SECOND DIVISION
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OLYMPIC
MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Petitioner, - versus - PLATINUM
GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 178188 |
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CITINICKEL
MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR,
in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL
CORPORATION,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 180674 |
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PLATINUM
GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - CITINICKEL
MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its own interest and on behalf
of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 181141 |
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x |
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PLATINUM
GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF
APPEALS and POLLY C. DY,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 183527
Present: *CARPIO
MORALES, J.
Acting Chairperson, TINGA, VELASCO, JR.,
**LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and brion, JJ.
Promulgated: May
8, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.:
Before
the Court are the following inter-related and subsequently consolidated cases:
1.
G.R. No. 178188 is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by Olympic Mines and Development Corporation (Olympic) assailing the decision dated February 28, 2007,[1]
and resolution dated May 30, 2007[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97259, which effectively upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa
City, Branch 95, in Civil Case No. 4199, and affirmed the injunctive writs
issued therein;
2.
G.R. No. 180674 is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by Citinickel Mines and Develoment Corporation (Citinickel) assailing the decision dated November 20, 2007 of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99422, which dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by Citinickel against the injunctive writ[3]
issued by the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Branch 95 in Civil Case No. 4199;
3.
G.R. No. 183527 is a petition for certiorari filed by Platinum
Group Metals Corporation (Platinum), assailing
the resolution dated March 3, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 101544, which
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC of
Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case
No. 4199; and
4.
G.R. No. 181141 is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by Platinum against the resolution dated
These four (4) petitions
stem from the Operating Agreement entered into by Olympic and Platinum, and the
subsequent attempts made by Olympic, and thereafter its successor-in-interest
Citinickel, to unilaterally terminate the same.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Operating Agreement between Olympic and
Platinum
In
1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted “Mining Lease Contracts”[4]
by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) covering mining areas located in
the municipalities of Narra and Espanola,
On
July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating
Agreement[5]
with Platinum, by virtue of which Platinum was given the exclusive right to
control, possess, manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market
or dispose mining products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of
Narra, with an area of 768 hectares, and the Pulot Nickel Mine in the
Municipality of Espanola, covering an area of 1,408 hectares (referred to as subject mining areas), for a period of
twenty five years. In return, Platinum
would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2½% of the gross revenues.
Olympic and Platinum
applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary government permits and
environmental compliance certificates.
On
Civil Case No. 4181 and
the Branch 52 Order
On April 25, 2006, Olympic
instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC of
Puerto Princesa, Branch 52 (docketed as Civil Case No. 4181) against
Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought
to enjoin Platinum from conducting mining operations on the subject mining
areas, and also to recover possession thereof.
Civil Case No. 4181 essentially involved the issue of whether Olympic
can unilaterally terminate the Operating Agreement on account of the alleged
gross violations committed by Platinum, and accordingly, prevent the latter
from continuing its mining operations.
The RTC, through an Order dated May 16, 2006 (Branch 52 Order), ruled that it did not; the trial court found that
Platinum substantially complied with the terms of the Operating Agreement and
declared that Olympic’s unilateral termination thereof was legally
impermissible.[6] The
RTC thus dismissed Olympic’s complaint.
Administrative Complaints
Instituted by Olympic
Instead of seeking relief
against the Branch 52 Order (which thus became final and executory), Olympic then
filed two cases with different agencies of the DENR:
a.
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) Case No. 001-06 (filed on
b.
POA Case No. 2006-01-B (filed on
Assignment of Rights under
the Operating Agreement
While these two
administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its applications for
mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to
Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment dated
Civil Case No. 06-0185
After the assignment, Citinickel
filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of Parañaque, Branch 258, on
improper venue as among the grounds for dismissal.[8] Citinickel did not bother to appeal this
dismissal, opting instead to find other remedies.
Administrative Cases
Instituted by Citinickel
Citinickel thereafter
filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06, DENR Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) Case No.
8253, and POA Case No. 2006-02-B.
PMRB Case No. 002-06,
where Citinickel sought the cancellation of Platinum’s SSMPs, was dismissed
through a Resolution dated
DENR EMB Case No. 8253 was
instituted by Citinickel requesting for the cancellation of the Environmental
Compliance Certificates (ECCs) of
Platinum; although granted by the EMB, and later affirmed by the DENR
Secretary, the cancellation of Platinum’s ECCs was reversed by the Office of
the President.
While Civil Case No.
06-0185 (for the rescission of the Operating Agreement) was pending before the
RTC of Paranaque, Citinickel filed a complaint, docketed as POA Case No.
002-06-B, with the POA of DENR, asking for a writ of injunction against
Platinum and for the cancellation of the Operating Agreement. This time, Citinickel’s relentless efforts to
have the Operating Agreement cancelled bore fruit – the POA issued a Resolution
dated
Through a petition for certiorari,
Platinum questioned the POA Resolution before the CA; the case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 97288. The appellate
court, however, dismissed Platinum’s certiorari petition,[11]
upon finding that Platinum failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
POA Resolution with the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) – the body which
has appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the POA pursuant to
Section 78 of the Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Mining
Act) – before elevating the case to the CA.
Protesting the dismissal
of its certiorari petition, Platinum filed before the Court one of the
four petitions involved in these consolidated cases – G.R. No. 181141. Platinum contends that the non-filing of an
appeal (through a motion for reconsideration) with the MAB would be useless, as
the POA declared that its decision to cancel the Operating Agreement was not
just its own, but also that of the DENR, which includes the MAB. Additionally, Platinum claimed that the POA
Resolution[12] was
patently illegal, as it contravened the injunctive writs issued in Civil Case
No. 4199 (discussed next), thus the immediate need to invoke the appellate court’s
certiorari jurisdiction.
