PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - LEE
RODRIGO, JOHN DOE @ BUNSO, and PETER DOE @ LYN-LYN, Accused. LEE
RODRIGO, Accused-Appellant.
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G.R. No. 176159
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: September 11, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Before us for
review is the Decision[1]
dated September 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01531 which affirmed with modification[2]
the decision dated June 27, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Malolos City, Bulacan
in Crim. Case No. 917-M-2001.[3] The RTC’s decision found the accused-appellant
Lee Rodrigo (Rodrigo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the herein
accused, Lee Rodrigo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide
under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
late Paquito Buna the following sums of money, to wit:
1. [P50,000.00]
as civil indemnity;
2. P50,000.00
as moral damages; and
3. P60,000.00
as actual damages.
x x x
SO
ORDERED.
The Antecedents
The basic
facts of the robbery with homicide are not disputed. The spouses Paquito Buna and Rosita
Cabrera-Buna[4] (Rosita) owned a restaurant located at
Area H in San Rafael, Bulacan. The spouses were in their restaurant at around
10:20 a.m. on October 27, 2000 together with their two helpers; Paquito was
cooking in the kitchen while Rosita and the helpers were attending to two
customers. Three men, armed with guns, suddenly entered the restaurant, declared
a holdup, and immediately proceeded to divest the two customers of their money
and the restaurant of its earnings of P500.00. While the robbery was in
progress, Paquito came out of the kitchen and, seeing what was happening,
grabbed a “bangko”; he was instantly
fired upon three times by one of the armed men while the other two turned their
backs and laughed. After the robbers left, Rosita rushed Paquito to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Rosita
afterwards filed a criminal complaint through her Sinumpaang Salaysay (dated November 24, 2000)[5]
where she identified Rodrigo as among the men who robbed the restaurant and
killed her husband. On February 28,
2001, Rodrigo and two men bearing the aliases of “Lyn Lyn”[6]
and “Bunso” were formally charged
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The Information[7]
reads:
That on or about the 27th day
of October, 2000, in the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with short firearms, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, take, rob, and carry away with them P500.00 belonging
to the spouses Paquito Buna and Rosita Cabrera-Buna, to the damage and
prejudice of the said spouses in the amount of P500.00; and on the
occasion of the commission of the said robbery or by reason thereof, the herein
accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot with the short firearms
Paquito Buna, thereby inflicting on him serious physical injuries which
directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Rodrigo was arrested on May 29, 2001. The other two accused remain at large. Rodrigo pleaded not guilty upon arraignment
and trial on the merits subsequently followed.
The
prosecution introduced two witnesses – Rosita and Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, the
medico-legal officer whose testimony was dispensed with by agreement of the
parties.[8]
Thus, Rosita stood as the prosecution’s
only witness on the identity of the accused and on the commission of the
crime.
As an eyewitness, Rosita identified Rodrigo in
court as one of the three armed men who robbed the restaurant and its
customers.[9]
She testified that she saw Rodrigo as one
of the robbers who entered the restaurant; that one of the three immediately
declared a holdup;[10]
that Rodrigo had a firearm in his possession;[11]
that he brandished his firearm and threatened the occupants of the restaurant
in the course of the robbery;[12]
and that Rodrigo left with the other robbers after achieving their evil
purpose.[13]
On re-cross-examination, Rosita admitted that she initially
identified Rodrigo by means of a photograph shown to her at the police
station; the photograph was the only one shown to her at that time.[14]
After
the presentation of the following documentary evidence: (a) Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 24,
2000 of Rosita Buna (Exhibits “A” and “A-1”);[15]
(b) List of Expenses Incurred for the wake, funeral, and burial of Paquito Buna
(Exhibit “B” with submarkings);[16]
and (c) Certificate of Death of Paquito Buna (Exhibit “C”),[17]
the prosecution rested its case.
