Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
|
MA. JOY TERESA O. BILBAO, Petitioner, - versus
- SAUDI
ARABIAN AIRLINES, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 183915 Present: CORONA,
C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, and REYES,* JJ. Promulgated: December
14, 2011 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal of the May 30, 2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 102319 and its July 22, 2008 Resolution[2]
denying petitioner Ma. Joy Teresa O. Bilbaos (Bilbao) motion for
reconsideration. The assailed decision
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
held that Bilbao was not illegally dismissed and had voluntarily resigned. The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision
of the Labor Arbiter which ruled that Bilbao, together with two other
complainants, was illegally dismissed by respondent Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia)
and ordered the payment of full backwages, separation pay, and attorneys
fees.
The facts are as follows:
Bilbao was a former employee of
respondent Saudia, having been hired as a Flight Attendant on May 13, 1986
until her separation from Saudia in September 2004. During the course of her employment, Bilbao
was assigned to work at the Manila Office, although the nature of her work as a
flight attendant entailed regular flights from Manila to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
and back.
On August 25, 2004, the In-Flight
Service Senior Manager of Saudia assigned in Manila received an inter-office
Memorandum dated August 17, 2004 from its Jeddah Office regarding the transfer
of 10 flight attendants from Manila to Jeddah effective September 1, 2004. The said memorandum explained that such
transfer was made due to operational requirements.[3] Bilbao was among the 10 flight attendants to
be transferred.
Bilbao initially complied with the
transfer order and proceeded to Jeddah for her new assignment. However, on September 7, 2004, she opted to
resign and relinquish her post by tendering a resignation letter, which reads:
Jeddah IFS Base
Manager (F)
F/A Maria Joy Teresa O. Bilbao
PRN: 3006078
22 /
07 / 1425 H
7 / 09
/ 2004
RESIGNATION
I am tendering
my resignation with one (1) month notice effective 18 October 2004. Thank you for the support you have given me
during my 18 years of service.
(signed)
________________
F/As
SIGNATURE
3006078
(signed) September
7, 2004
_________________
AMIN GHABRA
SNR. MGR. IFS
JED (F)
(signed)
ABDULLAH
BALKHOYOUR
GM IFS CABIN
CREW
8/8/1425
21/9/04 ADMIN
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / DATE[4]
On October 28, 2004, Bilbao executed and
signed an Undertaking[5]
similar to that of a Receipt, Release and Quitclaim wherein she acknowledged
receipt of a sum of money as full and complete end-of-service award with final
settlement and have no further claims whatsoever against Saudi Arabian
Airlines.[6]
In spite of this signed Undertaking,
however, on July 20, 2005, Bilbao filed with the NLRC a complaint for
reinstatement and payment of full backwages; moral, exemplary and actual
damages; and attorneys fees. Two of the
other flight attendants who were included in the list for transfer to Jeddah,
Shalimar Centi-Mandanas and Maria Lourdes Castells, also filed their respective
complaints against Saudia. These
complaints were eventually consolidated into NLRC-NCR Case Nos. 00-07-06315-05
and 00-08-06745-05, and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes.
For her part, Bilbao maintained that her
resignation from Saudia was not voluntary.
She narrated that she was made to sign a pre-typed resignation letter
and was even reminded that the same was a better option than termination which would
tarnish her record of service with Saudia.
Bilbao and her co-complainants shared a common theory that their
transfer to Jeddah was a prelude to their termination since they were all
allegedly between 39 and 40 years of age.
Upon the other hand, Saudia averred
that the resignation letters from Bilbao and her co-complainants were
voluntarily made since they were actually hand-written and duly signed. Saudia asserted that Bilbao and her
co-complainants were not subjected to any force, intimidation, or coercion when
they wrote said resignation letters and even their undertakings, after
receiving without protest a generous separation package despite the fact that
employees who voluntarily resign are not entitled to any separation pay. Saudia also added that the transfer of flight
attendants from their Manila Office to the Jeddah Office was a valid exercise
of its management prerogative.
