Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO,
Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 187229 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: February
22, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated March 17, 2009, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision[2]
dated December 14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch
81, finding petitioner Arnel Sison guilty of the crimes of rape and violation
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8294.
On
Criminal Case No. Q-03-116710
That on or about the 16th
day of April 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, armed with firearm, kidnap and rape one [AAA] in
the following manner, to wit: said [AAA] boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure with
plate no. CSV-606, driven by the accused who was then plying his route at
Bocaue Toll Gate going to Cubao, Quezon City, and upon reaching EDSA corner New
York Street, Cubao, this City, accused suddenly poked his gun at her, kidnap
and detain her and forcibly brought her at the Town and Country, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, where accused had carnal knowledge of her by force and intimidation
against her will and without her consent.[3]
Criminal Case No.
Q-03-116711
That
on or about the 17th day of April 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) Peter Stahl .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number A414 with
five (5) ammunitions, without first having secured the necessary license/permit
issued by the proper authorities.[4]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty[5]
to both charges.
Trial thereafter ensued. During the
trial, two different versions were presented.
The evidence for the prosecution, as
aptly summarized by the RTC and adopted by the CA, are as follows:
Private complainant [AAA] was, at the time of subject incident, a
resident of x x x and was working on a
At
around P100.00 bill
that she paid. Her fare was only P30.00, so she still had a change of P70.00.
Accused made a few turns until they reached an alley, with nobody passing
through. [AAA] felt uneasy so she told the accused that she would alight, but
then she heard cocking of a gun. Accused
suddenly put his right arm over her right shoulder, drew her nearer to him,
pointed a gun at her chest with his right hand, while [he] continued driving
with his left hand. Accused kept driving
for about ten to twenty minutes until such time that they entered a drive-thru.
[AAA] saw the logo of the Town and Country Motel. She also noticed the signage
of the
After
the accused had sexual intercourse with [AAA], accused directed her to dress up
to which she complied. Before they went out of the room, accused told her not
to make any scene, otherwise, he would not hesitate to shoot her. When he
dropped her off somewhere in Cubao,
At
around
The
investigation conducted by PO2 Regundina Sosa disclosed that accuseds Permit
to Carry Firearm No. 1-B149052 has already expired on
Medico-Legal
Report No. M-1231-03, dated
Petitioner denied the accusation and claimed that what happened
between him and AAA was a consensual sex.
The RTC summarized the evidence for the defense as follows:
At around P4,000.00
and some signature clothes. [AAA] did not respond, so he just continue[d]
driving. When they reached P800.00,
but he changed his mind and instead, gave her P600.00 only and pocketed
the remaining P200.00. [AAA] did not anymore [count] the money. He summoned the bellboy, paid their bill,
went out of the room and boarded the van.
While they were waiting for the bellboy to open the garage door, he
checked his gun which he placed under the drivers seat. He even showed it to [AAA]. When the garage door was opened, they left
the hotel premises and proceeded to Cubao.
They passed by the SM Department Store but since it was already P150,000.00 for his release. The next day, his mother and
sister arrived and talked to the policemen. His mother and sister agreed to pay
the amount of P150,000.00 but when they came back, they were already
accompanied by his lawyer, Atty. Hernani Barrios, who advised them not to yield
to the demand which they did. He was
presented to the inquest fiscal and transferred to the Quezon City Jail where
he is detained up to now.
Accused further testified that he, being a
civilian agent of the MICO, Philippine Army, Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, was
carrying a caliber .45 Peter Stahl pistol (Exhibit E) with five (5) ammunitions
(Exhibits A1 to A-5). However, the policemen took his Permit to Carry Firearm,
Memorandum Receipt (MR) and Mission Order (MO) when they arrested him.
Nova Tabbu, accuseds
sister, merely corroborated his testimony that the policemen demanded the
amount of P150,000.00 for his release.
x x x x x x x x x
Erwin Ocampo, a
technical sergeant of the 46th Military Intelligence Company, Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, testified that the accused is a presidential agent for
which reason he has on file an Agent Recruitment Report, Agent Agreement,
Application for I.D. card, Oath of Loyalty, Pseudonym Agreement, Profile
Penetration Agent and Human Resource Report.
