SAMUEL
MALABANAN, G.R.
No. 163495
Petitioners,
Present:
CARPIO
MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
-
versus - TINGA,
VELASCO,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
RURAL
BANK OF CABUYAO,
INC., Promulgated:
Respondent.
May 8, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
This petition for review on
certiorari[1]
seeks to set aside the decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The following facts are
uncontroverted.
Samuel Malabanan (petitioner) was
indebted to the Rural Bank of Cabuyao (respondent) in the amount of P5,000,000.00. To secure the payment of said loan,
petitioner executed a Real Estate Mortgage[5]
(REM) on 18 April 1996 in favor of respondent over a parcel of land in Calamba,
Laguna, with an area of 1,021 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 255916.[6]
When petitioner failed to settle his
loan, he executed a dacion en pago
over the mortgaged property in favor of respondent on P100,000.00;
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.[10]
In his Answer,[11]
petitioner denied having executed a dacion
en pago, stated that he never appeared before the Notary Public, and that
its Executive Vice-President/General Manager, Renato Delfino, who purportedly
represented respondent, was no longer officially connected with the latter since
1999. He also made a counterclaim for
damages.[12]
Prior to the filing of the ejectment
case, however, petitioner had already filed an action for an Annulment of the dacion en pago and TCT No. T-493506 and reconveyance
before Branch 35, RTC-Calamba.[13]
In
the preliminary conference held on
1. The execution of the real estate mortgage in favor of herein plaintiff executed by defendant Samuel Malabanan.
2.
That prior to the institution of this instant case,
Civil Case No. 3316-2002 for the Annulment of Dacion En Pago and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-493506 and
Reconveyance with Damages and Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction
entitled Samuel [Malabanan] v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao Inc., Renato Delfino,
Notary Public Ruben Avenido and The Register of Deeds for
3. That the alleged Dacion en Pago refers to TCT-T-255916.
4.
The existence and receipt of the demand letter dated
On
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC
decision and ordered petitioner to vacate the subject property and to pay
respondent P100,000.00 for rentals and P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.[17]
Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review with Urgent Prayer for Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[18] Petitioner imputed error on the part of the
trial court in not dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground
of litis pendencia. He also faulted the RTC for not
simultaneously resolving the ejectment case and the annulment of dacion en pago.
On
In the present petition, petitioner
raises substantially the same issues brought before the Court of Appeals, which
can be summarized into two: (1) whether the complaint for unlawful detainer can
be dismissed on ground of litis pendencia
and forum shopping; and (2) whether the allegations in the complaint make out a
case of unlawful detainer.[20]
Petitioner asserts that there is a
pending case for annulment of dacion en
pago and TCT No. T-493506 before the RTC in which the issue to be resolved
also involves possession as in this case.
The allegations and the evidence to be presented in both complaints are
identical. Hence, the instant complaint
for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on grounds of litis pendencia and forum shopping.[21] Assuming without conceding that the complaint
cannot be dismissed, petitioner urges at least the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings pending resolution of the annulment case.
The
Court of Appeals squarely addressed this issue, viz:
It is established that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical possession or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.
While it is true that both parties raised the issue of ownership over the subject property, yet it is emphasized that in ejectment cases, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter, but such determination of ownership is not clothed with finality and neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership. Therefore, the judgment in the present case would not amount to res judicata in the other case which is the pending Annulment of Dacion En Pago.[22]
Forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the other.[23]
Petitioner and respondent are the
same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases. The issue of ownership was likewise being
contended, with same set of evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a
judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.
This issue is hardly a novel
one. It has been laid to rest by heaps
of cases iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land
or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.[24]
It bears emphasizing that in
ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto.[25] Therefore, the provisional determination of
ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of
whether a pending action for annulment would abate an ejectment suit must be
resolved in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership
of the same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment
suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who
has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.[26]
The crux of the controversy centers
on the propriety of the unlawful detainer suit. In unlawful detainer, one
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.[27] In such case, the possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess;
hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the
termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.[28]
The pertinent allegations in the
complaint read:
4.
That on various occasion, defendant Samuel Malabanan obtained loans from
plaintiff in the total principal amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00)
Philippine currency using as collateral that parcel of land located in Bo.
Parian, Calamba, Laguna consisting of 1,021 sq. m. including all the
improvements found therein and covered by TCT No. T-265916 of the Registry of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna (hereinafter referred to as “subject property” for
brevity). x x x
5. Unfortunately, however, defendant Malabanan failed to pay his loans with the plaintiff;
6. On November [12, 2001], to settle his loans with plaintiff, defendant Samuel Malabanan executed a dacion en pago (deed of assignment in payment of debt). x x x
7.
