EN BANC
G.R. No. 193261 (Meynardo A. Sabili v. The Commission on
Elections and Florencio Librea)
Promulgated:
April
24, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D I S S E N T I N G O P I N
I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari[1]
assailing and seeking to set aside the Resolutions[2]
dated January 26, 2010 and August 17, 2010 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-047 (DC), which denied due course to, and canceled, the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (Sabili) for the
position of Mayor of Lipa City in the May 2010 elections on the ground of his misrepresentation
that he is a resident of Barangay
(Brgy.) Pinagtong-ulan,
During the 1995 and 1998 elections, petitioner Sabili was elected
as a member of the Provincial Board representing the 4th District of
Batangas. During the 2007 elections, he ran
for the office of Congressman of the 4th District of Batangas but
lost. During these times, he admitted that he was a resident of Brgy. Sico,
On December 5, 2009, private respondent Florencio Librea (Librea) filed
a verified Petition to Deny Due Course
and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for
Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualifications with respondent COMELEC,
which was docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). In his petition, private respondent
Librea maintained that petitioner made several material misrepresentations in
his COC where he indicated that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan for
the last two years when in fact he was, and is, a resident of Brgy. Sico, San
Juan, Batangas, and so failed to meet the one-year residence requirement under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code.[3]
In resolving the controversy, the COMELEC held in its January 26,
2010 Resolution that the evidence presented by petitioner, as respondent in SPA
No. 09-047 (DC), failed to establish an abandonment of his domicile of origin
and the adoption of Lipa City as his domicile of choice or residence for
election law purposes. Hence, petitioner was disqualified to run in the May
2010 elections for the mayoralty position in that city. The COMELEC stated:
In the case before
us, it is not denied that Respondents domicile of origin is in
In the first place,
domicile or origin is not easily lost. If
one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate by
evidence an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. These elements must concur, and absent clear
and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile
of origin continues x x x.
x x x x
The above pieces of documentary evidence, all taken together
however, fail to convince us that Respondent Sabili successfully effected a
change of domicile. In all, the evidence
adduced by Respondent Sabili plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required
to convince this Commission that an abandonment of domicile or origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. The claim of an incidental change
of residence, lacking evidence determinative of abandonment of domicile of
origin, without more, would not be sufficient to break the principle, long
followed in cases involving questions of domicile that there was clear intent
to abandon and repudiate his domicile in
To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that
place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and
permanent place of abode.
In this case, Sabilis claim of a common law relationship
with Bernadette Palomares does not establish his actual physical presence in
Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan,
On January 28, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the COMELECs January 26, 2010 Resolution, and a Supplemental Motion the
following day.
On February 2, 2010, the case was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. In the meantime, the May 10,
2010 elections were conducted and petitioner emerged as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Lipa City.[5]
He eventually took his oath and assumed office.[6]
In a Manifestation dated June 15, 2010, petitioner informed the
COMELEC En Banc of these developments
and again prayed for the setting aside of the January 26, 2010 Resolution.
In its August 17, 2010 Resolution, however, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Discussing each point petitioner raised in that motion, the
COMELEC En Banc held:
We find that the
Second Division fully appreciated the evidence presented by both parties and
correctly found Sabili disqualified for failing to comply with the one (1) year
residency requirement.
Anent Sabilis first
ground in his motion for reconsideration, We find it important to state that
Sabili admitted in Paragraph 14 of his Answer that his domicile of origin is in
Brgy. Sico,
Sabilis second and
third grounds refer to the Second Divisions supposed failure to appreciate the
evidence adduced in this case. We do not find basis for these arguments. The
evidence presented, together with the arguments of the parties, were
inextricably interrelated and were thoroughly discussed and resolved by the
Second Division in the assailed 15-page Resolution. The Second Division was correct in giving little or no weight to the
following pieces of evidence presented by Sabili: a) Affidavit of Bernadette P.
Palomares which is self-serving for being executed by the common-law wife, and
has no independent corroboration that they are residing in Lipa City since 2007
or that the property was purchased with Sabilis personal funds; b) Affidavit
of Lenila G. Suarez, the previous owners of the property in Lipa City
supposedly occupied by Sabili and his family, which merely narrates the
circumstances surrounding the sale of the property and mentions in passing that
Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the
present; c) Certification issued by Hon. Dominador B. Honrade, Barangay Captain
of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan,
With regard to Sabilis
fourth ground, We find that the Second Division made no pronouncement adding a
property requirement as a qualification of an elective official.
