HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE, G.R. No. 174497
AURELIA CENSERO SEBE
and
Petitioners, Present:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Carpio Morales,
Nachura,*
Brion, and
Abad, JJ.
HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and
TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOOD
Respondents.
October 12, 2009
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ABAD,
J.:
This case concerns the jurisdiction of
Municipal Trial Courts over actions involving real properties with assessed
values of less than P20,000.00.
The Facts and the Case
In this petition for review on certiorari[1]
petitioners seek to reverse the Order[2]
dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of P20,000.00. Petitioners asked for reconsideration[3]
but the court denied it.[4]
On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses
Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their daughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed
with the RTC of Dipolog City[5] a
complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and Livelihood
Resources Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession
of two lots, which had a total assessed value of P9,910.00, plus damages.[6] On November 25, 1999 they amended their
complaint[7] to
address a deed of confirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevilla’s Answer[8] to
the complaint. The Sebes claimed that
they owned the subject lots but, through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to
sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his Answer[9] Sevilla
insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular manner.
While the case was pending before the
RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so his wife and children substituted him.[10] Parenthetically, with defendant Veronico
Sevilla’s death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this case.[11]
On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the
ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of title and
possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of less than P20,000.00.
Under the law,[12] said
the RTC, it has jurisdiction over such actions when the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00,[13] otherwise,
jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.[14] The RTC concluded that the Sebes should have
filed their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a
motion for reconsideration.[15]
They pointed out that the RTC mistakenly classified their action as one involving
title to or possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment
of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since such an action for annulment was incapable
of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC as
provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
129, as amended.
To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew
parallelisms between their case and the cases of De Rivera v. Halili[16] and Copioso
v. Copioso.[17]
The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court there said that, since it
also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the contracts of lease on which
the opposing parties based their rights of possession, the case had been transformed
from a mere detainer suit to one that was incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, civil actions, which were incapable of
pecuniary estimation, came under the original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance (now the RTC).[18] The Sebes pointed out that, like De Rivera, the subject of their case was
“incapable of pecuniary estimation” since they asked the court, not only to
resolve the dispute over possession of the lots, but also to rule on the
validity of the affidavits of quitclaim, the deeds of confirmation of sale, and
the titles over the properties.[19] Thus, the RTC should try the case.
The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the
assessed value of which was allegedly P3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled that the case
comprehended more than just the title to, possession of, or any interest in the
real property. It sought the annulment
of contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for
damages. In other words, there had been
a joinder of causes of action, some of which were incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the case properly fell within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here, petitioners
argued that their case had the same causes of actions and reliefs as those involved
in Copioso. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over their case.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the
Sebes’s motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.[20] Before the Huguete,
cancellation of titles, declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and
partition were actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over actions
of this nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case, the MTC had jurisdiction because
the assessed value of the lots did not exceed P20,000.00.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or
not the Sebes’s action involving the two lots valued at less than P20,000.00
falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Court’s Ruling
Whether
a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is
determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and the principal
relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of
courts.[21]
The
gist of the Sebes’s complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40 years
of two unregistered lots[22] in
Dampalan, P9,910.00.[23] On June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the
Sebes to sign documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim.[24] Being illiterate, they relied on Sevilla’s explanation
that what they signed were “deeds of real estate mortgage” covering a loan that
they got from him.[25] And, although the documents which turned out to
be deeds conveying ownership over the two lots to Sevilla for P10,000.00[26]
were notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any notary public.[27] Using the affidavits of quitclaim, defendant Sevilla
applied for[28] and
obtained free patent titles covering the two lots on September 23, 1991.[29] Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to
defendant Technology and P869,555.00.[30]
On
December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale covering the
two lots.[31] Upon closer examination, however, their signatures
had apparently been forged.[32] The Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making
them sign such documents to confirm the sale of the lots when defendant Sevilla
already got titles to them as early as September.[33] At any rate, in 1992, defendant Sevilla declared
the lots for tax purposes under his name.[34] Then, using force and intimidation, he seized possession
of the lots from their tenants[35] and
harvested that planting season’s yield[36] of
coconut and palay worth P20,000.00.[37]
Despite
demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots, forcing them
to hire a lawyer[38] and
incur expenses of litigation.[39] Further the Sebes suffered loss of earnings over
the years.[40] They were also entitled to moral[41] and
exemplary damages.[42] They thus asked the RTC a) to declare void the
affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the case; b) to
declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession to
them; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay them P140,000.00 in lost produce
from June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing of the complaint, P30,000.00
in moral damages, P100,000.00 in attorney’s fee, P30,000.00 in litigation
expenses, and such amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might fix.[43]
Based on the above allegations and
prayers of the Sebes’s complaint, the law that applies to the action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were decided under the original
text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even
under its predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the
case as a real action would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC.
