PEOPLE’S
BROADCASTING G.R. No. 179652
(BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.),
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO
MORALES, J.,*
Acting
Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,** and
BRION,
JJ.
THE
SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND Promulgated:
EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, May
8, 2009
and JANDELEON JUEZAN,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
The
present controversy concerns a matter of first impression, requiring as
it does the determination of the
demarcation line between the prerogative of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Secretary and his duly authorized representatives, on the one hand, and the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission, on the other, under Article 128 (b) of the
Labor Code in an instance where the employer has challenged the
jurisdiction of the DOLE at the very
first level on the ground that no
employer-employee relationship ever existed between the parties.
I.
The
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
The
petition traces its origins to a complaint filed by Jandeleon Juezan
(respondent) against People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc) (petitioner) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day
and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage
of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Regional Office No. VII,
Management representative informed that complainant is a drama talent hired on a per drama “ participation basis” hence no employer-employeeship [sic] existed between them. As proof of this, management presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement, employments of specific undertaking (a contract between the talent director & the complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. They (mgt.) has [sic] not control of the talent if he ventures into another contract w/ other broadcasting industries.
On the other hand, complainant Juezan’s alleged violation of non-diminution of benefits is computed as follows:
@ P 2,000/15 days + 1.5
mos = P 6,000
(August 1/03 to Sept 15/03)
Note: Recommend for summary investigation or whatever action deem proper.[5]
Petitioner
was required to rectify/restitute the violations within five (5) days from
receipt. No rectification was effected by petitioner; thus, summary
investigations were conducted, with the parties eventually ordered to submit
their respective position papers.[6]
In
his Order dated P203,726.30.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Order, claiming that the Regional Director gave credence to the
documents offered by respondent without
examining the originals, but at the same time he missed or failed to
consider petitioner’s evidence. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.[8] On appeal to the DOLE Secretary, petitioner
denied once more the existence of employer-employee relationship. In its Order
dated
Petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, claiming that it was denied due
process when the DOLE Secretary disregarded the evidence it presented and
failed to give it the opportunity to refute the claims of respondent. Petitioner maintained that there is no
employer-employee relationship had ever
existed between it and respondent because it was the drama directors and
producers who paid, supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that
the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been
considered by the labor arbiter because
respondent’s claim exceeded P5,000.00.
The
Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not deprived of due process as the
essence thereof is only an opportunity to be heard, which petitioner had when
it filed a motion for reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary. It further ruled
that the latter had the power to order and enforce compliance with labor
standard laws irrespective of the amount of individual claims because the
limitation imposed by Article 29 of the Labor Code had been repealed by
Republic Act No. 7730.[10]
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied.[11]
Before
this Court, petitioner argues that the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), and not the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over respondent’s claim,
in view of Articles 217 and 128 of the Labor Code.[12]
It adds that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed petitioner’s appeal without delving on the issues raised therein,
particularly the claim that no employer-employee relationship had ever existed between
petitioner and respondent. Finally, petitioner avers that there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
available to it.
On
the other hand, respondent posits that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion. He invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which “removes the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, from the effects of the
restrictive provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding the
confinement of jurisdiction based on the amount of claims.”[13] Respondent also claims that petitioner was
not denied due process since even when the case was with the Regional Director,
a hearing was conducted and pieces of evidence were presented. Respondent
stands by the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ ruling that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition for certiorari is a
wrong mode of appeal considering that petitioner had earlier filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals;
petitioner, instead, should have
filed a Petition for Review.[14]
II.
The
significance of this case may be reduced to one simple question—does the
Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship?
To
resolve this pivotal issue, one must look into the extent of the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE found in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7730. It reads:
Article 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. (emphasis supplied)
x x x
The provision is quite explicit that
the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only “in cases
when the relationship of employer-employee still exists.” It also underscores the avowed objective
underlying the grant of power to the DOLE which is “to give effect to the labor
standard provision of this Code and other labor legislation.” Of course, a
person’s entitlement to labor standard benefits under the labor laws
presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the first place.