Geronimo Ebrogar
testified that he noticed the accused leaving the bus terminal at around
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-03-116710,
the Court finds accused ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Kidnapping with Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay private complainant (AAA) the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-03-116711,
the Court finds ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months, and to pay a fine of thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00).[8]
The RTC found AAA's testimony, narrating how petitioner raped her, to
be candid and straightforward, thus reflective of her honesty and credibility.
It found nothing on record that would show that AAA was actuated by ill motive
in filing the charges against petitioner. The RTC also noted that AAA even
cried when she testified in court. It did not believe petitioner's claim that
AAA was a small time prostitute, considering that she was a college graduate
who was already working at the time of the incident and the fact that she
immediately reported the rape incident to the police despite threat to her
life.
As to the charge of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the RTC found the elements of
the crime to be duly proven. AAA
testified that petitioner pointed a gun at her and because of such threat
submitted herself to his bestial desire; the gun, as well as the ammunitions, was
offered in evidence and even the accused admitted that he had a gun at the time
of the incident. It was established through the testimony of police
investigator Regundina Sosa that based on petitioner's permit to carry firearm
outside residence, the same had already expired on
Petitioner filed his
appeal with the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment and
petitioner his Reply thereto.
On
WHEREFORE, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
1.
Regarding Criminal Case No. Q-03-116710, the
Court finds accused ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of RAPE qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay private complainant the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral
damages.
2.
Anent Criminal Case No. Q-03-116711, the Court
finds accused ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of thirty (30) days to four (4)
months.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In so ruling, the CA pointed out that
the crime committed was not kidnapping with rape, but only rape qualified with
the use of a deadly weapon. Applying
jurisprudence, it said that if the offender is only to rape the victim and in
the process, the latter had to be illegally detained, only the crime of rape is
committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in rape. The CA upheld the RTC's assessment of AAA's
credibility, because of its unique position to observe the deportment of the
witness while testifying. It also found
that while the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner's license to carry
said firearm outside residence already expired at the time he was apprehended
with it, however, there was no showing that the firearm he carried on April 17,
2003 was not licensed or its license had expired, thus petitioner could only be
liable for carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence under the last
paragraph of Section 1, P.D. 1866, as amended.
Hence, this petition
for review on the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT , WHICH IS PUNCTURED WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCY,
UNCERTAINTY, UNRELIABILTY AND WHOSE TESTIMONIES WERE INHERENTLY WEAK, FLAWED
AND CONTRARY TO NORMAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR THEREBY CASTING GRAVE DOUBT ON THE
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT. IT LIKEWISE TOOK THE TESTIMONY
OF THE COMPLAINANT AS GOSPEL TRUTH SANS ANY CRITICAL SCRUTINY AND
ACCEPTED THE SAME WITH PRECIPITATE CREDULITY.
B. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT BY FAILING TO
APPRECIATE NUMEROUS VITAL EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED, WOULD OTHERWISE RESULT
IN THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
C. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FINDING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT USED A DEADLY WEAPON AGAINST COMPLAINANT IN THE PERPETUATION
OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN QUESTION.
D. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WHEN THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO MEET THE STANDARD OF
MORAL CERTAINTY.[10]
Petitioner
faults the CA for affirming his conviction on the basis of AAAs inconsistent
and incredible testimony. He argues that he and AAA had given two conflicting
testimonies and the RTC erred in giving more weight to the unsubstantiated
testimony of AAA.
Petitioners
assignment of errors hinges on AAAs credibility and the sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to convict him of the crimes charged.
In People
v. Espino, Jr.,[11] we
said:
Time and again, we have held that when the
decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective
testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great
respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the
witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush
of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or
the scant or full realization of an oath" − all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position
to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value
were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application
where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[12]
We
find no reason to disregard the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
that AAA was raped by petitioner on
In
rape cases, the essential element that the prosecution must prove is the
absence of the victims consent to the sexual congress.[14]
The gravamen of the crime of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force or
intimidation and without consent.[15] Force in rape
is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In
the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by
any hard and fast rule.[16]
Petitioners
act of holding a gun and threatening AAA with the same showed force or at least
intimidation which was sufficient for her to submit to petitioners bestial
desire for fear of her life.
Petitioner
denies having raped AAA and claims that what transpired between him and AAA was
a consensual sex. In his desire to be
acquitted of the crime of rape, petitioner insists that AAAs testimony was
replete with incredibilities and inconsistencies, thus not worthy of credence.