Civil Case No. 4199
and the Injunctive
Writs
Civil Case No. 4199
involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract, and
specific performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto
Princesa,
Alleging that Olympic’s claims and misrepresentation in the letters dated April 24, 2006 [referring to the termination letter sent by Olympic to Platinum], May 18, 2006 [referring to the letter-complaint of Olympic filed in PMRB Case No. 001-06 which sought the revocation of Platinum’s SSMPs], and June 6, 2008 [referring to the letter of Olympic notifying Platinum of its intention to file legal action against Platinum for gross violations of the Operating Agreement], xxx Platinum filed with Branch 95 of the RTC of Puerto Princessa City on June 14, 2006, a complaint to quiet Platinum’s title/interest over the subject mining areas, to recover damages and to compel Olympic to perform its obligations under the Operating Agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
On July 21, 2006, upon xxx Platinum’s
motion, xxx Blancaflor, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the RTC of
Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, issued [an] xxx order in Civil Case No. 4199,
granting xxx Platinum’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction xxx directing Olympic, and its successor-in-interest, xxx
Citinickel, to cease and desist from performing any act that would tend to
impede, hamper, limit, or adversely affect xx Platinum’s full enjoyment of its
rights under the Operating Agreement xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, on
Olympic sought the
dismissal of Platinum’s Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion to dismiss where
Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the
issues raised in the case. Olympic
contended that the case involved a mining dispute requiring the technical
expertise of the POA; accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the POA. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss in a
Resolution dated
Citinickel, for its part,
filed its own certiorari petition before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 99422),
and questioned the injunctive writs issued in Civil Case No. 4199. It claimed that the writ of preliminary
injunction cannot be enforced against it since it was not impleaded in the case
even if it was an indispensable party; Olympic’s rights under the Operating
Agreement had already been transferred to it by virtue of the June 9, 2006
Deed of Assignment. The appellate court nonetheless dismissed
Citinickel’s petition, prompting the latter to file an appeal by certiorari
with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 180674.
Polly
Dy, as a member of Rockworks’ Board of Directors who was impleaded as
co-defendant of Olympic in Civil Case No. 4199, filed her own certiorari
petition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101544) against the injunctive writs
issued by the trial court in the same case.
Acting favorably for Polly Dy, the CA directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, enjoining
it from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 4199. Through a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 183527, Platinum asks the Court to annul the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 101544.
Civil Case No. Q-07-59855
Notwithstanding the
injunctive writ issued in Civil Case No. 4199 ordering Olympic/Citinickel to
respect the rights of Platinum under the Operating Agreement (including its
right to control, possess, and operate the subject mining areas), Citinickel
instituted a mandamus petition with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 100
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-07-59855), for the DENR Secretary to confiscate
and maintain custody and possession of the mineral ores stockpiled at the
Palawan Pier until the determination of the rights of Citinickel and Platinum
under the Operating Agreement. While the
trial court initially issued a status quo order, it eventually dismissed
the Citinickel’s petition for mandamus in its Decision dated May 4,
2007, for Citinickel’s failure to prove a clear legal right on its part to
justify the issuance of a mandamus writ in its favor, and also for
forum shopping.[14]
For a more graphic
presentation, these cases are presented hereunder in tabular form:
|
Case Number |
Parties |
Cause of Action |
Status |
|
Civil Case
No. 4181 (RTC |
Olympic v. Platinum |
Complaint
for injunction to enjoin Platinum from
continuing mining activities filed on |
·
May 16, 2006 Order dismissing the complaint
for injunction after finding that unilateral termination of the
Operating Agreement was illegal (Branch 52 Order). ·
Olympic did not appeal the Order. |
|
PMRB Case
No. 001-06 |
Olympic v. Platinum |
Complaint for revocation of Platinum’s SSMPs dated |
·
|
|
Civil Case
No. 4199 (RTC |
Platinum v. Olympic |
Complaint for quieting of title, damages, and specific performance |
·
·
|
|
DENR
POA Case No. 2006-01-B |
Olympic v. Platinum |
Petition to cancel Operating Agreement and revoke
Platinum’s SSMPs dated |
·
|
|
Civil Case
No. 06-0185 (RTC |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Complaint to rescind Operating Agreement dated |
·
· Citinickel did not appeal the Order. |
|
PMRB Case
No. 002-06 |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Petition to cancel Platinum’s SSMPs dated |
·
|
|
DENR POA
Case No. 2006-02-B |
Citinickel v Platinum |
Complaint to cancel Operating Agreement and to
issue injunction against Platinum
dated |
·
October 30, 2006
Resolution cancelling
OA and SSMP of Platinum (POA Resolution) |
|
EMB letter-
complaints filed as DENR EMB Case No. 8253 |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Complaint to cancel ECCs issued to Platinum dated |
· Elevated to DENR Secretary by Citinickel on account of alleged inaction of EMB ·
· Nov 22 Order denying MR of Platinum ·
|
|
Civil Case
No. Q-07-59855 (RTC |
Citinickel v. DENR |
Petition for mandamus to compel DENR Secretary to
confiscate and hold mineral ores stockpiled in |
·
|
THE
PETITIONS
G.R. No. 178188 on Jurisdiction and Venue
in Civil Case No. 4199
In its petition before the
Court,[15] Olympic assails the CA Decision[16]
dated February 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97259, in which the appellate court
affirmed the October 4,[17]
and 5[18]
2006 Orders of the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in Civil Case No. 4199. The CA declared that the trial court properly
exercised jurisdiction over Platinum’s complaint in Civil Case No. 4199 because
the main issue raised therein was whether Platinum had a claim and/or right
over the subject mining areas, pursuant to the Operating Agreement, and the
resolution of this issue did not require the technical expertise of the
POA. Moreover, the CA declared that
venue was properly laid in the RTC of Puerto Princesa (where the disputed
mining areas are located) because it was an action affecting an interest in
real property that was commenced and tried in a court that has jurisdiction
over the area of the real property.
Lastly, the CA found that the lower court had not abused its discretion
when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by Platinum. Olympic’s motion for reconsideration of the
CA’s decision was denied in the
Olympic
however asserts that it is the POA which has exclusive jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by Platinum in Civil Case No. 4199 because the case involves a
mining dispute that requires the technical expertise of the POA. Olympic additionally contends that the
complaint is a personal action because Platinum sought a declaration that it
did not violate the Operating Agreement, and was asking its enforcement; as a
personal action, the case should have been filed in the place where either the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff, and not
the court where the property is located.
