THIRD
DIVISION
|
GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T.
GARCIA, JR., AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., EMERLINDA S. TALENTO and RODOLFO H. DE
MESA, Petitioners, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS 12th
DIVISION, HON. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, in her capacity as
Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO S. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, HON. RONALDO D. PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, JOSECHITO B. GONZAGA, RUEL
A. MASINO and ALFREDO B. SANTOS, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 185132
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: April 24, 2009 |
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R E S O L U T
I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners assail in this Rule 65
petition the November 14, 2008 Resolution[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) holding in abeyance the resolution of their prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order on the implementation of the Office of
the Ombudsman’s October 28, 2008 Order[2]
for their preventive suspension.
Stripped
of non-essentials, the controlling facts follow.
Sometime
in 2004, the provincial government of Bataan caused the tax delinquency sale of
the properties of Sunrise Paper Products Industries, Inc. (
During
the pendency of the case, the province represented by the governor entered into
a compromise agreement with
However,
the trial court refused to dismiss the case and, on June 15, 2007, rendered its
Decision declaring, among others, that the auction sale was invalid, that the
transfer certificates of titles in the name of the province were falsified, and
that the compromise agreement executed by the parties was illegal.[9] In
G.R. No. 181311, currently pending with this Court, the province questioned,
among others, the said decision of the trial court. A status quo order restraining the implementation of the trial
court’s decision was issued by this Court in that case.[10]
Meanwhile, private respondents
Josechito B. Gonzaga, Ruel A. Magsino and Alfredo B. Santos, utilizing the June
15, 2007 Decision of the trial court as basis, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman the January 22, 2008 Complaint-Affidavit[11]
administratively and criminally charging, among others,[12]
the petitioners with violation of Sections 3(e) and (g)[13]
of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[14]
falsification of public documents, serious illegal detention, malversation of
public properties and funds, and plunder.[15]
On
October 28, 2008, the Ombudsman, in the administrative case docketed as
OMB-L-A-08-0039-A, issued the Order[16]
preventively suspending petitioners for six months. The decretal portion of the
Order reads:
UNDER
THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the
prayer seeking for the preventive suspension of respondent public officials is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Pursuant to Section
24, Republic Act No. 6770, and Section 9, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 7,
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, Series of 2003, GOVERNOR
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA JR., ATTY. AURELIO
C. ANGELES JR., EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, and RODOLFO H. DE MESA are hereby placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION until the administrative adjudication on this
case is terminated, but not to exceed six (6) months, WITHOUT PAY, except when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondents, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension.
Accordingly,
The Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government, or his duly
authorized representative is directed to implement this Order against GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA JR., ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES JR., EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, and RODOLFO H. DE MESA, and to thereafter notify this Office within
five (5) days from receipt hereof of their compliance herewith.
All
herein respondents are directed to file within the period of ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, their counter-affidavits and the affidavit of their witness/es,
if any, duly subscribed and sworn to before a notary public or any authorized
officer, and such other controverting evidence, copy furnished the complainant.
This
Order is immediately executory
pursuant to Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, in relation
to paragraph 1, Section 27 of R.A. 6770, and Section 7, Rule III,
Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, and in accordance with the
ruling in Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.
Let
it be known that refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with this
Order shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer as
provided in paragraph 3, Section 15 of R.A. 6770.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Questioning the preventive suspension
and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of the Ombudsman’s Order,
petitioners, on November 10, 2008, filed with the CA the petition, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 106026, for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance of an
injunctive relief.[18]
On November 14, 2008, the appellate
court issued the assailed Resolution,[19]
which pertinently reads:
Without
necessarily giving due course to the petition for certiorari, private respondents are hereby DIRECTED to file their COMMENT
thereon, and not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Petitioners are given five (5) days from receipt of said comment within which
to file reply.
Action
on the injunctive relief prayed for is held
in abeyance pending receipt of the pleadings ordered filed or
until the period to file the same shall have lapsed.
SO
ORDERED.[20]
Alarmed over the impending
implementation of the Ombudsman’s order and distraught with the apparent
inaction of the appellate court, petitioners instituted the instant petition
for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. On November 19, 2008, the Court
issued a TRO[21]
enjoining and prohibiting public respondents and any person representing them
or acting under their authority from implementing the October 28, 2008 Order of
the Ombudsman until further orders from the Court.