The case for
the defense relied solely on the testimony of Rodrigo who interposed the
defenses of denial and alibi.[18]
He claimed that he was at his house at
FVR I, Norzagaray, Bulacan with his wife, cousin, and neighbor on the alleged date
and time of the commission of the crime. He was at the time watching television
while taking care of his child. On cross-examination,
he admitted that the distance from Barangay San Rafael, Sapang Palay to his
house was more or less one kilometer; the distance can be covered in 10 minutes
through a single tricycle and jeepney ride. He also admitted that he came to know
that he was being implicated in the case two days after the October 27, 2000
robbery-killing incident.[19]
The RTC
convicted Rodrigo on June 27, 2005 of the crime of robbery with homicide on the
basis of Rosita’s testimony which the court found to be candid, straightforward,
firm, and without any trace of any improper motive. This testimony, an eyewitness account,
confirmed that Rosita saw Rodrigo as among the three robbers who robbed the
restaurant and who fled after divesting the restaurant of its earnings and the
customers of their money, killing Paquito in the course of the robbery. The RTC
declared that it was not important that Rodrigo did not actually shoot Paquito since
there was a conspiracy; it did not matter who among the conspirators did the
actual shooting as the act of one was the act of all, and all were equally
liable. The court refused to believe Rodrigo’s
defenses of denial and alibi in the absence of any
corroborating evidence and in light of Rosita’s positive and categorical eyewitness
identification and account of the crime.
The CA, to
where Rodrigo appealed his conviction, affirmed the lower court’s decision, with
the modification that the award of civil indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00. As the lower court did, the CA gave premium
to Rosita’s identification when it said: “. . .Rodrigo was positively identified by Rosita Buna as one of the three
(3) armed men who perpetrated the crime.
She was straightforward in narrating how accused-appellant Rodrigo and
his cohorts entered their restaurant, armed with guns and declared a hold-up. .
.” On the matter of identification,
the appellate court significantly noted that: Rosita identified accused-appellant
Rodrigo from the picture shown to her at the police station, and months later
when she saw him in San Jose del Monte Police Station, and that she pointed to accused-appellant
Rodrigo inside the courtroom during the trial of the case as among those who
robbed them in their restaurant. [20]
Rodrigo elevated his conviction to this Court, citing the
following reversible errors committed by the RTC and CA in their decisions:
(1)
In convicting Rodrigo of the crime charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and
(2)
In
relying on the alleged weakness of the defense evidence rather than on the
strength of the prosecution evidence.
Rodrigo particularly cited the inconsistencies in Rosita’s testimony
regarding his participation in the crime.
In his view, these inconsistencies, together with his alibi, showed that
he was not actually present at the crime scene.
The identification Rosita made at “the
police station was not sufficient and convincing to lead one to believe that
Lee Rodrigo was among the malefactors.
The act of the wife (herein witness) is expected from someone who had
just lost a loved one unexpectedly and in an unacceptable manner. Such form of identification clearly impaired
her credibility as a witness.”[21] Further, Rodrigo asserted:
However, before the
doctrine that positive identification prevails over denial or alibi may apply,
it is necessary that the identification must first be shown to be positive and
beyond question. Even though inherently
weak, the defense of alibi or denial nonetheless acquires commensurate strength
where no positive and proper identification has been made by the prosecution
witness of the offender, as the prosecution still has the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused. (People v. Crispin, 327 SCRA
167). While it is true that denial and
alibi are weak defenses, it is equally settled that where the evidence of the
prosecution is itself feeble, particularly as to the identity of the accused as
the author of the crime, the defense of denial and alibi assume importance and
acquire commensurate strength. (People
v. Giganto, Sr. 336 SCRA 294).[22]
For its part, the People banked on the great weight accorded
to the factual findings of the trial court, given its unique position of having
observed the witnesses while testifying.
It heavily relied, too, on Rosita’s credibility and the positive
identification she made as an eyewitness,[23]
and the fact that she was not actuated by any improper motive.[24]
Predictably, the People derided the
alibi for being inherently weak and for failure to demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission.[25]
Our Ruling
We
find the petition impressed with merit and acquit Rodrigo of the crime
charged.
Presumption of Innocence
While an accused stands before the
court burdened by a previous preliminary investigation finding that there is probable cause to believe that he
committed the crime charged, the judicial determination of his guilt or
innocence necessarily starts with the recognition of his constitutional right
to be presumed innocent of the charge he faces.
