Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON and
MARIA TERESA TUAZON, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 193023
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,* BRION, PEREZ, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: June 22, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
This is a petition
for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the decision[1] (dated
ANTECEDENTS
The antecedent
facts are not in dispute.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
The Petition
The present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR
did not expropriate the respondents land, but merely established a right-of-way
easement over it. The petition relies heavily on the lack of transfer of the
lands title or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents claim involved
an easement, its charter a special law should
govern in accordance with Article 635 of the Civil Code.[14]
NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the
respondents predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid
pursuant thereto were authorized by
its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the petitioner alleges that
establishing right-of-way easements over lands traversed by its transmission lines was the only mode by which it
could acquire the properties needed in its power generation and
distribution function. It claims that R.A.
8974,[15]
specifically its implementing rules, supports this position.
THE COURT RULING
We find the
petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the case to the RTC for the
determination of just compensation.
The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability
is limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its
transmission lines. It relies heavily
on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to support this position.
This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of cases, including Manubay[16] which was correctly
cited by the CA in the assailed decision.
In Manubay,[17]
NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that affirmed the payment, as
ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full value of a property traversed by NAPOCORs transmission
lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Through
then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court echoing the 1991 case of National Power Corporation v. Misericordia
Gutierrez, et al.[18]
formulated the doctrinal issue in Manubay,[19] as
follows:
How
much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a
parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines?
Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the
property? This is the question to be answered in this case.[20]
In holding
that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land
traversed by the transmission lines, we said:
Granting arguendo that what petitioner
acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way,
still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and
not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls
within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds
support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just
compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT
held thus:
x x x. Normally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable
that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of
right of way.
True, an easement of a right of way transmits
no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of
the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis.
As correctly observed by the CA, considering
the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on
the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal
use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent
of the land.
Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used
to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample.
In eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property
is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is that sum of money
which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefore.[21] (Emphasis
ours; citations omitted.)
We find it
significant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability of Manubay[22]
in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the application of Gutierrez[23]
which the CA had cited as authority for the doctrine that eminent domain
may also be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession.[24]
NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez[25]
as irrelevant on the ground that the expropriation proceedings were
instituted in January 1965, when the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with
the insertion of Section 3-A(b) in 1976.[26]
To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a fixed formula in the computation of
just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right-of-way.
Heavily relying on Section 3-A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR argues:
Absent any pronouncement regarding the effect
of Section 3-A (b) of R.A. 6395, as amended, on the computation of just
compensation to be paid to landowners affected by the erection of transmission
lines, NPC v. Gutierrez, supra, should not be deemed controlling in the
case at bar.[27]
We do not
find NAPOCORs position persuasive.
The
application of Gutierrez[28]
to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are
comparable.[29]
The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing
privately owned land. It likewise held that the
transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as
well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez[30]
that the exercise of the power
of eminent domain necessarily includes the
imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without
loss of title or possession[31]
therefore remains doctrinal and
should be applied.[32]
NAPOCORs
protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does
on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just
compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit.
We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the
courts.[33] In National
Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,[34]
we categorically held:
Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)
The determination of just
compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion
of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government.[35]
This judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article III of
the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for
public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation
v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,[36]
we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter:
The [herein petitioner] vehemently
insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a
maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial
function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our
Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property
shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.
The same
principle further resolves NAPOCORs contention that R.A. 8974, specifically
its implementing rules, supports NAPOCORs claim that it is liable to the
respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value of their land.
We amply addressed this same contention in Purefoods[37]
where we held that:
While
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only
10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property
subject to an easement of right-of-way, said
rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court held
that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve
only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the "justness" of the decreed compensation. (Citations omitted.)