The
central question we need to address in this case is the correctness of the
appellate court’s holding in abeyance or deferment of action on petitioners’
urgent prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief.
It is well to remember that the
petition filed with the CA, in which the ancillary remedy is sought, questions
the very validity of the issuance of the Order for preventive suspension. The
grounds raised by petitioners are of a serious nature, viz: the administrative charges involved acts committed in their previous
term of office, the complaint-affidavit was not supported by evidence and was
only based on the trial court’s ruling which is still being reviewed by this
Court, the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the said ruling, and the
issuance of the order was politically motivated. Let it be emphasized at this
point that if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner Garcia’s prior
term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be
administratively charged. Further, if this Court, in G.R. No. 181311, reverses
the trial court’s ruling or nullifies it for want of jurisdiction then the
complaint-affidavit of the private respondents will no longer have a leg to stand
on. It was imperative, therefore, on the part of the appellate court, as soon
as it was apprised of the said considerable grounds, to issue an injunctive
relief so as not to render moot, nugatory and ineffectual the resolution of the
issues in the certiorari petition. An
injunctive relief is not intended to determine a controverted right, but is
calculated to prevent a further perpetration of wrong or the doing of any act
whereby the right in controversy may be materially injured or endangered, until
a full and deliberate investigation of the case is afforded to the party.[22]
In this case, for the CA to defer
action on petitioners’ application for an injunctive relief pending the filing
of respondents’ comment is to foreclose altogether the very remedy sought by
petitioners when they questioned the alleged illegal preventive suspension.
This is so, because the Ombudsman’s Order is immediately effective and
executory,[23] and the
filing of the comment by all of the respondents will entail considerable time.
While we do not entirely blame the CA
for being too cautious in not granting any injunctive relief without first
considering the counter-arguments of the opposing parties, it would have been
more prudent for it to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme
urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO while
it awaits the respective comments of the respondents and while it judiciously
contemplates on whether or not to issue a writ of preliminary injunction.[24]
Verily, the basic purpose of the restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction.[25]
It is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights and
interests.[26]
At this point we must emphasize that
the suspension from office of an elective official, whether as a preventive
measure or as a penalty, will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.[27]
Thus, as the appellate court failed
dutifully and prudently to exercise its discretion, in violation of fundamental
principles of law and the Rules of Court, its action is correctible by a certiorari writ from this Court. Grave
abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[28]
We therefore accept as correct
petitioners’ direct elevation to this Court via the petition for certiorari the CA’s November 14, 2008
Resolution even if no motion for reconsideration was filed to afford the
appellate court an opportunity to rectify its error. Under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, the certiorari
petition, and not a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court, is the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Indeed, had they not filed the petition,
they would have been left with no avenue to protect their rights.[29]
While the general rule is that a
motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before the filing of a
petition for certiorari, the same
admits of exceptions, namely: (1) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(2) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (3) where there is
an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
will prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration will be useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (7) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the proceedings
was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (9) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or public interest is involved.[30]
Without further belaboring the point,
we find it very clear that the extreme urgency of the situation required an
equally urgent resolution, and due to the public interest involved, the
petitioners are justified in straightforwardly seeking the intervention of this
Court. Again, as we repeatedly held in prior cases, the provisions of the Rules
should be applied with reason and liberality to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[31]
We hasten to add at this juncture
that the petitioners in bringing the matter before this Court as soon as the CA
issued the assailed resolution have not violated the proscription on forum
shopping. While the parties are the same in this petition and in that in the
appellate court, the issues raised and the reliefs prayed for in the two fora
are substantially different. To repeat, here, the petitioners question in the
main the CA’s deferment of action on the application for an injunctive relief.
In their petition before the CA, however, they assail the very issuance of the
order for their preventive suspension. Further, as well discussed above, this
petition is their only remedy. Petitioners’ prayer for relief in this petition
is, just like in PAL Employees Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,[32] a
necessary consequence of the CA’s inaction on their pleas.