This principle, a right of the accused, is enshrined no less in our
Constitution.[26] It embodies as well a duty on the part of the
court to ascertain that no person is made to answer for a crime unless his
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[27] Its primary consequence in our criminal
justice system is the basic rule that the prosecution carries the burden of
overcoming the presumption through proof of guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, a criminal case
rises or falls on the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on the weakness
of the defense. Once the prosecution
overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and
the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the
defense which shall then test the strength of the prosecution’s case either by
showing that no crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have
committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting
doubt on the guilt of the accused. We
point all these out as they are the principles and dynamics that shall guide
and structure the review of this case.
Mode of Review
We mention, too, that the review of a
case opens the whole case for our consideration, including the questions not
raised by the parties.[28] Our role in the justice system is not so much
to penalize as to see that justice is done.
Towards this end, ours is the obligation to explore all aspects of a
case, including those that the parties have glossed over or have not fully
explored.
The Court, in discharging its mandated
duty, is tasked to consider two crucial points in sustaining a judgment of
conviction: first, the identification
of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the credibility
of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the
prosecution’s compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the elements
constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be present. Failing in either of these, a judgment for
acquittal is in order.
Identification of the Accused
The greatest care should be taken in
considering the identification of the accused especially, when this
identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally
depends on the reliability of the identification. This level of care and circumspection applies
with greater vigor when, as in the present case, the issue goes beyond pure
credibility into constitutional dimensions arising from the due process rights
of the accused.
In the
present case, the records show that Rodrigo’s arrest and eventual conviction
were wholly based on the testimony of Rosita who testified as an eyewitness and
who identified Rodrigo as one of the perpetrators of the crime. To the prosecution, the trial court, and the
appellate court, an eyewitness identification coming from the widow of the
victim appeared to have been enough to qualify the identification as fully
positive and credible. Thus, none of
them appeared to have fully examined the real evidentiary worth of the
identification Rosita made. The defense,
for its part, grasped the possible flaw in the prosecution’s case, but did not
fully pursue its case and its arguments on the basis of the existing
jurisprudence on the matter.
The
aspect of this case that remains unexplored, despite the availability of
supporting evidence, is Rosita’s out-of-court
identification of Rodrigo, done for the first time through a lone photograph
shown to her at the police station, and subsequently, by personal confrontation
at the same police station at an undisclosed time (presumably, soon after
Rodrigo’s arrest). Jurisprudence has
acknowledged that out-of-court
identification of an accused through photographs or mug shots is one of the
established procedures in pinning down criminals.[29]
Other procedures for out-of-court
identifications may be conducted through show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness (a procedure
that appears to have been done in the present case as admitted by Rosita[30]
and noted in the decision[31]),
or through line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.[32]
The
initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional
law implications in terms of the possible
violation of the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights to a fair trial to the extent
that his in-court identification
proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic
identification. In the context of this
case, the investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves,
purposely or unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, or at least actively
prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo was one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is no different from
coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only with respect to the
means used. Either way, the police
investigators are the real actors in the identification of the accused;
evidence of identification is effectively created when none really exists.
In People v. Pineda, we had occasion to
explain photographic identification and the dangers it spawns: an impermissible
suggestion and the risk that the eyewitness would identify the person he or she
saw in the photograph and not the person she saw actually committing the crime,
thus:
…
[W]here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any
subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not upon the
witness’ recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his
recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to
attempt a corporeal identification of a person whose photograph he previously
identified may say, “That’s the man that did it,” what he may actually mean is,
“That’s the man whose photograph I identified.”
xxx xxx xxx
A
recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion
that where a witness has made a photographic identification of a person, his
subsequent corporeal identification of that same person is somewhat impaired in
value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of the fact that he first
saw a photograph.[33]
We
confirmed the existence of this danger in People
v. Teehankee where the Court tackled the reliability of out-of-court identifications as an
issue; we recognized that the harmful effects on the rights of the accused of
these types of identification can go as far as and contaminate in-court identification.[34]
Speaking through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato Puno, the Court said:
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the
prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification carries vital
evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness
identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the
scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA
testing. Some authors even describe
eyewitness evidence as “inherently suspect.”
