THIRD
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- DANTE GRAGASIN y PAR, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 186496 Present: CARPIO
MORALES,* J., CHICO-NAZARIO,** Acting Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: August 25, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this
Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of
the Decision[1]
dated 07 August 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02652,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par, affirming the Decision[2]
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, in Criminal
Case No. 4083, finding accused-appellant Dante Gragasin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article
266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353, imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering accused-appellant to pay the offended party P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages and costs of the suit.
On
On 10 December 2001, upon AAA’s sworn
statement dated 26 September 2001, accused-appellant was charged before the RTC
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, with the crime of Rape defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, Section I, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 8353 in relation to
Republic Act No. 7659 in an Information which reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4083
That on September 23, 2001 in the evening, at Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, 9 years old, against the latter’s will and consent, to her own damage and prejudice. [4]
When arraigned on
The
prosecution offered three witnesses, namely: private complainant AAA, who was a
nine-year-old girl at the time of the commission of the crime; BBB,[6]
the victim’s mother; and Dr. Napoleon Logan, Municipal Health Officer of
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, who personally examined AAA. The following documentary exhibits were also proffered
in evidence: (a) AAA’s birth certificate; (b) joint affidavit of AAA’s parents;
and (c) Certification of Medico-Genital Examination issued by Dr. Logan.
The
prosecution first presented BBB, the mother of the victim AAA.
Under oath, she swore that AAA was
born on
The next witness presented by the
prosecution was the victim AAA, who testified that she was an elementary
student who knew accused-appellant because he had been a helper for quite some
time already in her grandmother’s house where he also slept. At around
The final witness presented by the
prosecution was Dr. Napoleon Logan, Municipal Health Officer of XXX, XXX, as
expert witness. Dr. Logan testified that
he examined AAA on
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair, no growth, labia majora and labia minora coaptible, fourchette, lax; vestibular mucosa, intact; Contussion noted at both labia majora, hymenal orifice 1.2 cm in diameter, no lacerations noted. Vaginal wall and rugosities cannot be reached by examining finger.
Laboratory Examination:
Microscopic Examination of Vaginal discharge. Negative for Spermatozoa.[7]
The
medical examination revealed that while AAA did not suffer any hymenal
lacerations, she sustained contusions at the left and right labia majora. Dr. Napoleon Logan further testified that the
contusion at the left and right majora could have been caused by a blunt object
such as a human penis.
After
the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant filed a motion to file and admit
demurrer to evidence, averring that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and attacking the testimonies of AAA and her mother as
being seriously flawed and inconsistent. Opposing the demurrer to evidence, the
prosecution claimed that it had proven accused-appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and that minor inconsistencies of a minor witness testifying
in court must be liberally construed in the child’s favor, as a child was prone
to be misled and intimidated by the loud and menacing questions of the adverse
party’s counsel.
On
The
defense presented accused-appellant Dante Gragasin as its sole witness, who
denied the accusations against him and interposed the defense of alibi.
He testified that on
On cross examination,
accused-appellant admitted he saw AAA that evening but only saw her outside the
house of her grandmother along the path to the house. They exchanged a few words and learned that
she was looking for her grandmother.
Evaluating
the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties during trial,
the court a quo gave more weight to
the prosecution’s version and convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Rape,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE,
finding the accused Dante Gragasin y Par guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A and
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353, the court hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party P50,000.00
as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of this
suit.[8]
In
giving full weight and credit to AAA’s testimony, the trial court applied the
doctrine that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve
full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Neither was there any
showing of a sinister motive on the part of AAA or her family to testify as
they did. Although there was no
testimony that AAA cried at any time after the alleged incident, it does not
mean that nothing happened to her. It
bears stressing that, on direct testimony, AAA testified that she, in fact,
fell ill for a day after the incident. The
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable,
and people react differently.
On
intermediate appellate review, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the findings of the RTC, but modified the penalty and award of damages in this
wise:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
appeal is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Dante Gragasin y Par is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the
Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[9]
Hence,
this appeal where accused-appellant prays for his acquittal.
