THIRD
DIVISION
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ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III and
CHRISTINE S. DAYRIT,
Petitioners, - versus
- PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 175162 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* AZCUNA,** CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
petition assails the 24 February 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63280 denying petitioners’ petition for review and directing the
Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 11, to proceed with the
trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038, as well as the
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
On
Art. 286 (Grave Coercion)
That on the 14th
day of September 1999 at around
Art. 280, par. 2 (Trespass to Dwelling)
That on the 14th
day of September 1999 at around
On
Petitioners
denied the allegations against them.
They argued that on
Judge
Calixtro O. Adriatico of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
Branch II, conducted the preliminary examination. On
After a careful perusal of
the allegation setforth in the complaint-affidavit, taking into consideration
the allegation likewise setforth in the counter-affidavit submitted by the
respondents and that of their witnesses, the Court finds no probable cause to
proceed with trial on the merits of the above-entitled cases.
The Court believes and so
holds that the instant complaints are merely leverage to the estafa[4]
case already filed against private complainant herein Daisy Afable by the
Miladay Jewels Inc. wherein respondent Atty. Tabujara III is its legal counsel;
while respondent Dayrit appears to be one of the officers of the said company.
As could be gleaned from
the record, private complainant herein Daisy Afable is being charged with the
aforestated estafa case for having allegedly embezzled several pieces of
jewelry from the Miladay Jewels Inc., worth P2,177,156.00.
WHEREFORE, let these cases
be dismissed for lack of probable cause.[5]
Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that when she filed the complaints
for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling on
In their
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argued that even
before respondent filed the criminal complaints for grave coercion and trespass
to dwelling, she was already being administratively investigated for the
missing jewelries; that she was ordered preventively suspended pending said
investigation; that the theft of the Miladay jewels was reported to the Makati
Police on 7 September 1999 with respondent Afable being named as the primary
suspect; that on 17 September 1999, which corresponded to the date of filing of
the criminal complaints against petitioners, the employment of respondent with
Miladay, Jewels, Inc. was terminated.
Petitioners further alleged that respondent filed the criminal
complaints for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling as leverage to compel
petitioners to withdraw the estafa case.
On
Acting on the “Motion for
Reconsideration” filed by the private complainant herein on January 17, 2000,
with “Opposition…” filed by the accused on January 27, 2000, taking into
consideration the “Manifestation/Brief Memorandum” filed by the said private
complainant on March 4, 2000, the Court found cogent reason to reconsider its
order dated January 7, 2000.
The sworn
allegation/statement of witness Mauro V. de Lara, which was inadvertently
overlooked by the undersigned, and which states, among other things, that said
witness saw the private complainant herein being forcibly taken by three
persons, referring very apparently to the accused herein, from her residence is
already sufficient to establish a prima facie evidence or probable cause
against the herein accused for the crimes being imputed against them. It is likewise probable that accused herein
could have committed the crime charged in view of their belief that the private
complainant herein had something to do with the alleged loss or embezzlement of
jewelries of the Miladay Jewels.
WHEREFORE, in order to
ferret out the truth/veracity of the complainant’s allegation and in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, let the above-entitled cases now be set for
trial.
Let therefore warrant of arrest
be issued against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-29038 (Grave
Coercions), fixing their bail for their provisional liberty in the amount of
P12,000.00 for each of them.
As regard Criminal Case No.
99-29037 (Trespass to Dwelling) the same shall be governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.[6]
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the alleged affidavit of
Mauro V. de Lara on which the court a quo based its findings of probable
cause was hearsay because it was not sworn before Judge Adriatico; that De Lara
did not personally appear before the investigating judge during preliminary
investigation. However, petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied in the Order dated
Acting on the “Motion for
Reconsideration” filed by the accused, thru counsel. With comment from the
counsel of the private complainant, the Court resolves to deny the same there
being no cogent reason to reconsider the Court order dated
The Court has resolved to
try the above-entitled cases on the merits so as to ferret out the truth of the
private complainant’s allegations and there being probable cause to warrant
criminal prosecution of the same.
