THIRD DIVISION
|
ERWIN H. REYES,
Petitioner, -
versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. and/or ROTAIDA TAGUIBAO, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 180551 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 10, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Erwin H.
Reyes, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated
The present Petition arose from
a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees filed by petitioner against respondents Coca Cola Bottlers
Philippines (CCBP) and Rotaida Taguibao (Taguibao) before the Labor Arbiter on
Respondent CCBP is a
corporation engaged in the business of production and distribution of
carbonated drinks, and Taguibao is its Human Resource Manager.
In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he
was first employed by respondent CCBP, through Interserve Manpower Agency
(Interserve), as a Leadman in February 1988.
Petitioner was initially assigned to the Mendiola Sales Office of
respondent CCBP. Petitioner’s employment
contract was renewed every five months and he was assigned a different task
every time. Such an arrangement
continued until petitioner was directly hired by respondent CCBP as a Route
Salesman on
In opposing the Complaint,
respondent CCBP refuted petitioner’s allegation that he was a regular
employee. Petitioner’s employment was
for a fixed period of three months, which was subsequently extended[3]
with petitioner’s consent. Petitioner
was employed pursuant to the mini-bodega
project of respondent CCBP wherein respondent CCBP sought to extend its market
to areas that cannot be serviced by its regular salesmen. After the viability of this marketing scheme
was found to be unsuccessful, respondent CCBP was constrained to discontinue
petitioner’s fixed-term employment. In addition,
respondent Taguibao had no liability for terminating petitioner’s employment
when it was not effected in bad faith.
On
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering [herein respondents CCBP and Taguibao] as follows:
(1) To reinstate [herein petitioner] to his former position as route
salesman, or to any substantially equivalent position with all the rights,
privileges, and benefits appertaining thereto including seniority rights;
(2) To pay [petitioner] his full backwages which as of August 30, 2005
already amount to P565,500.00 subject to re-computation to include salary
increases granted during the intervening period and during the pendency of the
instant case, as well as benefits and privileges due a regular employee; and
(3) To pay [petitioner] the award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10%
of the total judgment sum.
In compliance with the
directive of the Labor Arbiter, respondents CCBP and Taguibao immediately
reinstated petitioner to his former position as Route Salesman on
On
WHEREFORE, the decision dated
1. Backwages:
Salary
– P13,000 x 6.2 months = P 80,200.00
13th
month pay – P 80,600
= 6,716.67
12 P87,316.67
2. Separation
Pay
P13,000 x 5
years = P 65,000.00
P152, 316. 67
The award of 10%
attorney’s fees is deleted.
All the parties, namely
petitioner and respondents CCBP and Taguibao, moved for the reconsideration of
the foregoing NLRC Decision. Petitioner,
on one hand, maintained that the reckoning point for the computation of his
backwages must be from the time his employment was unlawfully terminated, and
not from the institution of his Complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondents CCBP and Taguibao, on the other
hand, reiterated their previous position that petitioner’s employment was
terminated only after the expiration of the fixed period for the same; and
prayed that the NLRC vacate its previous finding of illegal dismissal.
In a Resolution dated
From the
The Court of Appeals, however,
in its Resolution dated
Since petitioner failed to
timely file a Motion for Reconsideration, the Resolution dated
On
In a Resolution dated
Hence, petitioner comes before
this Court via the instant Special
Civil Action for Certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated
I.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT EXCUSING
PETITIONER’S PROCEDURAL LAPSES.
II.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF BACKWAGES
AWARDED COMPUTED FROM THE TIME THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL WAS FILED.
III.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT.
IV.
WHETHER OR
NOT THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DELETING THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEE.
The
Court first disposes the procedural issues involved in the present case.
It is evident from a
perusal of the records that petitioner indeed failed to provide the Court of
Appeals a written explanation as to why he did not personally serve a copy of
his Petition therein upon the adverse parties, as required by Section 11, Rule
13[8] of the Revised Rules
of Court. The records also readily
reveal that petitioner did not file a timely Motion for Reconsideration of the
Petitioner, however,
submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his Petition before the Court of Appeals, and the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the greater
interest of substantial justice.
Petitioner attributes the technical flaws committed before the appellate
court to his former counsel, and urges the Court to excuse him therefrom since
compliance with the procedural rules calls for the application of legal
knowledge and expertise which he, as a layman, cannot be expected to know. Petitioner, thus, prays that this Court give
his Petition due course and set aside the Resolutions dated
For
their part, respondents CCBP and Taguibao had long conceded in this battle when
they no longer appealed the 31 May 2006 Decision of the NLRC, therefore,
rendering the same final and executory with respect to them. Yet, respondents CCBP and Taguibao still
insist before this Court that petitioner was not illegally dismissed, since he
was employed for a fixed-term only, and his services were terminated upon the
expiration thereof. Respondents CCBP and
Taguibao also argue that petitioner’s procedural
faux pas cannot be excused by merely attributing the same to his former
counsel, in view of the doctrinal rule that negligence of the counsel binds his
client.