Platinum,
on the other hand, opposes Olympic’s contentions, claiming that Olympic itself
had already recognized the authority of the trial court to resolve the dispute
by instituting Civil Case No. 4181 before the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Branch 52
(the injunction case filed by Olympic against Platinum that was dismissed for
lack of merit). Incidentally, Platinum
points out that Olympic had committed forum shopping because aside from Civil
Case No. 4181, it filed several other administrative cases, all grounded on
Platinum’s alleged violation of the Operating Agreement.
With
regard to the issue of venue, Platinum claims that its principal objective in
instituting Civil Case No. 4199 was to retain possession of the subject mining
areas – it was therefore a real action properly filed in the Puerto Princesa
court that had jurisdiction over the areas.
G.R. No. 183527 on the
Injunction against the
Proceedings in Civil Case No. 4199
While
the jurisdiction of the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Branch 95 was upheld by the
CA’s Special Fifth Division in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97259, the 15th Division of the appellate court, on the other
hand, enjoined (through a Resolution[19]
dated March 2, 2008, in CA-G.R. SP No. 101544) the same trial court from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 4199 and
from implementing its Orders dated July 21, 2006,[20]
October 26, 2006,[21]
and April 13, 2007.[22]
In
assailing the CA’s 15th Division’s Resolution dated March 2, 2008
(through the present petition for review on certiorari)[23],
Platinum principally argues that Polly Dy – the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No.
97259 – had no standing to question the injunctive writs issued in Civil Case
No. 4199 because none of the writs were directed against Polly Dy. Additionally, Polly Dy did not file a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed Orders of the trial court, rendering her CA
certiorari petition fatally defective
for being premature.
G.R. 180674 on Citinickel’s
inclusion in the injunctive writs issued in Civil Case No. 4199
Citinickel
questions the CA Decision[24]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 99422, which dismissed for lack of merit its petition for certiorari, assailing the July 21, 2006[25]
and April 13, 2007[26]
Orders of the RTC in Civil Case No. 4199.
Citinickel
assails the CA Decision through this petition,[27]
asserting that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated
Platinum counters that the
injunction orders are binding on Citinickel because the assignment of Olympic’s
rights to Citinickel only took effect upon the approval thereof by the Regional
Director, which approval was issued only in
G.R. No. 181141 on the
validity of the POA Resolution
In
its Petition for Review,[28]
Platinum assails the CA Resolution[29]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 97288, which dismissed its petition for certiorari questioning the POA Resolution for having failed to
previously file a motion for reconsideration with the POA. The CA also denied
Platinum’s motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[30]
dated
Platinum
claims that it chose not to file a motion for reconsideration of the POA
Resolution in DENR Case No. 2006-02-B because that motion would have been
denied by the POA as it had already affirmed the cancellation of Platinum’s
ECCs in DENR Case No. 8253. Further, an
appeal to the MAB would also be useless because the POA had declared that the
decision to cancel the Operating Agreement and the SSMPs was not entirely its
(POA’s) own, but also that of the DENR, which includes the MAB. Platinum
contends that it had to file the petition for certiorari because the POA Resolution was patently illegal as it
effectively nullified the injunctive writ previously issued by the lower court
in Civil Case No. 4199.
THE
COURT’S RULING
The key matter in
resolving all four petitions involves the issue of jurisdiction – that is, which body has the authority to hear and
decide the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the
operating agreement.
Jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators
Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint.[31]
In Civil Case No. 4199,
Platinum alleges in its complaint[32]
the following:
3. Plaintiff is engaged in mining operations. Defendant holds mining rights/claims over the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra and the Pulot Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Espanola (hereinafter, the “subject mining areas”) in Palawan.
4.
On
2.1 To enter, occupy, possess, explore, develop, utilize and control the mineral properties subject to Section 2, hereof;
2.2 To conduct mining and all subsidiaries, associated and other related operations in the mineral properties at a rate it deems appropriate;
2.3 To mill, beneficiate and process the ores by appropriate methods or process within or outside the area of the mineral properties;
x x x
5. Section 23 of the Operating Agreement states that it shall be effective for twenty-five (25) years or for the life of the subject mining areas. Under Section 19 thereof, it may only be [pre]terminated for gross violations of its terms and provisions.
x x x
9. On
x x x
17. Defendant claims and declares
in the letter dated
18. Defendant’s claims and misrepresentations in said letters and complaint have cast a cloud on plaintiff’s rights and interests over the subject mining areas. The said letters and complaint unequivocally give the impression that, since the Operating Agreement has already been terminated, plaintiff no longer possesses any right or interest over the subject mining areas.
x x x
21. Defendant’s actions are clearly in breach of the Operating Agreement. To repeat, the Operating Agreement provides that it may only be [pre]terminated for gross violations of its terms and provisions. As stated above, however, defendant’s allegations with respect to plaintiff’s violations of the terms and conditions of the Operating Agreement are merely imagined.
22. In any case, even assuming in gratia argumenti that there is factual basis for defendant to terminate the Operating Agreement, defendant’s termination thereof is clearly bereft of legal basis and in breach of the Operating Agreement. Section 20 unambiguously provides:
The FIRST PARTY may terminate this agreement by giving thirty (30) days notice to the SECOND PARTY based on gross violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement.
23.