The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
x x x
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a
victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of
the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate
accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these
three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited to normal human fallibilities and
suggestive influences.[35] [Emphasis Supplied].
In People v. Pineda, we also laid down the
proper procedure on photographic identification, namely: first, a series
of photographs must be shown and not merely that of the suspect; and second,
when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display
should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.[36]
In
these cases, we emphasized that photographic identification should be free from
any impermissible suggestions that would single out a person to the attention
of the witness making the identification.[37]
That a single photograph, not a series, was
shown to Rosita is admitted by Rosita herself in her testimony. The following exchanges transpired at her
re-direct examination:
Fiscal:
(to
the witness)
Q Now, when you saw the accused Lee
Rodrigo, how did you see Lee Rodrigo to [sic] the Police Station?
A His picture was shown to me and I told
the police that he is the one, sir.
Q This Lee Rodrigo, the accused in this
case?
A Yes, sir.[38]
reinforced by the
following on re-cross-examination:
Atty.
Roque:
Q You said, Madam witness, that you knew
the accused through picture shown to you, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who
showed you the picture?
A Police
Morado, sir.
Q How
many pictures were shown to you?
A Just
one only, sir.
Q Only
the accused in this case, Lee Rodrigo?
A Yes,
sir.[39]
(Emphasis supplied)
This
testimonial admission has its roots in Rosita’s Sinumpaang Salaysay (“Salaysay,”
Exhs. “A” and “A-1”)[40]
that gave the following details of this same out-of-court identification as
follows:
12. T-: Sino ba ang sinasabi mong pumasok sa loob
ng iyong Restaurant na armado ng mga baril at nangholdap una sa Bombay at
bumaril dito sa iyong asawa at pagkatapos kinuha pa and benta ng iyong
Restaurant?
S: Ito sina LEE RODRIGO, Alyas BUNSO at
isang Alyas LYN LYN po.
13. T-: Kilala
mo ba itong nasabing mga suspects na armado ng baril at pumatay sa iyong asawa
matapos mangholdap?
S-: Hindi
ko sila kilala pero sinabi sa
akin ni Chito Alicante na driver ng nagdedeliver ng Coca Cola na ang mga
pangalan ay Alyas Bunso at Alyas LYNLYN at ang isa dito si LEE RODRIGO dito ko nalang (sic) nalaman ang tunay na
pangalan sa himpilan ng pulisya ng ipakita sa akin and kanyang retrato na siya ang nakita kung unang bumaril sa
aking asawa at kumuha ng pera na kita ng aming Restaurant. [emphasis
supplied].
Thus,
the prosecution’s evidence themselves, both documentary and testimonial, show
that the police investigatory procedure violated the jurisprudential rule we
cited above. To reasonably determine
whether this flawed procedure indeed led to an unreliable in-court
identification, we again hark back to Teehankee
for the very useful guidelines it provided:[41]
In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
attention at the time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Another
well-known authority on eyewitness identification, Patrick M. Wall, made a list
of 12 danger signals that exist independently of the identification procedures
investigators use.[42] These
signals give warning that the identification may be erroneous even though the
method used is proper.[43] Outside
of the six factors mentioned in Teehankee,
two danger signals in Wall’s list are relevant in the case before us, namely: (1)
the limited opportunity on the part of the witness to see the accused before the commission of the crime; and (2)
the fact that several persons committed the crime. We shall consider them all
in passing upon the reliability of Rosita’s in-court
identification in the discussions below.
1.
Rosita
did not know the robbers. A critical point in the totality of Rosita’s
testimony, admitted as early as her November 24, 2001 Sinumpaang Salaysay, is that she did not know the
robbers. In other words, she saw them
for the first time during the robbery.