The clause “in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exists” signifies that the
employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the emergence of the
controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE’s power does not apply in two instances, namely:
(a) where the employer-employee relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever
existed.
The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11
of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Standards Cases[15]
issued by the DOLE Secretary. It reads:
Rule II MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM COMPLAINT/ROUTINE INSPECTION
Sec. 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. Accordingly, if on the face of the complaint, it can be ascertained that employer-employee relationship no longer exists, the case, whether accompanied by an allegation of illegal dismissal, shall immediately be endorsed by the Regional Director to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In the recent case of Bay
Haven, Inc. v. Abuan,[16]
this Court recognized the first situation and accordingly ruled that a complainant’s allegation of his
illegal dismissal had deprived the DOLE
of jurisdiction as per Article 217 of the Labor Code.[17]
In the first situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC
because it is the NLRC which has jurisdiction
in view of the termination of the
employer-employee relationship.
The same procedure has to be followed in the second situation since it
is the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee
relationship between the evidentiary parties from the start.
Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim
when the employer-employee relationship has terminated or such relationship has
not arisen at all. The reason is
obvious. In the second situation
especially, the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a matter
which is not easily determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily so,
because the elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a mere
ocular examination. The intricacies and implications of an employer-employee
relationship demand that the level of
scrutiny should be far above the cursory and the mechanical. While documents, particularly
documents found in
the employer’s
office are the primary source
materials, what may prove decisive are
factors related to the history of the
employer’s business operations, its current state as well as accepted contemporary
practices in the industry. More often than not, the question of
employer-employee relationship becomes a battle of evidence, the determination
of which should be comprehensive and
intensive and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial body that
is the NLRC.
It can be assumed that the
DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to
make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Such prerogatival
determination, however, cannot be coextensive
with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely
preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of
enforcing labor standards provisions. The
determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still
primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause “in cases
where the relationship of employer-employee still exists” in Art. 128 (b).
Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two
important questions must be resolved:
(1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or
alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of;
and (2) Are there violations of the Labor Code or of any labor law?
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a statutory prerequisite
to and a limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor, one
which the legislative branch is entitled to impose.
The rationale underlying this limitation is to eliminate the prospect of
competing conclusions of the Secretary
of Labor and the NLRC, on a matter fraught with questions of fact and law,
which is best resolved by the quasi-judicial
body, which is the NRLC, rather than an administrative official of the executive branch of the
government. If the Secretary of Labor
proceeds to exercise his visitorial and enforcement powers absent the first
requisite, as the dissent proposes, his
office confers jurisdiction on itself which it cannot otherwise acquire.
The
approach suggested by the dissent is frowned
upon by common law. To wit:
[I]t is a general rule, that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may be final on all particulars, making up together that subject matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet, upon this preliminary question, its decision must always be open to inquiry in the superior court.[18]
A more liberal interpretative mode, “pragmatic
or functional analysis,” has also emerged in ascertaining the jurisdictional
boundaries of administrative agencies whose jurisdiction is established by
statute. Under this approach, the Court examines the intended function of
the tribunal and decides whether a particular provision falls within or outside
that function, rather than making the provision itself the determining
centerpiece of the analysis.[19] Yet even under this more expansive approach,
the dissent fails.
A reading of Art. 128 of the Labor Code reveals
that the Secretary of Labor or his authorized representatives was granted
visitorial and enforcement powers for
the purpose of determining violations
of, and enforcing, the Labor Code
and any labor law, wage order, or rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto. Necessarily, the actual
existence of an employer-employee relationship affects the complexion of the
putative findings that the Secretary of Labor may determine, since employees
are entitled to a different set of rights under the Labor Code from the employer
as opposed to non-employees. Among these
differentiated rights are those accorded by the “labor standards”
provisions of the Labor Code, which the Secretary of Labor is mandated to enforce. If there is no employer-employee relationship
in the first place, the duty of the employer to adhere to those labor standards
with respect to the non-employees is questionable.