Clearly, the Operating Agreement may only be considered terminated after
the lapse of 30 days. In the instant case, defendant served plaintiff the
letter dated
From these allegations, we
learn that Platinum had rights and interest in real property, specifically, the
right to possess and to mine the subject mining areas for a certain period of
time, as stated in the Operating Agreement. Olympic, however, had cast a cloud
on its interest when: (a) Olympic sent
Platinum a letter claiming that it had already terminated the Operating
Agreement; (b) Olympic filed a complaint with the RTC Puerto Princesa, Palawan,
Branch 52 (docketed as Civil Case No. 4181), asking the court to enjoin
Platinum from conducting mining operations under the Operating Agreement, since
this Agreement had already been unilaterally terminated by Olympic; and (c)
Olympic wrote to the Governor of Palawan to inform him that its Operating
Agreement with Platinum was already terminated and to request that the Governor
revoke Platinum’s SSMPs. Olympic’s act clearly indicated its intent to deprive
Platinum of its rights, prompting the latter to file the complaint to quiet its
title or interest in the subject mining areas and remove all doubts as to the
Agreement’s continuous effectivity.
Platinum’s primary objective was to protect its interest in the subject
mining areas covered by the Operating Agreement, specifically, under Section
2.12 and 3.4, both are obliged “to maintain the validity and subsistence of the
mining rights subject of the agreement.”[33] It is thus obvious that the complaint falls
within the ambit of the RTC’s original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all
other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.[34]
Olympic, through its
petition in G.R. No. 178188, contends that jurisdiction should instead be with
the POA. It posits that to fall under
the jurisdiction of the POA, the dispute must necessarily involve questions of
facts or matters requiring the
application of technological knowledge and expertise or which needs the
interpretation and the application of particular knowledge and expertise
possessed by the members of the Panel.
It reads Platinum’s complaint in Civil Case No. 4199, to be a matter
involving a mining dispute that raises questions of facts or matters requiring
the application of technical knowledge and expertise of the POA – an
interpretation that we cannot sustain in light of the clear wording of the law.[35]
The POA’s jurisdiction is
set forth in Section 77 of the Mining Act:
Sec.
77. Panel of Arbitrators. – xxx.
Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
a. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
b.
Disputes involving mineral agreements or
permits;
c. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires; and
d. Disputes pending before the
Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Section 77, paragraphs (a) and (b)
are the provisions principally invoked in this case to confer jurisdiction over
the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum – provisions which, upon
closer inspection of the law and jurisprudence, belie Olympic’s and
Citinickel’s contentions.
In
Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, et
al.,[36]
this Court, speaking through Justice Velasco, specified the kind of disputes
that fall under Section 77(a) of the Mining Act:
The phrase “disputes involving
rights to mining areas” refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition
to an application for a mineral agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he power of the POA to resolve any
adverse claim, opposition, or protest relative to mining rights under Section
77 (a) of RA 7942 is confined only to adverse
claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating
to applications for the grant of mineral rights. xxx. Clearly, POA’s
jurisdiction over “disputes involving rights to mining areas” has nothing to do
with the cancellation of existing mineral agreements. [Emphasis supplied.]
In so ruling, the Court read Section 77 (a) in relation with
Sections 38 and 41 of DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 (Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Mining Act or RIRR), which provide:
Sec. 38. x x x. Within thirty (30) calendar days
from the last date of publication/posting/radio announcements, the authorized
officer(s) of the concerned office(s) shall issue a certification(s) that the
publication/posting/radio announcement have been complied with. Any
adverse claim, protest or opposition shall be filed directly, within thirty (30)
calendar days from the last date of publication/posting/radio announcement,
with the concerned Regional Office or
through any concerned PENRO or CENRO for filing in the concerned Regional
Office for purposes of its
resolution by the Panel of Arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of this Act
and these implementing rules and regulations.
Upon final resolution of any
adverse claim, protest or opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators shall likewise
issue a certification to that effect within five (5) working days from the date
of finality of resolution thereof. Where
there is no adverse claim, protest or opposition, the Panel of Arbitrators
shall likewise issue a Certification to that effect within five working days
therefrom.
x x x x
x x x
x x
No Mineral Agreement shall be
approved unless the requirements under this Section are fully complied with and
any adverse claim/protest/opposition is finally resolved by the Panel of
Arbitrators.
Sec. 41. x x
x Within
fifteen (15) working days from the receipt of the Certification issued by the
Panel of Arbitrators as provided in Section 38 hereof, the concerned Regional
Director shall initially evaluate the Mineral Agreement applications in areas
outside Mineral reservations. He/She
shall thereafter endorse his/her findings to the Bureau for further evaluation
by the Director within fifteen (15) working days from receipt of forwarded
documents. Thereafter, the Director
shall endorse the same to the secretary for consideration/approval within
fifteen working days from receipt of such endorsement.
In case of Mineral Agreement applications in areas
with Mineral Reservations, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt of
the Certification issued by the Panel of Arbitrators as provided for in Section
38 hereof, the same shall be evaluated and endorsed by the Director to
the Secretary for consideration/approval within fifteen days from receipt of
such endorsement. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Sections 38 and 41 of the RIRR pertain to the procedure
involved in approving mineral agreements.
These provisions are largely lifted from Sections 48 and 53 of PD 463
(or the Mining Resources Development Decree), except that instead of the POA,
it was the Director of Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau or MGB)
who previously had the authority to rule on pre-approval protests or adverse claims.
To properly fall within the POA’s jurisdiction under Section
77 (a) of the Mining Law, the dispute must:
1.
refer to an adverse
claim, protest, or opposition to an application for a mineral agreement;
and
2.
be filed prior to
the approval by the DENR Secretary of the mineral agreement.
Under these
terms, Section 77 (a) established a cut-off period (i.e., before the
approval of the mineral agreement) when the POA’s jurisdiction may be properly
invoked, and this period had long lapsed insofar as the dispute between
Citinickel and Platinum is concerned, as Olympic’s mining lease contract and
its Operating Agreement with Platinum had already been approved by the
Government. Accordingly, invocation of the
POA’s jurisdiction under Section 77(a) finds no application in this case.
Neither will POA be vested
with jurisdiction through Section 77(b), as the nature of the agreement between
Olympic and Platinum is not the “mineral agreement” contemplated under the
law. The term “mineral agreement” has a
specific definition under the Mining Act, Section 3 (ab) thereof states:
Section 3. Definition of
Terms. – xxx
(ab) “Mineral Agreement” – refers to a contract between the
government and a contractor, involving mineral production-sharing agreement,
co-production agreement, or joint-venture agreement.