On
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF CONSUMMATED RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ELEMENT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE PROSECUTION’S.
The
assignment of errors may be narrowed down to the sole issue of whether or not
accused-appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
Appealing his conviction, accused-appellant anchors his innocence on denial and alibi. He argues that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with human experience, thus, not credible to sustain conviction. If accused-appellant inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, there would have been even the slightest tear on her hymen. Assuming arguendo that a crime was committed, accused-appellant should only be convicted of attempted rape for the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond any shadow of doubt the fact of penetration or even a mere touching by the penis of the labia.
The
defense also attempted to cast doubt on AAA’s and BBB’s credibility as
witnesses. First, the defense claims that
AAA failed to shout for help or make any sound to alert other persons nearby
while she was allegedly being raped. Second,
what militates against the prosecution’s cause is the inaction of AAA’s parents
immediately after they saw accused-appellant naked on the bed, an odd behavior
for the parents of a child whom they believed to have been sexually violated.
Finally,
the defense argues that the fact that accused-appellant proceeded to do his
chores the day after the alleged incident is evidence of his innocence, since
the natural reaction of a person who has committed a wrong is to flee from the
person he has wronged.
On
the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports accused-appellant’s
conviction, on the basis of the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by the prosecution.
Rape is a serious offense with grave
consequences, both for the accused-appellant and private complainant; hence,
the review of a judgment of conviction for rape must be done with utmost care.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court
is guided by three principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility, and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[12]
In
line with these principles and considering the gravity of the offense charged
and severity of the penalty that may be imposed, this Court has meticulously
evaluated the entire case records and transcript of stenographic notes, and
finds no reason to deviate from the appellate court’s findings of
accused-appellant’s guilt.
Under Article 266-A[1] of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, rape is committed by a man who
has carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
A perusal of the Information reveals
that accused-appellant was charged with rape committed under the first and
fourth circumstances:
a) Through
force, threat or intimidation;
x x x x
d) When
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
In rape cases, the gravamen of the
offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her
consent.[13] If the woman is under 12 years of age, such as
in the case of AAA, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only
because force is not an element of statutory rape, but because the absence of
free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual
intercourse is proven.[14]
The prosecution clearly established
that AAA was barely nine years old on
Prosecutions
for rape almost always involve sharply contrasting and irreconcilable
declarations of the victim and the accused.
At
the heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of the
witnesses, to be resolved primarily by the trial court, which is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. The
manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is
best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who has the unique and
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. In essence, when the question arises as to
which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy
of belief, the assessment of the trial court is generally given the highest
degree of respect, if not finality. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to
the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would
otherwise affect the result of the case. The assessment made by the trial court
is even more enhanced when the Court of Appeals affirms the same, as in this
case.
In giving more credence to the version of the defense, the trial court observed that the victim was direct, unequivocal, convincing and consistent in answering the questions propounded to her. Indeed, the records disclose that AAA was categorical and straightforward in narrating the sordid details of her horrid experience as accused-appellant ravished her even at such tender age:
Q. What happened?
A. He pulled my hand and he brought me to the kitchen.
Q. How long after you arrived in your grandmother’s house if Dante pulled you towards the kitchen?
A. For a while.
Q. When he brought you to the kitchen, what happened next?
A. He laid me down on the bed.
Q. Is there a bed in the kitchen?
A. That is his room.
Q. After he laid you down on the bed, what did he do next if any?
A. He removed my short pants and panty.
Q. After removing your clothing, what happened next?
A. He began to kiss me.
Q. What else did he do?
A. He inserted his penis in my vagina.
Q. While he was doing these things to you, what was your reaction?
A. I pushed him on the bed.
Q. When you were able to push him from the bed, what transpired next?
A. He fell and I ran.
Q. Were you able to run away from him?
A. He pulled me again and my grandmother arrived.
Q. What did you do when your grandmother arrived?
A. I ran to our house.
Q. Now, if you can see the accused again, would you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To whom did you first reveal the incident?
A. My mother.
Q. When did you reveal the incident?
A.