As to the fifth
ground, We will sustain the position of the Second Division when it ruled:
In this case,
Sabilis claim of a common law relationship with Bernadette Palomares does not
establish his actual physical presence in Bgy. Pinagtong-ulan,
Sabilis sixth and
seventh grounds deserve little merit. Nothing in the Assailed Resolution
reveals that Sabilis relationship with Palomares or the property regime
governing such relationship had direct bearing on the Second Divisions
determination of Sabilis qualification. Sabilis relationship was merely
discussed in relation to the allegations that Sabili bought a house using his
personal funds but decided to register the property only in the name of
Palomares which is quite peculiar.
Finally, on the eight ground, We
hereby declare that Sabilis residence is a matter that will affect his
qualification to run for public office in
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status
Quo Order under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nullification of the COMELECs Resolutions for supposedly having been
issued without or in excess of respondent COMELECs jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Among the
documents attached to his petition is a new Certification of Residency issued
by the Pinagtong-ulan barangay chairman
Dominador Honrade that had been sworn before a notary public.[8]
On September 7, 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order
requiring the parties to observe the status quo before the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
As pointed out by
Justice Sereno in her opinion, the following are the issues for Our Resolution:
(1)
Whether the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution
dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and
(2)
Whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.
Failure to serve advance notice of the promulgation of the
resolution does not affect the validity of the resolution
On the first issue, petitioner posits that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it failed to serve advance notice of the promulgation
of the August 17, 2010 Resolution under Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696
(Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections).[9]
Hence, so petitioner claims, his right to due process was violated. Respondents,
on the other hand, argue that Sec. 9 of COMELEC Resolution 8696 had been
suspended by COMELEC Order dated May 4, 2010 in view of the exigencies
attendant to the holding of the countrys first automated national elections.
Justice Sereno is of the opinion that petitioner erred in his
claim of having been deprived of due process, adding that the August 17, 2010
Resolution was validly promulgated. On this issue, I fully agree with my
esteemed colleague.
The suspension of Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and the
consequential lack of advance notice regarding the date of promulgation of the
COMELEC En Bancs August 17, 2010 Resolution
is in accordance with the COMELECs constitutionally granted power to make its
own rules of procedure. The suspension action, without more, did not violate
the petitioners right to due process or vitiate the validity of the COMELECs
resolution. After all, as pointed out by Justice Sereno, the advance notice of
the date of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. More than
that, the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution was sufficiently made known
to petitioner who was able to timely file the present petition to assail and
question the same Resolution. Clearly, the suspension of Sec. 6, COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 and the non-service of an advance notice to petitioner are of
no consequence to the validity of the Resolution and the findings of the
COMELEC, or to the opportunity granted to petitioner to assail the Resolution.
A certiorari writ is not available to correct errors in the appreciation
of evidence by the lower tribunal
On the second issue, however, I respectfully disagree with Justice
Sereno who maintains that the COMELEC committed errors in the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence so that the Court is compelled by it[s] bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELECs errors.[10]
Lest it be forgotten, the present recourse was filed under the
aegis of Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Time and again,
this Court has emphasized that a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is a limited remedy to correct only errors
of jurisdiction, not of judgment.[11]
Its only function is to keep a lower tribunal within its jurisdiction[12]
and not to authorize the court exercising certiorari
powers to review, reconsider, re-evaluate, and re-calibrate the evidence
previously presented before and considered by the lower tribunal. In First
Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,[13]
We reiterated this elementary precept:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and
evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value
thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation
of the evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of the evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It
is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo.
This rule holds greater force in an application for certiorari against
the COMELEC as it is the institution created by the Constitution precisely to
handle election matters and so presumed to be most competent in matters falling
within its domain.[14]
Hence, the factual findings of the COMELEC En
Banc are binding on this Court[15]
absent any showing of a grave abuse of its discretion.