Through the said dacion
en pago, plaintiff was able to effect [the] transfer of registration of the
subject property in its name on [
8. Under the circumstances, plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession of the subject property;
9. But through tolerance, plaintiff allowed defendant Malabanan to remain in the subject property without requiring him to pay any rentals;
10. However, when the need of the plaintiff for the subject property arose, plaintiff has demanded unto defendant Malabanan to peacefully surrender the possession of the subject property, the last of which was received by defendant on September [1, 2002] sent by [the] undersigned counsel which was received by defendant on September 16, 2002. x x x
x x x
12. Defendant Malabanan has been unlawfully detaining the subject property from plaintiff and defendant Malabanan and all persons acting his authority should be ejected therefrom and possession thereof surrendered to plaintiff;
x x x[29]
An examination of the complaint
reveals that initially, petitioner exercised possession over the subject
property as the registered owner. He
executed a real estate mortgage in favor of respondent and for his failure to
pay his obligation, he purportedly executed a dacion en pago, whereby ownership over the property was transferred
to respondent. Subsequently, a new TCT
was issued in respondent’s name. Thus,
respondent became entitled to possession.
Petitioner insists that the
allegations in the complaint were not supported by sufficient evidence to
justify the remedy of an action for unlawful detainer. He challenges the allegations of how
respondent came “to possess” the subject property and anchors his claim on the
alleged simulated dacion en pago. To prove fraud in the execution of said deed,
petitioner points out that the subject property is formerly covered by TCT No.
T-265916 in his name while the subject of the dacion en pago refers to TCT No. T-255916, registered in the name
of Ledesco Development Corporation.[30]
While petitioner harps on the
supposed variance between the two certificate of titles, he failed to explain
why the supposed erroneous TCT No. T-255916 covers the property subject of the
Real Estate Mortgage, which he himself admitted to having executed. To bolster the reasonable conclusion that
indeed it was a mere typographical error, the technical description of the
mortgaged property clearly refers to the lot situated in Calamba, Laguna.
In dismissing petitioner’s
contention, the trial court observed that the variance in the TCT numbers
appearing on the title and the deed may be attributed to a typographical oversight
because the technical descriptions of the properties covered by TCT No.
T-255916 and TCT No. T-265916 would clearly show that the properties covered
therein refer to one and the same property, which is the property in dispute.[31] The appellate court added that what is
controlling is the technical description of the property. Moreover, petitioner admitted having executed
the Real Estate Mortgage which also bears the erroneous TCT No. T-255916.[32]
Petitioner accuses respondent of employing
fraudulent means and pretenses in procuring his signature in the said deed as
he never consented to its execution. He
further denies appearing before the Notary Public and that the Community Tax
Certificate Number appearing on the document was not his.
It can readily be inferred that
petitioner is primarily asserting his ownership over the subject property. It should be reiterated, at the point of
being repetitive, that in an unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be resolved
is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the property in dispute. The trial
court and the appellate court were one in saying that respondent had
overwhelmingly established its right of possession by virtue of the dacion en pago and the torrens title.
At this
juncture, it may not be amiss to note that in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised for the simple
reason that the Court is not a trier of facts. It is not duty-bound
to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. The factual findings
of the trial court, especially when adopted and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals as in the present case, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.[33]
In the case
at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court lent more credence to the
validity of the dacion en pago and
respondent’s title. This determination,
however, is regarded merely as provisional.
It is a settled doctrine that courts in ejectment cases may determine
questions of ownership whenever necessary to decide the question of possession.[34] In any case, we sustain the finding that the respondents have the better
right to possess the subject property.
Well-established is the rule that if
possession is by tolerance as has been alleged in the complaint such possession
becomes illegal upon demand to vacate, with the possessor refusing to comply
with such demand.[35]
Going over the allegations in the
complaint, it is clear that respondent’s action for unlawful detainer is based
on petitioner’s possession by mere tolerance.
From the time the title to the property was transferred in the name of
respondent, petitioner’s possession was converted into one by mere tolerance of
the owner. The forbearance ceased when
respondent made a demand on petitioner to vacate the lot. Thenceforth,
petitioner’s occupancy had become unlawful.
A person who occupies the land of
another with the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[36]
There is no doubt that the plaintiff
in an ejectment case is entitled to damages caused by his loss of the use and
possession of the premises. Damages in the context of Section 17, Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to "rent" or fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property.[37]
Respondent, as the plaintiff in the
complaint for unlawful detainer brought before the MTCC, had sought therein the
award of P100,000.00 a month as
reasonable rental.[38] Before
this Court, petitioner asserts that respondent had failed to prove his claim
that the reasonable rental value is P100,000.00 a month.[39] Respondent, as the plaintiff in the
complaint before the MTCC, had the burden to adduce evidence to prove the fair
rental value or reasonable compensation for the subject property,[40]
but it failed to discharge its burden. All that it did was to make through his
counsel a self-serving and uncorroborated assertion in the unverified Position
Paper[41] before the MCTC that “(g)iven the size and
strategic location of the subject property the reasonable rentals” for its use
“can be safely estimated at P100,000.00 a month.”[42] Neither
did the trial court make any ratiocination when it granted the rentals rentals
prayed for by respondent.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED
IN PART. The Decision dated
affirmation of the Regional Trial
Court’s award of reasonable rentals in favor of respondent is DELETED and SET ASIDE,
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
**Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro is hereby designated as additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, who is on official leave
[2]
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