The Court rules in favor of petitioner.
It is true that for petitioner’s failure to
comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, his petition
should be expunged from the records. In
the case of Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. v. Ricafort,[9]
the Court stressed the mandatory character of Section 11, Rule 13, viz:
We thus take
this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to
other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person,
personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to
other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as
to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11. This Court
cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced
by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
Nevertheless, the Rules of Court itself calls for
its liberal construction, with the view of promoting their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[10] The Court is fully aware that procedural
rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed
procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of
technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to
relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character,
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation
speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.[11]
In numerous cases,[12]
the Court has allowed liberal construction of Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court when doing so would be in the service of the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of the equity jurisdiction of this
Court. In one such case, Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13]
this Court provided the following justification for its non-insistence on a
written explanation as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of
Court:
The rules of
procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They were conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to
suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.
The call for a liberal interpretation of the
Rules is even more strident in the instant case which petitioner’s former
counsel was obviously negligent in handling his case before the Court of
Appeals. It was petitioner’s former
counsel who failed to attach the required explanation to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343. Said counsel did not bother to inform
petitioner, his client, of the
The basic general rule is that the negligence of
counsel binds the client. Hence, if
counsel commits a mistake in the course of litigation, thereby resulting in his
losing the case, his client must perforce suffer the consequences of the
mistake. The reason for the rule is to
avoid the possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence
of his or her counsel to escape an adverse decision of the court, to the
detriment of our justice system, as no party would ever accept a losing
verdict. This general rule, however,
pertains only to simple negligence of the lawyer. Where
the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive,
reckless and inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since, in such a
case, the client is effectively deprived of his or her day in court.[14]
The circumstances of this case qualify it under
the exception, rather than the general rule.
The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel may be considered gross
since it invariably resulted to the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily
available to the petitioner. Not only
was petitioner deprived of the opportunity to bring his case before the Court
of Appeals with the outright dismissal of his Petition on a technicality, but
he was also robbed of the chance to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of
his Petition. What further impel this Court to heed the call for substantial justice are
the pressing merits of this case which, if left overshadowed by technicalities,
could result in flagrant violations of the provisions of the Labor Code and of the
categorical mandate of the Constitution affording protection to labor.
Higher interests of justice and equity demand
that petitioner should not be denied his day in court and made him to suffer
for his counsel’s indiscretions. To
cling to the general rule in this case would only to condone, rather than
rectify, a serious injustice to a party -- whose only fault was to repose his
faith and trust in his previous counsel -- and close our eyes to the glaring
grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC.
This Court is aware that in the instant case, since
petitioner’s appeal before the Court of Appeals is to be given due course, the
normal procedure is for us to remand the case to the appellate court for
further proceedings. The Court, however,
dispensed with this time-consuming procedure, since there is enough basis on
which proper evaluation of the merits of the case may be had. Remand of this case would serve no purpose
save to further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play. It is already an accepted rule of procedure
for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation.[15]
Having thus settled the procedural matters in the
instant case, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues.
The Court is convinced beyond cavil that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in modifying the 30 April 2005 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, for
in so doing, the NLRC not only disregarded the elementary statutory and
jurisprudential principles, but also
violated the basic principles of social justice and protection to labor
enshrined in the Constitution.
Explicit is Art. 279 of the Labor Code which
states:
Art. 279.
Security of Tenure. -- In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement.
Applying the above-quoted statutory provision,
this Court decreed in Pheschem Industrial
Corporation v. Moldez[16]:
Article 279
of the Labor Code provides that an illegally dismissed employee shall be
entitled, inter alia, to the payment
of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from
the time that his compensation was withheld from him, i.e., from the time of his illegal dismissal, up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. Thus, where
reinstatement is adjudged, the award of backwages and other benefits continues
beyond the date of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision ordering reinstatement and
extends up to the time said order of reinstatement is actually carried out.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court was more emphatic in Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation
v. Dapiton,[17] when it ruled
that backwages had to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty
he had to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. It was to be computed from the
time of the employee’s illegal dismissal (or from the time his compensation was
withheld from him) up to the time of his reinstatement.