First, petitioner claims that
while AAA testified during her direct examination that his right arm was on her
shoulder with a gun pointed at her chest, she also testified during her
cross-examination that she was texting her officemates, thus under such a
circumstance, it would be insane for him to allow her to text her officemates
if he has plans of raping her.
We do not agree.
A reading of AAAs testimony during
her cross-examination shows that she never said that she was texting her
officemates at the time that a gun was already pointed at her. She testified that she was the last passenger
in the vehicle driven by petitioner and the latter told her that he had no
change for the 100-peso bill fare she paid him;[17] that petitioner continued driving, but when he did not stop in a store they passed
by to have the 100-peso bill changed, it was then that she texted her
officemates.[18] She decided to go down the vehicle, but it
was moving fast[19]
and, thereafter, petitioner pulled her nearer to him by putting his right hand
on her shoulder and pointed a gun at her chest.[20] Hence, the texting of officemates happened
before the gun was poked at her.
The fact that not one of AAA's
textmates was presented as witness would not detract from her credibility.
Jurisprudence has steadfastly been already repetitious that the accused may be
convicted on the sole testimony of the victim in a rape case, provided that
such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.[21]
AAA repeatedly stated that petitioner sexually abused her against her will. The
straightforward narration by AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her
categorical identification of petitioner as the malefactor, sealed the case for
the prosecution.[22]
Second, petitioner assails
AAA's vivid remembrance of the places they passed by, which shows her relaxed
condition in petitioners company.
Such contention is devoid of merit.
AAA was a 21-year-old working woman
and was not blindfolded when they were traversing the roads on the way to the
motel. Thus, she was able to read the
landmarks and logos in the places that they passed by which included the name
of the motel.
Third, petitioner contends that AAA had several
opportunities to ask for help or escape while they were in the motel, i.e.,
when petitioner was negotiating with the motel roomboy for a room with a
parking garage, and after the roomboy had left the garage and petitioner pushed
her outside of the vehicle.
We are not persuaded.
AAA testified that when petitioner slightly opened the window of the
driver's side to talk to the roomboy, only a part of petitioner's head could be
seen and since the vehicle was heavily tinted, the roomboy could not see her.[23]
Also, she could not also say a thing because the gun was poked at her.[24] And after she was pushed out of the vehicle,
she tried to escape but petitioner who was still holding the gun went out of
the vehicle and got hold of her.[25] These circumstances present no opportunity
for her to escape. Moreover, people
react differently under emotional stress.[26]
There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident, especially if the assailant is physically near. The workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.[27]
In a given situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be
frozen into silence. Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or
shout for help at the very first opportunity cannot be construed consent to the
sexual intercourse.[28]
Fourth,
petitioner avers that to strip an unwilling person of her clothes will result
in a serious struggle. However, the
medical report did not show any indication of contusion or hematoma on AAA's
legs or abdomen.
Even
assuming that AAA failed to put up a strong resistance to repel petitioner's
physical aggression, such failure does not mean that she was not raped. Petitioner had a gun which was sufficient to intimidate her and to submit to his lustful
desire. It is well settled that
physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is
exercised upon a victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to
the rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.[29]
Fifth,
petitioner points out the impossibility of AAA's account that his right arm was around her right shoulder
poking a gun at her chest while his left hand was at the wheels, because such
position would not allow him to change gear while making turns.
Such contention remained unsubstantiated and, therefore, self-serving.
As the Solicitor General correctly argued, petitioner neglected to prove such
impossibility by actual demonstration which is fatal to his cause.
Sixth, petitioner insists that he and AAA had a getting-to-know
conversation during the trip, which explained why AAA even testified that he
uttered her name during the sexual act; that she even got his cell phone number
and it was through her text message that she arranged a tip for his arrest.
Such contention fails to persuade.