This
decision should not be considered as placing an undue burden on the Secretary
of Labor in the exercise of visitorial and enforcement powers, nor seen as an unprecedented diminution of the same, but rather a
recognition of the statutory limitations thereon. A mere assertion of absence
of employer-employee relationship does not deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction
over the claim under Article 128 of the Labor Code. At least a prima facie showing of such
absence of relationship, as in this case, is needed to preclude the DOLE from
the exercise of its power. The
Secretary of Labor would not have been precluded from exercising the powers
under Article 128 (b) over petitioner if another person with better-grounded claim of employment than that which respondent had. Respondent, especially if he were an
employee, could have very well enjoined
other employees to complain with the DOLE, and, at the same time, petitioner
could ill-afford to disclaim an employment relationship with all of the people
under its aegis.
Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case
had been consistent in maintaining that respondent is not its employee.
Certainly, a preliminary determination, based on the evidence offered, and
noted by the Labor Inspector during the inspection as well as submitted during
the proceedings before the Regional Director puts in genuine doubt the
existence of employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the prudent
recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer respondent to the NLRC for the proper dispensation of his
claims. Furthermore, as discussed
earlier, even the evidence relied on by the Regional Director in his order are
mere self-serving declarations of respondent, and hence cannot be relied upon
as proof of employer-employee relationship.
III.
Aside from lack of
jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason
to to set aside the Regional Director’s
It is not enough that the evidence be simply considered. The standard is substantial evidence as in
all other quasi-judicial agencies. The
standard employed in the last sentence of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code that
the documentary proofs be “considered in the course of inspection” does not
apply. It applies only to issues other than the fundamental issue of existence
of employer-employee relationship. A
contrary rule would lead to controversies on the part of labor officials in
resolving the issue of employer-employee relationship. The onset of arbitrariness is the advent of
denial of substantive due process.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. This applies
with greater force in cases before quasi-judicial agencies whose findings of
fact are accorded great respect and even
finality. To be sure, the same findings
should be supported by substantial evidence from which the said tribunals can
make its own independent evaluation of the facts. Likewise, it must not be
rendered with grave abuse of discretion; otherwise, this Court will not uphold the
tribunals’ conclusion.[20] In the same manner, this Court will not
hesitate to set aside the labor tribunal’s findings of fact when it is clearly
shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record or when there is showing of fraud or error of law.[21]
At the onset, it is the Court’s considered view that the
existence of employer- employee relationship could have been easily resolved,
or at least prima facie determined by
the labor inspector, during the inspection by looking at the records of
petitioner which can be found in the work premises. Nevertheless, even if the
labor inspector had noted petitioner’s manifestation and documents in the Notice of Inspection Results, it is
clear that he did not give much credence to said evidence, as he did not find
the need to investigate the matter further.
Considering that the documents shown by petitioner, namely: cash
vouchers, checks and statements of
account, summary billings evidencing
payment to the alleged real employer of
respondent, letter-contracts
denominated as “Employment for a Specific Undertaking,” prima facie negate the existence of employer-employee relationship,
the labor inspector could have exerted a bit more effort and looked into
petitioner’s payroll, for example, or its roll of employees, or interviewed
other employees in the premises. After all, the labor inspector, as a labor
regulation officer is given “access to employer’s records and premises at any
time of day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right
to copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition
or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or which may aid in
the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules and
regulations pursuant thereto.”[22] Despite these far-reaching powers of labor
regulation officers, records reveal that no additional efforts were exerted in the course of the inspection.
The Court further examined the records and discovered to its
dismay that even the Regional Director turned a blind eye to the evidence
presented by petitioner and relied instead on the self-serving claims of
respondent.