Expectedly, petitioner Sabili attributes grave abuse of discretion
to respondent COMELEC to justify a review and re-evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties. However, not every claim of an existence of a grave
abuse of discretion deserves consideration; otherwise, every erroneous judgment
will be void, appellate courts will be overburdened and the administration of
justice will not survive.[16]
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
Grave abuse of discretion exists only when there is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or,
in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[17]
An unfavorable evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence presented by a party will not be inquired into
unless it is shown that the evaluation was done in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility.[18]
This, the petitioner has failed to prove in his petition for certiorari.
In fact, petitioner has not disputed or even mottled the
presumption that the COMELEC has regularly performed[19]
its duties in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.[20]
Thus, this Court must not, as it cannot, stray beyond the confines of a certiorari review and go so far as to re-examine
and re-assess the evidence of the parties and weigh anew its probative value.[21]
Nonetheless, Justice Sereno subscribes to the view that the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly unreasonable
as to turn into errors of jurisdiction.[22]
I beg to disagree. Even if We consider the present case as an exception to the
rule on the limitations of a certiorari review, the evidence presented by
petitioner does not persuade an actual change of his domicile.
Petitioner failed to establish
compliance with
all the requisites for a change of
domicile
Petitioner admits that before April 2007 he was a resident of, and
his domicile of origin was,
In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne
in mind: (1) a man must have residence or domicile somewhere; (2) a residence
once established remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can only have
one residence or domicile at a time.[26]
Clearly, therefore, there is a
presumption in favor of a continuance of an existing domicile.[27]
When the evidence presented by the contending parties are in equipoise that it
is impossible for the court to determine with certainty the real intent of the
person whose domicile is in question, the
presumption requires the Court to decide against a change of domicile and the
retention of a domicile in question.[28]
Hence, the burden of proving a change of domicile lies on the person who
claims that a change has occurred.[29]
In this case, the burden lies on the petitioner.
For the petitioner to overcome the presumption of the continuity
of his domicile of origin, he must show by clear and convincing evidence of (1)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.[30]
Thus, to establish a new domicile of
choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative
of that intention. Bodily presence in the new locality
is not the only requirement; there must be a declared and probable intent to
make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode.[31]
Indeed, the most important requirements for the establishment of a new
domicile is (1) an actual and physical presence in the new locality; and (2) a
clear and declared intent to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi) and remain in the new place of residence (animus manendi).
Intending to establish that petitioner failed to meet the
foregoing requisites, respondent Librea presented the following documentary
exhibits:
1.
Petitioner Sabilis COC filed on December 1, 2009;[32]
2.
Tax Declaration issued in 2009 covering the property in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan,
3.
Certification of Property Holdings issued on November 24, 2009
covering the properties in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City in the name of Palomares;[34]
4.
Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the
lot bought from spouses Manolito and Leonila Suarez and covered by TCT No.
T-173356;[35]
5.
Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the
lot bought from spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda Macasaet and covered by TCT No.
T-173355;[36]
6.
Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the building
on the lot covered by TCT No. TCT No. T-173356 bought from the spouses Suarez
and covered by TCT No. T-173355;[37]
7.
Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the
building on the lot covered by TCT No. TCT No. T-173355 bought from the spouses
Suarez and covered by TCT No. T-173355;[38]
8.
Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 over the
building on the lot no. 5553 bought from the spouses Suarez;[39]
9.
Certification of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009 over Block
2,
10.
Certification of No Improvement dated December 14, 2009 over Block
2, Lot 5 Brgy. Lodlod,
11.
Affidavit of petitioner Florencio Librea dated December 4, 2009;[42]
12.
Sinumpaang
Salysay Eladio de Torres dated December 4, 2009;[43]
13.
Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez dated December 28, 2009;[44]
14.
Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet dated December 28, 2009;[45]
15.
Affidavit executed by Pablo Lorzano;[46]
16.
Voter Certification on petitioner Sabili issued by COMELEC
Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.;[47]
17.
Voters Registration Record No. 07361248 of petitioner Sabili
approved on June 21, 1997;[48]
18.
1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner;
19.
Sabilis 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative;[49]
20.
Certification of No Marriage for Bernadette Palomares issued by
the National Statistics Office (NSO) on December 22, 2009;
21.