Quite
obviously, the Operating Agreement is not “a contract between the government
and a contractor”;[37]
instead, it is a purely civil contract between
two private entities – one of whom happens to be a party to a mineral
agreement with the government. While the
enforcement of the terms of an operating agreement would necessarily relate to an existing and approved
mineral agreement (as may be inferred from Section 4 of DENR Memorandum Order
No. 2003-08),[38] this
however does not make the two concepts the same, nor does it make an operating
agreement a specie of the mineral agreements contemplated under the Mining
Act. Section 26 of the Mining Act[39]
states that a mineral agreement may be in the form of a mineral production
sharing agreement, a co-production agreement or a joint-venture agreement, and
does not include an operating agreement in the enumeration. Apart from this, the Mining Act and the various
administrative issuances treat these two separately by providing for different
requirements, rules, and procedures governing their application, approval, and
cancellation. Thus, to contend that a dispute involving operating agreements can be
classified as a “dispute involving mineral agreements or permits” stretches the
definition of “mineral agreement” beyond the clear terms of the law.
Indeed, the adoption of a
definite meaning for “mineral agreement” reveals the intent to remove from the
DENR, through the MGB, the jurisdiction over disputes involving civil contracts
on mining rights. Presidential Decree
No. 1281[40]
enumerates cases that fall under the Bureau of Mines’ jurisdiction:
Section
7. In addition to its regulatory and
adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or persons engaged in
mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(a)
a
mining property subject of different
agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with several mining
operators;
(b)
xxx
(c)
cancellation
and/or enforcement of mining contracts
due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and
conditions thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although Section 77 (d) of
the Mining Act[41] has
transferred to the POA jurisdiction over disputes pending before the Bureau of
Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b) did not adopt the wording of Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so as to include all other forms of
contracts – public or private – involving mining rights; Section 77 (b) in
relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include a general
catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights similar to
those in Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the Mining Act, through the
above-quoted Sections 3 (ab) and 26, has limited the jurisdiction of the POA,
as successor of the adjudicatory functions of the Bureau of Mines, to mineral
agreements between the government and the private contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes between
parties to any mining contract (including operating agreements) may previously
fall within the Bureau of Mines’ jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD
No. 1281, it can no longer be so placed now within the authority of the POA to
settle under Section 77 (b) of the Mining Law because its jurisdiction has been
limited to the resolution of disputes involving public mineral agreements.
Parenthetically, the “permit” referred to in Section 77(b)
of the Mining Act pertains to exploration permit, quarry permit, and other
mining permits recognized in Chapters IV, VIII, and IX of the Mining Act. An operating agreement, not being among those
listed, cannot be considered as a “mineral permit” under Section 77 (b).
Since the Operating Agreement is not the mineral agreement
contemplated by law, the contention that
jurisdiction should be with the POA under Section 77(b) of the Mining Act
cannot be legally correct. In plainer terms, no jurisdiction vests in
the POA under the cited provision because the Operating Agreement is not the
“mineral agreement” that Section 77(b) refers to.
Even an invocation of Section 77(c) of Mining
Act (referring to “disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claim-holders/concessionaires”) would not suffice to confer jurisdiction over
the dispute to the POA. Surface-owners,
occupants, and concessionaires refer to owners or occupants of the real
property affected by the mining activities conducted by the
claim-holders/concessionaires (entities which are holding mining rights granted
by the government).[42]
Neither Citinickel nor Platinum falls under this classification.
Additionally,
the Court notes that both Olympic and Citinickel have previously recognized the
RTC’s jurisdiction to decide the dispute when they filed civil cases before the
trial courts of Palawan[43] and
Parañaque,[44]
respectively, for the cancellation of the Operating Agreement on account of
Platinum’s alleged gross violations. By doing so, both Olympic and Citinickel
acknowledged the authority and jurisdiction of the trial court to resolve their
dispute with Platinum. Not only did they
acknowledge this jurisdiction, they as well failed to appeal the decisions
rendered by the trial courts in these cases. Thereby, they accepted the binding effect of
the trial court decision, and – more importantly – recognized the trial court’s
authority to rule on their dispute with Platinum regarding the Operating
Agreement. In other words, they are now estopped from claiming that the POA, rather than the trial court, has the
sole and exlcusive authority to resolve the issue of whether the Operating
Agreement may be rescinded for Platinum’s alleged violations.
Olympic
also raises the issue of venue: since one of Platinum’s causes of action in
Civil Case No. 4199 was specific performance in Civil Case No. 4199, Olympic
claims that Platinum’s action was actually a personal one that should have been
filed either in Olympic’s or in Platinum’s place of residence, i.e., in
Manila or in Makati City, respectively, and not in Puerto Princessa, Palawan.
This
contention however is negated by the allegations made by Platinum in its
complaint to quiet title, filed before the RTC of Puerto Princesa,
The controlling factor in
determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which said cases are
filed.[45] As we had earlier stated, Platinum’s primary
objective in filing the complaint is to protect its interest in the subject
mining areas, although it joined its claims of breach of contract, damages, and
specific performance in the case. In any
event, the Rules of Court allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC,
provided one of the causes of action (in this case, the cause of action for
quieting of title or interest in real property located in Palawan) falls within
the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein.[46] In
fine, there is absolutely no reason to disturb the CA’s findings that venue was
properly laid in the
In light of these, the Court affirms the jurisdiction of the
RTC of Puerto Princesa,
Our conclusion on the
trial court’s authority to rule on Civil Case No. 4199 necessarily invalidates
the injunctive writ issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 101544 against the
continuance of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4199. We
thus grant Platinum’s petition in G.R. No. 183527. Moreover, the Court agrees with Platinum’s
contention that Polly Dy had no standing to assail the injunctive writs issued
as these were not directed against her; her petition for certiorari before the
CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 101544) should have been dismissed.