On August 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter
Reyes rendered a Decision[7]
declaring that Bilbao, together with co-complainants Centi-Mandanas and
Castells, was illegally dismissed, and ordering Saudia to pay each of the
complainants full backwages from the time of the illegal dismissal until the
finality of the decision, separation pay of one month for every year of service
less the amount already received, plus ten percent (10%) attorneys fees on the
amounts actually determined to be due the complainants.
Saudia filed an appeal before the NLRC
alleging that Bilbao and her co-complainants voluntarily executed their
resignation letters and undertakings; thus, they were not illegally
dismissed. Moreover, Saudia opined that
Bilbao and her co-complainants claim of illegal dismissal was a mere
afterthought as they waited for almost one year from the date of their alleged
dismissal to file their respective complaints.
Bilbao followed suit and also appealed
before the NLRC, arguing that she was entitled to the payment of moral and
exemplary damages since her termination was allegedly attended by bad faith,
fraud and deceit.
On June 25, 2007, the NLRC granted
Saudias appeal, and reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The decretal portion of the NLRC decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the respondents appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is issued finding the respondent not guilty
of illegal dismissal.
For
lack of merit, the complainant Bilbaos appeal is DISMISSED.
Accordingly,
the complaint is DISMISSED.[8]
In a Resolution[9]
dated October 26, 2007, the NLRC amended its earlier Resolution dated June 25,
2007, to state that Castells and Centi-Mandanas were also not entitled to moral
and exemplary damages. Moreover, the
NLRC failed to find any compelling justification or valid reason to modify,
alter or reverse its earlier resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the Appeals and Motions for Reconsideration
of complainants Maria Lourdes Castells and Shalimar Centi-Mandanas are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Likewise,
the Motion for Reconsideration of Maria Joy Teresa Bilbao is DENIED.
No
further motion of similar nature shall be entertained.[10]
Bilbao went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in ruling that she was not illegally dismissed and not entitled to the
payment of moral and exemplary damages.
On May 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Resolutions of the NLRC dated June 25, 2007 and October 26, 2007,
and held that the resignation of Bilbao was of her own free will and
intelligent act.[11]
Dissatisfied, Bilbao filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution
dated July 22, 2008.
Hence, the instant petition for review
filed by Bilbao on the following grounds:
6. GROUND FOR THIS PETITION/ISSUES
6.1. The Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in upholding the erroneous Decision of the NLRC, Third Division which
Decision reversed the Labor Arbiters findings.
The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in accord
with law or with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
6.2. The Court of Appeals committed palpable error
in ruling that petitioner was not forced to resign; the Court of Appeals
decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law and contrary to
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
6.3. The Court of Appeals committed patent mistake
in ruling that the petitioners (sic)
termination was valid because respondent had the right to terminate the
petitioner even without just cause; this is an outright violation of the Labor
Code and applicable laws and jurisprudence; The Court of Appeals likewise erred
in validating the resignation because it was accompanied with words of
gratitude and payment of separation benefits.[12]
In
her Petition[13]
dated September 15, 2008, Bilbao asserts that the initial step of Saudia in transferring
her to Jeddah was, by itself, constructive dismissal since the transfer order was
unreasonable, discriminatory, attended by bad faith, and would result to demotion
in rank or diminution in pay. Moreover,
Bilbao maintains that her resignation letter was not voluntarily made as it was
in a pre-typed form supplied by Saudia, and was accomplished when she was under
pressure and had no choice but to resign.
Lastly, Bilbao insists that the undertaking or waiver and quitclaim that
she signed in favor of Saudia was invalid as she particularly puts in issue the
voluntariness of its execution.
In
its Comment[14]
dated November 14, 2008, Saudia preliminarily asserts that the petition raises the
factual issue of whether or not Bilbao voluntarily resigned from her employment
with Saudia, which is not proper for a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, thus warranting its outright dismissal. Nonetheless, Saudia presents its arguments
and contends that it validly exercised its management prerogative in
transferring Bilbao to another work station.
