RODOLFO “RUDY” CANLAS, G.R. No. 184285
VICTORIA
CANLAS, FELICIDAD
CANLAS and
SPOUSES PABLO
CANLAS AND
CHARITO CANLAS,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
ILUMINADA
TUBIL,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 25, 2009
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari
is the June 12, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
99736, which reversed
the April 11, 2007 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (
The facts are as follows:
On June 9, 2004, a complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed by respondent Iluminada Tubil against petitioners
x x x x
3. That the plaintiff is the owner, together with the other heirs of her late husband Nicolas Tubil who are their children, of a residential land located at San Juan, Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 2420, with an area of 332 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 11199 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, x x x;
x x x x
4. That before the aforesaid parcel of land was titled, it was declared for taxation purposes in the name of plaintiff Iluminada Tubil in the Municipal Assessor’s Office of Guagua, Pampanga, x x x;
x x x x
6. That sometime ago, the defendants Roldolfo ‘Rudy’ Canlas, Victoria Canlas and Felicidad Canlas erected a house in the aforesaid land of the plaintiff, which they are presently occupying as their residential house;
7. That likewise sometime ago defendants spouses Pablo Canlas and Charito Canlas erected a house in the aforesaid land of the plaintiff, which they are presently occupying as their residential house;
8. That the said houses of the defendants were erected in the aforesaid land and their stay therein was by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, as well as co-heirs, considering that defendants are plaintiff’s relatives;
9. That plaintiff and her co-heirs wish to use and dedicate the aforesaid parcel of land fruitfully, demands were verbally made upon the defendants to vacate and remove their house therefrom, but defendants just ignored the plea of plaintiff and co-heirs, and instead failed and refused to remove the houses without any lawful and justifiable reason;
10. That in light of said refusal, the plaintiff referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent defendants demand letters to vacate dated January 12, 2004, but inspite of receipt of the same defendants failed and refused to vacate and remove their houses and continue to fail and refuse to do so without lawful justification x x x;
11. That this matter was ventilated with before the barangay government for conciliation, mediation, arbitration and settlement prior to the filing of this case with this court, but no settlement was arrived at inspite of the effort exerted by the barangay authorities and so a certification to file action was issued by the Pangkat Chairman of Barangay San Juan, Betis, Guagua, Pampanga x x x;[5]
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC
is without jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that the case was not
prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest.[6]
On September 14, 2004, the MTC denied the motion because the
grounds relied upon were evidentiary in nature which needed to be litigated.[7]
Thus, petitioners filed their answer where they denied the
allegations in the complaint. They claimed that together with their
predecessors-in-interest, they had been in open, continuous, adverse, public
and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than 60 years; that
respondent’s title which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 03540 was
dubious, spurious and of unlawful character and nature; and that respondent’s cause of action was for an accion publiciana, which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the MTC.[8]
On
October 23, 2006, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for unlawful
detainer because respondent failed to show that the possession of the petitioners
was by mere tolerance.
Respondent
appealed to the
Respondent
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which rendered the
assailed decision on June 12, 2008, which reversed the Regional Trial Court’s
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us SETTING ASIDE the decision rendered
by Branch 50 of the
IT IS SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
September 1, 2008 Resolution.[11]
Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari
alleging that:
x x x THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE DECISION RENDERED BY
BRANCH 50 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA, PAMPANGA ON APRIL 11, 2007 IN
SPECIAL CIVIL CASE NO. G-06-544
Petitioners contend that the
x x x x
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
We
note that when petitioners filed their motion to dismiss before the MTC, they
claimed that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, in the instant petition for review, petitioners
changed their theory; they now claim that it is the MTC, and
not the
As a rule, a change of theory cannot
be allowed.[13] However, when the factual bases thereof would
not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order
to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory,[14]
as in this case, the Court may give due course to the petition and resolve the
principal issues raised therein.
The
issue to be resolved is which court, the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction over
the subject matter. If it is an unlawful
detainer case, the action was properly filed in the MTC. However, if the suit is one for accion publiciana, original jurisdiction
is with the
Well-settled
is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.[15] In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[16]
Unlawful detainer is an action to
recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The
possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.[17]
An unlawful detainer proceeding is
summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court. The action
must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in
said case is the right to physical possession.[18]
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action
to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing
of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.