We are cognizant that, apart from the
propriety of the CA’s deferment of action on the application for injunctive
relief, there remains the question of the validity of the Ombudsman’s order of
preventive suspension which is yet to be resolved by the appellate court. The
latter clearly involves factual issues. Since we are not a trier of facts,
following our disposition in Benguet
Management Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33]
we should remand this case to the CA for a speedy resolution on the merits.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The November 14, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it deferred action on the petitioners’ application for injunctive relief
should be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issued by the Court on November 19,
2008 enjoining and prohibiting public respondents and any person representing
them or acting under their authority from implementing the October 28, 2008
Order of the Ombudsman STANDS until
further orders from the Court. The instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination on the merits.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Romeo F. Barza concurring, rollo, pp. 44-45
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Section 267 of the LGC reads in full:
“Section 267. Action Assailing Validity of Tax Sale.—No court shall entertain any action assailing the validity or any sale at public auction of real property or rights therein under this Title until the taxpayer shall have deposited with the court the amount for which the real property was sold, together with interest of two percent (2%) per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of the action. The amount so deposited shall be paid to the purchaser at the auction sale if the deed is declared invalid but it shall be returned to the depositor if the action fails.
“Neither shall any court declare a sale at public auction invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings unless the substantive rights of the delinquent owner of the real property or the person having legal interest therein have been impaired.”
[7] Approved on October 10, 1991 and became effective on January 1, 1992.
[8] Rollo, p. 21.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Impleaded as respondents in the complaint-affidavit are Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., Provincial Legal Officer Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr., Provincial Administrator Rodolfo H. De Mesa, Provincial Treasurer Emerlinda S. Talento, Vice Governor Benjamin M. Alonzo, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Rodolfo SD. Izon, Manuel N. Beltran, Edward C. Roman, Edgardo P. Calimbas, Rodolfo S. Salandanan, Dante R. Manalaysay, Orlando S. Miranda, Fernando C. Austria and Eduardo G. Florendo; Philippine National Police Regional Director Ismael R. Rafanan, Chief of Police Asterio B. Cumigad, Evelyn L. Miranda, Col. Fernando Vinculado (Ret.), Jose M. Carandang, and Eduardo T. Garcia.
[13] Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 pertinently reads:
“Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
“x x x x
“(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
“x x x x
“(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.”
“x x x x.”
[14] Approved on August 17, 1960.
[15] Rollo, pp. 340-343.
[16] Supra note 2.
[17] Rollo, pp. 453-454.
[18]
[19] Supra note 1.
[20]
[21]
[22] Laureta, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Injunction,
1989 ed., p. 3, citing Kinlock Tel. Co.
v. Local Union No. 21 B.E.W, 275 Fed. 241 and Triumph Electric Co. v. Thullen, 209 Fed. 938.
[23] See Gobenciong v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 159883, 168059, 173212, March 31, 2008, 550 SCRA 502, 522.
[24] Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 5. Preliminary
injunction not granted without notice; exception.—No preliminary injunction
shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should
not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
“However, and subject to the provisions of the
preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall
immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to
service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining
order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two
(72) hours provided herein.
“In the event that the application for preliminary
injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary
restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a
temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial
declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or renew
the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
“However, if issued by the Court of Appeals, or a
member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty
(60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until
further orders.”
[25] Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,
401 Phil. 431, 448 (2000).
[26] Yusen Air and Sea Service Philippines, Inc.
v. Villamor, G.R. No. 154060, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 167, 171.
[27] Joson III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160652, February 13,
2006, 482 SCRA 360, 374.
[28] Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, 359 Phil. 276, 304 (1998).
[29] PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association,
Inc. v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 161110, March 30, 2006, 485
SCRA 632, 647.
[30] Diamond
Builders Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, G.R. No.
171820, December 13, 2007, 540 SCRA 194, 210; Star Paper Corporation v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 154006, November 2,
2006, 506 SCRA 556, 564-565; Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation,
G.R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 373; Romy’s Freight Service v. Castro, G.R. No. 141637, June 8, 2006,
490 SCRA 160, 164.
[31] Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, G.R. No. 169241, May 2, 2006, 488
SCRA 574, 581.
[32] Supra
note 29.
[33] 458
Phil. 204 (2003).