National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages stating
that as of November 28, 2009, Sabili is married to Daisy Cervas;[50]
22.
NSO Certification issued on December 22, 2009 stating that
Palomares does not appear in the National Indices of Marriages;[51]
23.
Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that Sabili
has no business therein dated December 11, 2009;[52]
24.
Printout of a Facebook
webpage of petitioners daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili stating that her
hometown is
25.
Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification
that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard
Sabili (petitioners son) do not appear on its list of graduates;[54]
26.
Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of
On the other hand, to support his position that he has abandoned
his domicile of origin and adopted
1. Affidavit
of Bernadatte Palomares;[56]
2. Birth
Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili;[57]
3. Birth
Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili;[58]
4. Affidavit
of Leonila G. Suarez;[59]
5. Certification
of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Chairman Dominador Honrade dated
October 30, 2009;[60]
6. Notarized
Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Chairman Dominador
Honrade dated August 25, 2010;[61]
7. Affidavit
executed by Jacinto Honrade Cornejo, Sr.;[62]
8. Affidavit
executed by Rosalinda Macasaet;[63]
9. Certificate
of Appreciation issued by the parish of Sto. Nio of Pinagtong-ulan;[64]
10. Designation
of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City
Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.;[65]
11. COMELEC
Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.;[66]
12. COMELEC
Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated June 6, 2009;[67]
13. Petitioners
Income Tax Return for 2007;[68]
14. Official
Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 2007;[69]
15. Petitioners
Income Tax Return for 2008;[70]
16. Official
Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 2008;[71]
17. Pinagsama-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
January 16, 2010;[72]
18. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
January 16, 2010 executed by Dominador Macuha;[73]
19. Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for
20. Sabilis
Panunumpa sa Katungkulan dated July
30, 2010.[75]
Petitioner claims that the foregoing documents are sufficient to
constitute substantial evidence of his change of domicile pursuant to this
Courts pronouncements in Mitra v.
COMELEC.[76] A
closer inquiry, however, will reveal a whale of difference between the present
case and Mitra. Consider: While there
were circumstances in Mitra that led
the majority of this Court to conclude that petitioner Mitra made incremental
transfer moves to change his domicile (by, among others, leasing a dwelling,
purchasing a lot for his permanent home, building a house thereon, and
maintaining substantial investments in the new locality in the form of an
experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse, and a cock farm), the
petitioner in this case, Sabili, failed to adduce any evidence that would
substantially prove a change of his domicile from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa
City whether by incremental acts or an
immediate deed. There lies the
difference.
As shown by the Certification of No Improvement issued by the
Indeed, petitioner heavily anchors his claimed residency in
Pinagtong-ulan,
To say the least, this claim is not only questionable but
appalling. Petitioners temerity in asserting that he had been living with Palomares
for 20 years, while he was legally
married to another, and so should be considered to have followed his
paramours residence simply goes against the norms of decency, if not the law against
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, We cannot now recognize his residency in
Even in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,[80] this
Court did not consider Mrs. Marcos to have followed the residence of former
President Marcos, her legal spouse. Why should this Court now consider Sabili
to have adopted a domicile of choice in Lipa just because his common-law
spouse has a house registered in her name located in the same city? To
consider a man to follow the residence of the woman who he cannot marry is
dangerous precedent.
If this Court is disposed to establish a rule that a man can
follow the residence of a woman, that woman must be the mans lawful wife, not
his concubine. This is corollary to the
provisions of the Family Code explicitly imposing on the husband the obligation
to establish his domicile with his wife and live with her:
Art. 68. The husband
and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband
and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.
The court may exempt
one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there
are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of
the family.
Further, even assuming that it was petitioner who negotiated the
purchase and paid for the property in Pinagtong-ulan (no deed of sale was
presented), his act of having it registered in the name of his common-law
spouse only indicates a donative intent without the necessary formalities or the
payment of taxes, not the intent to abandon
his domicile of origin and maintain a new domicile of choice.
