SECOND DIVISION
|
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
- versus - VICTORIO N. MEDRANO, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 177580 Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: October
17, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Challenged via Petition for Review on Certiorari
are the Decision[1]
dated June 29, 2006 and Resolution dated April 2, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 93165[2]
which nullified the Decision dated July 19, 2004 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (petitioner), as modified, finding Victorio N. Medrano (respondent) guilty
of sexual harassment in the administrative complaint against him and dismissed
the said complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Sometime in May 2003, Ma. Ruby A.
Dumalaog (Ma. Ruby), a teacher at Jacobo Z. Gonzales Memorial National High
School in Biñan, Laguna (the school), filed a sworn letter-complaint[3]
before the Office of the Ombudsman (for Luzon) charging her superior–herein respondent,
Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the school and concurrently the principal of San Pedro Relocation
Center National High School in San Pedro, Laguna, with (1) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995),
docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0613-E (criminal case), and (2) grave misconduct,
docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0488-E (administrative case).
The administrative
complaint, in essence, alleged that in the afternoon of
In his Counter-Affidavit,[4]
respondent denied the charge, claiming that it was “maliciously designed to
harass and threaten him to succumb to Ma. Ruby’s demand that she be given a
regular teaching post.” He thus prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
While the administrative case was
pending investigation, Ma. Ruby filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive
Suspension,[5]
alleging that respondent was “using the powers of his office by utilizing his subordinates
in harassing her.” By Order[6]
of
Respondent,
this time assisted by counsel, Atty. Alan P. Cabaero, moved for the lifting of the
preventive suspension Order on the ground that the evidence of his guilt is not
strong.[7] It was denied.
Undaunted, respondent
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[8]
alleging that the Schools Division Superintendent Lilia T. Reyes had already
designated Hereberto Jose D. Miranda as the new OIC of the school in his stead,
effective September 1, 2003. By Order[9]
of
By Decision[10]
of
With
respect to the criminal case, petitioner, by Resolution[11]
of
Respondent moved for reconsideration of
petitioner’s issuances in both cases. Respecting the administrative case,[12]
he assailed not only the factual findings and conclusions of petitioner, but, for
the first time, he challenged its jurisdiction over the case. He argued that under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 (the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers), an administrative
complaint against a public school teacher should be heard by an investigating committee of the
Department of Education Culture & Sports,
now Department of Education (DepEd), composed of the school superintendent of
the division where the teacher belongs, a representative from a teachers’
organization, and a supervisor of the division.
He thus prayed for the dismissal
of the administrative case as petitioner has no jurisdiction over it.
By Joint
Order[13]
of
Dissatisfied,
respondent filed a Petition for Review (with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction)[14]
before the Court of Appeals, assailing petitioner’s decision in the
administrative case, attributing to it grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it –
I
. . . assumed jurisdiction over
the administrative case against petitioner, although
under R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, only the appropriate
committee of the Department of Education
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
try administrative complaints against public
school teachers.
II
. . . denied him his right to present before
the Graft Investigation Officer the text messages sent by complainant which
would have established the fact that the sexual harassment charge did not
actually happen. x x x
III
. . . totally ignored his overwhelming
evidence positively establishing his presence in another place at the time the
alleged acts of sexual harassment were committed against complainant.
IV
.
. . found him guilty of sexual harassment and imposed upon him the penalty of
one (1) year suspension from the service.[15] (Underscoring supplied)
By the now
assailed Decision of June 29, 2006, the appellate court annulled petitioner’s July 19, 2004 Decision,
as modified, in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the
sole ground that petitioner has no jurisdiction over it. It held
that although respondent raised the issue of jurisdiction only after petitioner
rendered an adverse decision, “the rule on estoppel
will not apply against [Medrano]” because such jurisdictional issue was raised “when
the case was still before the Ombudsman.”[16]
It thus found no need to address the
other issues raised by respondent.
Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration[17]
of the appellate court’s Decision was denied by Resolution[18]
of
Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that it (petitioner) has
concurrent jurisdiction with the DepEd
over the administrative complaint against respondent.[19]
Instead of
filing a comment on the present petition as directed, respondent filed a Manifestation With Motion In Lieu Of
Comment[20]
praying that “the instant petition be dismissed for being moot and academic” in
view of the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance[21] by Ma. Ruby on September 17, 2007
before Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ramonito Delfin of Biñan, Laguna, as
well as the Order[22]
of even date issued by the MeTC of Biñan dismissing the criminal case[23]
against him due to her lack of interest to prosecute the case.