One of the natural consequences of a finding that
an employee has been illegally dismissed is the payment of backwages corresponding
to the period from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The statutory intent of this matter is
clearly discernible. The payment of
backwages allows the employee to recover from the employer that which he has
lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal.[18] Logically, it must be computed from the date
of petitioner’s illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. There can be no gap or interruption, lest we
defeat the very reason of the law in granting the same. That petitioner did not immediately file his
Complaint should not affect or diminish his right to backwages, for it is a
right clearly granted to him by law -- should he be found to have been
illegally dismissed -- and for as long as his cause of action has not been
barred by prescription.
The law fixes the period of time within which
petitioner could seek remedy for his illegal dismissal and for as long as he
filed his Complaint within the prescriptive period, he shall be entitled to the
full protection of his right to backwages.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of
four years from the time of his illegal dismissal within which to institute the
complaint. This is based on Article 1146
of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years.[19] The four-year prescriptive period shall
commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker.[20] Here, petitioner was dismissed from service
on
The Labor Arbiter, in his computation of the
award for backwages to petitioner, had followed the long-settled rule[21]
that full backwages should be awarded, to be reckoned from the time of illegal
dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
The NLRC, however, modified the Labor Arbiter’s award for backwages by
computing the same only from the time petitioner filed his Complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, i.e.,
on
We find no justice or rationality in the distinction
created by the NLRC; and when there is neither justice or rationality, the
distinction transgresses the elementary principle of equal protection and must
be stricken out. Equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
as to both rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[22] There is no sufficient basis why petitioner
should not be placed in the same plane with other illegally dismissed employees
who were awarded backwages without qualification.
Herein
petitioner, having been unjustly dismissed from work, is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary
equivalents computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.[23] Accordingly, backwages must be awarded to
petitioner in the amount to be computed from the time his employment was
unlawfully terminated by respondents CCBP and Taguibao on
We also do not agree with the NLRC in deleting
the directive of the Labor Arbiter for the reinstatement of petitioner to his
former position, on the flimsy excuse that the petitioner’s position as Route
Salesman was confidential in nature and that the relationship between
petitioner and respondents CCBP and Taguibao was already strained.
To protect the employee’s security of tenure, the
Court has emphasized that the doctrine of “strained relations” should be
strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his
right to reinstatement. Every labor
dispute almost always results in “strained relations,” and the phrase cannot be
given an overarching interpretation; otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee
can never be reinstated.[24] The assumption of strained relations was
already debunked by the fact that as early as March 2006 petitioner returned to
work for respondent CCBP, without any antagonism having been reported thus far
by any of the parties. Neither can we sustain
the NLRC’s conclusion that petitioner’s position is confidential in nature. Receipt of proceeds from sales of respondent
CCBP’s products does not make petitioner a confidential employee. A confidential
employee is one who (1) assists or acts in a confidential capacity, in regard
to (2) persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
specifically in the field of labor relations.[25] Verily, petitioner’s job as a salesman does
not fall under this qualification.
Finally, the Court overrules the deletion by the
NLRC of the Labor Arbiter’s award for attorney’s fees to petitioner. Petitioner is evidently entitled to
attorney’s fees, since he was compelled to litigate[26]
to protect his interest by reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of
his employment by respondents CCBP and Taguibao.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Associate Justice Renato C. Corona
was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring. Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring. Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[3] Pleadings submitted by respondent CCBP were silent as to how long petitioner’s employment was extended. No copy of the original contract or its extension was submitted by respondent CCBP.
[4] Rollo, pp. 175-179.
[5]
[6]
[7] The Complaint before the Labor
Arbiter was filed on
[8] SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. – Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
[9] 355 Phil. 404, 413-414 (1998).
[10] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1, Section 6.
[11] Barnes
v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753,
[12] Fulgencio
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 457 Phil. 868, 881-882 (2003); Musa v. Amor, 430 Phil. 128, 138 (2002);
Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. De Macatangay,
G.R. No. 164947,
[13]
[14] Escudero
v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-60578,
[15] Bunao
v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 159606,
[16] G.R. No. 161158,
[17] 377 Phil. 951, 966 (1999).
[18]
[19] Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 229 Phil. 279, 288-289 (1986).
[20] Ramos
v. Our Lady of
[21] Labor Code, Art. 279; C-E Construction Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 456 Phil. 597, 607-608 (2003); Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, 359 Phil. 317, 329 (1998); Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 81200, 17 October 1990, 190 SCRA 525, 537.
[22] Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1164 (1957).
[23] Labor Code of the
[24] Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corporation, 354 Phil. 112, 122 (1998).
[25] San
Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt
[26] Civil Code of the