This fact can make a lot of difference as human experience tells us: in
the recognition of faces, the mind is more certain when the faces relate to
those already in the mind’s memory bank; conversely, it is not easy to recall
or identify someone we have met only once or whose appearance we have not fixed
in our mind.
2. Lack of any prior description. Other
than giving Rodrigo’s name in her Sinumpaang Salaysay and confirming that – dito
ko nalang [sic] nalaman ang tunay na pangalan sa himpilan
ng pulisya ng ipakita sa akin ang kanyang retrato na siya and nakita kung [sic] unang Bumaril sa aking asawa at kumuha ng pera na kita ng aming
Restaurant – Rosita provided no
other description of Rodrigo or of the other two, whether in her Sinumpaang Salaysay or in court. The original records of the case in fact
contain no record of statements secured from witnesses immediately after the
crime was committed on October 27, 2000. Thus, there is no basis to compare
Rosita’s or any other witnesses’ immediate recollection of what transpired at
the crime scene and the description of the perpetrators, with Rosita’s
photographic identification and her in-court identification at the trial. This is a glaring gap in the police
investigation and one that leaves Rosita’s identification unsupported, given
the absence of corroborative evidence from other witnesses.
3. Opportunity to view the
criminals and degree of focus at the time. Rosita’s first encounter with the robbers – people she did not know before – happened
very briefly during a very horrifying experience when her
husband was shot and killed. Whether the
event and its details etched themselves in Rosita’s memory or whether
everything happened in a blur is hard to say with definite certainty and should
be gauged through Rosita’s consistency in testifying on other aspects of the
case.
4. Number of criminals involved;
degree of focus on the criminals. With three
robbers involved,[44]
Rosita’s focus and attention could not have been total on any one robber
alone. In fact, if one robber should
have caught her attention at all, he would have been the one who shot her
husband and who, by her own testimony, was not Rodrigo whom she variously claimed
to be outside the restaurant at that time or robbing her Indian customer.[45]
5. Time
element attendant to identification.
The time element involved in the process of identification is shown by
the sequence of events following the robbery-homicide on October 27, 2000. The earliest document on record subsequent to
the crime is Rosita’s Sinumpaang Salaysay
of November 24, 2000 where Rosita significantly mentioned that she did not
know the robbers and that one Chito Alicante gave her their names. The Information against Rodrigo was filed
with the court on February 28, 2001[46]
and the warrant of arrest was issued only on April 18, 2001.[47] The records do not show when Rosita saw
Rodrigo at the San Jose del Monte Police Station[48]
(as the CA decision noted) but this presumably happened only after his arrest
on April 18, 2001 or 5 ½ months after the crime. Thereafter, Rosita identified Rodrigo in
court on April 10, 2002, or more than 15 months after the crime. Thus, Rosita only saw Rodrigo twice before
they met in court; first, at the
crime scene as she alleged; and, second,
at the San Jose del Monte Police Station under circumstances that do not appear
in the records.
6. Suggestiveness of the
photographic identification. As we
have already noted, at no point did Rosita describe the robbers so that a
take-off
point for comparison can be made. Rosita
simply made her photographic identification of Rodrigo as follows:
21. T-: Mayroon akong ipapakita dito sa iyong
isang retrato, ano ang masasabi mo dito?
S-: Iyan po ang tumutok sa Bombay pagkatapos
kinuha ang pera at ina [sic] bumaril dito sa aking asawa.
(Investigator showing to the complaining witness of
picture of suspect LEE RODRIGO). [emphasis
supplied]
Significantly,
this identification came a month after the crime – a long month when the police
appeared to have achieved no headway in their investigation (although Rodrigo
himself admitted that he heard from a policeman-neighbor that he was
“implicated” in the crime two days after its commission[49]).
By her own account, Rosita only learned the names of the robbers from
information given by one Chito Alicante who never appeared as a witness in the
case.[50]
The photographic identification was made at the police station by showing her the
lone photograph of Rodrigo who was
expressly noted in the Sinumpaang Salaysay
as a “suspect.” Thus, Rosita, who did not know the robbers, initially fixed
them in her mind through their names that Chito Alicante supplied, and
subsequently, linked the name Lee Rodrigo to the faces she saw in the
photograph the police presented as the suspect.