That the
respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of
transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition,
NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation now estops
the respondents from their present claim.[38]
This insinuation has no legal
basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose
cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents right to just
compensation. In Rafael C. de
Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,[39]
we ruled:
The
owner of land,
who stands by, without objection, and
sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is
completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his
apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad
company. In such case there can only
remain to the owner a right of compensation. (Goodin v. Cin. And
Whitewater Canal Co.,
One
who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its
road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it
free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His
acquiescence in the company's taking possession
and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his
resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a
waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the
company, he is not deprived of his
action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the
construction or operation of the road. (St. Julien v. Morgan etc.,
Railroad Co., 35
In sum, we
categorically hold that private land taken for the installation of transmission
lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power Corporation
v. Benjamin Ong Co,[40]
and we reiterate this ruling today:
As
earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially
provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will
only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way
easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that
when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is
liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.
(Citations omitted.)
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we DENY the
present petition for review and AFFIRM
the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as Acting Member of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 1006 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 41-49; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, and concurred in by Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan and Socorro B. Inting.
[2] Twentieth Division,
[3] Rollo,
p. 50; in Civil Case No. T-008, dated
[4] Denominated as
[5] Created pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395, also known as An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation.
[6] Per the decision of the CA, the agreements are titled and dated as follows: (a) Deed of Conveyance and Declaration of Ownership with Waiver of Claims to Improvements Damaged, dated July 3, 1995; (b) Deed of Conveyance and Declaration of Ownership with Waiver of Claims to Improvements Damaged, dated August 4, 2007; and (c) Right of Way Grant in Favor of National Power Corporation, dated December 31, 1995.
[7] Supra note 2.
[8] Rollo, p. 44.
[9] G.R. No. 155065,
[10] G.R. No. 150936,
[11] No. L-59603,
[12] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[13]
[14] Article 635 of the Civil Code reads: Art. 635. All matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title.
[15] Entitled An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of
Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects
And For Other Purposes, approved
on
[16] Supra note 10. In National Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation (G.R. No. 160725, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA 17, 31), we held: The question of just compensation for an easement of right-of-way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by NAPOCOR's transmission lines has already been answered in National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation.
[17] Supra note 10.
[18] G.R. No. 60077,
[19] Supra note 10.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Supra note 18.
[24] Rollo, p. 46.
[25] Supra note 18.
[26] The amendment was pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 938, dated
Section 4. A new section shall be inserted to be known as Section 3A of the same Act to read as follows:
Sec. 3A. In acquiring private property or private property rights through expropriation proceedings where the land or portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines, only a right-of-way easement thereon shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which such land is actually devoted will not be impaired, and where the land itself or portion thereof will be needed for the projects or works, such land or portion thereof as necessary shall be acquired.
In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to be acquired through expropriation proceedings, the same shall
(a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof, not to exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
(b) With respect to the acquired
right-of-way easement over the land or portion thereof, not to exceed ten
percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
In addition to the just compensation for easement of right-of-way, the owner of the land or owner of the improvement, as the case may be, shall be compensated for the improvements actually damaged by the construction and maintenance of the transmission lines, in an amount not exceeding the market value thereof as declared by the owner or administrator, or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower; Provided, that in cases any buildings, houses and similar structures are actually affected by the right-of-way for the transmission lines, their transfer, if feasible, shall be effected at the expense of the Corporation; Provided, further, that such market value prevailing at the time the Corporation gives notice to the landowner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, to the effect that his land or portion thereof is needed for its projects or works shall be used as basis to determine the just compensation therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
[27] Rollo, p. 30.
[28] Supra note 18.
[29] See note 18.
[30]
[31] Likewise cited in National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-Paderanga, supra note 9.
[32] Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the
[33] National Power Corporation v. Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 11, 21, citing National Power Corporation v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 170846, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 674; National Power Corporation v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 170945, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 333; Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, 30 March 2006, 485 SCRA 586; National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 481; National Power Corporation v. Chiong, 452 Phil. 649 (2003); Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 886 (2000); National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, 18 January 1991, 193 SCRA 1.
[34] G.R. No. 164964,
[35] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao,
G.R. No. 167809, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 619, citing Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603,
[36]
G.R. No. 175176,
[37] Supra note 16, at 33-34.
[38] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[39] 36
Phil. 908, 911-912 (1917).
[40]
G.R. No. 166973,