitioners was already dismissed without prejudice, and
since petitioners had not filed any other case involving the subject
properties, there is no longer any pending suit to speak of.
Hence,
the CA did not commit any error when it ordered the cancellation of the notices
of lis pendens
annotated at the back of TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632.
Lastly,
petitioners insist on their allegations they set forth in their Amended
Complaint that they are pro-indiviso owners of
the subject parcels of land and that Encarnacion and Tolentino submitted a falsified Subdivision Agreement and
Subdivision Plan resulting in the partition of and the issuance of title over
the subject properties. Suffice it to say, however, that the RTC Resolution
denying petitioners' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint had already become
final and executory. This only means that the original
Complaint stands. In effect, petitioner cannot use the Amended Complaint as a
basis for indemnity that the notice of lis pendens should not be cancelled as it does not form
part of the records.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson
WE
CONCUR:
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with the concurrence of Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Mariano C. Del Castillo.
[2] Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42489, Annex “C”, rollo, p. 45.
[3] Annex “F”, rollo, p. 68.
[4] Annex “E”, rollo, p. 63.
[5] Annex “D”, rollo, p. 52.
[6] Annex “I”, rollo, p. 78.
[7] Annex “J”, rollo, p. 79.
[8] Annex “K”, rollo, p. 86.
[9] Annex “M”, rollo, pp. 104-106.
[10] Annex “N”, rollo, p. 107.
[11] Annex “O”, rollo, p. 109.
[12] Annex “P”, rollo, p. 118.
[13] Annex “K”, CA rollo, p. 74
[14] Annex “Q”, rollo, p. 120.
[15] Annex “R”, rollo, p. 122.
[16] CA rollo, p. 2.
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 219.
[22]
[23] G.R. No. 172315,
[24] Amendments by leave of court – Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
[25] G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008 citing Valenzuela v. CA, G.R. No. 131175, August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 779, 787-788.
[26] Collantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 561, 562.
[27]
[28] Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294,
[29] G.R. No. 142406,
[30]