Republic of
the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
ENGR. APOLINARIO DUEÑAS, Petitioner, -versus - ALICE GUCE-AFRICA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 165679 Present: CARPIO
MORALES,
Acting Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: October
5, 2009 |
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DECISION
Time
and again, we have held that in a petition for review on certiorari
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we cannot review or pass upon
factual matters, save under exceptional circumstances, none of which obtains in
the present case. Petitioner endeavors in
vain to convince us that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding him negligent in the
construction of respondent’s house and holding him liable for breach of contract.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the April
29, 2004 Decision[2] of the
Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70757, which affirmed the December 21, 2000 Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 157, Pasig City, in an action for breach of
contract with damages[4]
filed by respondent against petitioner.
THE FACTS
For respondent and her family,
Respondent found the occasion an
opportune time to renovate their ancestral house. Thus, in January 1998 she entered into a
Construction Contract[5] with
petitioner for the demolition of the ancestral house and the construction of a new
four-bedroom residential house. The
parties agreed that respondent would pay P500,000.00 to the petitioner,
who obliged himself to furnish all the necessary materials and labor for the
completion of the project. Petitioner
likewise undertook to finish all interior portions of the house on or before
On
On P550,000.00
(which is P50,000.00 more than the contract price). However, and despite knowledge that the
construction of the house was intended for the forthcoming marriage of
respondent’s sister, petitioner unjustly and fraudulently abandoned the project
leaving it substantially unfinished and incomplete. Several demands were made, but petitioner obstinately
refused to make good his contractual obligations. Worse, petitioner’s
workmanship on the incomplete residential house was substandard.
Respondent
prayed for the return of the P50,000.00 overpayment. She also prayed for an award of P100,000.00
for the purpose of repairing what had been poorly constructed and at least P200,000.00
to complete the project.
In
his Answer with Counterclaim,[7]
petitioner asserted that it was respondent who undertook to secure the
necessary government permits.[8] With regard to the alleged overpayment,
petitioner claimed that the amount of P50,000.00 was in payment for the additional
works which respondent requested while the construction was still on going. In fact, the estimated cost for the
additional works amounted to P133,960.00, over and above the P500,000.00
contract price.
Petitioner
likewise alleged that the delay in the construction of the house was due to
circumstances beyond his control, namely: heavy rains, observance of Holy Week,
and celebration of barangay fiesta.
Ultimately, he was not able to complete the project because on
He maintained that he cannot be held liable
for the amounts claimed by the respondent in her complaint considering that he had faithfully complied with the
terms and conditions of the
Construction Contract.
On
Respondent
testified on the material points alleged in her complaint. She also presented the testimony of her
brother Romeo Guce, who declared on the witness stand that petitioner confided
to him that he had to stop the construction because he could no longer pay his workers. He also testified that petitioner asked for additional
amount of about P20,000.00 to finish the house. He relayed this to the respondent who refused
to release any additional amount because of petitioner’s unsatisfactory and
substandard work. But later on,
respondent acceded and gave petitioner P20,000.00.
To
establish the status of the project and determine the amount necessary for the repair
and completion of the house, respondent presented Romeo Dela Cruz, a licensed
realtor and a graduate of an engineering course at the Technological Institute
of the P100,000.00 and another P200,000.00 to
complete it.
Petitioner
also took the witness stand and testified on matters relative to the defenses
he raised in his answer.
On December 21, 2000, the
RTC rendered a Decision[9] in favor of the
respondent and against the petitioner. The RTC gave more credence to respondent’s
version of the facts, finding that-
Clearly,
Dueñas [herein petitioner] failed to tender performance in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the construction contract he executed with
Moreover, Dueñas negligently
abandoned the unfinished structure shortly after a confrontation with
Significantly, the poor construction performance manifested in the structure after Dueñas in bad faith abandoned it. Indeed, the newly constructed edifice needs significant repairs if only to make it habitable for its occupants.[10]
Consequently, the fallo
of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Alice G. Africa and against defendant Apolinario Dueñas who is hereby directed to pay plaintiff:
- P100,000.00
for the necessary repair of the structure;
- 200,000.00 for the completion of the construction;
- 50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
- and costs of suit.
Plaintiff’s claim for moral, nominal and exemplary damages are hereby denied for lack of sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Both
parties were unsatisfied. They thus brought
the matter to the Court of Appeals assailing the Decision of the RTC. The appellate court, however, found no cogent
reason to depart from the trial court’s conclusion. Thus, on
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the
SO ORDERED.[13]
ISSUES
Feeling
aggrieved but still undeterred, petitioner interposes the present recourse anchored
on the following grounds:
I.
THE COSTS OF ACTUAL DAMAGES AWARDED ARE BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES.[14]
II.