In
Cabrera v. Getaruela,[19]
the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges
a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1)
initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(2)
eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3)
thereafter,
the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4)
within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In
the instant case, respondent’s allegations in the complaint clearly make a case
for an unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MTC over the
subject matter. Respondent alleged that
she was the owner of the land as shown by Original Certificate of Title No.
111999 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga; that the land had been
declared for taxation purposes and she had been paying the taxes thereon; that
petitioners’ entry and construction of their houses were tolerated as they are
relatives; and that she sent on January 12, 2004 a letter demanding that petitioners
vacate the property but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
on June 9, 2004, or within one year from the time the last demand to vacate was
made.
It is settled that as long as these
allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.
This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not
support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court - after
acquiring jurisdiction - may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of
evidence.[20]
The ruling cited by the Court of Appeals in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,[21]
i.e., that jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint for ejectment such that when the complaint
fails to faithfully aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected, or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court,[22]
finds no application in the instant case.
In Sarmiento, the
complaint did not characterize the entry into the land as legal or
illegal. It was also not alleged that
dispossession was effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to make out a case of forcible entry, nor was there a contract, express
or implied, as would qualify the case as unlawful detainer.[23] Contrarily, the complaint in this case specifically
alleged that possession of the petitioners was by tolerance. The rule is that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the
owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.[24] In Sarmiento,
the claim that possession of the land was by tolerance was a mere afterthought,
raised only in subsequent pleadings but not in the complaint.[25]
The requirement that the complaint should aver jurisdictional
facts, like when and how entry on the land was made by the defendants, applies
only when at issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the
MTC and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed as being one for accion publiciana cognizable by the
The ruling in the Sarona
case cited by petitioner i.e., that a
complaint for unlawful detainer should allege when and how entry on the land
was made by the defendant, finds no application to the case at bar. In Sarona, the main issue was the
timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC. In forcible entry cases, the prescriptive
period is counted from the date of defendant’s actual entry on the land; in
unlawful detainer, from the date of the last demand to vacate. Hence,
to determine whether the case was filed on time, there was a necessity to
ascertain whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. In light of these
considerations, the Court ruled that since the main distinction between the two
actions is when and how defendant entered the land, the determinative facts
should be alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in Sarona, the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the complaint was never in issue for whether the
complaint was one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the MTC had
jurisdiction over it. The case at bar is
different for at issue is the jurisdiction of the MTC over the unlawful
detainer case for petitioner (defendant therein) asserts that the case is one
for accion publiciana cognizable by the
In the instant case, the timeliness
of the filing of the complaint is not at issue as the dispossession of the
property by the respondent has not lasted for more than one year. Thus, the ruling of the
Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the
proper inferior court for unlawful detainer within one year, after such
unlawful withholding of possession, counted from the date of the last demand.[28] The records show that respondent sent the
demand to vacate the property to the petitioners on January 24, 2004 and filed
the complaint for unlawful detainer on June 9, 2004, which is well within the
one-year period.
Having ruled that the MTC acquired
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3582, it thus properly exercised its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for failure of the
respondent to prove tolerance by sufficient evidence. Consquently, Section 8 (2nd par.)
of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which ordains the Regional Trial Court not to
dismiss the cases appealed to it from the metropolitan or municipal trial court
which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case
on the merits, finds no application here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 12, 2008
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99736 ordering the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 50
to decide Special Civil Case No. G-06-544, as well as its September 1, 2008
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The October 23, 2006
Decision of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 2, dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer for failure of respondent to show that petitioners’
possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 24-27; penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Records (1), pp. 34-37.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159270, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 569, 584.
[14] Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office v. LCN Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 174873, August 26, 2008.
[15] Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114, 133.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009.
[20] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 611 (2005).
[21] G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 108.
[22]
[23]
[24] Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA 366, 378.
[25] Supra note 20 at 115.
[26] 333 Phil. 331, 340 (1996).
[27] Rollo, p. 62.
[28] Heirs of Fernando Vinzons v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 146, 152 (1999).