In her Affidavit
of Desistance, Ma. Ruby stated, inter
alia:
2. That
in retrospect and after an objective and sincere review of the events that led
to the filing of the instant cases [referring to the criminal and
administrative cases], I am now fully enlightened that said incident was just a
product of mistake of fact and clear
misunderstanding between me and the accused/respondent, who after all, was not
actually criminally nor immorally motivated to
do any form of offense/harm to
my person. Thus, I am now retracting everything I
said against the accused/respondent in
my letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman dated
3. That x x x, I am no longer interested in pursuing the criminal and administrative cases I filed against Mr. Victorio N. Medrano, and is now requesting the Honorable Court [referring to the trial court in the criminal case], the Office of the Ombudsman or the Honorable Supreme Court with whom the administrative case is pending, to dismiss the said cases. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner opposes
respondent’s move, contending that Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal
of the criminal case do not constitute legal bases for dismissing the present petition
and the administrative complaint.
The issues
for resolution are:
1. Whether the petition has
become moot and academic, Ma. Ruby having executed an affidavit of desistance and
the criminal case having been dismissed due to her lack of interest to
prosecute the same;
2. Whether petitioner has jurisdiction
over the administrative complaint against respondent; and
3. Whether respondent is estopped to question petitioner’s assumption
of jurisdiction over the administrative complaint.
With
respect to the first issue, the Court holds in the negative.
The flaw in
respondent’s argument that the execution of Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance
and the dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the
administrative case is that it ignores the whale of a difference between those two
remedies. In Gerardo
R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra
(Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman),[24]
the Court stressed the distinct
and independent character of the remedies available to an
offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public
officer, thus:
Significantly,
there are three kinds of remedies available against a public officer for
impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties:
(1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These remedies may be
invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or
successively. Sometimes, the same
offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.
Defeat
of any of the three remedies will
not necessarily preclude resort to other
remedies or affect decisions reached thereat,
as different degrees of evidence are required
in these several actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is needed, whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil
cases. In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required.
It
is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each
other. The settled rule
is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the first two will not
inevitably govern or affect the third
and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases
may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
At any rate,
an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with
suspicion and reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and
ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.[25] And there is always the probability that it
would later be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable.[26] Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually
a ground for the dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.[27]
The
suspicious and unreliable nature of Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance is evident. Firstly,
her affidavit was executed only on September
17, 2007 or more than three (3) years after petitioner had rendered its
July 19, 2004 Decision, as
modified by its Joint Order of April 8, 2005 finding respondent guilty of sexual
harassment. Secondly, unlike her six-page sworn
letter-complaint of
In fine,
the bases of respondent’s plea to have the present petition dismissed do not obliterate
his liability in the administrative case subject of the present petition.
In resolving
the second issue – whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against respondent – it is necessary to examine the source,
nature and extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis-à-vis the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution “created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman.” Hailed as the “protectors
of the people,” the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority,
powers, functions, and duties to act on complaints against public officials and
employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13 thereof, thus:
Sec. 12.
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed
in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the result thereof.
Sec. 13.
The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate
on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own
instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act
or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith;
(4)
Direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6)
Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant
and with due prudence;
(7)
Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and
the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by
law. (Underscoring supplied)
The above enumeration
of the Ombudsman’s far-reaching powers is not exclusive as the framers of the
Constitution gave Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation,
additional powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman, as mandated in Section
13(8), quoted above.
Pursuant to the constitutional command, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989) providing for the functional, structural organization, and the extent
of the administrative disciplinary authority of the petitioner.[28]
The
provisions of this law “apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance” committed by any officer or
employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, “during his
tenure in office.”[29] The acts or omissions which the petitioner may
investigate are quite extensive:
SEC. 19. Administrative
Complaints.– The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited, to acts or omissions
which:
(1)
Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2)
Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course
of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4)
Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary
powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or
devoid of justification.
Its
mandate is not only to “act promptly on complaints” against such public
officers or employees, but also to “enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where
the evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service by the Government to
the people.”[30]
R.A. No. 6770, however, restrains the petitioner
from exercising its disciplinary authority “over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress and the Judiciary,”
thus:
SEC. 21. Officials
Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.– The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, except over officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress and the Judiciary.
SEC. 22. Investigatory
Power.– The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a
verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer
or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the
investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may
warrant. The officer or employee and the
private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same
penalties and liabilities. (Underscoring
supplied)
The above constitutional
and statutory provisions taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow upon the petitioner full administrative disciplinary
power over public officials and employees except those impeachable
officials, Members of Congress and of the Judiciary.
When an administrative charge is initiated against a public
school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that
the same shall be heard initially by
an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent
of the division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of
the division, as members, thus:
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding Schools Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman,
a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization
and a supervisor of the Division, the
last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings and recommendations
to the Director of Public Schools within
thirty days from termination of the hearings;
Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of
the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. (Underscoring supplied)
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,[31] the
Court held:
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of the division. x x x.
x x x x
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some “proper
disciplinary authorit[ies],” such as the investigating committee of the
DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989
directs that the petitioner “may refer
certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority
for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees.”[32]
In light of this, the Court holds
that the administrative disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive
power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.