In his position paper, respondent claimed that he was hired by
petitioner in September 1996 as a radio talent/spinner, working from P60.00
per script, earning an average of P15,0000.00 per month, payable on a
semi-monthly basis. He added that the payment of wages was delayed; that he was
not given any service incentive leave or its monetary commutation, or his 13th
month pay; and that he was not made a member of the Social Security System (SSS), Pag-Ibig and
PhilHealth. By January 2001, the number
of radio programs of which respondent was
a talent/spinner was reduced, resulting in the reduction of his monthly
income from P15,000.00 to only P4,000.00, an amount he could
barely live on. Anent the claim of petitioner that no employer-employee
relationship ever existed, respondent argued that that he was hired by
petitioner, his wages were paid under the payroll of the latter, he was under the control of petitioner and its agents, and
it was petitioner who had the power to dismiss him from his employment.[23] In support of his position paper, respondent
attached a photocopy of an identification card purportedly issued by
petitioner, bearing respondent’s picture
and name with the designation “Spinner”; at the back of the I.D., the following
is written: “ This certifies that the card holder is a duly Authorized MEDIA
Representative of BOMBO RADYO
PHILIPPINES … THE NO.1 Radio Network in the Country ***BASTA RADYO BOMBO***”[24] Respondent likewise included a Certification
which reads:
This is to certify that MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program employee of PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF- Bombo Radyo Cebu) since 1990 up to the present.
Furtherly certifies that Mr. Juezan
is receiving a monthly salary of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS.
This certification is issued upon the request of the above stated name to substantiate loan requirement.
Given this 18th day of
April 2000,
(signed)
GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager
On the
other hand, petitioner maintained in its position paper that respondent had
never been its employee. Attached as annexes to its position paper are
photocopies of cash vouchers it issued to drama producers, as well as letters
of employment captioned “Employment for a Specific Undertaking”, wherein
respondent was appointed by different drama directors as spinner/narrator for
specific radio programs.[25]
In his Order, the Regional Director merely made a passing remark
on petitioner’s claim of lack of employer-employee relationship—a token
paragraph—and proceeded to a detailed recitation of respondent’s allegations.
The documents introduced by petitioner
in its position paper and even those presented during the inspection were not
given an iota of credibility. Instead,
full recognition and acceptance was accorded to the claims of respondent—from
the hours of work to his monthly salary, to his alleged actual duties, as well
as to his alleged “evidence.” In fact,
the findings are anchored almost verbatim on the self-serving allegations of
respondent.
Furthermore, respondent’s pieces of evidence—the identification card and the certification
issued by petitioner’s Greman Solante— are not even determinative of an
employer-employee relationship. The
certification, issued upon the request of respondent, specifically stated that
“MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program
employee of PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF- Bombo Radyo Cebu),” it is not therefore “crystal clear that
complainant is a station employee rather than a program employee hence entitled
to all the benefits appurtenant thereto,”[26]
as found by the DOLE Regional
Director. Respondent should be bound by
his own evidence. Moreover, the
classification as to whether one is a “station employee” and “program
employee,” as lifted from Policy Instruction No. 40,[27]
dividing the workers in the broadcast industry into only two groups is not
binding on this Court, especially when the classification has no basis either
in law or in fact.[28]
Even the identification card purportedly issued by petitioner is
not proof of employer-employee relationship since it only identified respondent
as an “Authorized Representative of Bombo Radyo…,” and not as an employee. The phrase gains significance when compared vis a vis the following notation in the
sample identification cards presented by petitioner in its motion for
reconsideration:
1. This
is to certify that the person whose
picture and signature appear hereon is an employee of Bombo Radio
2.
This ID must be worn at all times within Bombo Radyo
HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARMENT
(Signed)
JENALIN D. PALER
HRD HEAD
Respondent tried to address the discrepancy between his identification card and the standard identification cards issued by petitioner to its employees by arguing that what he annexed to his position paper was the old identification card issued to him by petitioner. He then presented a photocopy of another “old” identification card, this time purportedly issued to one of the employees who was issued the new identification card presented by petitioner.[29] Respondent’s argument does not convince. If it were true that he is an employee of petitioner, he would have been issued a new identification card similar to the ones presented by petitioner, and he should have presented a copy of such new identification card. His failure to show a new identification card merely demonstrates that what he has is only his “Media” ID, which does not constitute proof of his employment with petitioner.