THE RULINGS THAT DUEÑAS ABANDONED THE WORK AND INCURRED DELAY ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.[15]
III.
THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY RAIN WATER WERE NOT DUE TO APOLINARIO DUEÑAS’ FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE.[16]
OUR RULING
For
purposes of clarity, we shall tackle simultaneously the second and third
arguments raised by the petitioner.
Instant petition
not available to determine whether petitioner violated the contract or
abandoned the construction of the house
Petitioner
contends that he neither abandoned the project nor violated the contract. He maintains that continuous rains caused the
delay in the construction of the house and that he was not able to finish the
project because respondent ordered him to stop the work. In fact, there was no reason for him to stop
the project because he still had available workers and materials at that time, as
well as collectibles from the respondent. Petitioner likewise contends that the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s finding that he was
guilty of negligence.
The
contentions lack merit.
Petitioner endeavors to convince us
to determine, yet again, the weight, credence, and probative value of the
evidence presented. This cannot be done
in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court where only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon
by us. In Fong v. Velayo,[17] we
defined a question of law as distinguished from a question of fact, viz:
A question of law arises when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the questioned posed is one
of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question
by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
It has
already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of
contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under
Rule 45.[18] We will not review, much less reverse, the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals especially where, as in this case,
such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are not a trier
of facts.[19] The established rule is that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and
binding on us. We are not wont to review
them, save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[20]
Except with
respect to the first ground advanced by the petitioner which will be discussed
later, none of the above exceptions obtain in this case. Hence, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
was negligent in the construction of respondent’s house and thus liable for
breach of contract.
Respondent not entitled to actual damages for want of evidentiary proof
Petitioner further
argues that the appellate court erred in affirming the RTC’s award of actual
damages for want of evidentiary foundation.
He maintains that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree
of certainty. In the case at bench,
petitioner argues that the trial and the appellate courts awarded the amounts
of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00 as actual damages based merely on the
testimonies of respondent and her witness.
We agree. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that
“one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved.” In Ong v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
held that “(a)ctual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that
will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was
injured. They pertain to such injuries
or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement.” To be recoverable, actual damages must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. We cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the amount of damages. Thus, it was held that before actual damages
can be awarded, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, and
credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.[22]
Here, as correctly pointed out by
petitioner, respondent did not present documentary proof to support the claimed
necessary expenses for the repair and completion of the house. In awarding the amounts of P100,000.00
and P200,000.00, the RTC and the Court of Appeals merely relied on the
testimonies of the respondent and her witness.
Thus:
As to the award
of P100,000.00 as cost of repair and P200,000.00 as the amount
necessary to complete the house, the Court finds the same to be in the nature
of actual damages. It is settled that
actual damages must be supported by best evidence available x x x. In the case at bar, the Court finds that the
testimony of the plaintiff-appellant in this regard is supported by the
testimony of Romeo dela Cruz, a realtor, who inspected the structure after it
remained unfinished. Said testimonies
are sufficient to establish the claim. x
x x
Respondent entitled to temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages
Nonetheless,
in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a
party is entitled to temperate damages.
Articles 2216, 2224 and 2225 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2216. No
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Art. 2225.
Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Temperate
or moderate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[23] The amount thereof is usually left to the
discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind
that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory. [24]
There
is no doubt that respondent sustained damages due to the breach committed by
the petitioner. The transfer of the
venue of the wedding, the repair of the substandard work, and the completion of
the house necessarily entailed expenses.
However, as earlier discussed, respondent failed to present competent
proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary loss. To our mind, and in view of the circumstances
obtaining in this case, an award of temperate damages equivalent to 20% of the
original contract price of P500,000.00, or P100,000.00 (which,
incidentally, is equivalent to 1/3 of the total amount claimed as actual
damages), is just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated P100,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 718
dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-15.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 96-103; penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[3] Records, pp. 171-179; penned by Judge Esperanza Fabon-Victorino.
[4] Docketed as Civil Case No. 66930.
[5] Records, p. 6.
[6]
[7]
[8] During trial, however, petitioner declared
on the witness stand that the parties agreed that he will secure the necessary
permit only if the concerned government agency requires it. TSN,
[9] Records, pp. 171-179.
[10] Supra note 3.
[11]
[12] Supra note 2.
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 6
[15]
[16]
[17] G.R. No. 155488,
[18] Omengan v. Philippine National Bank,
G.R. No. 161319,
[19] Ledonio v. Capitol Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 149040,
[20] College
Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc., G.R. No. 155604,
[21] G.R. No. 117103,
[22] Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Alberto
Delos Santos, G.R. No. 138296, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 509, 519.
[23] Art. 2224, Civil
Code of the
[24] Supra note 20, at 40.