In fact, Sabilis resounding omission to provide the COMELEC and
this Court the deeds of sale over the properties in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City
executed by the spouses Manolito and Leonila Suarez and the spouses Rodolfo and
Rosalinda Macasaet in favor of Palomares, as well as the certificates of title,
puts doubt on Sabilis allegation that there was a transfer of ownership over
the properties to Palomares in April 2007 that would have allowed her and/or
the petitioner to claim the right to reside in the properties. This doubt is aggravated
by the fact that the tax declarations over the properties show that the deeds
of sale were drawn up and notarized only in August 2008.[81]
Indeed, the claim of an actual and physical transfer on the same
month of the negotiation, April 2007, strains credulity considering that it is
admitted by Sabili that he ran for a position in the lower house of Congress in
the May 2007 elections (for which he filed a COC indicating his domicile as San
Juan, Batangas). Was there enough time to effect an actual and physical change
a month before the elections? If there was time to relocate, why were the deeds
of sale drawn up and notarized only in August 2008[82] and the tax declarations transferred in the
name of Palomares only in the same month if they had already relocated in April
2007?
All these inconsistencies easily show that when Sabili stated in
his COC that he had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, he had
deliberately committed a material misrepresentation obviously to deceive the
voting public.
It is also curious to note that even Sabilis common-law spouse,
named as the owner of the property in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, is registered as a
resident of
Parenthetically, Palomares Affidavit cannot be considered as a
declaration against her interest under the rules on evidence because the primary
requisite of Sec. 38, Rule 130[84]
is that the declarant is dead or unable to testify, and it is not alleged that
Palomares has died or is now unable to testify.
Instead, Palomares Affidavit should be taken with the metaphorical
grain of salt. The numerous falsities committed by Palomares in various
official and governmental documents negate any faith on her word and betray her
propensity to lie to favor her family so that it is not grossly unreasonable
to hold that Palomares have committed a misrepresentation in her affidavit in
order to support Sabili. This is readily apparent in the very documents
presented by Sabili as his own evidence. For instance, Palomares had previously
perjured herself as the informant in the birth certificates of her children
sired by petitioner.[85]
Palomares asserted in the birth certificate of her son that she married
petitioner on December 2, 1980 in Bulacan, Bulacan. On the other hand, she
claimed that she and petitioner were married on March 2, 1983 in
So are Sabilis statements. It should not escape this Court that
Sabili has adopted the untruthful statements of Palomares in the birth
certificates of their children as his own evidence in the proceedings before
the COMELEC and this Court. He has, therefore, clearly sanctioned the falsities
boldly stated thereon. Worse, the same predilection for the untruth can be observed
in Sabilis Voters Certification that he presented as his own evidence. While
it is not denied that he is married to Daisy Cervas Sabili, he did not dispute
the entry made on his status as single. In fact, in his Income Tax Returns
(ITRs) for 2007 and 2008 he claimed that his spouses name was Sabili
Bernadette Palomares, when the NSO certified that as of November 2009, Sabili
was still legally married to Daisy Cervas. Clearly, petitioner shows a pattern
of false machinations intended to assume a coveted electoral position.
Unfortunately for him, deceit cannot take the place of compliance with the
statutory qualifications for office.
It is also notable that petitioners children by Palomares have not
attended any of the educational institutions in
In the case of Fernandez v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[89]
this Court considered the existence of real and substantial reason to
indicate animus manendi in the
purported new domicile of choice:
In
the case at bar, there are real and
substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of
choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his
wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children
have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005.
Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any
candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently
reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that city even
prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the name of
petitioner and his wife. One of these properties is a residence in Bel-Air,
Sta. Rosa which petitioner acquired even before 2006 but which petitioner had
been leasing out. He claims that he rented out this property because prior to
2006 he had not decided to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa. This could explain
why in early 2006 petitioner had to rent a townhouse in Villa de Toledo his
Bel-Air residence was occupied by a tenant. The relatively short period of the
lease was also adequately explained by petitioner they rented a townhouse
while they were in the process of building their own house in Sta. Rosa. True
enough, petitioner and his spouse
subsequently purchased a lot also in Villa de Toledo in April 2007, about a
month before election day,
where they have constructed a home for their familys use as a residence. In all, petitioner had adequately shown that his
transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not merely for
complying with the residency requirement under election laws.[90]
Unlike in Fernandez where We sustained petitioners change of
domicile and qualification for his office, Sabili has no real and substantial
reason to establish his domicile in
Contrary to Justice Serenos Opinion, Sabilis act of filing his ITR
in Revenue District Office No. (RDO) 59 in
In the clear
absence of the most important element in the establishment of a domicileanimus manendiit is of no use to
discuss the consequence of testimonies as to his bodily presence in the
locality. As stated, all the requisites
for a valid change of domicile or residence is necessary for election law
purposes. In the absence of even just one element, the presumption is in favor
of the maintenance and continuity of the domicile of origin. Hence, in this
case, petitioner is presumed to still be a resident of
The notarized
certification of the Baranggay Chairman
of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan,
Section 44. Entries in
official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the
As is readily apparent, Section 44, Rule 130 pertains to entries
in official records. Needless to state, no such entries or records were referred
to in the certification, much less presented before the COMELEC or this Court.