The accused’s contention
that the statement of witness Mauro de Lara is bereft of credibility and that
the complaints at bar were initiated merely for harassment purposes could be
ventilated well in a full blown trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing reason, let the trial of these cases proceed as already scheduled.[7]
Petitioners
moved for clarificatory hearings which were conducted on
On
The case
was thereafter raffled to Branch 79 which rendered its Decision[10]
denying the petition for annulment of the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders of
the Municipal Trial Court. The Regional
Trial Court found that after conducting clarificatory hearings, the court a quo
issued an Order on
While it is true that
respondent Judge Hon. Calixto O. Adriatico dismisses both criminal cases last
January 7, 2000 finding no probable cause and later on reverse himself by
issuing the question Order dated May 2, 2000 alleging among others that said
Judge inadvertently overlooked the statement of witness Mauro V. De Lara, the
stubborn facts remain that whatever defects, or shortcomings on the parts of
the respondent Judge was cured when he conducted clarificatory examination on
the dates earlier mentioned in this Order.[11]
The
dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, reads:
RESPONSIVE OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the instant Petition for the Annulment of the Orders of the
respondent Judge dated
ACCORDINGLY, the Presiding
Judge of branch II, the Hon. Calixto O. Adriatico may now proceed to hear and
decide crim. Cases nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 pending before that Court.[12]
Petitioners
filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals asserting that the
court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in basing its findings
of probable cause and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest solely on the
unsworn statement of Mauro De Lara who never appeared during preliminary
investigation and who was not personally examined by the investigating
judge. Moreover, they argued that the
However,
the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that petitioners
resorted to the wrong mode of appeal; i.e., instead of an ordinary
appeal, petitioners filed a petition for review. [13] The dispositive portion of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch II is directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case Nos.
99-29037 and 99-29038 and to dispose of them with deliberate dispatch.[14]
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[15] Hence, the instant petition raising the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN BASING ITS FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONERS FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND ISSUANCE OF
WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST THEM, UPON AN UNSWORN STATEMENT OF A
WITNESS WHO NEVER APPEARED BEFORE, NOR WAS PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY, THE TRIAL
COURT.
A. THE
CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THAT NO WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AND AFTER PERSONALLY
EXAMINING UNDER OATH THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONERS ASSERT THEIR RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE
CONSTITUTION WHICH TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER RULES OF PROCEDURE OR TECHNICALITIES.
A. IT IS
WELL-SETTLED THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT IS BOUND BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
PETITION AND NOT BY ITS CAPTION.[16]
Petitioners insist that the Orders of the court a quo dated
In its Comment, respondent People of the
On the other hand, respondent avers that the issue on the
propriety of the issuance by the court a quo of the 2 May 2000 and 14
July 2000 Orders has become moot because clarificatory hearings were thereafter
conducted and another Order dated 18 September 2000 was issued finding probable
cause against petitioners; and, that the statement of Mauro De Lara was
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Orlando Paguio although it was Judge
Calixtro Adriatico who acted as the investigating judge.
The petition is meritorious.
Before
proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the issue of whether or
not the Court of Appeals properly denied the petition for review filed by the
petitioners under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
In
denying the petition for review under Section 1,[17]
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by petitioners, the appellate court
stressed that they availed of the wrong mode of review in bringing the case to
it since the petitioners filed an original action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to the RTC, the remedy availed of should have been an appeal under
Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary
appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It
is only when the decision of the RTC was rendered in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction would a petition for review under Rule 42 be proper[18]
We
do not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
The present
controversy involved petitioners’ sacrosanct right to liberty, which is
protected by the Constitution. No person
should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.[19]
While
it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than
frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of the dockets of
the courts is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice.[20]
The Court
has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses. This is in keeping
with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, and that strict and rigid application of
rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be avoided.
It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain
the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[21]
In those rare cases to which
we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear
need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system
and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the
strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant is
given the full opportunity for a just and proper disposition of his cause.[22]
The emerging trend in the rulings of this
Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, we have
consistently held that rules must not be applied so rigidly as to override
substantial justice.[23]
The Court of Appeals should have
looked beyond the alleged technicalities to open the way for the resolution of
the substantive issues in the instance case.
The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in dismissing petitioners’ petition
for review. By dismissing the said
Petition, the Court of Appeals absolutely foreclosed the resolution of all the
substantive issues petitioners were repeatedly attempting to raise before the Court
of Appeals.
We now proceed to the resolution of the
substantive issues raised by the petitioners.
Section 2, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution, provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest
shall issue only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he/she may produce, and particularly describing the person to be
seized.
To determine the existence of probable cause, a preliminary
investigation is conducted. A
preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.[24]
A
preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing
of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day without regard to the fine.[25] Thus, for cases where the penalty
prescribed by law is lower than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, a criminal
complaint may be filed directly with the prosecutor or with the Municipal Trial
court. In either case, the investigating
officer (i.e., the prosecutor or the Municipal Trial Court Judge) is
still required to adhere to certain procedures for the determination of
probable cause and issuance of warrant of arrest.
In the instant case, respondent directly filed the criminal
complaints against petitioners for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling
before the Municipal Trial Court. The
penalty prescribed by law for both offenses is arresto mayor, which
ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.
Thus, Section 9, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court applies, to wit:
SEC.
9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. –
x x x x
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. –
If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the
procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally
evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under
oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, he shall dismiss the same. He
may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10)
days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause
despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its
submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the accused had already been
arrested, and hold him for trial.
However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for
placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of
arrest. (Emphasis supplied.)