Saudia then enumerates the following factual circumstances which
allegedly reveal the voluntariness of Bilbaos resignation, to wit:
a)
[Bilbaos] resignation letter was penned
in her own handwriting and duly signed by her;
b)
[Bilbao] tendered her letter of
resignation in Jeddah, KSA on 07 September 2004;
c)
[Bilbao] is of sufficient age and
discretion, could read, write, and understand English and a college graduate;
d)
There is no proof that any material or
physical force was applied on her person or her family;
e)
[Bilbao] then voluntarily executed an
Undertaking acknowledging receipt of various sums of money and irrevocably and
unconditionally releasing Saudia, its directors, stockholders, officers and
employees from any claim or demand whatsoever in law or equity which they may
have in connection with her employment with respondent;
f)
[Bilbao] received generous financial
benefits without protest;
g)
It took [Bilbao] at least one (1)
year from the date of the alleged dismissal to file her Complaint against
[Saudia]; and
h)
The intimidation, force or coercion
allegedly employed by [Saudia] surfaced, for the first time, when the Complaint
were (sic) filed on 20 July 2005,
which was then amended on 01 September 2005.[15]
Lastly,
Saudia claims that Bilbao is not entitled to any award of moral and exemplary
damages since there is no dismissal, much less illegal dismissal committed by
Saudia, as Bilbao voluntarily resigned from her employment.
This
Court finds no merit in the petition.
At
the outset, it bears stressing that the jurisdiction of this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is generally
confined only to errors of law. It does
not extend to questions of fact. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions, such as in the instant case, where the findings
of fact and the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of
the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.[16] To recall, the Labor Arbiter found that Saudia
illegally dismissed Bilbao, while the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are in
agreement that Bilbao voluntarily tendered her resignation.
After a review of the case, we uphold the findings of the
Court of Appeals that Bilbao voluntarily resigned from her employment with
Saudia. Her resignation letter and
undertaking that evidenced her receipt of separation pay, when taken together
with her educational attainment and the circumstances surrounding the filing of
the complaint for illegal dismissal, comprise substantial proof of Bilbaos
voluntary resignation.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to
dissociate oneself from employment. It
is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with
the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the
alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in
fact, intended to sever his or her employment.[17]
In the instant case, Bilbao tendered
her resignation letter a week after her transfer to the Jeddah office. In the said letter, Bilbao expressed her gratitude
for the support which Saudia had given her for her eighteen years of
service. Clearly, her use of words of
appreciation and gratitude negates the notion that she was forced and coerced
to resign. Besides, the resignation
letter was hand-written by Bilbao on a Saudia form and was in English, a
language she is conversant in.
Additionally,
instead of immediately filing a complaint for illegal dismissal after she was
allegedly forced to resign, Bilbao executed an Undertaking in favor of Saudia,
wherein she declared that she received her full and complete end-of-service
award with final settlement, to wit:
I, the
undersigned employee
Name/ MARIA JOY
TERESA O. BILBAO
PRN/ 3006078
hereby declare
that I have received my full and complete end-of-service award with final
settlement and have no further claims whatsoever against Saudi Arabian
Airlines.
By signing this
undertaking, I also fully Understand that any other future claims filed by me
shall not be considered, accepted, or entertained.
Name: MARIA JOY
TERESA O. BILBAO
PRN: 3006078
Signature:
(SGD.)
Date: October
25, 2004[18]
What
is more, Bilbao waited for more than 10 months after her separation from Saudia
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Despite
the foregoing circumstances, Bilbao maintains that she was forced and coerced
into writing the said resignation letter in the form prepared by Saudia, and
that she was left with no other option but to resign. Saudia, on the other hand, claims that
Bilbaos resignation was voluntary, thus, there could be no illegal dismissal.