Injunctive
Writ against Citinickel, as Successor-in-Interest of Olympic
In G.R. No. 180674,
Citinickel mainly argues it cannot be bound by the injunctive writs issued in
Civil Case No. 4199 as it was not impleaded in the case, despite the fact that
the Deed of Assignment was executed before Civil Case No. 4199 was instituted
by Platinum, thus making it an indispensable party. Citinickel further claims that the POA
Resolution had already attained finality when the CA dismissed Platinum’s
petition for certiorari questioning
the POA Resolution in its
We disagree.
In this case, one fact
resonates and remains unrebutted – the transfer of Olympic’s rights to
Citinickel was done surreptitiously, via
the Deed of Assignment dated June 9, 2006, without the knowledge or consent of Platinum.
Thus, when Platinum instituted Civil Case No. 4199 on June 14, 2006 – five days
after the execution of the Deed of Assignment – Platinum was not notified of
the assignment or even of the earlier Memorandum of Agreement between Olympic
and Rockworks, contrary to the terms of Section 13 of the Operating Agreement which
expressly requires any party transferring or assigning its rights under the
Operating Agreement to a third party to inform the original party of the
transfer or assignment. Section 13 of
the Operating Agreement states:
The rights and interests of either [Olympic] or
[Platinum] in and under this Agreement are assignable and/or transferrable, in
whole or in part, to persons or entities qualified xxx provided that the rights of both of the parties under this Agreement
are preserved and maintained, unaffacted or unimpaired, and provided further that the assignee
undertake to be bound by all the provisions of this Agreement, provided
furthermore that the assigning party shall duly notify in writing the other
party of such proposed assignment and/or transfer before the actual assignment
and/or transfer is done. [Emphasis supplied.]
Even if Platinum knew of the assignment/transfer, it was not bound to
include Citinickel in the complaint because the assignment/transfer of a
mineral agreement application would, by law, take effect only after the approval of the DENR Secretary
or his representative. Section 40 of DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40
(Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Mining Act), which states:
Section 40. Transfer or Assignment of Mineral Agreement Application. - Transfer or assignment of Mineral Agreement applications shall be allowed subject to the approval of the Director/concerned Regional Director taking into account the national interest and public welfare: Provided, That such transfer or assignment shall be subject to eligibility requirements and shall not be allowed in cases involving speculation. [Emphasis supplied.]
The provision is clear – any transfer
or assignment of a mineral agreement application is still subject to the
approval of the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau or the Regional
Director concerned. In determining
whether to approve the assignment or not, the Director or Regional Director has
to consider the national interest, public welfare, as well as study the
eligibility of the party to whom said application is being transferred to. Any assignment of a mineral agreement is thus
considered provisional, pending final approval by the Director or Regional
Director. Thus, although the Deed of
Assignment between Olympic and Citinickel was executed on
Thus, we resolve to
dismiss Citinickel’s petition for lack of merit.
Validity of
the POA Resolution
Platinum’s Rule 65
petition praying for the annulment of the POA Resolution was dismissed by the
CA in its Resolution dated
We
disagree with the reasoning of the CA and resolve to overturn its
The
rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions,
such as:
1) when there is a violation of due process;
2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5) when there is irreparable injury;
6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[47]
Platinum’s serious
allegations amount to circumstances calling for urgent judicial intervention.
More importantly, Platinum’s allegations essentially attack POA’s jurisdiction
over Citinickel’s complaint for lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA thus
committed a reversible error when it failed to recognize the POA’s
jurisdictional errors and instead, mistakenly placed its reliance on a
procedural technicality.
Going into the merits of
G.R. No. 181141, the Court finds that the POA Resolution was issued in
disregard of the injunctive writs in Civil Case No. 4199. We have earlier ruled in G.R. No. 180674 that
Citinickel, as successor-in-interest of Olympic, became bound by the writ of
injunction issued by the trial court, even though it was not formally impleaded
as a party when Civil Case No. 4199 was instituted. The injunction prohibited the parties –
Citinickel included – from performing “any act that will tend to impede,
hamper, limit or adversely affect the full enjoyment by [Platinum] of its
rights under the Operating Agreement xxx [and] from performing any act which
will disturb the status quo.” When the
POA issued the assailed Resolution rescinding the Operating Agreement and
cancelling Platinum’s SSMPs at the instance of Citinickel, it clearly went
against the prohibition.
Not only was the POA
Resolution issued in contravention of the injunctive writ, POA Case No.
2006-02-B (where the Resolution was issued) was instituted in blatant violation
of the rules of forum shopping. POA Case
No. 2006-02-B was instituted while Citinickel’s complaint for cancellation of
the Operating Agreement was pending before the RTC of Paranaque (docketed as
Civil Case NO. 06-0185). And while there
was yet no decisive ruling on the status and validity of the Operating
Agreement in these cases, Citnickel had prematurely instituted petitions to
cancel Platinum’s SSMPs and ECCs before the PMRB (docketed as PMRB Case No. 002-06)
and EMB, respectively. Along the same
line, Citinickel filed a mandamus
petition before the RTC of Quezon City (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-07-59855)
to compel the DENR Secretary to confiscate and hold possession of the mineral
ores of Platinumstockpiled at the
Both
Olympic and Citinickel evidently trifled with the courts and abused its
processes by improperly instituting several cases before various judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies, one case after another (some even simultaneously filed
during the pendency of other cases) once it became evident that a favorable
decision will not be obtained in the previously filed case – all of which are
focused on the termination of the Operating Agreement and the cancellation of
Platinum’s mining permits. While a
party may avail himself of the remedies prescribed by law or by the Rules of
Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his
pleasure or caprice.[48] The actions of Olympic and Citinickel,
taken separately or collectively, betray a pattern of calculated and
intentional forum shopping that warrants denial of the reliefs they pray for.
In accordance with our finding
in G.R. No. 180674 that Citinickel is bound by the injunctive writ issued by
the trial court in Civil Case No. 4199, as well as our observation in G.R. No.