Instead, the certification plainly states in a pro-forma way: This is to
certify that Meynardo A. Sabili, 53 years old is a resident of Zone 5 of
Barangay Pinagtong-ulan Lipa City since April 2007. Neither does the
certification mention any record kept by the Baranggay Secretary, or even cite
any of its entries. Clearly, Section 44, Rule 130 cannot clothe the
certification executed by the Baranggay Chairman of Pinagtong-ulan with
finality and conclusiveness. Instead, as it is not the duty of the Baranggay
Chairman, but the duty of the Baranggay Secretary, to keep an updated record
of all inhabitants of the baranggay,[92]
the certification must be dismissed as nothing but containing hearsay
statements.
In fact, even if we consider arguendo
the Baranggay Chairmans certification
stating that Sabili is a resident of his baranggay, there is no indication that
the term resident used therein carries the same meaning as the resident
used in the provision requiring residence as a qualification for candidacy,
which is equivalent to domicile that requires not just physical presence but,
again, animus manendi. At most, the certification
may only attest to the bodily presence of petitioner in his baranggay, but not the element of Sabilis
intent to remain therein which, as indicated by circumstances, is patently absent.
The certification is also negated given the conflicting testimonies of residents of the Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan
where petitioner claims to be residing.[93]
Again, the rule is in the presence of conflicting evidence on the issue of
domicile, the Court is behooved to uphold the presumption of the continuity of
the domicile of origin.[94]
Both the Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Parish of Santo
Nio and Sabilis Designation as a Member of the Advisory Body of Guardians
Brotherhood Incorporated cannot be considered to establish Sabilis domicile in
Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since, as noted by the COMELEC, the first merely mentions
material and financial support to the fiesta celebration. And there is nothing in the second document making residency in
Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan as a requisite for the designation in the Advisory Board.
Furthermore, it notable that Sabili applied for transfer of his
registration record only on June 9, 2009 and the same was approved in October
31, 2009 as proven by Sabilis voter certification. Technically, therefore,
Sabili is a registered voter of
Indeed, it is not
only that each evidence presented by petitioner fail(s) to convincingly show
that fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007,[95]
even collectively considered, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish
such failure.
As Sabilis acts belie his intent to change his domicile and be a resident
of
Sabilis subsequent election is of no consequence considering that
an invalid COC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, much less valid votes.
More importantly, while the electorates will is indeed primary, the electorate
likewise deserves a person who is unwilling to resort to a Machiavellian
circumvention of the laws and blatant falsehood just to suit his own purposes.
He is not only disqualified from a public office but more importantly does not
deserve the publics trust.
I, therefore, submit that the COMELECs Resolutions be upheld and the
instant petition for certiorari be denied.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
[1] Under Rule 64
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Both penned by
Judge Jose Emmanuel M. Castillo.
[3] Sec. 39. Qualifications.-
(a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect. (Underscoring supplied.)
[4] Rollo, pp. 59-61. Emphasis supplied.
[5] Annex P to the Petition.
[6] Rollo, p. 293, Annex Q to the
Petition.
[7] Emphasis supplied.
[8] Rollo, p. 300, Annex S to the Petition.
[9] SEC. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision
or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date
previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties
or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the
fastest means of communication.
[10] Ponencia, p. 12.
[11]
[12] Angara v. Fedman
Development Corporation, 483 Phil. 495
(2004); quoted in PCGG v. Silangan
Investors and Managers, Inc., G.R. Nos. 167055-56 & 170673, March 25,
2010, 616 SCRA 382.
