G.R. No. 152309.
AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information,
is a resolution of this Court dated
G.R. No. 152309. (Arokiaswamy
William Margaret Celine vs. University of the
Philippines Board of Regents, Francisco Nemenzo II, Emerlinda Roman, Maria Serena Diokno,
Consuelo Paz, Isagani Medina, Roger Posadas, Olivia Caoili, Pacifico Agabin, Carmelita Guno and Marichu Lambino).
For consideration is a motion, dated August 21, 2002, entitled
CAUSE/JUSTIFICATION WITH OMNIBUS MOTION (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
RESOLUTION DATED JULY 29, 2002 (A), MOTION TO INHIBIT THE HONORABLE JUSTICE
VICENTE MENDOZA, MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE SANCTION BY SC ETHICS COMMITTEE AGAINST
JUSTICE MENDOZA AND MOTION TO REFER THE CASE TO THE SC EN BANC), filed by petitioner
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.
Re: Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
In its
resolution, dated
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:
“1. Accept Petitioner’s cause/justification why she
should not be cited in contempt for certain statements she has made in her
letters and in previous pleadings;
“2. Inhibit the Honorable Justice Vicente Mendoza
from Further Proceedings of the Case;
“3. Refer the Matter to the SC Ethics Committee for
Appropriate Sanction against Justice Mendoza;
“4. Refer the Case to the SC En Banc for adjudication
on the merits of the case, to Reconsider the Resolution (a) dated July 29,
2002, and eventually to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
order the U.P. to release Petitioner’s doctoral diploma, and to refer the case
back to the RTC for continuation of the proceedings on damages.
“Other remedies just and equitable under the premises
are likewise prayed for.”[1]
The present
motion is thus a second motion for reconsideration. As such it should be denied
outright pursuant to Rule 52, Section 2, in relation to Rule 56, Section 4, of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “no second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.”
All the more the present motion should be denied because the arguments
set forth therein are the same ones already raised in petitioner’s first motion
for reconsideration dated
First.
Petitioner reiterates her contention that the provision for payment of
sheriff’s fee and clerk’s Commission applies only “in cases where the injunction
is issued by this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.”
Payment of sheriff’s fees and clerk’s commission, in addition to the
docket fee and the other lawful fees, is required when, as here, a party
appealing seeks an injunctive relief. Revised Circular No. 1-88 (effective July
1, 1991), par. 1 (c) of this Court is explicit on this point, and the failure
to pay the fees in question warrants the dismissal of a petition under Rule 56,
Section 5 (c) of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Subsequent payment, as
provided in par. 5 of the said circular, will not cure the defect.
Second. Petitioner failed to attach to her petition in the
Court of Appeals her petition for mandamus and the comment of U.P. which had
been filed in the RTC, Branch 104,
This Court found the petition in this case to be without merit precisely
because it was insufficient in form and substance. In any event, the
requirement to append a copy of the pleadings filed below to a petition for
review is a requirement of Rule 42, Sections 2 and 3 thereof, which provide
that noncompliance with these requirements, as to “the form and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition,” is a ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
Third.
Petitioner claims that the present case is based on a different cause of action
because “the corpus delicti has now been acknowledged
as a thesis of UP. Diliman” and “is [being used as] a resource material for the UP.
Community in the field of history”; that the Court, in avoiding this material
fact, did not comment on that portion of the RTC decision authorizing her to
sue UP. for damages such that “if [she] can be
entitled to damages, why can she not be entitled to her degree?”; that “even granting
that the factual findings in G.R. No. 134625 (that petitioner plagiarized her
thesis) was sustained in the second action of petitioner against UP., the
acknowledgment of the said thesis as a ‘thesis of UP. Diliman’ and the usage of the same
as a reference material for the UP. community,
indicates that plagiarism is the standard of U.P., and that, . . . the
respondents are merely being academic hypocrite[e]s or scholastic pretenders in
refusing to grant petitioner her due.”
The question of plagiarism was laid to rest in G.R. No. 134625 and the RTC, Branch 104 appropriately dismissed the mandamus suit
under the principle of res judicata.
As such, the issue can no longer be relitigated, not
to mention that whether, as alleged, petitioner’s thesis is used in UP. as a reference book is a question of fact which is subject
to proof. Petitioner’s references to “plagiarism {as} the
standard of UP., and that . . . the respondents are merely being academic
hypocrites or scholastic pretenders are
deplorable in the case of a candidate for a doctoral degree.
Fourth.