It has long been established that in administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial evidence is sufficient as a basis for
judgment on the existence of employer-employee relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the
quantum of proof required in labor cases, is “that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”[30] No particular form of evidence is required to
prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove
the relationship may be admitted.[31] Hence, while no particular form of evidence is
required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some
substantial evidence. Moreover, the
substantiality of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative
aspects.[32]
In the instant case, save for respondent’s
self-serving allegations and self-defeating evidence, there is no substantial
basis to warrant the Regional Director’s finding that respondent is an employee
of petitioner. Interestingly, the Order
of the Secretary of Labor denying petitioner’s appeal dated 27 January 2005, as
well as the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari,
are silent on the issue of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, which further suggests
that no real and proper determination the existence of such relationship was
ever made by these tribunals. Even the dissent skirted away from the issue of
the existence of employer-employee relationship and conveniently ignored the
dearth of evidence presented by respondent.
Although substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of
quality, the peculiar environmental circumstances of the instant case demand
that something more should have been proffered.[33]
Had there been other proofs of employment, such as respondent’s inclusion in
petitioner’s payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court would have
affirmed the finding of employer-employee relationship. The Regional Director, therefore, committed
grievous error in ordering petitioner to answer for respondent’s claims. Moreover, with the conclusion that no
employer-employee relationship has ever existed between petitioner and
respondent, it is crystal-clear that the DOLE Regional Director had no
jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint.
Thus, the improvident exercise of
power by the Secretary of Labor and the
Regional Director behooves the court to subject their actions for review and to
invalidate all the subsequent orders they issued.
IV.
The
records show that petitioner’s appeal
was denied because it had allegedly failed to post a cash or surety bond. What it attached instead to its appeal was
the Letter Agreement[34]
executed by petitioner and its bank, the cash voucher,[35]
and the
Deed of Assignment of Bank
Deposits.[36] According to the DOLE, these documents do not
constitute the cash or surety bond
contemplated by law; thus, it is as if no cash or surety bond was posted
when it filed its appeal.
The
Court does not agree.
The
provision on appeals from the DOLE Regional Offices to the DOLE Secretary is in
the last paragraph of Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, which reads:
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (emphasis supplied)
While the requirements for perfecting
an appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business, the law does admit exceptions when warranted by the circumstances.
Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.[37] Thus, in some cases, the bond requirement on appeals involving
monetary awards had been relaxed, such as when (i) there was substantial
compliance with the Rules; (ii) the surrounding facts and circumstances constitute
meritorious ground to reduce the bond; (iii) a liberal
interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or (iv) the appellants, at
the very least exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a
partial bond during the reglementary period.[38]
A
review of the documents submitted by petitioner is called for to determine
whether they should have been admitted as or in lieu of the surety or cash
bond to sustain the appeal and serve the
ends of substantial justice.
The
Deed of Assignment reads:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT OF BANK DEPOSIT
WITH SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, GREMAN B. SOLANTE in my capacity as Station Manager of DYMF
Cebu City, PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING
SERVICES, INC., a corporation duly
authorized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, for
and in consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY (P203,726.30) Phil. Currency,
as CASH BOND GUARANTEE for the monetary award in favor to the Plaintiff in the
Labor Case docketed as LSED Case No. R0700-2003-09-CI-09, now pending appeal.
That Respondent-Appellant do hereby
undertake to guarantee available and sufficient funds covered by Platinum
Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4 of
PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC.
in the amount of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY (P203,726.30) payable to
Plaintiff-Appellee/Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office VII at Queen City Development Bank, Cebu Branch,
Sanciangko St. Cebu City.
It is understood that the said bank has the full control of Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4 from and after this date and that said sum cannot be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellee/ Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office VII until such time that a Writ of Execution shall be ordered by the Appellate Office.
FURTHER, this Deed of Assignment is limited to the principal amount of PESOS:
TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & 30/100 ONLY (P203,726.30)
Phil. Currency, therefore, any interest to be earned from the said Deposit will
be for the account holder.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 18th day if June, 2004, in the City of Cebu, Philippines.
PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC.
By:
(Signed)
GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager
As priorly mentioned, the Deed of Assignment was accompanied
by a Letter Agreement between Queen City
Development Bank and petitioner
concerning Platinum Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4,[39]
and a Cash Voucher issued by petitioner showing the amount
of P203,726.30 deposited at the said bank.
Casting aside the technical
imprecision and inaptness of words that mark the three documents, a liberal
reading reveals the documents petitioner did assign, as cash bond for the
monetary award in favor of respondent in LSED Case NO. RO700-2003-CI-09, the
amount of P203,726.30 covered by petitioner’s PSD Account No.
010-8-00038-4 with the Queen City Development Bank at Sanciangko St. Cebu City,
with the depositary bank authorized to remit the amount to, and upon withdrawal by respondent and or
the Department of Labor and Employment
Regional Office VII, on the basis of the proper writ of execution. The Court finds that the Deed of Assignment
constitutes substantial compliance with the bond requirement.
The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed.[40] The Deed of Assignment in the instant case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the judgment amount.
The Deed of Assignment must be distinguished from the type of bank certification submitted by appellants in
Cordova v. Keysa’s Boutique,[41] wherein this Court found that such bank certification did not come close to the cash or surety bond
required by law. The bank certification in Cordova
merely stated that the employer maintains a depository account with a balance of P23,008.19,
and that the certification was issued
upon the depositor’s request for
whatever legal purposes it may serve.
There was no indication that the said deposit was made specifically for
the pending appeal, as in the instant case.
Thus, the Court ruled that the bank certification had not in any way
ensured that the award would be paid should the appeal fail. Neither was the appellee
in the case prevented from making withdrawals from the savings account.
Finally, the amount deposited was measly compared to the total monetary award
in the judgment.[42]
V.
Another
question of technicality was posed against the instant petition in the hope
that it would not be given due course.
Respondent asserts that
petitioner pursued the wrong mode of appeal and thus the instant
petition must be dismissed. Once more,
the Court is not convinced.
A petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. There is “grave abuse of discretion” when
respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its
judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[43]
Respondent may have a point in
asserting that in this case a Rule 65
petition is a wrong mode of appeal, as
indeed the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and certiorari
jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
it is settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an
appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari
and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and
sufficient, as where the orders of the
trial court were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or there is need
to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts
of an inferior court or tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized
execution of the judgment.[44] This
Court has even recognized that a
recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of
petitioner’s fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special circumstances
warrant immediate and more direct action.[45]
In one case, it was held that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie
if it is satisfactorily established that
the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence
material to or even decisive of the controversy,[46] and
if it is shown that the refusal to allow a Rule 65 petition would result in the infliction of an
injustice on a party by a judgment that evidently was rendered whimsically and
capriciously, ignoring and disregarding uncontroverted facts and familiar legal
principles without any valid cause whatsoever.[47]
It
must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice
in certiorari proceedings.[48] The Court has not too infrequently given due
course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have
been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations would warrant such a
recourse.[49]
Moreover, the Court allowed a Rule 65 petition, despite the availability
of plain, speedy or adequate remedy, in view
of the importance
of the issues
raised
therein.[50]
The rules were also relaxed by the Court after considering the public interest
involved in the case;[51] when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the broader
interest of justice so requires; when the writs issued are null and void; or
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[52]
“The peculiar circumstances of this case warrant, as we
held in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
107 SCRA 504, 524, the ‘exercise once more of our exclusive prerogative to
suspend our own rules or to exempt a particular case from its operation as in x
x Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
(83 SCRA 453, 478-480 [1978]), thus: ‘ x x The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair
trials and expediting justice. As a
corollary, if their applications and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead
of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified.”[53]
The Regional Director fully relied on the self-serving allegations of respondent
and misinterpreted the documents presented as evidence by respondent. To make
matters worse, DOLE denied petitioner’s
appeal based solely on petitioner’s alleged failure to file a cash or
surety bond, without any discussion on the merits of the case. Since the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals sought the reversal of
the two aforesaid orders, the appellate
court necessarily had to examine the evidence anew to determine whether the conclusions
of the DOLE were supported by the evidence presented. It appears, however, that the Court of
Appeals did not even review the assailed orders and focused instead on a general
discussion of due process and the jurisdiction
of the Regional Director. Had the
appellate court truly reviewed the
records of the case, it would have seen that there existed valid and sufficient
grounds for finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOLE Secretary as well the
Regional Director. In ruling and acting
as it did, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals may be properly subjected
to its certiorari jurisdiction.