[13] G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578 (emphasis supplied); quoted in Soriano v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 160772, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 394.
[14] Matalam v.
Commission on Elections, 338 Phil. 447, 470 (1997).
[15] Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331; citing Dagloc v. Commision on
Elections, 463 Phil. 263, 288 (2003); Mastura v. Commission on Elections, 349
Phil. 423, 429 (1998).
[16] San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga
Omnibus Development Corporation, G.R. No. 168088, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA
564.
[17]
[18] Rimbunan Hijau
Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, G.R. No. 152228, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 650,
661.
[19] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 2(m).
[20]
[21] Macawaig v.
Balindong, G.R. No. 159210, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 454;
citing Garcia v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 147427, February 7, 2005, 450 SCRA 535, 547.
[22] Ponencia, p. 12.
[23] Japzon v.
COMELEC, supra note 15; emphasis supplied.
[24] Limbona v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 240.
[25] Pundaodaya v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 179313, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 178, 184-185; citing Domino v.
Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798,
818 (1999).
[26]
[27] In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of
Tess Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos.
163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 303; Chesire, Private
International Law 218-219.
[28] Private International Law by Chesire, pp. 218-219.
[29] Bevilaqua v.
Bernstein, 642 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (S.D.N.Y.1986); cited in
[31] Domino v. Commission on Elections, supra note 25, at 820 (1999); emphasis supplied.
[32] Rollo, p. 431.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56] Annex 1 to petitioners Answer; id. at 102, 394.
[57] Annex 2 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 103, 395.
[58] Annex 3 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 394.
[59] Annex 4 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 104, 397.
[60] Annex 5 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 105, 398.
[61] Annex S to Sabilis Petition for Certiorari; id. at
300.
[62] Annex 6 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 399.
[63] Annex 7 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 106, 400.
[64] Annex 8 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 107, 401.
[65] Annex 9 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 108, 402.
[66] Annex 10 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 109, 403.
[67] Annex 11 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 110, 404.
[68] Annex 12 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 111, 405.
[69] Annex 12-A to Sabilis Answer; id. at 112, 407.
[70] Annex 13 to Sabilis Answer; id. at 113, 406.
[71] Annex 13-A to Sabilis Answer; id. at 114, 408.
[72] Rollo, p. 212.
[73]
[74] Annex P to Petition for Certiorari.
[75] Annex Q to Petition for Certiorari.
[76] G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
[77] Rollo, pp. 442-443.
[78]
[79] Rimbunan Hijau
Group of Companies and Niugini Lumber Merchants Pty., Ltd. v. Oriental Wood
Processing Corporation, G.R. No. 152228,
September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 650; European
Resources and Technologies, Inc. v. Ingenieuburo Birkhahn + Nolte,
Ingeniurgesellschaft mbh, G.R. No. 159586, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA 246; Communication
Materials Design, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102223, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 673.
[80] G.R. No.
119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.
[81] Rollo, pp. 444-448; Private respondents
Annex B
[82]
[83]
[84] Section
38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant,
if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against
third persons.
[85] Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[86]
[87]
[88]
[89] G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
[90] Emphasis supplied.
[91] <http://www.bir.gov.ph/directory/rdoinner.htm#66>
visited March 15, 2012.
[92] Section 394 (d)
(6), Local Government Code.
[93] Respondent Librea presented his Affidavit as well as
the Affidavits of Eladio de Torres, Violeta Fernandez, Rodrigo Macasaet and
Pablo Lorzano. Sabili on the other hand, presented the Affidavits of Leonila
Suarez, Jacinto Cornejo Sr and Rosalinda Macasaet. Notably, the witnesses of
Sabili all benefited from a business transaction with Palomares, Sabilis
common-law wife. Suarez and Macasaet sold properties to Palomares while Cornejo
was hired by her to renovate a house. Hence, it is not far-fetched to conclude
that they would be biased in favour of Sabili. Furthermore, the Pinagsama-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 16, 2010 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Dominador Macuha attributed familial relations to the witnesses of Librea and
the wife of Sabilis opponent for the mayoralty position.
[94] Bevilaqua, supra note 29.
[95] Ponencia, pp. 23-24.