Petitioner also insists that the title “Dr.” should not be removed from the
caption of this case citing as reasons that the Court appears to have
acquiesced in her continued use of the title as it “was sustained in the first
resolution” {dated April 1, 2002} of this Court; that U.P. had recognized her
right to the degree because a copy of the U.P. Newsletter mailed to her added
the title “Ph.D” to her name; and that “this Court
ha{d} not stated (in the second resolution dated July 29, 2002) anything
against petitioner’s using her doctoral title.”
Petitioner
was allowed to graduate with the doctoral degree in anthropology subject to the
outcome of the plagiarism charge against her. As she was found guilty thereof,
her degree was accordingly withdrawn. Consequently, she cannot use the title
“Dr.” or the degree “Ph.D.” to her name in the pleadings she files before this
Court and in other courts or tribunals for that matter. Her use of the title or
degree cannot ripen into a right.
Indeed, so as not to give the impression that the Court had acknowledged
petitioner’s right to use such title, Joseph Bryan Hilary P. Davide, Chief Justice’s Staff Head, in a letter to
petitioner, dated
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine
1108
Ms. Celine,
“This refers to our letter of
“Our attention has been called to
the fact that the Second Division has denied on
“Considering the action of the
Second Division and the previous cases relative to your alleged doctoral
degree, we hereto withdraw the title ‘Dr.’ and the term ‘Ph.D
in our greeting in our letter of 3 August. You are warned not to use that
letter as a recognition of a right to the Ph.D.
degree. Henceforth, all your communication, if any, shall be addressed to the
Second Division of the Court.
Truly yours,
For the Chief Justice
(Sgd.) JOSEPH BRYAN HILARY P. DAVIDE”
Re: Motion to
Refer the Case to the SC En Banc
Petitioner seeks the referral of this case to the Court en banc for
resolution stating that:
“Petitioner is of the opinion that the
SC Second Division could not rule in favor of Petitioner in the second action
even if it is based on a different cause of action, because it had decided the
first case (in G.R. No. 134625) against her. If this II Division is bound by
its previous ruling in G.R. No. 134625, regardless of the subsequent turn of
events in the relations between the petitioner and the respondents, then,
Petitioner would like to request that the case be referred to the SC En Banc.
“At any rate, as per the resolutions
of the Honorable Supreme Court, it is the En Banc which can modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle laid down by a Division, to wit:
“The following are considered en banc cases
xxx
“7. Cases where a doctrine or
principle laid down by the Court en banc or division may be modified or
reversed;
xxx
(SC En Banc Resolution dated
“Hence, petitioner requests that this case be
immediately referred to the SC En Banc for adjudication on the merits, (Even
when it is referred to the En Banc, the Honorable Justice Mendoza should not
participate in this case.)”[2]
As stated in Circular No. 2-89 (effective March 1, 1989), par. 3 of this
Court, the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or
resolutions of a Division may be appealed. Cases are referred either to the
Court en banc or to the different divisions according to the nature of the case
and the questions raised therein. Petitions for review of decisions of the
Court of Appeals, like the one at bar, are referred to the Divisions. Decisions
rendered by the Court, whether en banc or through any of its divisions,
represent the decisions of the Supreme Court itself.
Re: Motion to Inhibit Justice Vicente Mendoza from
Further Proceedings and Motion to Refer the Matter to the SC Ethics Committee
for Appropriate Sanction against Justice Mendoza
Petitioner alleges that:
“In G.R. No. 134625, Justice Mendoza reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals (granting the Petition for Mandamus) even
before the U.P.’s Petition for Review was given the
course. Now, without even asking the U.P. to comment on the Petition filed by
Petitioner, he has dismissed it on untrue grounds.
“When a Motion for Reconsideration is filed against a
Decision, said motion is either denied or granted on the basis of the contents
of the same Decision. However, to deny Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
against the resolution dated April 1, 2002, Justice Mendoza has stated (in the
resolution dated July 29, 2002) some reasons other than what were laid in the
April 1 resolution.
“The Honorable Justice Mendoza has deliberately
misquoted and suppressed the facts and issues of the case, and even the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. He has also
misrepresented petitioner’s statements with regard to payment of docket fees.
“In this situation, Petitioner does not believe that
the Honorable Justice Mendoza could objectively resolve the instant pleading
hence, she seeks his immediate inhibition from the case. Earlier, Petitioner
had sought the individual resolution of her MR. dated
“Since Petitioner believes that the resolution dated
“Petitioner also requests that she be not cited in
contempt of this Court for this motion, because she is only being articulate about
the realities of life and is fighting for justice for herself.