After all, this Court has
previously ruled that the extraordinary writ of
certiorari will lie
if it is satisfactorily
established that the tribunal had
acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to
or even decisive of the controversy.[54]
The most important
consideration for the allowance of the instant petition is the opportunity for
the Court not only to set the demarcation between the NLRC’s jurisdiction and
the DOLE’s prerogative but also the procedure when the case involves the fundamental
challenge on the DOLE’s prerogative based
on lack of employer-employee relationship. As
exhaustively discussed here, the DOLE’s prerogative hinges on the
existence of employer-employee
relationship, the issue is which is at the very heart of this case. And the evidence clearly indicates private
respondent has never been petitioner’s employee. But the DOLE did not address, while the Court
of Appeals glossed over, the issue. The peremptory dismissal of the instant petition
on a technicality would deprive the
Court of the opportunity to resolve the novel controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
appeal, and the Orders of the
Director, DOLE Regional Office No. VII, dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
**Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro is hereby designated as additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, who is on official leave
[1]People’s
Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc) v. The Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, the Regional Director, DOLE Region VII and
Jandeleon Juezan, rollo, pp. 38-43 and 56, respectively.
Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices
Agustin S. Dizon and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, concurring.
[2]Complaint
dated
[6]Per
Minutes of the
[12]Petitioner maintains that the instant case is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director because respondent’s claim exceeds P
5,000. The argument must be struck down at once, as it is well settled,
following the amendment of the Labor Code by R.A. 7730 on
[15]Dated
[17]
[18]Bunbury v. Fuller 9 Ex. 111, 140 (1853), cited in Cases, Materials and Commentary on Administrative Law by S.H. Bailey, B.L. Jones, A.R. Mowbray, p. 423. This view is more popularly called the “preliminary or collateral question.”
[19]Re
[27]Issued
by then Minister of Labor Blas F. Ople on
[29]The argument was made in respondent’s Comments on Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, DOLE Records, pp. 135-138, photocopy of the identification card is on p. 134.
[32]Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-Natu, et al. v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., et al.,
G.R. No. L-25291,
[33]Pacific
Maritime Services, Inc., et al. v. Nicanor Ranay, et al., G.R. No. 111002, July 21, 1997, 275 SCRA
717.
[37]Orozco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155207, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 700, 709, citations omitted.
[39]The Letter Agreement contains the interest rate for the deposit, the maturity date, the stipulated interest rates in case the principal is withdrawn within a certain period, as well as the 20% withholding tax.
[40]Cordova v. Keysa’s Boutique, G.R. No. 156379, 16 September 2005, 470 SCRA 144, 154, citing Your Bus Lines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93381, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 160.
[42]
[44]Provident International Resources Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 119328, 26 July 1996, 259 SCRA 510.
[45]Conti v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 134441, 19 May 1999, 307 SCRA 486 citing Detective & Protective Bureau v. Cloribel, L-23428, 29 November 1968, 26 SCRA 255 and Matute v. Court of Appeals, L-26085, 31 January 1969, 26 SCRA 768.
[48]Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
131209,
[52]Chua, et al. v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467,
440 SCRA 365, 374-375, citing MMDA v.
JANCON Environmental Corp., G.R. No.
147465,
[53]Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. IAC, L-74369, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 706, 716, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-54886, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA 504 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA 459..