In the instant case, respondent, although
designated as then OIC of a public school and concurrently the school principal
of another public school, is undoubtedly covered by the definition of the term
“teacher” under the second paragraph of Section 2 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which provides:
SEC 2. Title – Definition.– This Act shall x x x apply to all public school teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term ‘teacher’ shall mean all persons engaged in the classroom, in any level of instruction; on full time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should have been referred by petitioner to the proper committee of the DepEd for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
This brings the Court to the third
issue. While petitioner should have desisted from hearing
the administrative complaint against respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd
committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered
a decision thereon, respondent is now barred from assailing petitioner’s
acts under the principle of estoppel. He had
actively participated in the administrative proceedings before petitioner. In his
Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner for affirmative relief by seeking
the dismissal of the administrative complaint
allegedly for being baseless.[33] From then on, he was assisted by counsel in filing several motions. When he was preventively suspended for six months without pay, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that “a new Order be issued reversing or setting aside the
preventive suspension Order.”[34] When this was denied, he again filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[35] for the lifting of his suspension since
he was already replaced as OIC, which motion was granted. It was only after petitioner had rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration, impugned
petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be permitted
to challenge petitioner’s acts belatedly.
In applying the principle of estoppel in Alcala v. Villar,[36]
the Court held:
Respondent
Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High School,
Pilar,
x x x x
On
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without jurisdiction over
the administrative complaints against public school teachers. It ruled that the
governing law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, and
x x x x
x x x, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. x x x.
x x x x
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. x x x. In Emin v. De Leon, a public school teacher was administratively charged with and found guilty of dishonesty under P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law). The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, is the applicable law and that the Civil Service Commission does not have jurisdiction over the administrative case. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the dismissal from the service of the public school teacher as the latter was found to have been sufficiently afforded due process. x x x. Thus –
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.
x x x x
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them. x x x. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, petitioner himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission by x x x further praying for ‘any remedy or judgment which under the premises are just and equitable.’ It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for decision and accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
x x x x
In the same vein, respondent in the case should be barred under the principle of estoppel by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have resolved the appeal on its merits, x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The ruling
by the Court of Appeals that estoppel
will not apply against respondent because he raised the issue of jurisdiction
“when the case was still before the Ombudsman”[37]
is thus bereft of merit.
The appellate
court’s citation of Duero v. Court of
Appeals[38]
in which this Court held that the therein private respondent
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of June 29, 2006 and Resolution of April 2, 2007
in CA-G.R. SP No. 93165 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REM
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISU
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De
[2] Entitled
“Victorino N. Medrano v. Ma. Ruby A.
Dumalaog and Hon. Dep. Ombudsman for
[3] CA rollo, pp. 25-30.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] In
this Joint Order, Atty. Adoracion A. Agbada, Graft Investigation &
Protection Officer II, Office of the Ombudsman, proposed the denial of
respondent’s separate motions for reconsideration of the July 19, 2004 Decision, but the
proposal was modified by Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez as indicated in his marginal note
therein, stating: “With modification.
Pls. see Memorandum of Dir. Gonzales
dated
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it most respectfully recommended that
the proposed Joint Order dated
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Petition, rollo, p. 13.
[20]
[21] Appended to the Manifestation With Motion In Lieu Of Comment, id. at 74.
[22]
[23] The acts complained of in the criminal case arose from the same incident subject of the instant administrative case.
[24] G.R.
No. 180700,
[25] Victoriano v. People, G.R. Nos. 171322-24,
[26]
[27]
[28] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 92, 110, citing Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, 248 SCRA 566 (1995).
[29] Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
“SEC. 16. Applicability.– The provisions shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure in office.”
[30] Section 13 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
“SEC. 13. Mandate.– The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.” (Underscoring supplied)
[31] 346 Phil. 940, 953, 955-956 (1997), reiterated later in Emin v. Chairman De Leon, 428 Phil. 172, 184 (2002) and in Alcala v. Villar, 461 Phil. 617 (2003).
[32] Section 23 of the law provides:
“SEC. 23. Formal Investigation.– (1) Administrative investigations conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with due process.
“(2) At its option, the Office of the
Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the
proper disciplinary authority for the institution
of appropriate administrative proceedings against
erring public officers or employees, x x x.
x x x x.” (Underscoring supplied)
[33] CA rollo, p. 49.
[34]
[35]
[36] Supra note 31 at 620-626.
[37] Assailed
CA Decision of
[38] 424 Phil. 12 (2002).