Q. It was also at that night after the incident, is that what you are saying?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How do you feel about Dante Gragasin now?
A. I am very angry.
Q. How does this affect your schooling?
A. I got sick.
Q. For how long did you get sick?
A. One day, sir.
x x x x
Q. When the accused Dante Gragasin first approached you, AAA, was he reeking with liquor?
A. Yes, sir.[16]
Not
only did AAA identify accused-appellant as her rapist; she also recounted the
rape in detail, particularly how the sexual intercourse took place.
A rape victim, who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
consistent, is a credible witness.[17] Moreover, when the offended party is a young
and immature girl, as in this case, where the victim was barely 9 years old at
the time the rape was committed, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, not only because of their relative vulnerability,
but also because of the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed
by court trial, if the matter about which they testified were not true.
Accused-appellant
denies raping the victim and claims he was asleep at the time the incident allegedly
took place. For alibi to succeed as a
defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and
(b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[18] By his own testimony, accused-appellant
testified that at the time the crime was supposed to have been committed, he
was sleeping in his quarters, in the kitchen of AAA’s grandmother. Clearly, there was no physical impossibility
for him to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission
thereof. This is, undeniably, evidence
of his presence at the locus criminis.
Accused-appellant’s
denial in this case, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative, self-serving evidence, which cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on
affirmative matters. His denial and
alibi cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of AAA, a minor less than 12
years old, who narrated how accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina.
With respect to the absence of
hymenal lacerations on AAA’s genitalia, it is well settled that medical
findings of injuries in the victim's genitalia are not essential to convict
accused-appellant of rape. Hymenal lacerations
are not an element of rape.[19] What is essential is that there was
penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven
beyond doubt in this case by the testimony of AAA.[20]
In People v. Palicte,[21]
the accused therein claimed that no rape was committed on the 11-year-old
victim, because there was no deep penetration of her vagina as the hymen was
still intact, but this Court held:
The fact that there was no deep penetration of the victim's vagina and that her hymen was still intact does not negate the commission of rape. According to Dr. Jose Ladrido, Jr., who has been in medico-legal cases since 1963 and has examined many rape victims, if the victim is a child, as in the case of Edievien, rape can be done without penetration. Without penetration the male organ is only within the lips of the female organ, and there is interlabia or sexual intercourse with little, none, or full penetration, although he admitted that it was also possible that there was no rape since the hymen was intact.
In the case before us, Edievien repeatedly testified that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina for half an hour, as a consequence of which she suffered pain. This, at least, could be nothing but the result of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape. Being a virgin, as found by the examining physician, her hymenal resistance could be strong as to prevent full penetration. But just the same, penetration there was, which caused the pain. For, rape is committed even with the slightest penetration of the woman's sex organ. Mere entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, as in this case of Edievien, is sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape.
Accused-appellant’s contention that
there can be no consummated rape, considering the absence of spermatozoa in the
victim's vagina, is of no merit. The
absence of spermatozoa does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis that
was inserted into the victim's vagina.[22] Jurisprudence is replete with examples where,
despite the absence of spermatozoa, the accused was still found guilty of
consummated rape. People v. Dones[23]
held that the important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of
semen, but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. In People
v. Bato,[24] this
Court affirmed that the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a
prosecution for rape, the important consideration not being the emission of
semen, but the unlawful penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Similarly, this Court stressed in People v. Arivan[25]
that the absence of spermatozoa in the private complainant's sex organ does not
disprove rape. It could be that the victim washed or urinated prior to
her examination, which may well explain the absence of spermatozoa.
In prosecutions for rape, the
testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable for a conviction for rape. Such is not an element of rape. By declaring that the accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina, the victim AAA said all that was necessary
to prove rape. However, Dr. Logan’s
testimony in fact bolstered AAA’s credibility when he explained that there were
contusions in the labia majora and labia minora of private complainant’s vagina,
which could have been caused by a blunt object, including a penis. The medical findings and testimony of Dr.
Logan corroborated the testimony of the victim and her mother.