Even
assuming that Saudia prepared the form in which Bilbao wrote her resignation
letter as claimed, this Court is not convinced that she was coerced and
intimidated into signing it. Bilbao is
no ordinary employee who may not be able to completely comprehend and realize
the consequences of her acts. She is an
educated individual. It is highly
improbable that with her long years in the profession and her educational
attainment, she could be tricked and forced into doing something she does not
intend to do. Under these circumstances,
it can hardly be said that Bilbao was coerced into resigning from Saudia.
Besides,
Bilbao did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that she was forced or
threatened by Saudia. It must be
remembered that for intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites
must be present: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2)
that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or
serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance
which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced
on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a
well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the
necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or
property.[19] In the instant case, Bilbao did not prove the
existence of any one of these essential elements. Bare and self-serving allegations of coercion
or intimidation, unsubstantiated by evidence, do not constitute proof to
sufficiently support a finding of forced resignation. It would be utterly unfair and unjust to hold
that Saudia illegally dismissed Bilbao and to impose upon it the burden of
accepting back Bilbao who unequivocally and voluntarily manifested her intent
and willingness to sever her employment ties.
Anent
the Undertaking signed by Bilbao, this Court is of the opinion that the same
was validly and voluntarily executed. Indeed,
not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. There are legitimate waivers and quitclaims
that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of workers claims which
should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.[20] And if such agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and should
not later be disowned.
Periquet v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[21]
held that:
Not
all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement,
it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did
so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. x x x.[22]
This
Court quotes with approval the finding of the NLRC, to wit:
Having
signed the waiver, it is hard to conclude that [Bilbao was] merely forced by
the necessity to execute the undertaking. [Bilbao is] not [a] gullible nor
unsuspecting [person] who can easily be tricked or inveigled and, thus, need
the extra protection of law. [She is a]
well-educated and highly experienced flight [attendant]. The undertaking executed by [Bilbao is]
therefore considered valid and binding on [her] and [Saudia].
Due
to [her] voluntary resignation, [Bilbao is] actually not entitled to any
separation pay benefits. Thus, the
financial package given to [her] is more than sufficient consideration for
[her] execution of the undertaking.[23]
Clearly then, Bilbaos claim that she
was illegally dismissed cannot be sustained.
There is no showing that the Undertaking and resignation letter were
executed by Bilbao under force or intimidation.
Bilbaos claims for reinstatement, payment of backwages without loss of
seniority rights and with interest, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees must inevitably fail.
This Court has always reminded that:
Although
the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the workers
and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers, such
inclination has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for
the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
applicable law and doctrine. An employee
who resigns and executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally
stopped from filing any further money claims against the employer arising from
the employment.[24]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated May 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated July 22, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 102319 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice |
|
* Per Raffle dated November 28,
2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 31-45; penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del
Castillo (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices Arcangelita
Romilla-Lontok and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.
[2] Id. at 47-48.
[3] Id. at 137.
[4] Id. at 143.
[5] Id. at 145.
[6] Id. at 143.
[7] Id. at 150-164.
[8] Id. at 176-177.
[9] Id. at 179-181.
[10] Id. at 181.
[11] Id. at 44.
[12] Id. at 15.
[13] Id. at 9-29.
[14] Id. at 201-246.
[15] Id. at 217-218.
[16] Nasipit
Lumber Company v. National Organization of Workingmen (NOWM), G.R. No.
146225, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 158,
170.
[17] BMG
Records (Phils.), Inc. v. Aparecio, G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007, 532
SCRA 300, 313-314.
[18] Rollo,
p. 145.
[19] Guatson International Travel and Tours, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 100322, March 9, 1994, 230 SCRA 815, 822.
[20] Magsalin
v. National Organization of Working Men, 451 Phil. 254, 263 (2003).
[21] 264 Phil. 1115 (1990).
[22] Id. at 1122.
[23] Rollo, p. 174.
[24] Alfaro
v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 310, 321 (2001).