“At this point, Petitioner would like to report to
this Honorable Supreme Court about the developments of the administrative case
she instituted at the Office of the Ombudsman against the respondents:
Petitioner’s Complaint, to which only the RTC
Decision was attached, was ‘Dismissed for Lack of Merit’ (and not for the
‘deficiencies’) by Graft Investigating Officers Vitaliano
Mendoza and Julita Calderon. So, Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation with Motion to Inhibit Vitaliano
Mendoza and Julita Calderon.
“Since Petitioner pointed out anomalies and
irregularities on the part of the aforementioned investigators, the Honorable
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
granted the inhibition of Vitaliano Mendoza and Julita Calderon, and created a 3 men {sic} panel to examine
the allegations of petitioner (Annex ‘J’).
“Petitioner hopes that the Honorable Justice Vicente
Mendoza would be inhibited from further handling her case.”[3]
The resolutions in this case are per cur/am. They do not bear any
authorship and they therefore cannot be attributed to any member. Hence, the
motion for inhibition of Justice Mendoza and the motion for appropriate
sanctions against him are both denied for lack of any factual and legal basis.
Based on her assumption that Justice Mendoza is likewise the author of the
resolutions in this case as in the prior case (G.R. No. 134625), petitioner’s
idea of a fair decision or resolution appears to be one that is rendered in her
favor. It would seem that any decision or resolution that is not in her favor
is biased. While a party litigant may file a motion for disqualification of a
member of the Court, the same must be based on justifiable grounds and not on
unfounded and malicious imputations aimed at casting aspersions on the dignity
and integrity of a member.
In her letter dated May 22, 2002, to the Chief Justice, petitioner
stated: “I am not sure if Justice Mendoza is again the ponente
(who described me as ‘fraud’, ‘dishonest’, etc. in G.R. No. 134625), the latest
resolution makes me suspect that Justice Mendoza could have denied my new
petition in order to save his face or to save the face of the U.P. or both.”
This statement is both malicious and false. The use of the words “fraud”
and “dishonest” was in the context of the decision in G.R. No. 134625, based on
the results of several investigations conducted by the various committees of
the University of the
“As the foregoing narration of facts
this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the
charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the
investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may
be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally
stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual
investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private
respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the
basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D degree.
(Emphasis supplied)[4]
“. . . If an institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates.
“Where it is shown that the
conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university
has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus
conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the
‘graduation’ of such a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the ‘graduation’ of such a student that is in
question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private
respondent’s case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the
graduation ceremonies on
There was
no specific reference to petitioner but to the general grounds upon which a
university, and not only U.P., may cancel or revoke a degree it has granted.
In an
attempt to justify her motion for the inhibition of Justice Mendoza and her
contemptuous language, petitioner further states:
“In her letters and in the MR.,
Petitioner has not said anything new. In an effort to make sure that the
‘unpleasant past happenings’ do not get repeated, Petitioner only reiterated
certain statements which she had said at least two years ago, and which have
not been protested or condemned by either the Honorable Justice Mendoza or any
other member of this Court.
“On
“On
“When Petitioner filed with this
Court the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 147888, she sought the inhibition of
Justice Mendoza and she pointed out the foregoing facts. She further stated
that ‘the Motion to Reopen was denied on an allegation that the Entry of
Judgment was made on November 16, 1999 when actually such entry was made only
on March 20, 2000 as per Notice of Entry of Judgment from the SC Judgment
Division’ [Annex ‘E’]. The resolution denying the Motion to Reopen
and the notice of entry of judgment are hereto attached as Annexes ‘F’ &
‘G’, respectively.
“Since neither Justice Mendoza nor
any other member of the SC had expressed any negative reaction against the
various allegations of Petitioner against him, she was convinced that those
allegations have entirely been admitted (as true) by this Court and by Justice
Mendoza himself.
“In writing the subject statements,
petitioner did not definitely show any ill will against Justice Mendoza, and
she only tried to protect her interest in the litigation.”[6]
Justice Mendoza, while once a member of the faculty of the
“The motions of respondent for the
reopening of the case and for the inhibition of Justice Vicente Mendoza from
the disposition of her motion for reopening are EXPUNGED from the records of
this case, the case having been decided on
The effect
was to disregard the petitioner’s motion as not filed and, hence, it was not to
be acted upon by the Court. This is why it became unnecessary to pass upon
petitioner’s allegation that Justice Mendoza was disqualified from the
consideration of the first case because he had acted on the matter as a member
of the University Council of U.P.