Note that by providing only a lone photograph, complete with a name
identified as the suspect, the police did not even give Rosita the option to
identify Rodrigo from among several photographed suspects; the police simply
confronted her with the photograph of Rodrigo as the suspect.
7.
Rosita’s consistency
regarding Rodrigo’s precise role in the
robbery leaves much to be desired.[51] It is a matter of record that she testified
that Rodrigo entered the restaurant along with his two cohorts,[52]
but she subsequently declared that Rodrigo was outside the restaurant
brandishing his firearm.[53]
She also declared on cross-examination that Rodrigo was one of those who robbed
the Indian,[54] but on
re-direct, he declared that he did not touch the Indian nor take his valuables;
he just stood there.[55] It is noteworthy that while Rosita appeared
clear, categorical, and definite about the participations of Lyn-lyn and Bunso
in the robbery, she failed to do the same with respect to Rodrigo’s role in the
crime. An aspect that never saw light during the trial was the statement in the
Sinumpaang Salaysay that there
were other participants in the crime, albeit hearsay, who served as lookouts,
namely, Ricky de la Cruz, Mateo Malson alias “Mike,” and Carding Oronos. No explanation can be gleaned from the
evidence on what happened to these identified possible accomplices. The
Salaysay also mentions the people with Rosita in the restaurant, namely,
the helpers and the customers. None of
these eyewitnesses was ever called upon to testify. While these discrepancies
and gaps may appear to be trivial in considering the elements of the crime, they
assume significant materiality in considering the weakness of Rodrigo’s
identification as one of the robbers.
Separately
from these considerations, we entertain serious doubts about the validity of
the reasoning, made by both the trial and the appellate courts, that a widow’s
testimony – particularly, her identification of the accused – should be
accepted and held as credible simply because the defense failed to show by
evidence that she had reasons to falsify.[56]
Arguably,
a widow who testifies about the killing of her husband has no motive other than
to see that justice is done so that her testimony should be considered totally
credible. This assumption, however, is
not the same as the conclusion that a witness is credible because the defense
has not shown any ill motive that would motivate him or her to falsely
testify. Strictly speaking, this
conclusion should apply only to third parties who are detached from and who
have no personal interest in the incident that gave rise to the trial. Because of their presumed detachment, the
testimonies of these detached parties can be presumed credible unless impugned
by the adverse party through a showing of an ill or ulterior motive on the part
of the witnesses.
The
presumed detachment that applies to third parties obviously cannot apply to a
widow whose husband has been killed, or for that matter, to a relative whose
kin is the victim, when the testimony of the widow or the relative is offered
in the trial of the killer. The widow or
the relatives are not detached or disinterested witnesses; they are parties who
suffered and experienced pain as a result of the killing. In fact, they are better characterized as aggrieved parties as even the law
recognizes them as such through the grant of indemnities and damages. One reality about these aggrieved parties is
that their reactions and responses to the crime vary. Indeed, for some of them, the interest of
seeing that justice is done may be paramount so that they will act strictly according
to legal parameters despite their loss and their grief. At the opposite extreme are those who may not
so act; they may want to settle and avenge their loss irrespective of what the
law and evidence may indicate. In
between these extremes are those who may not be outwardly or consciously
affected, but whose judgment with respect to the case and its detail may be
impaired by their loss and grief. All
these are realities that we must be sensitive to.
Thus,
the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not simplistically be equated to
or treated as testimonies from detached parties. Their testimonies should be
handled with the realistic thought that they come from parties with material
and emotional ties to the subject of the litigation so that they cannot be
accepted and held as credible simply because the defense has not adduced
evidence of ill-motivation. It is in
this light that we have examined Rosita’s identification of Rodrigo, and we
hold as unpersuasive the lower courts’ conclusion that Rosita deserved belief
because the defense had not adduced any evidence that she had motives to
falsely testify. The better rule, to our
mind, is that the testimony of Rosita, as an aggrieved party, must stand on its
independent merits, not on any failure of the defense to adduce evidence of
ill-motivation.