178188 that the trial court, not POA, has jurisdiction over Platinum’s complaint
in Civil Case No. 4199, we can come to no other conclusion than to declare that
the POA gravely abused its discretion when it issued the POA Resolution dated October
30, 2006. Thus, we grant Platinum’s petition in G.R. No. 181141, and annul the
POA Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we rule as follows:
a)
in G.R. No. 178188
(Olympic Mines v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation): Olympic’s petition is denied
for lack of merit and the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97259 is AFFIRMED;
b)
in G.R. No. 183527
(Platinum Group Metals Corporation v. Court of Appeals): The assailed CA
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 101544
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
c)
in G.R. No. 180674
(Citinickel Mines and Development Corporation v. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor
and Platinum Group Metals Corporation): The
questioned CA Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99422 is AFFIRMED; and
d)
in G.R. No. 181141
(Platinum Group Metals Corporation v. Citinickel Mines and Development
Corporation): The CA decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97288 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The POEA Resolution, having been issued in
violation of a previously issued writ of preliminary injunction, is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 618 dated
** Designated additional member of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 619 dated
[1] Rollo, G.R. No. 178188, pp. 41-58.
[2]
[3]
RTC Order dated
[4]
Numbered as PLC-V-544, PLC-V-545,
PCL-V-550, MLC-MRD-127, MLC-MRC-128, MLC-MRD-129, and MLC-MRC-130. The mining
lease contracts subsequently became the subject of mineral production sharing
agreements (MPSA) applications by
Olympic (AMA-IVB-040 and AMA-IVB-0454).
[5] Rollo, G.R. No. 178188, pp. 87-94.
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 180674), pp.
402-404.
[7]
Rollo, G.R. No. 180674, pp.
592-596, states in part:
The PMRB Resolution
As
born out of the records, the letter-complaint does not present any other ground
aside from those matters that have already been passed upon by the Court in
Civil Case No. 4181. Ergo, since the ground for revocation of the [SSMPs]
dwells more on the termination of the Operating Agreement between [Olympic] and
[Platinum], which is contractual in nature, over which the competent court had
already ruled over the same issue raised herein, this Board finds no cogent
reason to disturb the said Order dated May 16, 2006, which appears to have
become final and executory.
[8]
Rollo, G.R. No. 178188, pp. 511-519, states in part:
The PMRB Resolution
With
regard to the second issue that there are pending cases between the same
parties for the same cause of action, the court found that there is her
identity of parties in the sense that the complainants are the same because there
is privity between [Olympic] and [Citinickel] which is the former’s
successor-in-interest who are litigating for the same subject matter and under
the same title of being the awardee and in the same capacity.
xxx xxx xxx
After
weighing the grounds relied upon by the parties in this regard, the court
found that venue in this case has been improperly laid, since the reliefs
prayed for by [Citinickel] is the return and/or surrender of the possession and
control of the subject mining areas, as well as other personal equipment and
documents appurtenant to the subject mining sites. The action therefore is real and not
personal, contrary to the claim of [Citinickel]. [Emphasis supplied]
[9]
Rollo (G.R. No. 180674), pp. 1059-1064.
[10]
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the complaint, dated July 18, 2006, filed by Olympic Mines and Development
Corporation, as represented by Citinickel Mines and Development Corporation,
and the earlier Petition, dated June 8, 2006, filed by Olympic Mines and
Development Corporation are, as they are hereby given due course.
1. The
Operating Agreement, dated
2. The
Small Scale Mining Permits SSMP PL W No. 39 and 40, issued under the name of
Platinum Group Metals Corporation are, as they are hereby cancelled and
withdrawn.
3. In
order to prevent respondent, their privies and all other persons working in
their behalf from further inflicting wanton damage and prejudice to the
environment, it is recommended to the Mines Adjudication Board that an order be
issued directing that they cease and desist from operating the mining areas
subject of this case.
4. Enjoining
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the Environmental Management Bureau, of
DENR Region IV-B MIMAROPA to conduct an in depth investigation and accounting
of the environmental damage brought upon the areas covered for proper
assignment.
SO ORDERED.
[11]
Resolution dated
[12]
Supra note 7; The POA Resolution
states in part:
The
preliminary injunction issued by the [RTC ] of Palawan, to our mind, should not
be made to enjoin the DENR from looking into the allegations of violations of
the Operating Agreement and some other
environmental issues committed by [Platinum] in the conduct of its operations
in the mining areas in Palawan. xxx the DENR cannot be compelled or prevented
from doing what it must do under the premises on the simple reason that it was
never impleaded or made party in the cases filed by Platinum that resulted in
the issuance of the Order dated
[13]
Platinum sought to hold Rockworks and the members of its Board of Directors
liable for the patently unlawful acts and/or bad faith under Section 31 of the
Corporation Code in directing the affairs of Rockworks. According to Platinum, the Memorandum of
Agreement between Olympic and Rockworks showed the intent “to oust Platinum and
to take immediate possession and control of the mining areas involved in the
Operating Agreement” through the creation of a joint venture company to be
known as Citinickel Mines and Development Corporation. Rockworks is one of the stockholders of
Citinickel; rollo (G.R. No. 183527), pp. 8-9, 13, 25; see p. 2 of
Memorandum of Agreement between Olympic and Rockworks, rollo, G.R. No.
181141, pp. 164-170.
[14]
Rollo (G.R. No. 178188), pp. 635-647.
[15]
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court; dated
[16] Supra note 1.
[17]
The RTC Order dated
[18]
The RTC Order dated
[19] Rollo, G.R. No. 183527, pp. 37-40.
[20]
Granting Platinum’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
[21]
Granting Platinum’s motion to amend complaint for the purpose of impleading
additional defendants (namely, the members of the Board of Directors of
Rockwell).
[22]
Granting Platinum’s application for an extended writ
of preliminary injunction.
[23] Rollo,G.R. No. 183527, pp. 3-21.
[24]
Dated
[25] Supra notes 14 and 16.