Granting that they had a conversation
during the trip since AAA was seated in the front seat, such circumstance did
not establish that she agreed to the sexual act. In fact, there is no evidence to prove
petitioners claim that after the incident, AAA texted him and arranged for
them to meet and was then apprehended by the police. The prosecution
established that it was through the efforts of the police that petitioner was
apprehended. Police Officer Mario Palic testified that based on the complaint
for rape lodged by AAA in their station, he and the other police officers made
a follow-up.[30]
After which, they received an
information that the vehicle used in the rape incident was parked along Edsa,
New York, Quezon City, in front of the Baliwag Terminal.[31] Together with AAA, they proceeded to the
place where the vehicle was parked and when AAA saw petitioner standing near
the parked vehicle, she identified him as her rapist.[32]
Seventh, petitioner claims that
his failure to give AAA the amount of P4,000.00 and the things he had
promised to buy for her was the reason why AAA charged him with the crime of
rape.
Such
argument deserves scant consideration.
We find apropos what the RTC said in the issue, thus:
x x x Even in these very hard
times, the court could not believe that AAA, a college graduate of x x x
Computer College and working as a Product Support Representative with x x x would stoop so low to subject herself to the
shame and scandal of having undergone such a debasing defilement of her
chastity if the charge filed were not true. [33]
In fact, while petitioner, in his direct testimony, was portraying AAA
as a prostitute, the latter cried.[34] AAA's crying shows how she might have felt
after being raped by the petitioner and yet be accused of a woman of loose
morals. The victim's moral character in
rape is immaterial where it is shown that intimidation was used for the victim
to have sex with the accused.[35]
The truthfulness of AAAs charge for rape was
further bolstered by her conduct immediately after the rape incident. After petitioner dropped her off in Cubao,
AAA immediately went to her office and narrated her ordeal to her
officemates. Accompanied by them, she
went to the police station to report the incident and submitted herself to
medical examination.
However, as to petitioner's
conviction for illegal possession of firearms, such judgment must be set aside.
We find that he can no longer be held liable for such offense since another
crime was committed, i.e., rape.
P.D. 1866, as amended by RA 8294,
the law governing Illegal Possession of Firearms provides:
SECTION
1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments
Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. − The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and
a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or
.32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high-powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and
9 millimeter, such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser-calibered
firearms but considered powerful, such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic
and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
If homicide
or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the
violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup detat.
The same
penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by
such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons
found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or
willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use, unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence
in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
In People v. Ladjaalam,[36] we laid
down the correct interpretation of the law and ruled:
x x x A simple reading thereof
shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime,
there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this
case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of
firearms.
Moreover, penal laws
are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In
this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to
herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the
language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x
x x x The law is clear: the
accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of
the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.[37]
All told, we affirm petitioner's
conviction for the crime of rape. However, petitioner's conviction of illegal
possession of firearms is set aside.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death. The prosecution was able to sufficiently allege in the Information,
and establish during trial, that a gun was used in the commission of rape. Since no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance was established in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty
shall be imposed.[38] Thus, we affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted by the courts
below.
As to the damages awarded for the crime of qualified rape,
however, modifications are in order.
Considering that the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua, the
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity must be reduced to P50,000.00.[39] Also the award of P100,000.00 as moral
damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 based on prevailing
jurisprudence.[40] Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
should be awarded by reason of the established presence of the qualifying
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon.[41]
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid, likewise pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[42]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages. Petitioner is also ORDERED
to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Petitioner's conviction of Illegal Possession of
Firearms is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Edgardo P.
Cruz and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring;
rollo, pp. 61-78.
[2] Per
Judge Ma. Theresa L. dela Torre-Yadao; id. at 128-139.
[3] CA
rollo, p. 10.
[4]
[5] Records, p. 27.
[6] Rollo,
pp. 64-65.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] G.R. No. 176742,
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14] People
v. Baluya, G.R. No. 133005,
[15]
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] People
v. Espino, Jr., supra note 11, at 701.
[22] Id. at 702, citing People v. Macapal, Jr., G.R. No. 155335, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 387, 400.
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26] People v. Sandig,
G.R. No. 143124,
[27]
[28]
[29] People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 176265,
[30] TSN,
[31]
[32]
[33] Rollo, p. 137.
[34] TSN,
[35] People v. Baluya, G.R. No. 133005,
[36] G.R. Nos. 136149-51,
[37]
[38] Revised Penal Code, Art. 63.
[39] People of the Philippines v.
Carlo Dumadag y Romio, G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011, citing People v. Macapanas, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010, 620 SCRA 54, 76;
People v. Jumawid, G.R. No. 184756, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 808.
[40]
[41]
[42]