Corollarily, Section 6 of the same Rule provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – x x
x
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – x x x [T]he judge may issue
a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.
Clearly, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the assailed 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders finding probable cause
to hold petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of arrest because it
was based solely on the statement of witness Mauro De Lara whom Judge
Adriatico did not personally examine in writing and under oath; neither did he
propound searching questions. He merely
stated in the assailed
In Sangguniang Bayan of Batac v. Judge Albano,[26]
the Court found respondent judge guilty of ignorance of the law because he
failed to comply with the procedure on the issuance of warrant of arrest, thus:
Failure to comply with such procedure will make him
administratively liable. In the case at
bar, respondent judge issued several warrants of arrest without examining
the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation of
Section 6 of Rule 112 which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – x x x
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – If the municipal
trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and
that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
The
records show that respondent judge has violated the rules on preliminary
investigation and issuance of a warrant of arrest since the start of his term
as municipal judge in Batac, Ilocos Norte in September 1991. The gross ignorance of respondent judge has
immensely prejudiced the administration of justice. Parties adversely affected by his rulings
dismissing their complaints after preliminary investigation have been denied
their statutory right of review that should have been conducted by the
provincial prosecutor. His practice
of issuing warrants of arrest without examining the complainants and their
witnesses is improvident and could have necessarily deprived the accused of
their liberty however momentary it may be. Our Constitution requires that all members of
the judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. Respondent judge’s
stubborn adherence to improper procedures and his constant violation of the
constitutional provision requiring him to personally examine the complainant
and the witness in writing and under oath before issuing a warrant of arrest
makes him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge.
When the investigating judge relied solely on the
affidavit of witness De Lara which was not sworn to before him and whom he
failed to examine in the form of searching questions and answers, he deprived
petitioners of the opportunity to test the veracity of the allegations
contained therein. Worse, petitioners’
arguments that De Lara’s affidavit was hearsay was disregarded by the
investigating judge despite the fact that the allegations therein were completely
rebutted by petitioners’ and their witnesses’ affidavits, all of whom appeared
before and were personally examined by the investigating judge. It was thus incorrect for the court a quo
to rule thus:
The accused’s contention
that the statement of witness Mauro de Lara is bereft of credibility and that
the complaints at bar were initiated merely for harassment purposes could be
ventilated well in a full blown trial.[27]
In sum, De Lara’s affidavit cannot be relied upon by the
court a quo for its finding of probable cause.
In
addition, this Court finds that the warrants of arrest were precipitously
issued against petitioners. Deprivation
of a citizen’s liberty through the coercive process of a warrant of arrest is
not a matter which courts should deal with casually. Any wanton disregard of the carefully-wrought
out processes established pursuant to the Constitution’s provisions on search
warrants and warrants of arrest is a serious matter primarily because its
effects on the individual wrongly-detained are virtually irremediable.[28]
The
procedure described in Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because failure to
follow the same would amount to a denial of due process. With respect to the issuance by inferior
courts of warrants of arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that
probable cause exists: 1) through an examination under oath and in writing of the complainant and his
witnesses; which examination should be 2) in the form of searching questions
and answers. This rule is not merely a
procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to two of the most
sacrosanct guarantees found in the fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures and the due process requirement.[29]
The
issuance of warrants of arrest is not mandatory. The investigating judge must find that there
is a necessity of placing the petitioners herein under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[30] Perusal of the records shows no necessity for
the immediate issuance of warrants of arrest.
Petitioners are not flight risk and have no prior criminal records.
Respondent’s
contention that any defect in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed 24 February 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63280 denying petitioners’ petition for
review and directing the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch
11, to proceed with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038, as
well as the 23 October 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch 11, is DIRECTED to
dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 for lack of probable cause
and to quash the warrants of arrest against petitioners for having been
irregularly and precipitously issued.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 531, dated
** Per
Special Order No. 521, dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[2]
[3]
[4] Entitled People of the
Respondent also
filed a Complaint for Illegal dismissal against Miladay Jewels Inc represented
by its president Michelle Dayrit Soliven docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
30-12-00756-99 which the labor arbiter decided on
[5] Rollo, p. 77.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] SECTION 1. How
appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00
for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
copy of the petition. The petition shall
be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought
to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[18] De Liano v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 1033, 1049-1050 (2001).
[19] PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Article
III, Section 1; Macasasa v. Sicad,
G.R. No. 146547,
[20] Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. 149793,
[21]
[22] Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524,
[23] Peñoso
v. Dona, G.R. No. 154018,
[24] RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 1.
[25]
[26] 329 Phil. 363, 374-375 (1996).
[27] Rollo, p. 107.
[28] Cabilao v. Judge Sardido, 316 Phil. 134, 141 (1995).
[29]
[30] Bagunas v. Judge Fabillar, 352 Phil. 206, 221 (1998).