[26]
Supra note 18; the dispositive portion of the extended writ of
preliminary injunction states:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this Court GRANTS the issuance of an expanded writ of
preliminary injunction as prayed for, to wit:
Directing
the DENR, Office of the Secretary of the DENR, the Secretary of DENR, as well
as the Panel of Arbitrators, Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) and the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), their agents, representatives or persons
entities acting on their behalf or under their authority, control or influence,
from interfering in any way with the possession, control and/or operation of
the Pulot Nickel Mine and the Toronto Nickel Mine, including the custody,
control and disposition of the mineral ores extracted pursuant to the Operating
Agreement and stockpiled at the stockyards; and further, from performing any
act which will disturb the status quo; and from doing any act – including the
implementation/enforcement of the Order dated 27 February 2007 issued by Judge
Alexander Balut and the Memorandum dated 27 February 2007 issued by the
Secretary of the DENR – that will tend to impede, hamper, limit or adversely
affect the full enjoyment by Platinum of its rights under the Operating
Agreement.
The
plaintiff-movant is directed to increase its bond from P2,000,000.00 to
P2,500,000.00 effective immediately to answer for any damage that may arise as
a result of the enforcement of the original writ of preliminary injunction and
this new expanded writ of preliminary injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[27]
Dated
[28]
Dated
[29] Dated
[30]
Rollo, G.R. No. 181141, pp. 84-87.
[31]
See Nell & Co. v. Cubacub, G.R. No. L-20843,
[32] Rollo, G.R. No. 180674, pp. 210-216.
[33] Supra note 5, p. 4.
[34] Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by
RA No. 7691. The relevant provision
states:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in
civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x
(2) In all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x
[35]
Rollo, G.R. No. 178188, pp. 13-25.
[36]
G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, 176226, and 176319,
[37]
Defined in Section 3(g) of the Mining Act as a “qualified person acting alone
or in consortium, who is a party to a mineral agreement or to a financial or
technical assistance agreement.”
[38]
Section 4. Approval
of Memorandum of Agreement/Option Agreement/Operating Agreement and other
Similar Forms of Agreement. - Memorandum of Agreement/Option Agreement/Operating
Agreement and other similar forms of Agreement, except involving
transfer/assignment of mining rights, entered into involving an
approved Exploration Permit, Mineral Agreement, Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreement, or any other mining permit under Republic Act No. 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, shall be registered with the MGB Central
Office/RO concerned and shall be subject to the approval of the MGB
Director upon evaluation and recommendation by the RO concerned.
Memorandum of Agreement/Option
Agreement/Operating Agreement and other similar forms of Agreement entered into
involving an application for EP, MA, FTAA, or any other mining permit
application, shall be registered with the MGB Central Office/RO concerned and
shall form part of the supporting documents of a mining application, subject to
the evaluation of the MGB Central Office/RO concerned. Such agreement shall be deemed approved upon
approval of the pertinent mining application. (Emphasis supplied)
[39] Section 26. Modes of Mineral Agreement. – For purposes of mining operations, a mineral agreement may take the following
forms as herein defined:
(a)
Mineral production sharing agreement - is an agreement where the Government
grants to the contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations
within a contract area and shares in the gross output. The contractor shall provide the financing,
technology, management and personnel necessary for the implementation of this
agreement.
(b)
Co-production agreement - is an agreement between the Government
and the contractor wherein the Government shall provide inputs to the mining
operations other than the mineral resource.
(c)
Joint-venture agreement - is an agreement where a joint-venture
company is organized by the Government and the contractor with both parties
having equity shares. Aside from
earnings in equity, the Government shall be entitled to a share in the gross
output.
A mineral agreement shall grant to the
contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to extract all
mineral resources found in the contract area.
In addition, the contractor may be allowed to convert his agreement into
any of the modes of mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance
agreement covering the remaining period of the original agreement subject to
the approval of the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)
[40] Revising Commonwealth Act No. 136, creating the Bureau of Mines, and for other purposes.
[41] See p. 21 of this Decision.
[42]
This definition can be inferred from a reading of Section 105 of the RIRR,
which states:
Section
105. Entry Into Lands - The holder(s) of mining right(s) shall
not be prevented from entry into its/their contract/mining area(s) for the
purpose(s) of exploration, development and/or utilization: Provided,
That written notice(s) at its/their registered address(es) was/were sent to and
duly received by the surface owner(s) of
the land(s), occupant(s) and concessionaire(s) thereof and that a bond is
posted in accordance with Section 108 hereof.
If
the surface owner(s) of the land,
occupant(s) or concessionaire(s) thereof can not be found, the
Permittee/Permit Holder/Contractor or concessionaire shall notify the concerned
Regional Director, copy furnished the concerned local officials in case of
private land or the concerned Government agency in case of concessionaires,
attaching thereto a copy of the written notice and a sworn declaration by the
holder(s) of mining right(s) that it/they had exerted all efforts to locate
such surface owner(s)/occupant(s)/concessionaire(s). Such notice(s) to the
concerned Regional Director shall be deemed notice(s) to the surface owner(s)
and concessionaire(s).
In cases where the surface owner(s)
of the land(s), occupant(s) or concessionaire(s) thereof refuse(s) to allow the
Permittee/Permit Holder/Contractor entry into the land(s) despite its/their receipt(s) of the written
notice(s) or refuse(s) to receive said written notice(s) or in case of
disagreement over such entry,
the Permittee/Permit Holder/Contractor shall bring the matter before the Panel
of Arbitrators for proper disposition. [Emphasis
supplied.]
[43]
Civil Case No. 4181; see p. 5 of this Decision.
[44]
Civil Case No. 06-0185, see p. 6 of this Decision.
[45]
Go v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 156187,
[46] RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Sections 5 and 6 state:
Section 5. Joinder of causes
of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in
the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.
Section 6. Misjoinder of
causes of action. — Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party
or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
[Emphasis supplied.]
[47] See Paat
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 11107,
[48]
Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No.
174929,