Conclusion
We hold
it highly likely, based on the above considerations, that Rosita’s photographic
identification was attended by an impermissible suggestion that tainted her
in-court identification of Rodrigo as one of the three robbers. We rule too that based on the other
indicators of unreliability we discussed above, Rosita’s identification cannot
be considered as proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of Rodrigo as
one of the perpetrators of the crime.
A first
significant point to us is that Rosita did not identify a person whom she had
known or seen in the past. The robbers
were total strangers whom she saw very briefly.
It is unfortunate that there is no direct evidence of how long the
actual robbery and the accompanying homicide lasted. But the crime, as described, could not have
taken long, certainly not more than a quarter of an hour at its longest. This
time element alone raises the question of whether Rosita had sufficiently focused
on Rodrigo to remember him, and whether there could have been a reliable
independent recall of Rodrigo’s identity.
We also
find it significant that three robbers were involved, all three brandishing
guns, who immediately announced a holdup.
This is an unusual event that ordinarily would have left a person in the
scene nervous, confused, or in common parlance, “rattled.” To this already uncommon event was added the
shooting of Rosita’s husband who charged the robbers with a “bangko” and was promptly shot, not once
but three times. These factors add up to
our conclusion of the unlikelihood of an independent and reliable
identification.
We have
to factor in, too, into this conclusion, the matter of Rosita’s motivation as
well as her frame of mind when she identified Rodrigo from a photograph. We take judicial notice that subsequent to
the crime was the victim’s burial,[57]
again an uncommon event attended by an acute sense of loss, grief and, at the
very least, disruption of and some measure of confusion in the bereaved
family’s daily life. Uncertainties and a good measure of anxiety must have been
present, too, because of the lack of any immediate significant developments in
the investigation of the case in its first month, i.e., between the time
of the crime and Rosita’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay and photographic identification.
We note that the original records of the case do not even indicate the
initial investigatory steps the police undertook, especially in terms of
securing the statements of the immediate witnesses and the description of the
criminals. Under these facts, it is more likely than not that when the police
called on Rosita to ask for the identification of the lone suspect they had already identified, Rosita was
prepared in her mind to believe the police, to confirm the results of their
investigation, and to identify the suspect as one of the perpetrators. That Rodrigo was presented and identified as a
suspect is unmistakably indicated in Rosita’s Sinumpaang Salaysay;[58]
that Rosita responded to the not-too-subtle suggestion of the police that
Rodrigo was one of the robbers is very likely. We note in this regard that
Rosita does not appear to have properly sorted out in her mind the details of what
transpired on October 27, 2000 as demonstrated by the inconsistencies in her
narration of the details of the crime, notably between her Sinumpaang Salaysay and her in-court testimony, as
well as in the details of her in-court testimony as her narration and
credibility were tested at the various stages of examination. To be sure, she correctly testified on the
elements of the crime of robbery with homicide and confirmed that it was
committed. Not at the same level of
certainty, however, are the respective roles of the three perpetrators and
their identities as the latter appear to be based more on relayed third-party
information and on police conclusions rather than on Rosita’s own personal
recollection of events. At this level of certainty, we would be violating the
rights of the accused to be presumed innocent and to due process if we affirm
the lower courts’ decisions. Hence, Rodrigo’s
acquittal on ground of reasonable doubt is in order.
Epilogue: The Defenses of Denial and Alibi
While
the defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak, they are only so in the
face of an effective identification.
Where, as in the present case, the identification has been fatally
tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies, doubt on the culpability
of the accused, at the very least, has been established without need to avail
of the defenses of denial and alibi. In
constitutional law and criminal procedure terms, the prosecution never overcame
the presumption of innocence that the accused enjoyed so that the burden of
evidence never shifted to the defense. Thus, any consideration of the merits of
these defenses is rendered moot and will serve no useful purpose.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated September
18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01531. Accused-appellant
LEE RODRIGO is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. We hereby ORDER
HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE unless there are other valid causes for his continued
detention.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for his immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando
(as Chairperson) with Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and Associate Justice
Arturo Tayag concurring; CA rollo,
pp. 66-74.
