Republic of the
Supreme Court
RICARDO P. TORING,
Petitioner, -
versus - TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE Respondents. |
G.R. No. 165321
Present: CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, *ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 3, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to
Teresita in 1978 at his aunt’s house in
Ricardo and Teresita were
married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of
Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric
Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than
twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before
the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to
Teresita null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered
in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature
of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr.
Albaran’s respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or
opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations
against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition
and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a
squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife
to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. Teresita,
however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times,
Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had
to settle these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying
debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts
she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left
the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also
missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired
for the family, so their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually
had to be taken in by Ricardo’s parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita
would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy
things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused
Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another man’s
child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s stomach
was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but
she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst
suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three
instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”; other
than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred
and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in
Ricardo opined that his wife
was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who
mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very
averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most
unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and
sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him.[4]
He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they
both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran
testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage
was Teresita’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita,
the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to
manifest the following pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense of entitlement
as she expected favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes,
being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage
of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to
recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration
her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude
and her proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These
patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which
started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave
and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms
as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of
that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from
her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita’s
eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and
examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct
of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for
annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It
asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son
Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties’
personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological makeup. The OSG also
argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently
prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the
alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor
that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and
annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr. Albaran’s
psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardo’s
evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC
decision and held that the trial court’s findings did not satisfy the rules and
guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[7]
The RTC failed to specifically point out
the root illness or defect that caused Teresita’s psychological incapacity, and
likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of
celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the
conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation do not appear to have
been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay
statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on
Teresita’s overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for
declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal
separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES’
ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults
the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly
the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court – in declaring
the nullity of the marriage – fully complied with Molina.
In its
Comment,[8]
the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC’s decision, particularly
in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Court’s guidelines
for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Reiterating its earlier arguments below,
the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show
the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological
incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root
cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely
unable to discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.
Ricardo’s
Reply[9]
reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of
Teresita’s psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. He claimed that
sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the
subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging
the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is
no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated
and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find
the petition unmeritorious, as the
CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s decision for lack
of legal and factual basis.
In
the leading case of
We further
expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability established in the
(1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage
as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis,
233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Subsequent jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual
situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of
In the present case and guided
by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted
of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter’s psychological
evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological
evaluation of Teresita.
a.
Dr. Albaran’s
psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her
psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential
marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements
told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr.
Albaran added that Teresita’s disorder manifested during her early adulthood
and is grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are
greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case,
became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because
of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that
a mere narration of the statements of
Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests
administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering
psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided
sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15]
the Court considered the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions to be
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of
respondent’s psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the
conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioner’s statements whose
bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua,[16]
the Court declared that while the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife
could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husband’s psychological
condition. To our mind, conclusions and
generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo,
are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized
that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.[18] This recognition, however, does not signify
that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the
evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means
that the requirements for nullity outlined in
Other than from the spouses, such
evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives,
close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present
at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only
other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for
purposes of Teresita’s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses’
eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could
not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until
long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this
observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson’s interview with the
pyschologist: Richardson’s statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising
eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated
instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his
father’s alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a
Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in
these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some
psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do
we find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic
psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not
uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital
problems – finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved
into the relationship between mother and son except to observe their estranged
relationship due to a previous argument – a money problem involving Ricardo’s financial
remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist’s evaluation
never explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at
the time of the spouses’ marriage, showed a debilitating psychological
incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence,
fatal to Ricardo’s cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran’s psychological
evaluation to fully explain the details – i.e.,
the what, how, when, where and since when – of Teresita’s alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. It seems to us
that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply
stated out of the blue that Teresita’s personality disorder manifested itself in
early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity should have been there
when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the
incapacitating nature of Teresita’s alleged personality disorder, and how it
related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain
in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita’s
psychological disorder.
Dr. Albaran’s testimony at the
trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed
to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps
in her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran’s cross-examination only
made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty
pinpointing the root cause of Teresita’s personality disorder, due to the
limited information she gathered from Ricardo and Richardson regarding
Teresita’s personal and family history. To directly quote from the records, Dr.
Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that “[t]he only data that I
have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family
and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the development of
the personality disorder.”[20]
Dr. Albaran’s obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that
a complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, could not be determined from meager information coming only from
a biased source.
b.
Ricardo’s testimony
Ricardo testified in court that
Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo’s
characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal, or “neglect” in the performance of
marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[21]
Ricardo’s testimony merely
established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the family’s finances
by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations.
Teresita’s spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the
loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does
not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36
of the Family Code. At most, Teresita’s
mismanagement of the family’s finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal
or neglect, during the marriage, in
the handling of funds intended for the family’s financial support.
Teresita’s alleged infidelity,
even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established
as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the
respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;[22]
there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to her
spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed
in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered personality
of this kind. Even Ricardo’s added
testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita’s dates with other men and her pregnancy
by another man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the
absence of an adverse integral element and link to Teresita’s allegedly
disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to
prove that Teresita’s alleged character traits already existed at the inception
of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[24]
In the absence of this element, a
marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be
alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code
Citing
In
Thus, contrary to Ricardo’s
position,
SEC.
2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
x x x x
(d) What to allege. – A petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of
the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to
discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological
incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo
merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for
being irresponsible in taking care of their family’s finances – a fault or
deficiency that does not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36
of the Family Code requires. We
reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person’s difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted
in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.[28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 18-29.
[3] Rollo, p. 19.
[4] RTC rollo, p. 4.
[5]
[6]
[7] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[8] Rollo, pp. 43-52.
[9]
[10] G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 41, 49-50.
[11] 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[12]
[13] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 7, at 676-678.
[14] See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319; Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157.
[15] Supra note 14.
[16] Supra note 14.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
[19] RTC rollo, p. 50.
[20]
[21] Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272.
[22] Santos v. Santos, supra note 11; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932 (1999); Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 233-232 (2004).
[23] Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.
[24] Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 11.
[25] Supra note 10.
[26]
[27] Effective March 15, 2003.
[28] Supra note 21, at 288.