But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601,
the distinction between these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. The amendment expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the first level courts to include real actions involving
property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.[44]
The power of the RTC under Section 19
of Batas Pambansa 129,[45]
as amended,[46] to hear
actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in
it now covers only real properties with assessed value in excess of P20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to
hear actions the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. Thus–
SEC.
19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In
all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
(2) In
all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.
Section 33, on the other hand
provides that, if the assessed value of the real property outside Metro Manila
involved in the suit is P20,000.00 and below, as in this case,
jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. Thus—
SEC.
33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases -- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x x
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) x x x.
But was the Sebes’s action one involving
title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it or one the
subject of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
The Sebes claim that their action is,
first, for the declaration of nullity of the documents of conveyance that
defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing and, second, for the reconveyance
of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla succeeded in
getting. The subject of their action is,
they conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action “involving title to real
property” means that the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that
he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.[47] Title is the “legal link between (1) a person
who owns property and (2) the property itself.”[48]
“Title” is different from a “certificate
of title” which is the document of ownership under the
Another way of looking at it is that,
while “title” gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a “certificate
of title,” the holder of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess
valid title to the real property. The
issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title
than what he actually has in law.[50] Thus, a plaintiff’s action for cancellation
or nullification of a certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence
of the defendant’s lack of title to real property. Further, although the certificate of title may
have been lost, burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists
and remains unaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to another or
subjected to a lien or encumbrance.[51]
Nestled between what distinguishes a “title”
from a “certificate of title” is the present controversy between the Sebes and
defendant Sevilla. Which of them has valid
title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the certificates of
title covering them?
The
Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferred ownership
of the same to anyone. Such title, they
insist, has remained with them untouched throughout the years, excepting only
that in 1991 they constituted a real estate mortgage over it in defendant
Sevilla’s favor. The Sebes alleged that
defendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership by tricking them into
signing documents of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to
secure the loan that they got from him.
Assuming
that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim of
ownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure evidence of ownership or certificates of title
covering the same and, second, to
possess and enjoy them. The court, in
this situation, may in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without
ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued to defendant Sevilla, direct
the latter to reconvey the two lots and their corresponding
The
present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the
documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title
covering the two lots. These would merely
follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the issue of which
between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also
entitled to their possession. Based on
the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded
the Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of conveyance rather
than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining
which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction
over which is determined by the assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the
two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00. Clearly, this amount does not exceed the
jurisdictional threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are
merely incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the
computation of the jurisdictional amount.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Order dated August 8, 2006, of the
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Special Order No. 730 dated October 5, 2009.
[1] Rollo, pp. 16-33.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Branch 9.
[6] Rollo, pp. 37-44.
[7] Records, pp. 31-40.
[8] Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129, as amended).
[13] B.P. 129, Sec. 19. Jurisdiction
in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) x x x.
[14] P20,000.00)
x x x.
[15] Rollo, pp. 92-97.
[16] 118 Phil. 901 (1963).
[17] 439 Phil. 936, 943 (2002): x x x the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.
[18] THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1948, Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: (a) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation; x x x (June 17, 1948).
[19] Rollo, p. 94.
[20] 453 Phil. 170
(2003): Respondent Teofredo bought land in P15,000.00. The Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT), however, only showed him as owner. He refused to partition the lot. Spouses
Huguete filed a complaint in 2001 before the RTC for annulment of TCT, tax
declaration and deed of sale, partition, damages and attorney’s fees. Teofredo moved to dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The trial court also denied
reconsideration. Spouses Huguete filed a
petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court ruled that since the
ultimate objective of the petitioners was to obtain title to real property, it
should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property. Thus, the RTC correctly
ruled that it had no jurisdiction.
[21] Gonzales v. Lacap, G.R. No. 180730,
December 11, 2008, citing Quinagoran v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 104, 113-114; Baltazar v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 136433,
December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 74, 89-90; Pascual
v. Beltran, G.R. No. 129318, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 545.
[22] Records, p. 34, par. 12 of the Amended Complaint.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] Batas Pambansa 129, Sec. 33 (3).
[45] The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[46] An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise Known
as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”
[47] Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Heirs of Valdez,
G.R. No. 171531, January 30, 2009, citing
Evangelista v. Santiago, 497
Phil. 269, 291 (2005).
[48] Black’s Law
Dictionary, 8th Edition, p. 1522, cited in Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque,
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008.
[49] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, supra,
citing Philippine National Bank v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 257 Phil. 748, 751 (1989).
[50] Agne v. The Director of Lands, G.R. No.
40399, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 793, 809.
[51] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, supra note 48.
[52] Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil. 855, 859 (1952), cited in Heirs of Bituin v. Caoleng, Sr., G.R. No. 157567, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 747, 762.