[2] Reducing the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00.
[3] Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 20-22.
[4] TSNs, April 10, 2002, May 22, 2002
and June 26, 2002.
[5] Prosecution’s Exhibits “A” and “A-1”; Records, pp. 5-6.
[6] Also referred to as Lengleng in the records.
[7] Records, p.
2.
[8] TSN, October 16, 2002, pp. 3-4. The prosecution and the defense stipulated
that Dr. Viray will testify on the following matters: (a) that he is a
medico-legal officer at the PNP Crime Office in Malolos, Bulacan; (b) that he
conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim Paquito Buna on October 27,
2000; and (c) that the cause of death of Paquito Buna in his Post-Mortem
Certificate of Death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of gunshot
wound in the head.
[9] TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 5.
[10] TSN, June 26,
2002, p. 9.
[11] Id., p.
10.
[12] Id., pp.
9-10.
[13] Id., p.
10.
[14] Id., p.
11.
[15] Supra note 5,
p. 2.
[16] Records, pp.
88-91.
[17] Id., p. 87.
[18] TSN, August 27, 2003.
[19]
Id., p. 4.
[20] CA Decision, p. 6, CA rollo,
p. 71.
[21] Accused-appellant’s Brief; CA rollo, p. 36.
[22] Id., p. 37.
[23] Brief for the Appellee; id., pp. 55-57.
[24] Id.
[25] Id., p. 58.
[26] PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Section 14, Article III.
[27] Aguirre v. People,
G.R. No. L-56013, October 30, 1987, 155 SCRA 337, 342.
[28] People v. Pineda,
G.R. No. 141644, May 17, 2004, 429 SCRA 478, 495.
[29] People v. Villena, G.R. No. 140066, October 14,
2002, 390 SCRA 637, 650.
[30] TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 5-6, 8.
[31] Supra note 20.
[32] People v. Teehankee,
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 54, 95.
[33] Supra note
28, p. 498.
[34] Supra note 32,
p. 95.
[35]
Id., pp. 94-95.
[36] Supra note 28,
pp. 497-498.
[37] Id., p.
498; People v. Villena, supra
note 29, p. 650; and People v. Teehankee, supra note 32, p. 95.
[38] TSN, June 26, 2002, p. 8.
[39] Id., p. 11.
[40] Supra note 5.
[41] Citing: Neil v.
Biggers, 409 US 188 [1973]; Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 US 98 [1977]; Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd Edition, p.
346.
[42] EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASE (1965),
pp. 90-130, where the author pointed out 12 danger signals that exist
independently of the identification procedures investigators use. These are:
“(1) the witness originally stated that he could
not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused
before the crime, but made no accusation against him when questioned by the
police;
(3) a serious
discrepancy exists between the identifying witness’ original description and
the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying
the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified some other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify
the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but
fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the
crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of
different racial groups;
(9) during his
original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was unaware
that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the
witness’ view of the criminal and his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime;
and
(12) the witness fails
to make a positive trial identification.” Cited in People v. Pineda, supra note 28, pp. 503-504.
[43] Id., p. 503.
[44] Other records from the original file of the case suggest
that there may have been others who did not enter the restaurant, but this has not
been introduced in any of the materials adduced in court; records, p. 8.
[45] TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 6; and TSN, June 26, 2002, p.
6.
[46] Records, p. 2.
[47] Id., p. 10.
[48] TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 5-6.
[49]
TSN, August 27, 2003, p. 4.
[50]
TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 5.
[51] TSN, June 26, 2002, p. 9; and TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 6
[52] TSN, June 26, 2002, p. 9.
[53] TSN, April 10, 2002, p. 6.
[54] TSN, June 26, 2002, p. 6.
[55] Id., p. 9.
[56] RTC Decision, p. 2; CA Rollo, p. 21. CA Decision, pp. 6, 8; CA Rollo, pp. 71, 73.
[57]
In this regard, see the evidence of
expenses attendant to the burial.
[58]
Records, p. 5.