As correctly found by the trial
court, this fact confirmed the testimony of AAA that accused inserted his penis
into her vagina, and that she was indeed raped by him. While accused-appellant was inserting his
sexual organ into the genital organ of AAA, she was able to push him and
escape. Thus, this explains why there was
no full penetration of his penis into her vagina.
Following
a long line of jurisprudence, full penetration of the female genital organ is
not indispensable.[26] It suffices that there is proof of the
entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female
organ. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ, however slight, is sufficient.[27] Penetration of the penis by entry into the
lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough
to justify conviction for rape.[28]
The allegation of force and
intimidation becomes immaterial in the instant case, because sexual intercourse
with a minor below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape.
Additionally, the defense insists
that the inaction of private complainant’s parents immediately after they
allegedly saw him naked on the bed was behaviour contrary to human experience,
as no parent would react in such a way when confronted with the situation of
seeing a naked man in a room where their minor daughter was. The defense also harps on the fact that there
is nothing in the testimony that will show that the victim cried or shouted for
help. This Court finds the same to be
without merit, considering that different people react differently to a given
situation. There is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience.
In sum, the prosecution was able to
discharge its burden of proving accused-appellant’s guilt. Accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Under the second paragraph of Article
266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, carnal
knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
On the award of damages, civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory
upon a finding of the fact of rape.[29] Moral damages are automatically awarded upon
such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.[30] Exemplary damages are awarded under Article
2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying. There being no aggravating circumstance that can be
considered, the award of exemplary damages would have to be deleted.
Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity must
be modified to P50,000.00, and moral damages reduced from P75,000.00
to P50,000.00.[31] In People
v. Sambrano,[32] the
Court decreed that the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00
as moral damages is only warranted when the rape is perpetrated with any of the
attending qualifying aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of
the death penalty. The instant case involves simple rape. Hence, the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages are
in order.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding
accused-appellant Dante Gragasin y Par GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the
award of damages: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages; exemplary damages are deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice Acting
Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 679 dated
** Per
Special Order No. 681 dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Associate Justices Edgardo F.
Sundiam and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; rollo,
pp. 2-18.
[2] Penned
by Acting Presiding Judge Jose Godofredo M. Naui; records, pp. 45-52.
[3] Private
complainant is referred to as AAA. In view of the legal mandate on the utmost
confidentiality of proceedings involving violence against women and children
set forth in Section 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the
Anti-violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
[4] Records,
p. 1.
[5] Records,
p. 14.
[6] The real name of the mother’s victim is withheld per Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No. 9262, and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[7] Records,
p. 6.
[8] Records,
pp. 124-131.
[9] Rollo, p. 18.
[10]
[11]
[12] People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599,
[13] People v. Igat, 353 Phil. 294, 302
(1998).
[14] People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168,
[15] Exhibit
“A”; records, p. 74.
[16] TSN,
pp. 21-27.
[17] People v. Lou, 464 Phil. 413, 425 (2004).
[18] People v. Gonzales, supra note 12 at
116.
[19] People v. Resurreccion, G.R.No. 185389,
[20] People v. Codilan, G.R. No. 177144,
[21] G.R.
No. 101088, 27 January 1994, 229 SCRA 543, 547-548, cited in People v. Gabris, 328 Phil. 184, 198 (1996).
[22] People v. Cañada, G.R. No. 112176,
[23] 325
Phil. 173 (1996).
[24] 382
Phil. 558, 566 (2000), citing People v.
Juntilla, 373 Phil. 351, 366 (1999); People
v. Sacapaño, 372 Phil. 543, 555 (1999); People
v. Manuel, 358 Phil. 664,
672 (1998).
[25] G.R.
No. 176065,
[26] People v. Castro, G.R. No. 172874,
[27] People v. Aure, G.R. No. 180451,
[28] People v. Boromeo, G.R. No. 150501,
[29] People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566,
[30] People v. Sabardan, G.R. No.132135,
[31] People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 178536,
[32] 446
Phil. 145, 162 (2003).