Re: Petitioner’s Compliance with the Resolution of
In its resolution, dated July 29, 2002 (b), the Court required
petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why she should not
be held in contempt of this Court for the contemptuous language and threat
contained in her letters of May 22, 2002 and July 11, 2002, to the Chief
Justice.
Petitioner now says:
“Petitioner has very high regard and
respect for the Honorable Supreme Court and she has been confident to get
Justice from this High Court, for which reason she filed two petitions
(docketed as G.R. No. 147888 and G.R. No. 152309) here. It is only the
Honorable Justice Vicente Mendoza in whom Petitioner has been disappointed
because of the way he has handled her case — very negative against her.
“In her letters addressed to the
Honorable Chief Justice and in her Motion for Reconsideration dated May 20,
2002, what Petitioner has said are meant for Justice Mendoza only and not for
any other member of this Court. If the other Justices have been offended by
those ‘statements’ of Petitioners, she sincerely apologizes for the same.
“If Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated
This Court finds petitioner’s explanation to be unsatisfactory. The
Court cannot tolerate petitioner’s use of vituperative language suggesting that
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the ponente in the first
case (G.R. No. 134625), was moved by considerations other than that of
upholding justice and the rule of law. As this Court ruled in In re Almacen,[8]
“undeniably the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistent with the intrinsic nature
of a Collegiate court, the individual members act not
as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.”
Indeed, what petitioner does not seem to know is that the opinions
written by members of the Court are actually decisions of the Court. Hence, we
speak of “decisions of the Court written by Mr. Justice so-and-so”
because, although written by a member of the Court, they are in actuality the
decisions of the Court. In this connection, Art. VIII, Section 13 provides that
“The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision
en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.”
Nor can petitioner justify the use of contemptuous language on the
ground that the Court did not censure her or take any action against her when
she made the same allegations in her pleadings and letters in G.R. No. 134625.
As already stated, no action was taken against her before because the offensive
language was contained in a pleading which had been expunged. Moreover, to the
Court then the petitioner’s bitterness was due to the understandable feeling of
losing a case. The Court hoped that in time petitioner would see her way clear
and accept the decision against her. Unfortunately, however, petitioner has
mistaken the Court’s tolerant attitude as an invitation to commit further abuse
against the Court and one of its members.
Nor can petitioner justify her attack on the ground that “what said are
meant for Justice Mendoza only”; that she had no intention to offend the other
justices of this Court; and that had the resolution been issued in her favor,
“she would have felt sorry for having said that Justice Mendoza been biased against her.” As already
explained, an attack on the person of any member of this Court is an attack on
the integrity of the entire Court.[9] In
at least two recent decisions,[10]
attacks on individual members of this Court and of the Court of Appeals were considered
attacks on the Courts concerned and punished as contempt of these Courts.
More recently, in In re Published Alleged
Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty.
Leonard De Vera,[11]
a member of the Bar was fined P20,000.00 for contempt
of this Court for statements made in a pending case. It was held that
maintaining the dignity of the courts and enforcing the duty of citizens to
respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice. Thus,
Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to
hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct directed against
the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect.
Finally, petitioner explains that “she is only being articulate about
the realities of life and is fighting for justice for herself.” Freedom of
speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court’s integrity and
authority and interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech
is not absolute, and it must be balanced with the requirements of equally
important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the
courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.[12]
One does not need to be a lawyer to know this. In any event, petitioner has not
in reality engaged in the free exercise of freedom of expression but in abuse
and slander, for which she should be sanctioned. A fine of P10,000.00 is appropriate for this purpose.
WHEREFORE,
the Court RESOLVED to:
(a) DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s resolution,
dated
(b) DENY the motion to refer
the case to the Court en banc for lack of merit;
(c) DENY the motion to
inhibit Justice Vicente V. Mendoza from participating in the deliberations of
the present case for lack of factual and legal basis;
(d) DENY the motion for
appropriate sanction against Justice Vicente V. Mendoza by this Court for lack
of factual and legal basis; and
(e) DENY petitioner’s use of
the title “Dr.” and “Ph.D.” in her pleadings in this case.
Petitioner Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is found GUILTY of contempt of court and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days
from receipt of this Resolution.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd)
TOMASITA M. DRIS
Clerk of Court
[1] RoIIo, p. 149.
[2]
[3]
[4] University of the
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 136-137.
[7]
[8] 31 SCRA 562, 601 (1970) citing Sarcos vs. Castillo, 26 SCRA 853 (1969).
[9] See In re Almacen, supra.
[10] MichaeI T. Vistan vs. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, AM. No. RTJ-02-1672,
[11] A.M. No, 01-12-03-SC,
[12] Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316, 354 (1988).